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CHAPTER  I 
THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
- An  historical  introduction  -
European  co-operation  as  we  know  it  today  began at  the  end  of  the  1940s.  It  has 
been  developing for  a  good  45  years.  It  had  two  overriding  aims. 
The  one  was  political.  It  was  to establish close  co-operation  as  a  means  of 
preventing another  war  between  West  European  nations.  That  aim  has  since  then 
been  a  cornerstone  of  French-German  co-operati~n:  co-operation  which  is 
remarkable  for  uniting  two  former  rivals  in  a  form  of  European  integration based 
on  "an ever closer union  among  the  peoples  of  Europe". 
The  second  aim  was  to  ensure  economic  progress,  prosperity and  welfare.  The 
background  to  this  was  the  destruction  caused  by  the  Second  World  War,  which  in 
combination  with  the  economic  depression  of  the  thirties  had  lowered  the  standard 
of  living considerably.  The  fear of  an  economic  paralysis of  Western  Europe  as  a 
consequence  of  an  inward-looking protectionist  policy  in  the  individual  countries 
formed  the  background  to  the  aim  of  "ensuring economic  and  social  progress  by 
eliminating the  barriers which  divide  Europe".  The  same  goes  for  the  aim of 
"improving  the  living and  working  conditions  of  their peoples". 
The  first  step  towards  co-operation  on  defence  was  taken  as  early  as  1948,  with 
the  creation of  the  Western  European  Union  (WEU)  comprising  the  United  Kingdom, 
France,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg.  With  the  formation  of  NATO  iu 
1949  the  WEU  led  something  of  a  shadow  existence  apart  from  a  brief period  in  the 
mid-1950s.  The  admission  of  Germany  and  Italy to  the  WEU  was  one  of  the 
preconditions  for Germany's  membershi?  of  NATO. 
In  the  economic  sphere  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community  {Paris Treaty of  1951) 
comprlsing  Germany,  France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  laid 
the  foundation  stone  for  the  form of  European  integration that  has  developed 
around  the  European  Communities  with  the  Maastricht Treaty  {Treaty  on  European 
Union)  as  the  latest  link.  As  its name  indicates,  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
was  designed  to  establish co-operation  among  the  aforesaid six nations  in  the 
coal  and  steel  sector.  It  was  no  coincidence  that  those  two  commodities  were 
chosen:  politically,  coal  and  steel  were  the  strategic,  key  commodities  which 
determined  whether  a  country  was  able  to start  rearming.  By  making  these  twc 
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commod1ties  the  subject  of  compulsory  co-operation  between  six countries  it 
became  impossible  in practice for  one  of  those  countries  to start  rearming  by 
itself.  For it was  the  fear of  German  rearmament  that  lay  behind  this  obJective. 
In  the  economic  sense  the  production  of  coal  and  steel  was  vital  to  future 
economic  growth.  The  hope  was  that  co-operation  on  these  two  economically 
crucial  commodities  would  create higher economic  growth  in  the  Western  European 
area. 
The  peace  settlement  after the  First  World  War  had  precisely  shown  that  to  impose 
a  kind  of  diktat  on  the  defeated countries  entailed considerable  risks  of  an 
unstable  economic  and  political  development.  The  lesson  drawn  from  this  was  that 
relations  between  the  European  countries after the  Second  World  War  must  be  based 
on  agreements  and  mutual  understanding. 
There  was  thus  a  clear recognition by  the political  leaders  in  Europe  at  that 
time  that  stable  European  co-operation must  be  built  on  the  premise  that  by 
virtue of  its size  and  economic  strength,  Germany  would  be  Europe's  economic 
heavyweight.  Any  form  of  European  co-operation which  did  not  take  that  fact  into 
account  would  inev1tably suffer  from  a  lack of stability and  balance.  It  would 
carry  the  germ of  economic  conflict  between  Germany  and  its neighbours,  which  it 
was  to  be  feared  would  grow  in  t1me  into  a  political  and  possibly also  a  military 
confl1ct. 
The  key  to  turning  these experiences  to  account  for  European  co-operation  lay  in 
introducing  the  concept  of  supranational1ty  into  that  co-operation.  This  meant 
placing part of  the  participating countries'  powers  of  self-determination  in  the 
coal  and  steel sector in the  hands  of  an  international  organization.  That 
organ1zation  was  independent  of  the  national  authorities.  It  had  the  power  to 
take  decisions  which  directly  affected  citizens  and  businesses  in  the  member 
countries.  No  distinction was  made  between  small  and  large member  countries. 
All  gave  up  their powers  of  self-determination  in  the  same  way,  according  to  the 
same  rules  and  to  the  same  degree.  This  was  in  fact  nothing  new  for  the  small 
member  countries,  which  were  used  to  arrang1ng their policies  according  to 
decis1ons  taken  in  the  large  European  countries.  but  for  the  large  countries  it 
was  a  new  thing  to  have  to  align oneself  on  and  take  account  of  other countries. 
The  next  step  in  the  European  integration process  was  the  proposal  on  the 
so-called  European  army  (The  European  Defence  Community}.  The  Treaty  on  this 
subject  was  entered  into  and  signed  in  1952  by  the  same  six countries  which  had 
jo1ned  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community.  The  Treaty  was  not  approved  by 
France. 
On  25  March  1957  the  six original  members  of  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community  signed 
the  Treaties on  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  and  the  European  Atomic 
Energy  Community  (EURATOM)  1n  Rome.  The  most  important  is  the  EEC  Treaty,  known 
as  the Treaty of  Rome.  It  was  a  development  and  extension  of  the  Coal  and  Steel 
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Community.  The  fundamental  principles of  that  Treaty  were  extended  to  the  bulk 
of  the  economic  and  commercial  activities of  the  member  countries.  The  Treat/ of 
Rome,  like  the Treaty of  Paris,  is  based  on  the  principle of supranationality. 
The  member  countries  place part  of  their powers  of self-determination in  the 
hands  of  an  international organization.  The  institutions of  that organization 
take  decisions  in  the  sectors  concerned.  Those  decisions  can directly affect 
citizens  and  businesses. 
The  member  countries  pool  their rights  to  take  decisions  in  a  number  of  specified 
areas  in order to  exercise their right  of decision,  not  in  isolation  and  alone, 
but  jointly.  It  is clear from  this  that  the  supranational  principle  in the 
economic  sphere  serves  to guard  against  a  policy  on  the part  of  one  or more 
countries  which  would  have  harmful  effects on  the  other participating members. 
For  such  a  policy  can  be  carried out  only if the State  concerned  has  the  right  to 
take  decisions  alone  and  independently of  international obligations.  Where 
decisions  are  taken  jointly it is in the  nature  of things  that  measures  which 
shift  economic  and  commercial  burdens  on  to other countries  cannot  be  taken  by  a 
single  country. 
The  precondition  for  effect1ve  implementation of  the principle of 
supranationality in practice was  a  set  of  fixed  and  familiar  rules  on  the 
dec1s1on-making  procedure.  The  Treaty of  Rome  therefore  lays down  who  has  the 
right  to  submit  proposals,  who  must  be  consulted  before decisions  are  taken,  how 
decisions  are  taken,  to  whom  they  apply,  and  who  is  to  rule  on  cases  of  doubt  ~s 
to  the  1nterpretation of  decisions  that  have  been  adopted.  The  Treaty of  Rome  is 
therefore  based  on  the  same  principles  as  a  national  community  founded  on  the 
rule  of  law.  There  is  internationally binding  co-operation,  where  the decisions 
taken  are  legally  binding on  the  member  countries  and  in certain  cases  on 
c1tizens  and  businesses  in  the member  countries.  The  dec1sions  are  subject  to 
supervision  by  a  court  (the  EC  Court  of  Justice). 
The  Treaty cf  Rome  contains  the  fundamental  principle  that  there  must  be  no 
discrimlnation  in  economic  and  commercial  terms  on  the  basis  of  nationality. 
This  constitutes  a  practical application of  the  higher principle  of  avoiding 
economic  and  commercial  decisions  damaging  to  other participating countries. 
On  January  1973  the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark  and  Ireland  jointed the  EC. 
On  January  1981  Greece  jointed the  co-operation process. 
On  January  1986  Spain  and  Portugal  joined the  co-operation process. 
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The  Spanish and  Portuguese  accession  took  place  after the  EC  had  completed 
negotiatlons  on  the  European  Single  Act  in  late  1985/early  1986.  That  Treaty 
constituted an  extension of  the  Treaty of  Rome,  focusing  on  three  points: 
First,  the  enshrining  in  the  Treaty of  the  objective of  the  internal  market 
combined  with  the  change  from  unanimous  to  qualified majority voting  on  the 
central Treaty provision on  harmonization  of  legislation concerning  the 
establishment  and  functioning  of  the  internal  market. 
Secondly,  the  inclusion  in  the Treaty of general  provisions  concerning  a  number 
of  areas  of co-operation in  which  legal  acts  had  previously  been based  on  other 
articles,  in particular Art1cle  235.  Provisions  were  thus  1nserted on  economic 
and  social  cohesion  (reducing  inequalities,  notably economic,  between  the  regions 
of  the Community),  research  and  technology,  environmental  protection  and 
protection of  the  working environment. 
Thirdly,  the  translation  into  Treaty  form  of  co-operation  on  foreign  policy, 
which  up  until  then  had  been  based  on  a  series of  reports.  The  introduct1on  to 
the Treaty prov1s1ons  on  fore1gn  policy states  that  the  members  of  the  European 
Communit1es  shall  endeavour  jointly to  formulate  and  implement  a  European  foreign 
policy.  It  also states  that  such  a  European  foreign  policy  may  also  encompass 
political  and  economic  aspects  of security policy.  This  section of  the  Single 
European  Act  also  refers  to  both  the  WEU  and  NATO. 
No  crucial  changes  to  the  structure  and  respective  powers  of  the  institutions 
were  introduced.  To  give  the  European  Parliament  a  better opportunity  to present 
its views  and  influence  the  way  proposals  were  dealt  with  in the  EC,  a 
co-operation procedure  was  introduced.  The  main  feature  of  this was  the  European 
Parliament's  right  to  express  its views  twice,  before  the  Counc1l  adopted  a  final 
decision. 
EC  co-operation has  a  dynamic  structure.  On  the  one  hand  the Treaties  are 
designed  as  framework  treat1es,  in  which  the  concrete elaboration of  future 
responses  to  future  problems  takes  place  in  the  1nstitutions on  the  basis  of  the 
objectives  and  principles  laid down  in  the Treaties.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Treaty  basis  1s  changed  where  there  is  good  reason  for  this.  Apart  from  the 
changes  already ment1oned  1t  might  be  worth  noting  that  the  Treaty  rules  on  the 
EC's  budget  have  been  amended  on  a  number  of  occasions.  most  recently  in  1977, 
direct  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  were  1ntroduced  1n  1979,  and 
Greenland's  status  was  changed  in  1985  from  that  of full  member  to  that  of 
overseas  country  or territory  (OCT). 
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CHAPTER  II 
THE  EUROPEAN  UNION 
- An  examination of  the  Maastricht  Treaty 
The  Maastricht  Treaty  continues  the  process  of  European  integration which  bega~ 
in  the  late  1940s.  It nevertheless  in  many  respects  embodies  new  ideas  co~pared 
with  the  earlier Treaties.  For  the  first  time,  the  EC  Member  States  hav£ 
prepared  a  Treaty  which  covers  all  their areas  of  co-operation. 
The  amendments  to  the  Treaty of  Rome  and  the  section on  Economic  and  Monetary 
Union  are  based  on  the  same  principle  as  the Treaty of  Rome  (the principle  of 
supranatio~ality). 
In  contrast,  the Titles of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  on  a  common  foreign  and  security 
pol1cy  and  on  justice  and  home  affa1rs  are  intergovernmental  in nature.  This 
means  that  the  principle of  supranationality does  not  apply  to  them.  What  is 
more,  decisions  in  these  areas  will  not  be  taken  under  the  Treaty of  Rome's 
decision-making  procedures.  However,  as  far  as  the Title  on  justice and  home 
affairs  is  concerned,  provision  is  made  for  transferring areas  of  co-operation 
from  intergovernmental  co-operation  to  co-operation governed  by  the  principles of 
the Treaty  of  Rome.  Unanimity  in  the  Council  is necessary  for  such  a  transfer, 
which  must  then  be  endorsed  where  appropriate,  by  Member  States  in accordance 
with  their respective  constitutional  requirements,  which  in Denmark's  case  means 
in  accordance  with  the Constitutional  Act. 
Another  innovation  is that  the  Maastr~cht Treaty  contains  only  a  limited  number 
of  provisions  which  take effect  for  the  Member  States  immediately it has  entered 
into  force.  The  Treaty  can  be  regarded  as  being  based  on  three elements. 
Firstly,  there  are  a  number  of  principles  contained  in  the  new  Treaty  which  were 
either ab2ent  from  or only partially present  in  the Treaty  of  Rome. 
Secondly,  there  are  decisions  which  come  into  force  immediately. 
Thirdly,  :here are  general  decisions  which  come  into force  at  a  later point  in 
time.  as  a  rule after they  have  been  adopted  unanimously. 
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1.  PRINCIPLES 
In  what  follows,  a  principle means  a  legal  precept  which  is  part  of  Community  law 
and  is  applied  by  the  Court  of  Justice.  Such  legal  precepts  must  be  respected  by 
the  institutions  which  promulgate  legislation.  Otherwise  the  Court  of  Justice 
will  be  abl~ to  declare  the  legislation null  and  void. 
Community  law  is governed  by  the  general  principle  that  the  institutions  can  act 
only  within  the  l1mits  laid  down  by  the  Treaty.  If institutions  exceed  those 
limits,  it is  the  duty  of  the Court  of Justice  to  declare  the  adopted  acts  null 
and  void.  This  can  only  happen  if the  question  of  the validity of  the  acts  is 
actually  put  to  the  Court  in  a  specific  legal  case. 
Set  out  below  is  a  short  examination  of  the  main  principles  in  the  Maastricht 
Treaty  which are either new  or have  been  strengthened. 
Principle of subsidiarity (principle of "closeness") 
The  principle of  subsid1arity or "closeness"  is  expressed  most  clearly  in  the 
section  of  the Maastricht  Treaty  which  amends  the  Treaty of  Rome.  The  wording  is 
as  follows: 
"In  areas  which  do  not  fall  within  its exclusive  competence,  the  Community 
shall  take  action,  in accordance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  only 
if·and insofar  as  the objectives  of  the  proposed  action  cannot  be 
sufficiently achieved  by  the  Member  States  and  can  therefore,  by  reason  of 
scale or effects of  the  proposed  action,  be  better achieved  by  the 
Community." 
"Any  action  by  the  Community  shall  not  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  to 
achieve  the  objectives  of this Treaty." 
Th1s  pr1nc1ple  applies  to  the  whole  Treaty,  since  at  the  end  of Article  B,  which 
applies  to  the Maastricht  Treaty  in its entirety,  it is  stated that: 
"The  objectives  of  the  Union  shall  be  achieved  as  provided  in  th1s 
Treaty ..... while  respecting  the  principle  of subsidiarity as  defined  in 
Article  3b  of  the Treaty establishing the  European  Community." 
The  term "principle of  closeness" is derived  from  the  first  Article  of  the 
Treaty,  which  offers  the  following  as  a  pointer for  long-term  trends  in  the 
development  of co-operation: 
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"This Treaty  marks  a  new  stage  in the  process  of creating  an  ever closer 
union  among  the  peoples  of  Europe,  in which  decisions  are  taken  as  closely 
as  possible  to  the  citizen." 
Like  the  other principles,  the  principle of "closeness" will  need  to  be  developed 
in practice.  It  is,  however,  possible  to picture what  the  new  principle will 
mean,  including  what  it is  likely  to  mean  for  the  individual  institutions  and  for 
undertakings  and  citizens in the  Community. 
The  princiDle of  "closeness" restricts  the  field of  action  of  the  Community 
institutions.  It is clear  from  the  text  that  Community  action must  be  subs1d1ary 
to  action  at  national  (or regional)  level.  Community  rules  can  be  made  only 
where  national  (or  regional}  solutions  a•e  inadequate. 
The  principle of  "closeness"  imposes  a  new  duty  on  all  the  institutions, 
especially  those  involved  in the  legislative process.  This  means  that  ttose 
institutions  and  every  member  of  them  (Ministers,  Members  of  the  Commission, 
Members  of the  Parliament,  Members  of the  ComMittee  of  the  Regions  and  Members  of 
the  Economic  and  Social  Committee)  will  in  a11  cases  be  duty  bound  to  consider 
whether there  is  a  need  for  a  Community  act  to achieve  the  desired goal. 
It will  need  to  be  assessed whether  a  Community  provision is "better"  than  a 
national  regulation for  a  given purpose.  It is in fact  a  matter of  extending  the 
principle  which  was  introduced  with  the  Single  Act  of  1986  for  environmental 
matters  (Article  130r(4}  of  the  EEC  Treaty}  so  that  it will  apply  generally to 
all  the areas  of  the  Treaty.  At  the  sarne  time  as  the  principle  of "closeness" is 
extended  to  cover  the  whole  field  of appllcation of  the Treaty,  it is also 
deepened  a~d hence  its  importance  is  increased.  There  are  two  points  where  the 
principle  h3s  been  expressed  more  clearly than  in the  previous  formulation. 
The  Community  is  to  promulgate  acts  only where  the  aim  of  the  action in question 
"cannot  be  :mfficiently" achieved  at national  level,  and  can  therefore  be 
"better"  achieved  at  Community  !eve  1.  The  text  does  not  employ  wider  ranging 
expressions  such  as  the  aim  "cannot  be  achieved"  or "cannot  be  fully  achieved"  at 
national  level.  This  clarifies the  principle of  "closeness":  regulation at 
national  (or  regional)  level  is "good  enough",  even  if the  aim  is  not  fully or 
completely  achieved  in this  way. 
The  other point  is  contau.ed  in the  formula  whereby  the Community  can  act  "only 
if and  insofar as"  the  a~m cannot  be  sufficiePtly achieved  by  national  measures. 
This  means  that  it is  not  enough  to  asse,;s  whether  a  ''better" solution  can  be 
found  at  Community  le~el for  the  area or subject  in question.  It  must  also  be 
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assessed  whether,  pursuant  to  the principle of "closeness",  the  Commun1ty  act  in 
question  is  justified in its  scope  and  degree  of detail.  Thus,  the  addition  of 
"insofar as" has  made  the  principle  of  "closeness" more  precise  by  showing  that 
detail  too  needs  to  be  weighed  up  (a sort  of  check  on  proportionality). 
In  the first  instance it is the  institutions  involved  in  the  production  of 
legislation which  must  observe  the  principle  of  "closeness".  It is  the 
Commission  which  makes  proposals  for  Community  legislation.  Hence,  1n  the  first 
1nstance it is  for  the  Commission  to assess whether  a  Community  act  is "better" 
and  whether it is better to  the  required  extent  ("insofar as").  It is  then  up  to 
the Council,  as  the  institution which  actually takes  the  decision,  to  assess 
whether  a  Community  act  is  "better"  and  whether it is better to  the  required 
extent.  If the validity of  the  assessment  made  is challenged,  the  institutions 
must  be  prepared  to  defend  their chosen  course  of  action before  the  Court  of 
Just1ce,  should  a  case  be  brought  by  a  Member  State,  an  undertaking  or  a  citizen. 
The  Court  of Justice  can  come  into  play  only  as  the  last  authority.  In 
accordance  with  the  Court's  general  role  in matters  of  co-operation,  it will 
chiefly  be  that  institution which  will  rule  on  whether  the  other  inst1tutions  in 
preparing  legislation have  made  over-wide  assessments  of  what  can  "better"  be 
regulated at  Community  level. 
The  pr1nciple  of "closeness"  is  valid  in all  areas  except  those  within  the 
exclusive  competence  of  the  Community  (where  only  the  Community  1s  empowered  to 
act}.  For  example,  the  principle  is  not  valid  in  areas  where  only  the  Community 
can  conclude  agreements  with  non-Community  countries  (typically  commercial  pol1cy 
matters).  Neither can  the  principle  be  applied  to  questions  which  concern  the 
Community  itself,  for  example  the  EC  budget. 
On  the other hand,  the  principle  does  apply  in all areas  where  it makes  sense  to 
decide whether  national  regulation  is better and  where  implementat1on  is  to  be 
achieved  through  national  rules.  The  principle will  thus  be  applied  in  the vast 
majority  of  areas:  agriculture,  fisheries,  economic  pol1cy,  industrial  policy, 
industrial  relations,  environmental  policy,  education  and  training,  health  and 
culture,  research  and  development,  etc.  The  principle will  also  hold  good  for 
co-operation  in the  fields  of  foreign  and  security policy  and  justice  and  home 
affairs. 
The  principle of "closeness"  also  has  a  role  to  play  in  co-operation  in 
industrial relations  since  a  Member  State may  choose  to  entrust  management  and 
labour Wlth  the  implementation of  EC  Direct1ves  at national  level. 
Precisely  because  the  institutions may  act  only within  the  lim1ts  set  by  the 
Treaty,  they  are  duty  bound  to give  reasons  for  their actions,  and  this  also 
applies  to  their application  of  the  principle of "closeness". 
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The  responsibility for  the  asse~sment lies with  the  Community  institutions 
producing  the  legislation.  The  question of the  correct  application  of  the 
principle  can  be  raised  in  any  forum  appropriate  to  the matter  in hand:  the 
Commission,  the  Council,  the  Parliament,  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  or  the 
Committee  of the  Regions.  If  a  particular matter  leads  to  a  case  before  the 
Court  of  Justice,  the  Member  States,  among  others,  are  entitled  to  make 
submissions. 
Prin~iple of the rule of  law 
The  principle of  the  rule of  law  is  expressed  in the  EEC  Treaty  in  the  clause 
"Each  inst1tution shall  act  within the  limits  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  it bJ 
this Treaty".  This  clause  is  retained  in the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
The  principle of  the  rule  of  law  is  repeated  in  the  first  paragraph  of  the 
provision  on  the principle  of  "closeness".  There  are  two  innovations.  Firstly, 
it is  the  Community  as  a  whole  and not  just its institutions which  must  respect 
this  principle.  Secondly,  the  Community  must  keep  to  the  powers  conferred  upon 
it by  the Treaty  and  to  the  objectives  assigned  to it therein.  The  innovations 
are useful  in  defining the  principle more  closely. 
The  principle of  the  rule of  law  has  two  aspects.  The  first  is  that  the 
institutions  may  only  take  decisions  where  there  is  a  definite  legal  basis  for 
them  in  the  Treaty.  The  second  is  that  they  may  not  take  decisions  which  are  at 
var1ance  with  the  Treaty. 
The  first  aspect  of  the  principle of  the  rule  of  law  means  that  the  Community's 
powers  are  limited.  It  is  able  to  take  legally binding decisions  only where 
there  is  a  Treaty  provision allowing it to  do  so. 
The  second  aspect  of  the principle means  that  legislation may  not  be  at  variance 
with  the  Treaty  - including the material  and  formal  limits  which  are  laid  down  in 
particular chapters  - or with  the  general  principles of  law  laid  down  in  the 
Treaty  or  aeveloped  in the  case  law  of  the  Court  of Justice. 
Principle of proportionality 
The  principle of proportionality is  a  legal  principle  which  the  Court  of  Justice 
has  interpreted in  terms  of  Community  law.  In  the  Maastricht Treaty this 
principle  is enshrined  in  the  last  paragraph  of  the  provision dealing with  t~e 
principle cf  "closeness":  "Any  action  by  the  Community  shall  not  go  beyond  wnat 
is  necessary  to achieve  the  objectives  of this Treaty." 
The  principle has  two  aspects.  The  first  is  that  the  least  intrusive of  the 
available solutions  must  be  chosen,  for  example  a  Directive is  to  be  preferred to 
a  Regulation.  The  second  is that  there  must  be  a  reasonable  proportion  between 
aims  and  means,  which  is to be  taken as  meaning  that  the  obligations arising for 
citizens  out  of  a  legislative act  must  not  exceed  what  is strictly necessari for 
achieving  the act's objectives. 
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Principle of consideration for the environment 
The  Single  European  Act  introduced  a  separate Title on  the  environment  into  the 
EEC  Treaty.  Pursuant  to  the  introductory provision of  that Title,  action  by  the 
Community  relating to  the  environment  has  the  following  objectives "to preserve, 
protect  and  improve  the  quality of  the  environment;  to  contribute  towards 
protecting human  health;  and  to ensure  a  prudent  and  rational utilization of 
natural  resources." 
Under  the  Single  Act,  the  three basic proVlSlons  for  Community  action  in 
environmental  matters  cover  the principle of  preventive  action,  the  principle 
that  environmental  damage  should  as  a  priority  be  rectified at  source,  and  the 
principle  that  the polluter should  pay. 
The  Maastricht Treaty  reinforces  the earlier Title on  the  environment 
(see  below),  and  also  introduces  the  general  principle  of  consideration for  the 
environment  w1th  the  same  legal  weight  as  the  other principles. 
The  principle of  consideration for  the  environment  finds  1ts  first  concrete 
expression  in the Articles  laying  down  objectives  in the  amendments  to  the  Treaty 
of  Rome,  where  it  is  one  of  the  considerations  which  are  to  apply  generally  to 
all  co-operation  in  the  Community.  Furthermore,  the  passage  on  the  environment 
Includes  an unconditional  rule  that  environmental  protection  requirements  must 
play  an  integral part  in  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  Community  policies 
in  areas  other than  environmental  protection.  This  means  that  when  Community 
Institutions discuss  proposed  legislation they  must  decide  whether it will  have 
environmental  consequences  and,  if so,  they  must  take  these  consequences  into 
account  when  adopting  the  legislation.  Thus,  the  rules  in  the Single  Act  are 
reinforced  by  the  fact  that  environmental  protection  requirements  are  now  an 
important  part  of Community  policy in other areas. 
Principle of cohesion 
The  Single  Act  introduced  a  title on  economic  and  social  cohesion  into  the 
EEC  Treaty.  The  aim  was  to  reduce  "dlsparities  between  the various  regions  and 
the  backwardness  of  the  least-favoured  regions".  This  was  to  be  achieved  by 
rationalizing the existing structural  funds  and  increasing  their efficiency. 
The  Maastricht  Treaty strengthens  the  previous title on  cohesion.  It  also 
introduces  a  general  principle of  cohesion or solidarity on  a  par with  the  other 
principles.  This  IS  achieved  by  stating in  the  provisions  laying  down  objectives 
in  the  amendments  to  the Treaty  of  Rome  that  a  harmonious  and  balanced 
development  of economic  activities  throughout  the  Community  and  economic  and 
social  cohesion  and  solidarity among  Member  States  are  among  the  considerations 
which  apply to all co-operation  in  the  Community. 
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Principle of respect for fundamental  rights 
"Fundamental  rights"  is  a  generic  term  for the  basic rights  of citizens  in  the 
Member  States which  arise  from  Member  States'  Constitutions,  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  similar conventions. 
In  its case  law,  the  Court  of  Justice  has  established  that  fundamental  rights  are 
a  part  of Community  law.  When,  therefore,  the  Court  of Justice  has  to  assess 
whether  a  specific Community  act  contravenes  Community  law,  it must  consider 
whether  the act  is prejudicial  to rights  laid  down,  for example,  in  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  or  in the  constitutions of  the  Member  States. 
Should  tha~ be  the  case,  the  Court  of Justice will  declare  the  act  in question 
null  and  void. 
This  principle established  by  the Court  of Justice is  now  incorporated  in  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  by  means  of  the  clause  which  reads:  "The  union shall  respect 
fundamental  rights,  as  guaranteed  by  the  European  Convention  for  the  protection 
of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  signed  in  Rome  on  4  November  1950  and  as 
they  result  from  the  constitutional  traditions  common  to  the  Member  States,  as 
general  principles  of  Community  law." 
There  is also  the  general  affirmation  that  "The  Union  shall  respect  the  national 
1dent1ties  of  its Member  States  (and  their)  systems of government". 
2.  RULES  WHICH  TAKE  EFFECT  IMMEDIATELY  THE  TREATY  HAS  ENTERED  INTO  FORCE 
The  new  provisions  taking effect  immediately the Treaty  has  entered  into  force 
fall  into  three  main  groups: 
2.1.  EXISTING  AREAS  OF  CO-OPERATION  (1st  PILLAR) 
In  a  number  of  areas  of  co-operation already expressly mentioned  in  the  Treaty 
the  text  has  been  reinforced  and/or  elaborated  on.  One  example  of  this  is  the 
increased  opportunity  for  taking decisions  by  a  qualified majority  instead of 
unanimously. 
(1)  During  the  Maastricht  Treaty negotiations  Denmark  took  a  particular interest 
in  the Title  on  environmental  policy  (see  the  Danish  Parliament's  resolutio~s of 
29  May  1991  and  5  December  1991). 
Environmental  concerns  are  now  covered  by  Article  2  of  the Treaty where  there  is 
reference  to  sustainable  and  non-inflationary  growth  respecting  the  environment. 
The  Community's  environmental  pol1cy  ¥•!il  aim  at  a  high  level  of environmental 
protection  taking  into  account  the diversity of  situations  in  the various  regions 
of  the  Community.  It will  be  based  on  the  precautionary principle  and  on  the 
principles  that  preventive  action should  be  taken,  that  environmental  damage 
should  as  a  priority be  rectified at  source  and  that  the polluter should 
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pay.  Environmental  protection  requirements  must  be  integrated  into  the 
defin1t1on  and  implementat1on  of  Community  activities  1n  other areas.  It  1s  also 
stated that  any  measure  taken  in  response  to  these  requirements  must  1nclude, 
where  appropriate,  a  safeguard  clause.  This  will  allow  Member  States  to  take 
provisional  measures,  for  non-economic  environmental  reasons,  subject  to  an 
~nspection procedure  at  Commun1ty  level. 
As  regards  the  adoption  of  the  legislation  in question,  qualified majority  voting 
1s  introduced  as  the  general  rule.  There  are  three  exceptions  to thls,  where 
unanimity  is  required.  Firstly,  provisions primarily of  a  fiscal  nature; 
secondly,  measures  significantly concerning  town  and  country  planning,  land  use 
(except  for  waste  management  and  measures  of  a  general  nature),  and  management  of 
water  resources;  thirdly,  measures  significantly affecting  a  Member  State's 
choice between  different  energy  sources  and  the  general  structure  of  its energy 
supply.  In  the  case  of  these  exceptions,  the Council  may  unanimously  define 
those  matters  on  which  decisions  are  to  be  taken  by  a  qualified majority. 
The  improved  opportunities  for  a  more  effective environmental  policy at  Community 
level  are  seen  in: 
- the  international  dimension  ("promoting  measures  at  international  level  to  deal 
with regional  or worldwide  env1ronmental  problems"),  which  appears  as  an 
objective  of  Commun1ty  environmental  policy along  with  the  three  objectives 
mentioned  above; 
- the  establ1shment  of guidelines  for  Community  environmental  policy:  the 
principle  of  a  high  level  of environmental  protection,  the  taking  into  account 
of  regional  differences,  and  the  precautionary  principle.  The  last  of  these 
can  be  paraphrased  as  meaning  that  the  environment  should  be  g1ven  the  benefit 
of  any  reasonable  doubt; 
- the  fact  that  harmon1zation  measures  taken  in  response  to  environmental 
protect1on  requ1rements  must  include,  where  appropriate,  a  safeguard  clause 
allowing Member  States provisionally  to  take  more  far-reachlng national 
measures  concerning  the  environment;  and 
- the  fact  that  the  general  rule  of  unanimity  and  consultation of  the  European 
Parl1ament  is  replaced  by  qualified majority  voting  and  the  co-operat1on 
procedure  w1th  the  European  Parl1ament.  In  the  case  of  the  spec1fic  except1ons 
to  this  rule,  the  Council  is able  to  decide  at  a  later date  that  decisions 
shall  be  taken  by  a  qualified majority. 
(2)  The  Community  has  always  had  provisions,  based  on  the  Treaty  of 
guarantee social  security for  workers  from  one  Member  State working 
Corresponding rules  were  introduced  in  1981  for  the  self-employed. 
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rules  ensure  that  the  rules  in the Treaty  regarding  the  free  movement  of  workers 
and  the  right  of  establishment  are  not  set  at  naught,  for  example  by  one  Member 
State  making  it  impossible  for  a  worker  from  another Member  State  to  draw  such 
sickness  benefits  as  are  otherwise  available to  its own  citizens. 
Beyond  these  co-ordinating rules.  which  are  aimed  at  preventing migrant  workers 
and  self-employed  persons  from  falling  between  the  various  national  social 
security schemes,  the  Treaty of  Rome  also enables  legislation to  be  enacted  on 
protection of  the  working  environment  and  equal  pay. 
However,  the  existing Treaty  does  not  make  provision for  the  Community  to 
legislate in  the  area  which  is normally  understood  as  that of  social  policy,  viz. 
old-age  pensions  and  other types  of  pension,  exceptional  cash  payments  and  other 
forms  of grant,  day-care,  home-helps,  etc. 
Under  the  present  Treaty it is  not  possible  to  take  decisions  on  uniform  social 
benefits  in  the  Member  States,  nor  is it possible  to  lower  a  particular Member 
State's standards  in  the  field  of  social  policy.  The  Maastricht Treaty does 
nothing  to  change  this. 
Under  the 7reaty of  Rome  rules  have  been  implemented  which  give  nationals of one 
Member  State  the  right  to  take  up  residence  in another Member  State,  even  if  t~ey 
do  not  inte~d to  be  gainfully  employed  there.  This  right  of  residence  is  subject 
to  certain conditions.  One  of  these  is  that  the  persons  concerned  must  have 
means  of  subsistence,  so  that  their residence  in another  Member  State is  not  a 
burden  on  that State's social  services.  The  Maastricht Treaty  does  not  contain 
any  provisions  which  infringe  or alter these  existing rules.  Where  a  national  of 
one  Member  State  who  is entitled to  social  benefits  takes  up  residence  in another 
Member  State,  the benefits are  financed  by  the  country  of origin and  not  by  the 
country  of  residence. 
The  Community's  social  dimension  is not  concerned  with social  policy  - as  tlle 
choice  of  words  might  lead  one  to  think.  Rather it is  concerned  with  the 
extension  and  reinforcement  of  a  series of  measures  which  are  aimed  at  improving 
conditions  on  the  labour market  and  at  related matters. 
The  Maastricht  Treaty  does  not  change  the  situation described  above,  but  does 
contain  the  new  principle  of  laying down  minimum  rules  which  are  adopted  by  the 
Council  by  a  qualified majority.  The  areas  involved are: 
- improvement  in  particular of  the  working  environment  to protect  workers'  health 
and  safety; 
- working  conditions; 
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- the  Information  and  consultation of workers; 
- equality between  men  and  women  with  regard  to  labour market  opportunities  and 
treatment  at  work; 
- the  integration of  persons  excluded  from  the  labour  market. 
In  several  other areas  the  unanimity  rule  is maintained.  These  are: 
- social  security  and  social  protection of  workers; 
- protection of  workers  where  their  employment  contract is  terminated; 
- representation  and  collective defence  of  the  interests of workers  and 
employers,  including co-determination; 
- conditions of  employment  for  third-country  nationals  legally  residing  in 
Community  territory; 
financial  contributions  for  promotion  of  employment  and  job-creation,  without 
prejudice  to  the  provisions  relating to  the  Social  Fund. 
It  1s  expressly stated  in  the Treaty provision  in  question  on  the  social 
dimension  that  It  does  not  apply  to  pay,  the  right  of  association,  the  right  to 
strike or the  right  to  impose  lock-outs. 
It  is  also stated  - in  application of  the princ1ple of "closeness"  - that  a 
Member  State may  entrust  management  and  labour with  the  implementation  of 
Directives  adopted  by  the  Community  in  the  areas  in question.  However.  the 
Member  State  IS  responsible  for  ensuring that  the  legal  position is  fully  in 
accordance  with  the  Directive. 
The  dialogue  between  management  and  labour  is also  a  new  element  introduced  by 
the  Maastricht  Treaty.  The  principle  involved  here  is that  the  Community  should 
not  enact  legislation  in  areas  where  management  and  labour  themselves  are better 
able  to  negotiate  agreements  at  Community  level. 
The  United  Kingdom  did  not  wish  to  be  involved  in  the  strengthening  of 
co-operation  in  the  social  sphere.  This  problem  was  resolved  in  the  Maastricht 
Treaty  by  means  of  a  special  Protocol  between  all  twelve  Member  States 
authorizing the  Eleven  (all  except  the  United  Kingdom)  to  use  the  Community's 
institutions  for  implementing  the  new  co-operation  ideas.  The  United  Kingdom  has 
therefore  accepted  that  the  other Member  States may  use  the  Community's 
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dec1sion-making  rules  and  institutions without  United  Kingdom  participation  in 
the  relevant  areas.  In  return,  the  other eleven Member  States  have  accepted  that 
acts  adopted  under  these  new  rules will not  be  applicable  to  the  United  Kingdcm. 
(3)  The  Treaty of  Rome  already  included  the  aim  of  evening out  the  differences  in 
living standards  between  the  Community's  most  and  least prosperous  regions;  in 
the original  Community  of Six this  in practice only  applied  to  Southern  Italy. 
After  the  e~largement of  the  Community  to  include  Ireland  (1973),  Greece  (1981), 
Spain  (1986)  and  Portugal  (1986)  this  principle  became  more  important  for 
Community  cohesion.  The  fact  that  the original  Community  was  based  on  the  ~ommon 
agricultural  policy  and  the  customs  union  for  industrial  goods  meant  that  no 
account  was  taken  of  the  significant  structural  and  partly poverty-related 
problems  wn1ch  exist  in quite  large  areas  of  Southern  Europe  and  Ireland,  and 
indeed also  in parts of  the  United  Kingdom. 
Such  considerations  led  in  the  1970s  to  the  creation of  a  Regional  Fund  to 
supplement  the  existing Social  Fund.  As  part  of  the  Community's  financial  reform 
of  1988  it was  decided  that  by  1994  there  should  be  a  doubling  of  Community 
financial  assistance  to  even  out  the  economic  d1fferences  between  the varicus 
areas  of  the  Community.  The  bulk  of  this  assistance would  be  provided  in  tPe 
framework  of  the Social  and  Regional  Funds.  Together with  the  Single  European 
Act  of  1986,  the  financial  reform  of  1988  meant  that  a  new  element  was  added  to 
the  Community's  objectives  and  this  became  known  as  economic  and  social  cohesion. 
In  this  area the  Maastricht  Treaty  represents  a  development  of  the activities 
described  above,  with  only  a  few  actual  innovations.  The  development  involves  a 
survey of  the  tasks,  objectives  and  organization of  the  existing Funds.  A 
decision  has  been  taken  to  set  up  a  cohesion  fund  by  the  end  of  1993.  This  will 
aim  to  support  environmental  protection projects  and  projects  in the  area of 
transport  infrastructure  (trans-European networks).  The  idea  of  trans-European 
networks  is to  link  the  Member  States  together as  regards  transport, 
telecommunications  and  energy. 
(4)  In addition,  there  are  minor  amendments  to  those  parts  of  the Treaty of  Rome 
dealing with competition  and  state aid,  the  common  commercial  policy  and  research 
and  technology. 
2.2.  "NEW"  AREAS  OF  CO-OPERATION  (1st  PILLAR) 
In  a  number  of  areas  of  co-operation which  previously  were  not  expressly 
mentioned  in  the Treaty,  provisions  have  been  introduced  which  are  new  in 
comparison  with  the  original Treaty of  Rome.  The  Community  had  already 
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enacted  legislation  1n  most  of  these  areas  of  co-operation  even  though  they  were 
not  covered  by  their own  separate Titles  in  the  Treaty.  This  is  also  true  of  the 
new  provis1ons  on  citizenship of  the  Union,  which  are  discussed  below. 
Behind  the  incorporat1on of  these  new  Titles  is  the  desire  to  define  what  the 
Commun1ty  is entitled to  do  and  to  specifically delimit  the  frameworks  for 
Community  action.  It is  largely  the  principle  of  "closeness"  and  its 
implementation  in practice  which  have  made  it both desirable  and  necessary  to 
include  specific  new  Titles  in  the  Treaty.  The  principle  of  "closeness" has 
found  particular expression  in  the  various  "new"  areas  of  co-operation. 
(1)  Education  and  training are  included  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  The  aim  lS  not 
to  achieve  uniformity  (harmonization}.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  a  reference  to 
respect  for  the  cultural  and  linguistic diversity  of  the  Member  States.  The 
pr1nc1ple  of  "closeness"  is  clearly exemplltled  in  the  text  in  question.  The 
Community  is  not  going  to  take  over  responsibility for  this area,  but  instead  is 
to  support  and  supplement  the  efforts  of  the  Member  States,  inter alia by 
promoting  co-operation between  educational  establishments  and  encouraging 
mobility  of  students  and  teachers.  It is  emphasized  that  Community  action  must 
fully respect  the  responsibllity of  the  Member  States  for  the  content  of  teaching 
and  the  organization of education systems. 
(2)  The  Title on  culture  follows  much  the  same  line  as  that  on  education.  The 
Community  is  to  support  Member  States'  activities.  Community  action must  respect 
reg1onal  and  national  diversity. 
(3)  The  aim  of  the Title on  health  is  that  the  Community  should  contribute 
towards  ensuring  a  high  level  of  human  health protection  by  encouraging 
co-operation  between  the  Member  States  and,  if necessary,  lending  support  to 
their action. 
{4)  Consumer  protection  likewise gains  Its  own  Title  in  the  new  Treaty  where  the 
aim  1s  to  place  the  Community  In  a  better posit1on  to  contribute  towards  a  high 
level  of quality  in  consumer  affairs. 
(5)  Ever  since  the  Treaty  of  Rome  was  signed,  the  Community  has  endeavoured  to 
construct  an  approach  towards  the  developing  countries.  This  has  resulted,  among 
other  things,  in  what  are  known  as  the  Lome  Conventions  with  various  African, 
Caribbean  and  Pacific countries.  Those  Convent1ons  included  various  kinds  of 
development  aid  and  gave  the  countries  concerned  advantages  when  selling  the1r 
products  in  Community  countries.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  has  introduced  a  specific 
Title on  development  co-operation.  That  Title will  form  the  legal  basis  for  a 
Community  development  policy  to  supplement  Member  States'  development  policies. 
It is expressly stated in the  provision setting out  the  objectives  that  the  aims 
include  the  sustainable  economic  and  social  development  of  the  developing 
countries  and  a  campaign  against  poverty.  It  is  also stipulated that  the 
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Community  is  to  contribute  towards  developing  and  consolidating democracy  and 
towards  respect  for  human  r1ghts. 
(6)  There  are  also  new  Titles  on  industrial policy  and  trans-European  networks. 
(7)  The  only  one  of  the  new  areas  which  can  be  considered  a  real  innovation,  in 
the  sense  that  the  Community  was  not  previously  involved  in the  ar.ea,  is that  of 
visa policy.  Under  the  Maastricht Treaty  the  Council  is  given  the  task  of 
selecting those  non-member  countries  whose  nationals will  require visas  when 
entering  the  Community.  Unanimity  is required  for  such  decisions  until 
1  January  1996.  After  that  date,  decisions will  be  taken  by  a  qualified 
majority. 
2.3.  INSTITUTIONS 
The  Maastricht  Treaty maintains  the  institutional structure which  was  established 
in  the Treaty of  Rome  and  upheld  by  the  Single  European  Act.  The  decision-making 
procedure  for matters  covered  by  the existing Treaty  has  not  undergone  any 
fundamental  changes.  However,  in  a  number  of  areas  there  are  adjustments  and 
innovations  within  the  given  framework. 
( 1)  With  the  1986  Single  European  Act,  a  co-operation  procedure  was  introduced 
which  mainly  came  to  be  applied  to  the  subject  area of  the  internal  market,  where 
at  the  sa~e time  the  possibility of  qualified majority  decision-making  in  the 
Council  was  introduced.  The  essence of  this  procedure  is  a  two-stage 
consultation of  the  Parliament  as  opposed  to  the original  one-stage  procedure. 
If the  Parliament  expressly rejects  the proposal  which  has  been put  to it,  the 
Council's decision must  be  unanimous.  The  Maastricht  Treaty extends  this 
co-operat  ~.on  procedure  to  cover  transport  policy.  state aid.  implementing 
provisions  for  the  Social  and  Regional  Funds,  development  aid  policy  and  most 
legislation  in  the  field of environmental  protection. 
(2)  The  Maastricht  Treaty  introduces  a  procedure  for  joint decision-making 
between  the  Council  and  the  Parliament  (co-decision).  With  this  new  procedure 
the  Parliament,  by  adopting a  position  in  plenary session,  can  block  the  adoption 
of  a  proposal  even if the Council  has  agreed  to  it.  During  the  Parliamentary 
proceedings  in question there  must  be  at  least  260  votes  cast  against  the 
proposal  out  of  a  possible  maximum  of  518.  The  real  aim of  the  procedure  laid 
down  for  joint  decision-making,  which  is a  complicated  one,  is  to  give  the 
Parliament  a  greater influence over  the  final  form  of  legislation.  The 
possibility of blocking :he  legisl~tion is the  last  component  in  a  longer 
procedure.  Judging  by  experience with  the  co-operation  procedure,  it is unlikely 
that  this possibility of blocking  legislation will  be  used  very  often. 
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The  joint decision-making  procedure  is  to  be  applied  to  a  number  of  areas  in  the 
Treaty,  including  the  internal  market,  the  right  of  establishment,  and  freedom  of 
movement  for  workers.  Most  of  the  new  areas  of  co-operation mentioned earlier 
are  also  subject  to  joint decision-making. 
(3)  Under  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  only  the  Commission  1s  empowered  to  subm1t 
proposals  to  the  Council.  This  division  of  tasks  was  maintained  in  the  Single 
European  Act  and  is  again confirmed  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  However,  the 
Maastricht  Treaty gives  the  European  Parl1ament  a  certa1n  limited  role  1n  the 
submission  of  proposals  to  the  Council  by  endowing it Wlth  the  right  to  call  upon 
the  Commission  to  submit  proposals. 
(4)  The  European  Parliament's  supervisory  powers  over  the  Commiss1on  have  been 
strengthened.  The  Parliament  must  be  consulted  before  a  new  Commission  President 
is  appointed  and  the  whole  Commission  must  be  approved  by  the  Parliament.  In 
addition,  there  are  further opportunities  for  the  European  Parliament  to  set  up 
special  committees  of  inquiry. 
(5)  During  the  negotiation  of  the Maastricht  Treaty  the  question of  greater 
openness  was  raised  by  the  Danes  and  others.  As  a  result,  it was  agreed,  among 
other things,  that  in  1993  at  the  latest  the  Commission  would  submit  a  report  to 
the  Council  containing  recommendations  for  improved  public  access  to  the 
1nformation available  to  the  institutions. 
(6)  A genuine  innovation  was  the  creation of  a  Ombudsman  on  the  Danish  model. 
The  Ombudsman  will  only  be  able  to deal  with  instances  of  alleged 
maladministration  by  the  Community  institut1ons. 
(7)  A Committee  of  the  Regions  is set  up  with  a  total  of  189  members  represent1ng 
reg1onal  and  local  bodies.  There  will  be  nine  Danish  members.  The  Committee  of 
the  Regions  is  to  be  consulted  by  the  Council  or  the  Commission  in  a  number  of 
specified  policy areas  before  decisions  are  taken.  The  Committee  can  also  issue 
opinlons  on  its own  initiative. 
(8)  The  Maastricht  Treaty  introduces  the  concept  of  citizenship of  the  Union. 
This  gives  nationals  of  Member  States certain rights.  The  most  important  are  the 
right  to vote  and·  the  right  to stand  as  a  candidate  at  municipal  elections  and 
elections  to  the  European  Parliament. 
The  Council  is to  take  a  decision unanimously  on  the  detailed arrangements  for 
the  right  to  vote  and  to  stand  as  a  candidate at  municipal  elections  and  the 
right  to  vote  and  to stand  as  a  candidate  in  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament.  Denmark  already  has  rules  governing  the  right  of aliens  to  vote  and 
to  stand  as  candidates  at municipal  elections. 
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The  section of  the  Treaty dealing with  citizenship of  the  Union  contains  no 
privileges with  regard  to  right  of  residence or access  to social  security schemes 
over  and  above  those  contained  in existing Community  law. 
With  regard  to  the  right  to  reside  freely  within  the  territory of  the  Member 
States,  it is  stated that  this  is  subject  to  the  limitations  and  conditions  laid 
down  in  the Treaty  and  in  the  measures  adopted  to  give it effect. 
The  new  rules  on  citizenship of  the  Union  do  not  confer any  new  social  rights. 
Reference  should  be  made  to  the  earlier discussion  of  the  social  dimension. 
3.  RULES  WHICH  TAKE  EFFECT  AT  A LATER  DATE 
The  general  decisions  which  take  effect at  a  later date  and  which,  as  an 
overriding principle,  require adoption  by  a  unanimous  vote  of  the  Member  States 
relate  to  the  third stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  the  defence-policy 
aspect  of  the  common  foreign  and  security policy,  and  the  concrete  formulation  of 
decisions  in  the  area of  justice and  home  affairs. 
3.1.  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION 
Economic  an~ Monetary  Union  is  to  be  achieved  in  three stages.  The  first  stage 
is  currentiy  in progress.  It will  result  in  the establishment  of  the  internal 
market,  free  movement  of  capital  and  participation by  all  the  Member  States  in 
exchange  rate  co-operation.  This  stage will  run until  the  end  of  1993. 
Once  the  Maastricht  Treaty  has  entered  into  force  the  composition  of  the unit  of 
account  for  European  monetary  co-operation  (the  ECU)  will  be  frozen.  The  ECU  is 
composed  of  fixed  amounts  of all  the  Member  States'  currencies.  Hitherto,  these 
amounts  have  been  adjusted  from  time  to  time.  After  the  Maastricht  Treaty  has 
entered  into  force  this will  no  longer be  possible. 
The  second  stage  begins  on  1  January  1994.  During  that  stage  there  are  no 
specif1c obligations  imposed  on  the  Member  States,  but  there  are generally  stated 
aims.  For  example,  the  Member  States must  try  to  avoid  excessive  government 
defiCltS. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  second  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  a  European 
Monetary  Institute  (EMI}  will  be  set  up.  The  EMI  will  be  the  monetary 
co-operatlo~ organization  for  the  second  stage.  The  current  Committee  of 
Governors  of  the  CentraJ  Banks  will  be  dissolved  when  the  second  stage  begins,  as 
will  the  European  Monetary  Co-operation  Fund  (EMCF).  The  EMI  will  take  over  the 
tasks  of  the  Committee  of  Governors  of  the  Central  Banks  with  regard  to  the 
European  Monetary  System  (EMS)  and  at  t~e same  time  will  be  assigned 
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certain new  tasks  in preparation  for  the  third stage.  The  EMI  will  not  enJoy  any 
concrete  powers  over  the  Member  States. 
The  prov1sions  1n  the Maastricht  Treaty  regarding  economic  and  monetary  policy 
which  are  to  be  applied  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  third stage  do  not  involve  any 
new  areas  of  transfer of sovereignty within  the  meaning of  §  20  of  the 
Constitutional  Act. 
The  third stage of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  is  to  be prepared  by  the  end  of 
1996.  At  that  time  the  Council  is  to  assess  the  Member  States'  economic 
situat1on.  The  aim will  be  to  determine  which  Member  States  are  ready  to enter 
the  third stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  In  the assessment  account  will 
be  taken  of price stability,  whether  there  are  excessive  government  budget 
deficits  and  government  debt,  exchange-rate stabil1ty,  and  the  evolution of 
interest  rates  1n  the  Member  States.  At  the  time  when  the  Maastricht  Treaty  was 
signed,  Denmark,  France  and  Luxembourg  met  the  set  targets. 
The  starting date  for  the  third  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  will  be  set 
before  the  end  of  1996  if a  majority  of  the  Member  States  have  met  the  targets 
la1d  down  and  the  Council  takes  the  relevant  decision.  If  this  decision  on  the 
start1ng date  has  not  been  taken  by  the  end  of  1997,  the  third  stage  of  Econom1c 
and  Monetary  Un1on  will  start  on  1  January  1999  for  those  countries  which  have 
met  the  condit1ons. 
Two  Member  States  have  reserved  a  special  procedure  for themselves,  namely  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Denmark.  In  a  separate  Protocol  the Danish  Government, 
referring to  the  Constitutional  Act,  has  stated  clearly,  with  the  agreement  of 
the  other Member  States,  that  Denmark  will  have  a  free  choice  regarding  its 
participation  in  the  third  stage.  Hence,  a  decision to move  into the  third  stage 
of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  will  include  Denmark  only  if the  Danish  Government 
has  first  informed  the  Council  that  Denmark  agrees  to  take  part  in that  stage. 
Set  out  below  is  a  brief description of  the  content  of  the  third  stage. 
A European  System of Central  Banks  will  be  set  up.  It will  have  1ndependent 
status  and  will  define  monetary  policy  and  daily exchange-rate  policy. 
The  primary objective  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  will be  to  maintain 
price stability.  The  overall  framework  for  economic  policy,  including  employment 
matters.  w1ll  be  determined  in  the  Economic  and  Financial  Affa1rs  Council. 
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Rules  have  been  laid down  to prevent  excessive government  budget  deficits  from 
affecting  the  other Member  States.  The  Council  can  take  certain steps with 
regard  to  Mcmter  States  which  persistently have  such excessive  government 
defic1ts.  These  steps  can  involve  requiring the  Member  States  in question  to 
publish additional  information before  issuing bonds  and  securities,  inviting the 
European  Investment  Bank  to  reconsider its  lending policy  towards  the 
Member  States  concerned,  requiring  a  non-interest-bearing deposit  to  be  made  with 
the  Community,  and/or  imposing  fines  of  an  appropriate  size. 
With effect  from  the  third  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  those  Member 
States participating in  the  third  stage are  to freeze  their exchange  rates  with 
regard  to  the  ECU  and  hence  with  regard  to  each  other.  The  effect of  this  will 
be  that  the  daily margin  of  fluctuatioP,  which  could  amount  to  a  maximum  of  plus 
or minus  2,25%,  will  disappear and  devaluation/revaluation will  no  longer  be  used 
as  part  of  the  economic  policy of  the  participating countries.  At  the  sar.1e  time 
a  separate  currency will  be  introduced  for  the participating countries.  It will 
be  called  the  ECU.  It  has  not  yet  been  decided  when  this step  will  be 
accompanied  by  a  uniform  currency  in the participating countries,  or whether 
those  countries  may  continue  to  issue their own  banknotes.  Under  the Treaty's 
rules.  such  a  decision  may  be  taken  by  the  Council  acting unanimously. 
3.2.  COMMON  FOREIGN  AND  SECURITY  POLICY 
The  twelve  Community  Member  States provided  a  treaty basis  for  co-operati0n  in 
the  area of  foreign  and  security policy in  the Single  European  Act.  Those 
earlier provisions  (Article  30  of  the  S1ngle  Act)  are  repealed  and  replaced  by 
the  provisions  on  a  common  foreign  and  security policy  in the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
The  institutional  and  decision-making  demarcation  line  vis-a-vis  European 
Community  co-operation is maintained.  There  is  no  application  of  the principle 
of  supranationality.  Co-operation  on  foreign  and  security policy is 
intergovernmental  co-operation.  The  Council  is  used  as  a  forum  for 
decision-making.  The  principle of  unanimity  is maintained  with  the  addition  that 
the  Council  may  decide  unanimously  which matters  may  be  decided  upon  by majority 
voting. 
The  objectives  of  the  common  foreign  and  security policy are: 
- to  safeguard  the  common  values,  fundamental  interests  and  independence  of  the 
Union; 
- to  strengthen  the  security of  the  Union  and  its Member  States  in all  ways; 
- to  preserve  peace  and  strengthen  int~rnational  ~ecurity,  in accordance  with  the 
principles  of  the  United  Nations  Charter as  well  as  the principles  of  the 
Helsinkt  Final  Act  and  the objectives  of  the Paris Charter; 
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- to  promote  international  co-operation; 
- to  develop  and  consolidate  democracy  and  the  rule of  law,  and  respect  for  human 
r1ghts  and  fundamental  freedoms. 
The  common  foreign  and  security policy,  which will  be  formulated  unanimously  in 
the Council,  can  be  expressed  as  "common  positions" or "joint  action".  Common 
positions  are  familiar  from  the earlier European  Politicial Co-operation  context 
which  was  enshrined  in  the  1986  Single Act.  If a  common  position  on  a  foreign 
policy matter is adopted  unanimously,  Member  States must  ensure  that  their 
national policies are  in  line with  it. 
With  ''joint  action"  a  new  concept  is  introduced  to  indicate  that  the  Community's 
foreign  policy  can  also  Involve  specific courses  of action.  Joint  action  is 
decided  upon  unanimously  in  the  Council  and  is essentially more  binding  on  the 
Member  States  than  a  common  position.  Joint  action  commits  the  Member  States  in 
the positions  they  adopt  and  in  the  conduct  of  their activity.  When  adopting 
joint  action,  or at  a  later stage,  the  Council  may  decide  unanimously  that  there 
are matters  within  the  framework  of  the  joint  action which  In  future  may  be 
decided  upon  by  a  qualified majority. 
In  the  autumn  of  1991  the  Community  Foreign Ministers  suggested  the  following 
four  areas  as  being  appropriate for  joint  action:  the  CSCE  process,  the  process 
of  arms  reduction  In  Europe,  the  non-proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  and  the 
economic  aspects  of security,  especially control  of  the  transfer of military 
technology  to  third  countries  and  arms  exports. 
The  common  foreign  and  security policy  covers  all questions  related  to  the 
security of  the  Union,  including the  eventual  framing  of  a  common  defence  policy, 
which  might  in  time  lead  to  a  common  defence.  This  means  that  defence-policy 
aspects  may  be  involved  in discussions  on  security policy. 
The  provision dealing with  security which  refers  to  the  eventual  framing  of  a 
common  defence  policy,  which  might  in  time  lead  to  a  common  defence,  represents  a 
compromise  reflecting the  different  positions  adopted  by  the  Member  States  during 
the  Intergovernmental  Conference.  Whilst  it was  previously  the  case  that  the 
common  foreign  policy  could  strengthen  the  co-ordination of positions  on  the 
political  and  economic  aspects  of security policy,  there  is  now  agreement  In  the 
negotiated  text  that  Ministers  may  also  discuss  defence-policy  aspects.  Thus,  if 
unanimity  is established,  it will  be  possible  to  adopt  common  positions  on 
foreign  and  security policy matters  which  not  only  concern  the  political  and 
economic  aspects of  security but  also  the  defence-policy  aspects. 
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However.  there  was  no  endorsement  for  making  defence-policy matters  the  subject 
of  joint  action.  It  was  therefore  decided  that  issues  with  defence  implications 
could  not  be  the  subject  of  a  joint  action  - certainly not  in relation to  the 
outside  world. 
The  new  arrangement  therefore  means  that  the  European  Union  cannot  determine  the 
organization of  Member  States'  defence,  their command  structure or specific 
military  operations,  etc.  These  matters  are  dealt  with  by  the  WEU  or  NATO. 
Under  the  ~reaty,  the  Western  European  Union  (WEU)  forms  an  integral part  of  the 
development  of  the  European  Union.  The  latter may  request  the  WEU  to  elabo~~te 
and  impleme~t decisions  and  actions with  defence  implications.  This  refle~t& the 
fact  that  the  European  Union  itself is  unable  to  take  such  decisions  and  action; 
however,  this  task  can  be  transferred  to  the  WEU  and  hence  to  the  countries  which 
are  members  of  that organization.  This  procedure  was  established after the 
question  of  ~he WEU's  link  with  both  the  European  Un1on  and  NATO  had  been 
discussed  on  many  occasions,  including  the  NATO  summit  on  7  and  8  November  1991. 
The  conclusion  reached  in  those  discussions  was  that the  WEU  would  be  given  a 
double  role:  one  vis-a-vis  the  European  Union,  and  the  other  as  the  European 
pillar of  NATO. 
In  a  special  Declaration attached  to  the  Treaty,  the  members  of  the  Western 
European  Union  invite  the  other members  of  the  European  Union  to  accede  to  the 
WEU  or  to  become  observers.  Simultaneously,  other  European  Member  States  of  NATO 
are  invited  to  become  Associate  Members  of  the  WEU.  It appears  from  the 
Declaration  that  the  European  non-members  of  the  WEU,  to  whom  this  text  is 
addressed,  are  expected  to  respond  before  the  end  of  1992. 
3.3.  JUSTICE  AND  HOME  AFFAIRS 
The  Title in  the  Maastricht  Treaty  on  justice  and  home  affairs,  like  the Title  on 
foreign  and  security policy,  is  of  an  intergovernm~ntal nature.  Decisions  are 
taken  in  the  Council  unanimously.  There  is no  application of  the  principle of 
supranationality. 
The  aim  of  this Title is  to  increase  co-operation between  the  Member  States  on 
the  fol)owing  matters: 
- asylum  policy; 
rules  governing  the  crossing by  persons  of  the  external  borders  of  the  Member 
States  anu  the  exercise of controls  thereon; 
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- immigration policy; 
- combating  drug  add1ction; 
- combating  fraud  on  an  international  scale; 
judicial  co-operation  in  civil matters; 
judicial  co-operation  in  crim1nal  matters; 
- customs  co-operation; 
- police  co-operation  for  the  purposes  of  preventing and  combating  terrorism, 
unlawful  drug trafficking and  other ser1ous  forms  of  international  crime, 
including if necessary  certain aspects  of  customs  co-operation,  in  connection 
w1th  the  organization of  a  Union-wide  system  for  exchanging  information  with1n 
a  European Police Office  (Europol). 
These  subjects  have  for  many  years  already  been  the  subject  of  considerable 
co-operation  between  the  Member  States.  This  has  occurred  without  a  proper basis 
~n a  treaty.  This  basis  is  now  provided  in the  Maastricht  Treaty,  although 
co-operation will  continue  to  be  in  its traditional  intergovernmental  form. 
It  is  certainly possible  under  the Treaty for  certain subjects  included  1n  this 
form  of co-operation  to  be  transferred  to  that  part  of  the  Treaty  which  is  based 
on  the  principle of  supranationality.  However,  this  does  not  apply  to  judicial 
co-operation  in  criminal  matters,  customs  co-operation  or police  co-operation. 
Unanim1ty  in  the  Council  is  necessary for  a  transfer in  these  cases,  which  must 
then  be  approved  by  the  Member  States  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  their 
constitut1ons,  which  1n  Denmark's  case  means  the  Constitutional  Act. 
4.  COMMON  PROVISIONS 
The  Maastricht  Treaty is  based  on  three pillars. 
The  first  pillar is  concerned  with  updating  and  extending  the Treaty  of  Rome, 
1ncluding  the  amendments  introduced  into it by  the  Single  European  Act  of  1986. 
It  is  in  this  part  of  the Treaty  that  the  Title on  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  is 
to  be  found.  Here,  the  pr1nciple  of  supranationality is applied  and  the 
~nst1tutions and  decision-maklng  procedures  of  the  Community  operate  1n  full. 
The  second pillar is  concerned  with  foreign  and  security policy.  This  involves 
intergovernmental  co-operation.  The  forum  is  the  Council.  The  princ1ple  of 
supranationality is  not  applied,  nor  is use  made  of  the  decision-mak1ng 
procedures  of  the  Community. 
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The  third pillar is  concerned  with  justice and  home  affairs.  This  involves 
intergovernmental  co-operation.  The  forum  is  the  Council.  The  principle of 
supratlonal].ty is  not  applied,  nor is use  made  of  the  decision-making procedures 
of  the  Community. 
The  Treaty  is  built  on  these  three pillars and  also contains  some  common 
prov1s1ons.  The  most  important  of  these  are  concerned,  firstly,  with  the 
accession of other countries  to  the  European  Union  and,  secondly,  with  a 
subsequent  intergovernmental  conference  in  1996  to  examine  certain provisions  in 
the Treaty. 
As  far as  admission  to  membership of  the  European  Union  is  concerned,  it is 
stated that  any  European  State may  apply  to  become  a  Member.  Accession 
conditions  would  be  negotiated at  an  intergovernmental  conference  between  the 
applicant  countries  and  the  existing Members  of  the  European  Union. 
Provision  is made  for  the  convening of  an  intergovernmental  conference  in  1996  to 
examine  certain provisions of  the Maastricht  Treaty.  The  Treaty  mentions  several 
areas  which  may  be  the  subject  of discussions  at  such  an  intergovernmental 
conference.  Attention  should  be  drawn  to  two  such  areas.  The  first  is  the  rules 
whereby  the  European  Parliament  may  influence  the  adoption of  EC  legislation. 
The  second  is  the  relationship  between  the  European  Union  and  the  Western 
European  Union  (WEU},  which  should  be  viewed  against  the  background  of  the  fact 
that  the  WEU  Treaty of  1988  can  be  denounced  with  one  year's notice.  Annex  1 
contains  a  timetable which  surveys  the progressive  implementation  of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty. 
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CHAPTER  III 
ENLARGEMENT  AND  FUTURE  FINANCING  OF  THE  EC 
- Connection  with  the  Maastricht Treaty 
Throughout  the  EC's  history there  has  been  discussion  of  the extent  to  which  EC 
co-operation  could  be  deepened  at  the  same  time  as  the  number  of members 
increased. 
As  far  as  the  EFTA  countries  are  concerned  it has  become  increasingly clear since 
the  end  ot  the  1980s  that  the decision  to establish the internal market  by  the 
end  of  199~ gave  greater relevance  to  the  question of  full  membership.  The  EFTA 
countries'  interest  in membership  has  thus  increased  as  the  internal  market 
process  has  been  successful.  The  convening  of  the  two  Intergovernmental 
Conferences  on  Political  Union  and  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  has  reinforced 
that  interest. 
The  Commission's  proposal  to establish  a  broader economic  area  in  Europe  by 
extending  the  EC  internal  market  to  include  the  EFTA  countries  came  to  appear  to 
a  number  of  those  countries  as  a  transitional  arrangement  - the  Agreement  on  the 
European  Economic  Area  (EEA)  - which  could  serve  as  preparation  for  full 
membership. 
The  EC's  negotiations  with  the  EFTA  countries  on  the  EEA  Agreement,  which 
happened  to  coincide  with  the  opening  up  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  showed 
that  the  association which  the  EC  could  offer the  EFTA  countries would  not  in  the 
longer  term  be  enough  to  safeguard  the  greater part  of their interests  -
economically  and  politically - in  the  new  Europe. 
To  date  the  following  EFTA  countries  have  applied  for  membership:  Austria, 
Sweden,  Finland  and  Switzerland.  There  have  also  been  applications  from  TurKey, 
Cyprus  and  Malta.  In  addition,  the  Norwegian  Prime  Minister has  declared himself 
in  favour  of  Norway  submitting  an  application for  membership  of  the  European 
Union  before  the  end  of  the  year. 
The  countries  of  Central  Europe,  in particular Hungary,  have  expressed  the  wish 
to  submit  early applications  for  membership.  ~ne Central  and  Eastern  European 
countries  thus  lay  special  stress on  the  fact  that  their agreements  with  the  EC 
have  membership  as  their ultimate goal. 
The  EC  has  .1ever  been  thougl1t  of  as 
three  enlargements  that  have  so  far 
United  Kingdom  and  Ireland  in  1973, 
Portugal  iu  1986,  demonstrate  that. 
Community  nas  never  refused,  and  as 
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meeting  in  Lisbon  in  June  1992  show,  that  the  Community  does  not  wish  to  turn  its 
back  on  In  future. 
The  other countries  in  Europe  seek  membership  for  the  sake  of  security, 
stability,  peace  and  economic  progress  and  in order  to  play  a  role  alongside  the 
Community  countries  in securing continuing  co-operation  and  integration  in 
Europe.  For  the  new  democracies  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  membership  of  the 
Union  is  the  expression  of  a  desire  to  consolidate their new-found  freedom  and 
stabilize their economic  and  political  development. 
The  debate  on  the  extent  to  which  a  deepening  of  EC  co-operation  can  take  place 
in parallel with  an  Increase  in  the  number  of  members  has  in  reality now  been 
concluded.  The  contradictions  between  the  advocates  of deepening  and  the 
advocates  of  widening  have  been  cleared  away.  There  is  agreement  that  deepening 
and  widening  are  complementary,  and  that  they  must  therefore  be  regarded  as 
inter-connected. 
1.  THE  CURRENT  POSITION  CONCERNING  EC  ENLARGEMENT 
Under  the Treaty  - both Article  237  of  the  Treaty of  Rome  and  Article  0  of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  - any  European  State  may  apply  for  membership.  Experience 
shows  that,  in addition  to  meeting  that  geographical  requirement,  new  member 
countries  must  also  fulfil  certain minimum  requirements,  some  relating to  the 
market  economy  and  economic  development  and  some  relating to  democracy  and  human 
rights. 
An  applicant  State  addresses  its application  to  the  Council,  which  takes  a 
unanimous  decision after consulting  the  Commission  and  after receiving the  assent 
of  the  European  Parliament,  which  must  act  by  an  absolute majority of  its 
members.  The  Commission's  opinion  concerning Austria  and  Sweden  is already 
available.  Its  opinions  concerning  the  Finnish  and  Swiss  applications  are 
expected  during  the  autumn.  If  an  application  is  submitted  by  Norway  the 
Commission  is  expected  to  be  able  to  have  its opinion  ready  within  a  short 
period,  partly because  the  negotiations  on  the  EEA  Agreement  have  given  the 
Commission  a  close  Insight  into  Norway's  circumstances  and  partly because  the 
two  Nordic  precedents  - Sweden  and  Finland  - will  be  available  as  a  basis  for  the 
opinion  on  Norway. 
At  the  European  Council  meeting  in Maastricht  in  December  1991  it clearly  emerged 
that  there  was  a  connection  between  EC  enlargement  and  its future  financing.  In 
accordance  with  the  conclusions  of  the  European  Council  meeting  in  Lisbon  on 
26  and  27  June  1992,  formal  negotiations  on  enlargement  can  commence  only  when 
there  IS  agreement  on  the  future  financing  of  the  EC  (the  Delors  II  package). 
At  that  meeting  it also  became  clear that  formal  enlargement  negotiations  can  be 
initiated only  when  the Maastricht  Treaty has  been  ratified.  This  is  made 
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clear in  the  Lisbon  conclusions,  which  state that  applicant  countries will  be 
admitted  to  the  European  Union. 
However,  the  Lisbon  conclusions  leave  the  door  open  in  the  meantime  for 
informal/5ounding negotiations  on  admission with  those  EFTA  countries  which  wa~t 
membership. 
The  European Council  states in  the  Lisbon  conclusions  that  any  European  State 
whose  system of government  is  founded  on  the  principle of democracy  may  apply  to 
become  a  member  of  the  Union.  The  principle of  a  Union  open  to  European  States 
that  aspire  to full  participation and  who  fulfil  the  conditions  for  membership  is 
a  fundamental  element  of the  European  construction. 
It also  e~erges from  the conclusions  that  in  the  European Council's  view  the 
EEA  Agreemer.t  has  paved  the  way  for  the  start of swift  enlargement  negotiations 
with  EFTA  countries  seeking membership  of  the  European  Union.  The  European 
Council  therefore  invites  the  Community  institutions to  speed  up  preparatory work 
needed  to  ensure  rapid  progress  in  the  forthcoming  negotiations,  including  the 
preparation  before  the  European  Council  in  Edinburgh  of  the  Union's  general 
negotiation  framework 
In  the  conclusions  it is stated that  negotiations  with  the  candidate  countries 
must,  to  the  extent  possible,  be  conducted  in parallel,  while  dealing with  each 
candidature  on  its own  merit. 
1.1.  THE  EFTA  COUNTRIES 
When  it enters  into  force  on  1  January  1993  the  EEA  Agreement  will  lead  to  the 
establishmant  of  one  of  the  largest  economic  co-operation  and  free  trade areas  in 
the  world.  Within  its borders,  goods,  services,  labour  and  capital  (the 
4  freedoms)  will  to  a  large  extent  be  able  to  move  freely  between  the 
19  countries  linked  together by  the  Agreement. 
The  EEA  Agreement  means  that  the  EFTA  countries  will  participate in  the  EC 
internal  market  in  industrial  goods,  but  not  in  EC  agricultural  and  fisheries 
policy.  The  EEA  Agreement  does  not  provide  for  free  trade  in  a  number  of 
agricultural  and  fishery products. 
Under  the  FEA  Agreement  the  EFTA  countries  wust  be  consulted  in  connection  with 
the  adoptiou  of  future  EC  rules,  but  there  is  no  provision for  actual  co-decision 
in  the  EC's  adoption  of  future  legal  instrllinents  concerning  the  internal market, 
etc. 
The  EFTA  cour.·Lries  are  bound  under  the  Agreement  to align their national 
legislation cu  a  very  substantial  proportion of the Community  law  in  the  areas 
concerned  a~ it existed when  the  Agreement  was  signed  (at  present 
approximately  1  400  legal  instruments).  There will  also be  an  obvious 
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incentive for  these  countries  to  adapt  their legislation  in  line with 
developments  in  the  relevant  Community  law  after  31  July  1991,  which  1s  the 
cut-off date  for  legal  instruments  that  are  automatically  covered  by  the 
Agreement. 
In  add1tion  to  common  rules  in the area of  compet1t1on  and  State  support  and 
certain disciplines  in relation  to  intellectual property  law,  the  Agreement  also 
covers  horizontal  policy areas  of particular relevance  to  the  abovementioned  four 
freedoms.  The  EEA  Agreement  will  mean  more  intensive  co-operation  in  a  number  of 
adjacent  areas  such  as  environment  policy,  research  and  technological 
development,  data  processing,  education  and  training,  social  policy,  consumer 
pol1cy,  small  and  medium-sized  businesses,  tourism,  the  audiovisual  sector and 
civil protection. 
The  EEA  Agreement  establishes  a  free-trade  area,  but  not  a  customs  union.  There 
will  thus still be  a  need  - also  after  1  January  1993  - for border formalities 
between  the  EFTA  countries  and  the  EC.  This  is also  because  of  the  rules  of 
origin,  which  have  been  liberalized,  and  the  exclusion  of  trade  in agricultural 
and  flshery  products,  the  continued  existence of  fiscal  frontiers  and  veterinary 
and  plant  health considerations,  all  of  which  make  border  controls  necessary. 
Furthermore,  the  EFTA  countries  undertake  during  the period  1993-1997  to 
contribute  ECU  2  000  million  (approximately  Dkr  16  000  million)  to  the  so-called 
Cohesion  Fund  for  5  years  (Dkr  4  000  mill1on  in  the  form  of grants  and 
Dkr  12  000  million  in soft  loans),  which  may  be  used  for  structural  projects  in 
the  EC  area  in  the  same  way  as  the activities financed  by  the  EC's  own  Structural 
Funds. 
Annex  2  contains  a  description  of  the  EFTA  countries'  ratification procedures  in 
connection  Wlth  possible  accession to  the  European  Union. 
1.2.  OTHER  APPLICANT  COUNTRIES 
The  European  Council  states  in its Lisbon  conclusions  that  if it proves  possible 
to  meet  the  challenges  involved  in  a  European  Union  comprising  an  increased 
number  of  member  countries,  progress  will  have  to  be  made  at  the  same  time  with 
the  1nternal  development  of  the  Union  and  with  the preparation of other 
countries'  membership. 
The  position regarding the applications  submitted  by  Turkey,  Cyprus  and  Malta  is 
that  each  one  is to  be  treated  on  its own  merits.  The  European  Council  does 
not  express  an  opinion on  enlargement  negotiations with these  countr1es,  but 
stresses that  co-operation with Turkey,  Cyprus  and  Malta  and  with  the  Central  and 
Eastern European  countries must  be  extended. 
As  far  as  co-operation with  the Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  is 
concerned,  this  must  systematically concentrate  on  assisting the  countries  in 
their endeavours  to prepare  for accession  to  the  European  Union,  as  they  wish. 
SN  4364/92  EN - 35  -
hip/LG/mjm 
The  Commission  has  the  task  of  evaluating  the  progress  made  in  this  area  and 
reporting  to  the  European  Council  meeting  in  Edinburgh,  where  the  European 
Council  will  consider  the  situation and,  if need  be,  propose  further  measures. 
2.  FUTURE  FINANCING 
Ratification of  the Maastricht Treaty,  agreement  on  the  EC's  future  financing  and 
the  start of  negotiations  on  EC  enlargement  have  been  linked  together  for 
negotiating purposes.  The  European Council  established that  link most  rece~tly 
at  its meeting  in  Lisbon  on  26  and  27  June  1992  (see  above). 
In  a  communication  to  the  Council  of  11  February  1992  the  Commission  put  forward 
its position  regarding  the  framework  for  EC  financing  over  the  period  1993-1997 
and  for  the  specific  changes  to  the  EC's  financial  provisions which it considers 
necessary  (the  "Delors  II  package"). 
There  are  several  reasons  why  the  Commission  is putting forward  its future 
financing  proposal  at  this  time.  In  the  first  place,  parts  of  the existing 
reform  of  financing  cover  only  the  years  1988-1992. 
In  the  second  place  the  Commission  wished  to put  forward  its views  on  the  goals 
and  priorities which  the  Comunity  should  lay  down  for  the  next  five  years.  A 
concrete  example  is  the  establishment  by  31  December  1993  of the  "Cohesion  Fund", 
mentioned  in Article  130d  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  which  was  one  of  the  most 
important  negot1ating objectives  for  the  less  prosperous  member  countries. 
2. 1.  THE  EXISTING  FINANCING  SYSTEM 
The  1988  financ1ng  reform  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
Single  European  Act  in  1987.  The  Single  Act  had  included  a  considerable 
strengthening of  the provisions  on  economic  and  social  cohesion.  For  that  reason 
inter alia it was  decided  at  the  European  Council  meeting  in  February  1988  that 
each  year  from  1989  to  1992  the  appropriations  for  the  Structural  Funds  should  be 
increased  by  ECU  1  300  million at  fixed  1988  prices.  This  means  that  by  the  end 
of  1992  appropriations  for  the  Structural  Funds  will  have  doubled  compared  with 
the  1987  level.  The  1988  reform  also  gave  a  higher priority to  expenditure  on 
the  so-alled  integrated Mediterranean  programmes  and  on  research. 
In  connection  w1th  the  financiug  reform  a  Council  Decision  was  adopted  on 
24  June  1988  on  the  rules  gover~ing the  EC's  own  resources.  That  Decision 
introduced  a  new  fourth  source  of  revenue  based  on  Member  States'  share  in  tt·e 
Community's  gross  national  prod~ct  (GNPl.  At  the  same  time  the  Council 
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Decision  imposed  a  ceiling  on  total  own  resources,  rising from  1,15%  of  GNP  in 
1988  to  1,2%  of  GNP  in  1992. 
With  regard  to discipline  in  the  matter of  Community  expenditure  (budgetary 
discipline),  the  Council  Decision of  24  June  1988  set  an  upper  limit  on 
EC  agricultural  expenditure.  Thus  the  annual  rate  of  increase  in  agricultural 
expenditure  must  not  exceed  74%  of  the  rate of  increase  in  member  countries' 
aggregate  GNP.  On  the  basis  of  that  rule  a  ceiling for  agricultural 
expenditure  - the  agricultural guideline  - is  worked  out  each  year  and  must  be 
complied  With  when  the  budget  is  drawn  up. 
Finally,  as  a  link  in  the  financing  reform process  the  Interinstitutional 
Agreement  on  budgetary  diSCipline  was  adopted  on  29  June  1988.  In  that  Agreement 
between  the  Council,  the  Commission  and  the  European  Parliament,  the  three 
institutions undertake  to  observe expenditure  ceilings  for  various  categories  of 
EC  budget  expenditure  in  each  of  the  years  1988  to  1992.  The  Agreement  contains 
rules  on  how  these ceilings  can  be  altered  should  the  need  arise. 
2.2.  THE  COMMISSION  PROPOSAL  FOR  FINANCING  REFORM 
As  future priority areas  the  Commission  points  in  its proposal  to: 
- the  Community's  external  relations,  particularly  in  the  light  of  developments 
in  Europe  In  recent  years; 
- economic  and  social  cohesion,  which  was  an  important  demand  for  a  number  of 
member  countries  in  the  Intergovernmental  Conferences,  and 
new  activities with  a  view  to  strengthening  Europe's  competitiveness. 
As  regards  the  EC's  external  relations,  the  Commission  exphasizes  In  its 
communication  the  increased  international  importance  the  Community  has  acquired 
following  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall,  the  Gulf  War  and  developments  in  Central 
and  Eastern  Europe,  and  following  the  dissolution of  the  Soviet  Union. 
As  priority areas  for  the  Community's  external  relations  the  Commission  points  to 
the  countries  In  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  CIS,  where  the  establishment 
of  new  democratic,  Independent  States will  require  further technical  and  economic 
ass1stance  from  the  EC. 
With  regard  to  the  Mediterranean  countries  the  Commission  considers  it  important 
that,  1n  order  to  ensure  stability and  security in  the  region,  the  Community 
should  continue  to  support  economic  and  democratic  reforms  in  those  countries 
with  financial  assistance. 
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It is the  Commission's  view that  there  should  be  a  strengthening of  Community 
co-operation with  the  developing  countries,  just  as  the  EC  should  increase its 
humanitarian assistance  in  cases  of  famine,  etc. 
Regarding  economic  and  social  cohesion,  the  Commission  underlines  the  importance 
of  increased assistance  to  the  least-favoured  regions  in  the  Community  and  to 
particularly exposed  population  groups  (e.g.  the  long-term unemployed  and  young 
people  undergoing  training). 
At  the  same  time  the  Commission  takes  the  view  that  there  should  be  a  substantial 
increase  in  the  effectiveness  of  the Structural  Funds.  The  object  of  the 
Cohesion  Fund  is  to  lend  support  to  environmental  protection and  transport 
infrastructure projects.  By  this means  inter alia the  idea is  to  create better 
condit1ons  for  a  more  uniform  economic  development  (convergence)  in  the  recipient 
countries  with  a  v1ew  to easing their entry into  the third phase  of  Economic  a~d 
Monetary  Union. 
In  the  section of  the  proposal  dealing with  the  strengthening of Europe's 
competitiveness  the  Commission  notes  that  European  industry is not  developing 
satisfactorily in  relation  to  the  USA  and  Japan.  The  Commission  points  out  that 
the  Community's  total  research  and  development  effort  is  at  the  level  that  Japan 
reached  ten years  ago.  As  a  second  example  the  Commission  notes  that  hi-tech 
products  account  for  31%  of  US  exports  and  27%  of  Japanese  exports  but  only 
17%  of  Europe's  exports. 
With  a  view  to  better utilization of  human  resources,  future  technology  and  the 
internal  market,  the  Commission  proposes  that  the  Community  should  supplement  the 
efforts  beir.g  made  in  the  Member  States  and  individual  businesses.  This  concerns 
areas  such  as  research  and  development,  improvement  of  vocational  training  and 
retraining  and  investment  in  the  trans-European networks  in  transport, 
telecommunications  and  energy. 
As  far as  revenue  is concerned  the  Commission  proposes  an  increase  in  the  limit 
on  the  Community's  own  resources  from  1,20% of gross  national  product  (GNP>  in 
1992  to  1,37%  in  1997. 
If  that  ce1ling  is  fully  used  in  1997,  given  the  Commlssion's  prediction of 
2,5%  annual  economic  growth  in  the Community,  in  1997  revenue  will  be  some 
ECU  20  000  million higher  than  revenue  on  the  1992  budget.  It  should  be  observed 
in  this  connection  that,  if the  current  level  of  1,2% of  GNP  is maintained,  the 
revenue  ceilirg will  be  ECU  11  000 million higher  in  1997  than  in  1992.  Hence 
t~e real  eftect of  increasing the  limit  from  1,2%  of  GNP  to  1,37% of  GNP  will  be 
a  mere  ECU  9  000  million. 
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The  Commiss1on  proposes  a  number  of  changes  to  the  existing revenue  system  which 
will  mean  that  a  larger share  of  the  Community's  revenue  will  be  collected 
through  the  fourth  resource  {GNP  contribution),  while  a  smaller proportion will 
be  ra1sed  through  VAT.  This  will  result  in  the  more  affluent  Member  States 
contributing  more.  This  is in  line with  the  aim  of  taking greater  account  of 
individual  Member  States'  capacity  to  contribute. 
Finally,  the  Commission  has  submitted  a  report  which it is  obliged  to  produce, 
pursuant  to Article  10  of  the  Council  Decision  on  own  resources,  on  the  question 
of  the  correction  of  budget  imbalances  1n  the  United  Kingdom's  favour. 
The  Commission  1s  considering the  idea that  the  existing arrangement  should  be 
continued  with  the  modification that  expenditure  concerning  the  Cohesion  Fund 
should  not  be  included  in  the  calculation basis. 
At  the  present  time  the  situation concerning  the  negotiations  on  the  EC's  future 
f1nanc1ng  is unresolved.  Some  Member  States  can  endorse  the  main  thrust  of  the 
Commission  proposal,  while  others  have  taken  a  critical stance. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
THE  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  CONFERENCES 
- A summary  of  the  course  of events  and  positions  -
The  impetus  for  the  intergovernmental  conference~ which  culminated  in the 
Maastricht  Treaty goes  back to  the  meeting of the  European  Council  in Hannover  in 
June  1988  under  the  German  presidency.  Here  the first  step was  taken  towards  the 
subsequent  negotiations  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  This  took place  1n  a 
special  committee  which  submitted a  report  in  t~e spring of  1989.  In  the  spring 
of  1990,  France  and  Germany  took  the initiative of starting negotiations  o~ a 
political union.  This  was  in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  Economic  and  Monetary 
Union  could  not  be  implemented  unless  progress  was  made  on  foreign  and'security 
policy matters  and  with  reference to the  Community  institutions  (decision-making 
procedure  and  democratic  legitimacy). 
In  December  1990  the first  meeting was  held of  the  intergovernmental  conferences 
on  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  and  Political  Union.  The  negotiations  continued 
throughout  1991,  and  they were  concluded  at  the  meeting of  the  European  Council 
in Maastricht  in  December  1991. 
It  was  France  that  favoured  the  establishment  of  an  economic  and  monetary  union. 
This  was  in consideration of  the  increasing inter-dependence  of  the  EC  countries' 
economic  and  monetary policies.  In  view  of this  de  facto  situation the  Freneh 
argument  ran  that  it would  be  in all countries'  best interests for  economic  and 
monetary  decisions  to  be  taken  jointly.  The  French  initiative was  a  continuation 
of  the  traditional  and  familiar  French policy on  Europe,  ever since  France  had 
led  the  way  in  the  1950's  with plans  for  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community. 
For  France,  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  was  the  main  consideration and  the 
strengthening of  the  Community  institutions desired  by  other member  countries  was 
less  important. 
Germany  accepted  the  French desire for  an  economic  and  monetary  union,  but  placed 
the  main  emphasis  on  a  political  union.  As  the  negotiations  proceeded,  Germany 
placed  more  and  more  emphasis  on  the  European  Parliament's  role,  which  became  a 
major  German  demand  during  the  negotiations.  The  background  to this  was  the  wish 
for  greater democratic  control  over  the  EC's  institutions,  in particular the 
Commission.  On  the political front,  the  German  Government  recognized  that  ~ 
pre-requisite for  the  realization of  the  German  unification process  was  a 
continuing strong German  commitment  to  Western  European  co-operation.  This  could 
be  achieved  in  the  form  of  a  European  Union  based  on  France's  initiative on 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  and  the  Franco-German  ideas  on  a  political union. 
Undoubtedly  a  further  argument  from  the  German  point  of view  was  that  the 
profound  changes  in Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  dissolution of  the 
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Soviet  Union  demanded  a  greater Western  European  commitment,  which  would 
naturally have  to  take  the  form  of  a  more  active  and  vigourous  EC. 
The  United  Kingdom  felt  a  considerable  degree  of scepticism about  the  1deas  on 
both  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  and  Political  Union.  This  scepticism was 
attributable  inter alia to  the  then  Prime  Minister,  Mrs  Thatcher,  and  was  a 
contributory factor  in  the  change  of  Prime  Minister in the  United  Kingdom  in  the 
autumn  of  1990.  During  the  negotiations  in  1991  the  United  Kingdom's  interests 
concerning  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  and  the  social  dimension  were 
accommodated.  The  new  Br1tish Prime  Minister,  John  Major,  declared  as  his 
political objective that  the  United  Kingdom  should  be  at  the heart  of  Europe  and 
praised the Maastricht  Treaty  as  a  triumph for  British interests. 
Italy played  an  important  role  in the  autumn  of  1990  in arranging  things  so  that 
the  negotiations  could start officially in December  1990.  The  Italian 
negotiating  line was  a  continuation of  Italy's traditional  policy  on  Europe.  It 
wanted  strong  integration,  preferably  in the  direction  of  a  kind  of  federation, 
and  the establishment  of  a  common  defence  policy.  Spain,  Greece  and  to  some 
extent Portugal  supported this  line. 
Spain,  Greece,  Portugal  and  Ireland,  in addition,  saw  it as  their most  important 
negotiating objective  to  secure  a  political declaration followed  by  concrete 
provisions  with  the  aim  of  strengthening economic  development  in the  Community's 
less  prosperous  regions.  This  took  the  form  of  the so-called Cohesion  Fund 
together,  to  some  degree,  with  the  ideas  on  trans-European  networks. 
Two  of the  Benelux  countries,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands,  held  the Presidency 
during  the  negotiations  in  1991,  and  this  influenced their national  negotiating 
positions.  The  Benelux  countries broadly  pursued  the  declared  political  goal  of 
a  strengthening of  the  Community  institutions,  including the  powers  of the 
European  Parliament. 
The  decisive  phase  of  the negotiations  occurred  in  June  1991  and  September  1991, 
where  the  issue  was  the  final  goal  of  co-operation between  the  twelve  member 
countries  and,  as  a  consequence  thereof,  the structure  of  the Treaty. 
One  group  of member  countries  wished  the  final  objective of  co-operation  to  be 
described  as  being  of  a  federal  nature.  Another  group  of  countries,  including 
Denmark,  was  unable  to  support  such  a  formulation.  The  result  was  that at  its 
meeting  in  December  1991  the  European  Council  reached  agreement  on  the 
formulation  "This  Treaty  marks  a  new  stage  in the  process  of creating  an  ever 
closer union  among  the  peoples  of  Europe,  in which  decisions  are  taken  as  closely 
as  possible  to  the  citizen." 
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The  other main  problem  concerning  the  structure of  the Treaty  was  in  reality 
resolved  in  the  early  autumn  of  1991.  The  Luxembourg  Presidency  had  been  working 
with  a  treaty structure based  on  three pillars corresponding to  the  model  which 
was  adopted  at  the  European  Council  meeting  in Maastricht.  In September  1991  the 
Netherlands  Presidency  submitted  a  proposal  for  a  "unified" treaty,  in which  the 
differences  with  regard  to  institutions  and  decision-making  procedures  as  between 
the  three pillars were  eliminated.  This  proposal  was  rejected by  10  member 
countries,  including  Denmark.  Thereafter the  preparatory discussions  for  the 
concluding negotiations  at  the  European  Council  meeting  in Maastricht  in 
December  1991  were  conducted  on  the  basis  of  the  text  submitted  by  the  Luxembourg 
Presidency. 
Denmark's  negotiating objectives  were  set  out  in  a  memorandum  submitted  to  the 
other member  countries  in October  1990.  That  memorandum  was  followed  up  in 
March  1991  by  specific  Danish  proposals  for  treaty texts.  There  was  a  clear 
political majority  in  favour  of  both  documents. 
Denmark's  participation in the  negotiations  on  European  Union  was  debated  in 
Parliament  on  29  May  1991,  at  which  the  following  resolution was  adopted: 
"Parliament  confirms  its support  for  the  proposals  contained  in  the  Danish 
EC  memorandum  and  calls  on  the  Government,  at  the  intergovermental 
conferences,  to  stand  by  the  demand  for majority decisions  concerning minimum 
requirements  in environmental  matters  in order  to  ensure  that  long-term 
environmental  interests are  not  neglected  as  a  result  of  other 
considerations." 
On  5  December  1991  a  further exploratory debate  was  held  in  Parliament  on  the 
negotiations  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  and  Political Union. 
The  following  resolution was  adopted: 
"Parliament  calls  on  the  Government  in  the  concluding negotiations  on  changes 
in  EC  co-operation  to  work  for: 
a  strengthening of  the  EC's  economic  and  political  co-operation without 
accepting  a  federal  aim  for  co-operation, 
- receptivity  to  the  admission  of  new  members  to  the  EC  and  increased 
co-operatlon with  non-member  countries, 
- a  strengthening  of  environment  policy with  the possibility of  laying  down 
mini~um requirements  by  majority  decision, 
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- the  introduction of  a  social  dimension, 
- no  Danish  commitment  to participate in military  co-operation, 
- no  Danish  commitment  to  participate in  a  common  EC  currency, 
- openness  1n  the  decision-making process. 
After the  signing  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  on  7  February  1992  the  Government 
introduced  a  bill  in  Parliament  concerning  Denmark's  accession  to  the  Maastricht 
Treaty.  In  the  vote,  130  voted  for  the proposal  in its final  version,  25  voted 
against,  1  member  abstained  and  23  were  absent.  The  bill did  not  secure  the 
5/6 majority  (150  votes)  required  for  Parliament  to  decide  the  matter alone.  In 
accordance  with  §  20  of  the Constitutional  Act,  the  final  adoption  of  the  bill 
was  put  to  a  referendum.  This  took  place  on  2  June  1992.  50,7%  of  the  votes 
cast  were  in  favour  of  rejection of  the  bill adopted  by  Parliament,  and  the bill 
thus  lapsed. 
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CHAPTER  V 
THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  AND  §  20  OF  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  ACT 
- The  surrender of  sovereignty within  the  meaning of  the  Constitutional  Act 
1.  SECTION  20:  HISTORY  AND  HOW  IT  FITS  INTO  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  ACT 
§  19  of  the Constitutional  Act  contains  the  rule  that  the  King,  i.e.  the 
Government,  shall  act  on  behalf  of  the  Realm  in  international affairs.  The 
Government  can  thus  commit  Denmark  by  entering  into agreements  with  other 
countries,  in  some  cases,  however,  only with  the prior consent  of Parliament.  In 
particular,( consent  must  be  obtained  where  fulfilment  of  the  obligation requires 
the  concurrence  of  Parliament,  but  also  where  the  obligation  is  otherwise  "of 
major  importance". 
§  19(1)  of  the Constitutional Act  reads  as  follows: 
"The  King  shall  act  on  behalf of  the  Realm  in  international affairs,  but, 
except  with  the  consent  of  the  Folketing,  the  King  shall  not  undertake  any  act 
whereby  the  territory of  the  Realm  shall  be  increased  or  reduced,  nor  shall  he 
enter  into  any  obligation which  for  fulfilment  requires  the  concurrence of  the 
Folketing,  or which  is otherwise  of  major  importance;  nor  shall  the  King, 
except  with  the  consent  of  the  Folketing,  terminate  any  international  treaty 
entered  :nto with  the  consent  of  the  Folketing." 
This  provision,  in slightly different  formulations,  has  been  the  central 
provision  in all  Danish  constitutional  acts  concerning  Denmark's  entry  into 
internationally binding agreements  with  the  outside world.  It  is on  this 
constitutional basis  that  the  substantial  international network  in which  Denmark 
participates has  been  established,  including  Denmark's  membership  of  the  UN, 
NATO,  the  Council  of  Europe,  etc. 
§  20  of  the  Constitutional  Act  was  added  when  the  Act  was  revised  in  1953, 
precisely  in  order  to  make  it possible  for  Denmark,  without  an  amendment  to  the 
constitution,  to  join  in  international  co-operation  in  which  joint  bodies 
exercise  direct  authority  over  citizens  and  businesses  in Denmark. 
§  20  of  the Constitutional  Act  reads  as  follows: 
"Powers  vested  in  the  authorities  of  the  Realm  under  this Constitutional  Act 
may,  to  such  extent  as  shall  be  provided  by  statute,  be  delegated  to 
international authorities  set  up  by  mutual  agreement  with  other states  for  the 
promotion  of  international  rules  of  law  and  co-operation. 
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(2)  For  the  enactment  of  a  bill dealing with  the  above,  a  majority  of 
five-sixths  of  the  members  of  the  Folketing shall  be  required.  If  this 
majority  is not  obtained,  whereas  the  majority  required  for  the  passing  of 
ordinary bills  is  obtained,  and  if the  Government  maintains  it,  the bill shall 
be  subm1tted  to  the  electorate for  approval  or  rejection  in accordance  w1th 
the  rules  for  referenda  laid  down  in§ 42." 
Professor  Max  S0rensen,  who  drafted  the  first  version  of  the  provision  for  the 
Const1tutional  Commission,  explained  the  background  to  the  provision  thus  in his 
1971  opinion  to  the  common  market  committee: 
"As  far  as  Denmark  is  concerned,  it may  be  taken  as  read  under  the 
constitutional  system that  authority over citizens  can  be  exercised  only  by 
Danish  institutions,  unless  the  constitution itself makes  provision  otherwise. 
Denmark's  accession  to  a  system such  as  that  established  by  the  European 
Communities  would  therefore  in principle  presuppose  an  amendment  to  the 
const1tution  unless  the  constitution itself provided  for  an  alternative 
posslbility. 
It  was  precisely to  make  it possible  for  Denmark  to  join in  international 
co-operation  in  this  more  advanced  form  without  an  amendment  to  the 
constitution that  §  20  was  inserted  1n  the  constitution when  1t  was  revised  in 
1953."  (Reprinted  in special edition of  Supplementary  Report  on  L  240, 
page  152) 
§  20  of  the Constitutional  Act  is  thus  a  special  prov1s1on  on  the  transfer of 
authority  to  international  bodies.  It  makes  it possible  to  fulfil  obligations  of 
that  kind  without  an  amendment  to  the  constitution. 
It  is worth pointing out  that  the  procedure  under  §  20  can  clearly only  be 
applied  where  it is  necessary  in order  to  give  international  bodies  (new)  powers 
over  c1tizens  and  businesses  in  Denmark,  or to enter  into  treaties  with  third 
countr1es  which  have  a  binding effect  on  Denmark.  All  other  international 
obligations,  i.e.  duties  for  the  State as  such,  which  can  be  fulfilled  in  another 
way,  namely  by  legislation,  do  not  require  the  §  20  procedure.  Denmark  can 
assume  such obligations  under  the  procedure  in  §  19  of  the  constitution. 
Powers  transferred  to  an  international  authority  in  accordance  with  the  procedure 
in  §  20  can  be  revoked  at  any  time  by  the  enactment  of  an  ordinary  law,  i.e. 
adopted  by  a  simple  majority  in Parliament.  Such  revocation will  be  completely 
val1d  under  the  constitution,  irrespective of whether  the  revocation  is  in 
accordance  with  international  law. 
2.  SECTION  20  AND  EC  CO-OPERATION  TO  DATE 
The  Act  of  Accession  of  1972  was  the  first  example  of  application  of  the 
procedure  in  §  20  of  the Constitutional  Act  prior to  Denmark's  accession  to  a 
treaty which  involved  the  transfer of  legislative,  administrative  and  judicial 
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powers  to  international  bodies.  Consent  to entry  into  the  obligations  of  the 
Treaty  (§  19)  was  given  in  legal  form  in§  1  of  the  Act.  In  addition,  the  Act 
contained various  implementing  provisions,  notably  §  2,  which  transferred powers 
to  the  EC  institutions  (§  20).  The  Act  stipulated that  the  institutioGs  cot1ld 
exercise  the  transferred  powers  to  the  extent  laid down  in  the Treaties.  The  Act 
was  ratified  on  11  October  1972  after it had  been  confirmed  on  2  October  1972  by 
a  binding  referendum pursuant  to  §  20  of  the Constitutional Act.  In  the 
referendum  63,3%  voted  yes. 
Since  access1on  in  1973,  no  new  powers  have  been transferred  to  the 
EC  institutions within  the  meaning of  the  constitution.  The  basic Treaty has,  it 
is  true,  been  amended  on  a  number  of  occasions,  most  recently  by  the  Single  Act 
in  1986,  but  on  each  occasion it was  concluded  by  the  Government  and  Parliament 
that  the  amendments  or additions  to  the  basic Treaty did  not  hand  over new  powers 
to  legislate,  administer or deliver  judgments  with direct application  to  citizens 
and  businesses  in  Denmark,  or  to  accede  to treaties with  third countries with 
binding effect for  Denmark. 
It  was  thus  concluded  in  connection with  the  ratification of  the Single  Act  that 
the  EC  institutions were  not  granted  powers  to  issue rules  binding  on  the  citizen 
in  new  areas,  and  that  the  fact  that  the voting rules  in  the  Treaty were  changed, 
e.g.  from  unanimity  to qualified majority,  did  not  involve  the  transfer of  new 
powers  from  Denmark,  and  therefore did  not  require  application of  the  procedure 
in  §  20  of  the Constitutional  Act.  The  same  applied to  the  change  in  the 
legislative process,  which  meant  that  the  European  Parliament  became  involved 
more  closely  in  a  number  of  areas,  the so·-called  co-operation procedure. 
Thus,  since  1973  the  EC  institutions  have,  on  the  basis  of  the Treaties, 
exercised  powers  transferred  when  Denmark  acceded.  The  enactment  of  laws  and  (to 
a  limited extent)  administration  and  the  handing  down  of  judgments  have  had 
direct  application  to citizens  and  businesses  in Denmark. 
In  some  areas  the  institutions made  very extensive  use  at  an  early stage  of  the 
powers  transferred  by  the  member  countries.  This  was  particularly the  case  w1th 
agricultural  policy,  the  rules  concerning  internal  trade  in goods  and  services. 
rules  on  the  free  movement  of  labour  and  the  common  commercial  policy vis-a-vls 
the  outside world.  In other areas  a  more  comprehensive  development  of  law  only 
occurred  later.  This  was  the  case  inter alia with  fisheries  policy,  which  wa~ 
seriously developed  in  the  second  half of  the  1970s  and  - particularly after the 
adjustments  introduced  with  the  Single  Act  in  1986  - the  environment,  protection 
of  the  working  environment  with  common  minimum  standards  and  legislation on  "the 
internal  market". 
It  may,  incidentally,  be  pointed  out  that  a  large part  of  EC  legislation over  the 
years  has  not  been  based  on  powers  transferred under  §  20,  as  a  large  proportion 
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of  the total  legislation is  binding on  the  member  countries  but  not  directly  on 
cit~zens and  businesses  in  the  member  countries. 
The  fact  that  the  institutions are  able  to  leg1slate  in  an  area takes  on 
practical  significance only  as  Community  regulation is  introduced  in  that  area. 
Thus  the  degree  of  freedom  of  the  national  authorities  in all  member  countries  is 
reduced  only  to  the extent  that  common  rules  are  established.  Even  in  areas  with 
very  extensive  common  rules  it is  therefore very  often  the  case  that  the  State's 
capacity  for  regulating the  area has  not  completely  disappeared.  Within,  for 
example,  the  agricultural  policy  area,  which  is  one  of  the  most  thoroughly 
regulated  Community  sectors,  there  remains  the possibility of  enacting  laws 
nationally  in various matters,  albeit  of  course  in  such  a  way  that  such 
leg1slation,  like all other  legislation,  does  not  conflict  with  Community  law. 
Supplementing  or  implementing national  legislation is  moreover  often provided  for 
in  EC  leg1slation.  Similarly,  most  administrative  and  in practice  almost  all 
judicial  powers  in  the  agricultural  sector  (and  other sectors)  continue  to  l1e 
with  the  national  authorities. 
It  can  thus  be  concluded  that  EC  co-operation has  for  almost  20  years  developed 
partly through  changes  to  the  basic Treaty  and  partly through  the  effect  of  the 
institutions,  but without  it being necessary  to  transfer new  powers  within  the 
meauing  of  the  constitution. 
3.  SECTION  20  AND  EUROPEAN  CO-OPERATION  IN  THE  PATENT  FIELD 
A proposal  for  the transfer of  powers  to  international  bodies  was  put  before 
Parliament  under  the  procedure  in  §  20  of  the Constitutional  Act  in the  patent 
field.  The  instruments  concerned  are  the  European  Patent  Convention  of  1973  and 
the Agreement  on  Community  Patents,  including the  Community  Patent  Convention 
of  1975.  These  two  sets of  international  agreements,  the  first  of  which  is 
moreover  open  to  non-member  countries  and  has  inter alia been  acceded  to  by 
Sweden,  still have  a  certain connection  with  EC  co-operation but  were  drawn  up  on 
a  general  international  basis  and,  furthermore,  do  not  constitute  an  amendment  to 
the  EC's  basic Treaties. 
The  f1rst  bill on  accession  to  the  two  Conventions  was  tabled  in  the 
parliamentary year  1976-1977  but  discussions  were  not  completed,  so  that  it was 
re-introduced  in  1977-1978,  when  it was  put  to  the  vote  and  a  five-sixths 
majority  failed  to be  obtained.  A bill on  accession  to  the  European  Patent 
Convention  was  subsequently  submitted  in  1980-1981,  and  again  in  1981-1982,  when 
it lapsed  owing  to  the  calling of elections.  The  bill was  again  submitted  in the 
parliamentary  year  1982-1983,  when  it was  voted  on  but  did  not  secure  the 
requisite qualified maJority. 
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Thereafter  the  matter  lay  dormant  until  the  parliamentary year  1988-1989,  when  at 
its third  reading it proved possible to  achieve  the required five-sixth majority 
(Act  No  368  on  the  European  Patent  Convention). 
In the  parliamentary year  1991-1992  the  Government  made  a  further attempt  to 
secure  the  required  majority  for  the  Agreement  on  Community  Patents  {Bill  L  61). 
Discussions  on  the bill were  not  concluded  and  it is expected  to  be  re-introduced 
in the  parliamentary year  1992-1993. 
There  is nothing  in  the  constitution to  prevent  the  resubmission of  the  same 
issue  conce~ning the  transfer of  powers  to  an  international  institution with  a 
view  to  making  it possible  to fulfil  a  specific international  agreement.  A bill 
under  §  20  does  not  differ in this  respect  from  other bills,  despite  the strict 
requirements  in  the  constitution  regarding the  adoption of  such  bills. 
It is  the  Government,  or  a  member  of  Parliament,  which  determines  on  the  basis of 
a  politlcal assessment  whether  it is expedient  to  submit  a  proposal,  but  if the 
required  five-sixth majority  in Parliament  is not  obtained it is the  Government 
alone  which  can  maintain  a  bill which  has  been  adopted  by  an ordinary majority 
vote,  with  the  effect  that  it can  be  put  to  a  referendum. 
4.  SECTION  20  AND  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
As  stated  above,  EC  co-operation  since  accession  in  1973  has  developed  on  the 
basis of  the  §  20  powers  which  were  transferred  at  that  time.  The  need  for  the 
transfer of new  or supplementary  powers  first  arose  in connection with  the 
Maastricht  Treaty. 
There  is  no  reason  to  repeat  the  analysis  which  was  carried  out  in  connection 
with  the  discussion of  the bill in  Parliament;  reference  is made  to  the note  from 
the  Justice Ministry of  3  March  1992,  the  common  market  committee's  questions  to 
the  Government  and  the  replies  received etc.,  which  were  published  in the  Special 
Edition  of  the  Supplementary  Report  on  L  240. 
In  its note  of  3  March  1992  the Justice Ministry goes  through  the Maastricht 
Treaty with  a  view  to  examining certain constitutional  issues  to which  Denmark's 
accession  to  that Treaty could  give  rise. 
The  note  points  to  a  number  of  prov1s1ons  in the  Maastricht  Treaty  to which,  in 
the  Justice Ministry's view,  Denmark  can  subscribe  only  in accordance  with  the 
procedure  in  §  20  of  the Constitutional  Act. 
The  Justice Ministry  notes  that  the  Maastricht  Treaty  introduces  a  series of  new 
areas  of  co-operation  which  have,  however,  to  a  certain extent  already  been 
regulated  under  EC  legal  instruments  drawn  up  under  the  authorizing provisions  of 
the  Treaty,  including Article  235. 
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4.1.  POSITIONS  TO  BE  TAKEN  PRIOR  TO  THE  ENTRY  INTO  FORCE  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
The  Justice Ministry note  points  to  the  following  instances  where  the  entry  into 
force  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  would  involve  a  transfer of  sovereignty provided 
the  bill  was  finally  adopted  in  the  form  adopted  by  Parliament. 
(1)  The  amendments  to Articles  1  to  3:  with  regard  to  these  amendments  the 
Justice Ministry note  states  that  they might  be  thought  to entail  a  certain 
extension  of  EC  powers. 
Taking this together with the  fact  that  there  1s  no  clear certainty concerning 
the  extent  to  which  the  current  EEC  Treaty gives  authority for the  drawing  up  of 
legal  instruments  in  some  of  the  new  areas  of  co-operation,  as  mentioned  in 
Articles  3  and  3a  and  in  the  special  sections  of  the  Treaty,  the  Justice 
Ministry's  overall  opinion  was  that  in this situation the procedure  in  §  20  of 
the  Constitutional  Act  should  be  applied. 
As  stated  in the  Justice Ministry note,  it may  be  assumed  that  it would  already 
be  possible to  some  extent  on  the  existing Treaty bas1s,  to  adopt  legal 
instruments  within  the  areas  which  the  Maastricht  Treaty  refers  to explicitly in 
contrast  with  the  earlier Treaties.  The  following  new  areas  are  divided,  each  of 
which  is  given  a  special  section  in the Treaty:  training  and  vocational  training, 
culture.  health,  consumer protection,  trans-European  networks,  including 
transport,  telecommunications  and  energy  infrastructure,  industrial  pol1cy  and 
development  co-operation.  There  are  also  three  areas  which  do  not  receive  a 
special  section in the Treaty  - energy,  civil protection and  tourism. 
There  would  not  really  be  a  transfer of  new  powers  to  the  EC  to  the  extent  that 
the  sectors  concerned  have  been  or  could  have  been  regulated  under  the 
authorizing provisions  of  the  Treaty,  including Article  235. 
However,  the  Justice Ministry  note  does  not  examine  in detail  the extent  to  which 
legal  instruments  could  be  drawn  up  in  the  areas  concerned  on  the  existing Treaty 
basis.  As  stated  above,  the  Justice Ministry  simply  notes  that  there  is  no  clear 
certainty  concerning  the  extent  to  which  the  current  EEC  Treaty gives  authority 
for  drawing  up  legal  instruments  in several  of  the  specific areas  concerned, 
including,  for  example  culture. 
Finally,  the  Justice Ministry  note  stresses,  as  mentioned  above,  that  the 
amendments  to  the  introductory provisions  of  the  Treaty  could  entail  some 
extension  of  EC  powers  on  the  basis  of  the  future  developments  clause  in 
Art1cle  235,  in  that  the  introductory provisions  are  relevant  for  demarcating  the 
scope  of  that  provision. 
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(2)  Article  8b:  The  obligation to give nationals  of other  EC  countries  who  are 
resident  here  the  right  to  vote  and  to  stand  as  a  candidate  at  municipal 
elections  and  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  is  contained  in the Treaty 
itself and,  insofar  as  these  provisions  are directly applicable,  does  not  involve 
a  transfer of  authority within  the meaning  of  §  20.  The  provision that  this 
right  is  to  be  exercised  subject  to  detailed  arrangements  to  be  adopted  by  the 
Council  acting  unanimously,  however,  gives  rise  to  doubts.  These  implementing 
provisions  may  impose  various  requirements  which will  have  to  be  fulfilled  before 
foreigners  can  acquire  the  right  to  vote  and  to  stand  as  a  candidate,  e.g. 
residence  in  the  host  country  for  a  certain period,  and  they  may  also provide  for 
actual  derogations.  The  Justice Ministry  concludes  that  Danish  acceptance  of 
these  provisions will  probably  require application of  the  procedure  in  §  20  of 
the Constitutional  Act. 
(3)  Article  100c:  Pursuant  to this prov1s1on it is  for  the  Council  to determine, 
with effect for all  member  countries,  the  third  countries  whose  nationals  must  be 
in  possession of  a  visa when  entering a  member  country  for  the first  time.  The 
Council  is also  given  authority  to  introduce  a  temporary visa requirement  for 
nationals  of  a  third country  should  an  emergency  occur which  makes  such  a  measure 
necessary,  and  it  can  also  draw  up  a  uniform visa format. 
It  is stressed for  form's  sake  that  the  new  rules  do  not  concern Danish  citizens 
entering Denmark  or other  EC  countries,  and  that  the  new  rules  in this  area do 
not  involve  third  country nationals  being  given  social  rights  in Denmark. 
(4)  Article K.9,  cf.  Art1cle  K. 1:  In  the  area of  asylum  policy it was  written 
into  the bill  adopted  by  Parliament  on  12  May  1992  that adoption of  the bill  and 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  meant  that  the  area of  asylum 
policy  could  be  transferred  from  intergovernmental  co-operation,  pillar 3,  to 
supranational  co-operation,  pillar 1,  by  means  of  a  decision by  the  Council 
act1ng  unanimously.  If  this  did  in  fact  occur,  the  adoption  of  the  bill would 
mean  that  powers  would  be  transferred  to  the  Council  in the  asylum policy area 
corresponaing  to  the  powers  conferred  in  the visa policy  area  by  Article  100c. 
The  Council  would  in  the  event  be  able  to  lay  down  a  common  asytum  policy  in 
relation  to  third  country  nationals. 
4.2  POSITIONS  TAKEN  AFTER  THE  ENTRY  INTO  FORCE  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
In  the  following  areas,  in which  implementation of  the Maastricht Treaty  would 
require  a  transfer of  sovereignty,  the bill adopted  by  Parliament  on  12  May  1992 
provided  for  a  decision  to  be  taken at  a  later date: 
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(1)  Art1cle  109{3):  EMU,  agreements  with  third  countries  on  monetary  or 
foreign-exchange  rates.  The  Justice Ministry's  note  considered  that  it  was 
doubtful  whether  the  EC  would  already  be  able  to  enter into  such  agreements  with 
third  countries.  It  was  therefore  assumed  that  the  §  20  procedure  would  be 
necessary  on  this point. 
As  the Justice Ministry note states,  a  possible  transfer of  sovereignty  on  this 
po1nt  is  different  in nature.  Whereas  the  other  areas  1dent1fied  are  examples  of 
the  EC  institutions  being  handed  powers  to  legislate,  administer  or pass 
judgments  with direct  application to  citizens or businesses  in  Denmark,  here  a 
power  is  transferred which,  under  the  constitution,  is explicitly conferred  on 
the  Government,  namely  the  capacity to enter  into  international  agreements.  If 
such an  agreement  entered  into  by  the  EC  were  also  to  be  binding  on  the  member 
countries,  a  transfer of powers  within  the  meaning  of  §  20  would  be  needed. 
A position would need  to  be  taken  on  the  question before  Denmark  could,  if the 
cas~ arises,  participate  in  the  third  stage  of  EMU,  probably  in  1996  but  in  1998 
at  the  latest.  If  a  decision  1s  not  taken  to  transfer the  relevant  power  to  the 
EC  institutions in  accordance  with  §  20,  Denmark  will  be  unable  to participate  in 
the  th1rd  stage of the  EMU. 
(2)  The  Statute for the  European  System of Central  Banks  and  the  European  Central 
Bank  (ESCB/ECB)  Article  34,  cf.  Article  19:  EMU,  certain  requirements  for  credit 
institutions.  Pursuant  to  these  provisions  the  ECB  is  empowered  to  require  banks 
and  sav1ngs  banks  directly  to  hold  minimum  reserves  on  accounts  with  the  ECB  and 
national  central banks  in order to fulfil  monetary  policy objectives. 
A position would  also have  to  be  taken  on  this  transfer of  sovereignty before 
Denmark  could,  if the  case  arises,  participate  in  the  third  stage  of  the  EMU. 
(3)  Article  K.9:  transfer of  certain areas  from  international  co-operation  to 
supra-natlonal  co-operation,  cf.  Article  K.1.  In  the  same  way  as  mentioned  above 
concerning asylum  policy,  application of  the procedure  in  §  20  will  be  necessary 
in order to  transfer one  or more  of  the  areas  mentioned  in Article  K. 1,  points  2 
to  6,  to  supra-national  co-operation,  pillar 1.  The  matters  concerned  are 
further border controls,  immigration policy  (concerning  third  country  nationals) 
two  forms  of cross-border crime,  v1z.  drugs  and  international  fraud,  and  civil 
matters. 
A position would  have  to be  taken at  the  time  when  consideration  was  being  given 
to  transferring co-operation  to  the  supra-national  arena  {Article  100c)  in  the 
case of  one  of  these  areas  or merely  part  of  an  area. 
A position could therefore  be  taken  for  the  five  abovementioned  areas  together, 
for one  area at  a  time,  or  for  one  partial area at  a  t1me. 
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4.3.  AREAS  IN  WHICH  A TRANSFER  OF  SOVEREIGNTY  IS  NOT  NECESSARY 
The  abovementioned  areas  are  thus  those  in  which  a  transfer of  sovereignty is 
identifieJ as  being necessary.  In  those  areas  new  powers  would,  in  the  event, 
have  to  be  transferred to  the  EC  institutions within the  meaning  of  §  20  of  the 
Constitutional  Act. 
It was  thus  assumed  when  the  law was  being discussed that  in particular the 
following  rules  in the  Maastricht Treaty  could  have  been  acceded  to  with binding 
effect  on  Denmark  without  the  application of  the  procedure  in §  20  of  the 
Constitutional  Act,  1.e.  with  the  ordinary  consent  of  Parliament: 
- The  new  intergovernmental  co-operation  in pillar 2  on  the  common  foreign  and 
security policy,  including the  more  binding  common  actions. 
- The  new  intergovernmental  co-operation  in pillar 3  in  legal  and  internal 
affairs,  irrespective  of  the question of  a  transfer of  certain areas  to 
pillar  1. 
- The  new  institutlonal  rules,  including 
- The  common  institutional  framework,  i.e.  the  fact  that  the  existing 
instit~tions would  conduct  co-operation  under all  three pillars,  which  means 
in particular that  decisions  would  also  be  taken by  the  Council  in connection 
with pillars  2  and  3. 
-Extension of  the  European  Parliament's  legislative powers,  i.e.  introduction 
of  the  new  co-decision procedure  and  extension of  the  scope  of  the 
co-operation  and  assent  procedure. 
-Strengthening of  the  European  Parliament's  supervisory  powers  (budget,  right 
of  petition,  examining  committees). 
- The  new  procedure  for  appointing  the  Commission. 
- New  voting  rules  in  the  Council  (qualified majority)  in certain areas. 
- Establishment  of  the  Committee  of  the  Regions  and  a  European  Ombudsman. 
- Introduction of  new  principles  for  the  working  of  the  EC  institutions,  in 
particular the  "closeness" principle. 
- Introduc!1on  of  a  common  currency  and  a  European Central  Bank  (see Section  5 
below  for details). 
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In  these  areas  there are  thus  new  Treaty  rules  which  only  bind  Denmark  as  such. 
In  these  areas,  pursuant  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  there  can  be  no  enactment  of 
laws,  administration or passing of  judgments  with  direct  appl1cation  to  citizens 
or  bus1nesses  in  Denmark  to  a  greater extent  than  on  the  present Treaty basis. 
5.  SECTION  20  AND  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION 
The  rules  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty  on  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  illustrate very 
succinctly that  the  concept  of  sovereignty  in  §  20  of  the Constitutional  Act  is 
of  a  judicial nature.  Treatment  according  to  this  special  provision does  not 
necessarily reflect greater political  importance  or mean  that  the  specific 
obligations  concerned  are weightier  than  other obligations  which  do  not  require 
the§  20  treatment. 
As  appears  from  the  account  given  above,  Denmark  can  assume  most  obligations 
(Wlth  the  related  rights)  which  are  enshrined  in  the  new  rules  on  EMU  on  the 
basis  of  the  general  provision in§  19  of  the  Constitutional  Act.  This  appl1es 
to  the setting of  exchange  rates  and  the  introduction of  a  common  currency, 
establishment  of  the  European  Central  Bank  and  the  European  System  of  Central 
Banks,  the obligation  to  avoid  disproportionately  large public  deficits  and  the 
Council's  right  to  impose  penalties  in  that  connection. 
On  these  and  other similar points,  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  crucial 
prov1sions  in  the  EMU,  Denmark  can  accede  and  fulfil  the  new  rules  under  the 
procedure  in  §  19. 
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THE  RATIFICATION  PROCESS  IN  THE  OTHER 
MEMBER  STATES 
- Procedure  and  debate 
This Chapter describes  national  procedures  for  ratification of  the 
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Maastricht  Treaty.  Of  the  twelve  EC  Member  States,  five  have  completed  their 
national  procedures;  three  (Denmark,  Ireland  and  France)  have  done  so  by  means  of 
a  referendum  and  two  (Luxembourg  and  Greece)  by  means  of  a  parliamentary vote. 
The  other  Member  States  are  expected  to  complete  their procedures  using  the 
parliamentary process.  One  Member  State  (Luxembourg)  has  already deposited its 
instrument  of  ratification. 
The  various  countries'  national  constitutional  ratification procedures differ, 
particularly with  regard  to  the  need  to  amend  the national  constitution, 
secondary  legislation and  the  need  to  consult  interested parties  (such  as 
constituent  States).  Thus,  for  example,  constitutional  amendments  are necessary 
in  France,  Spain,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Italy and  Germany.  In  the  case of  the 
United  Kingdom,  the  ratification  law will  contain only  those  parts of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  which  relate  to  the  Community  (first pillar),  since 
co-operation  between  States  (second  and  third pillars)  does  not  require  any 
special  legislation before  ratification.  In  connection with  the national 
ratification procedure  ln  some  Member  States  resolutions  have  been  passed  in 
national  parliaments.  These  resolutions  are  by  way  of being  interpretations of 
the  Maastricht  Treaty,  or concern national  legislation which  has  been  affected, 
or national  decision-making procedures  on  EC  matters. 
The  general  picture  in the  other  EC  countries  shows  that  there  is  broad political 
support  from  the  dominant  parties  in  the  various  countries'  parliaments.  It  is 
mainly  the  far-right  and  far-left  wings  that  are  against  ratification of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty. 
Reaction  to  the  result  of  the  Danish  referendum  on  2  June  was  expressed  in  the 
Oslo  declaration of  4  June  1992,  which  stated that: 
"- Ministers  heard  a  report  from  the  Danish  Foreign Minister on  the  results  of 
the  Dan1sh  referendum,  the  outcome  of  which  they all  regret. 
- Ministers  noted  that  11  Member  States  expressed  their wish  to  see  the 
European  union  established  by  all Member  States.  They  exclude  any  reopening 
of  the  text  signed  in Maastricht. 
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- The  ratification process  in Member  States  will  continue  on  the  basis  of  the 
existing text  and  in  accordance with  the agreed  timetable  before  the  end  of 
the  year. 
They  all  agreed  that  the  door for Denmark's  participation 1n  the  union  rema1ns 
open." 
This  position was  conf1rmed  in the  Lisbon  European  Council's  conclusions. 
Reaction  to  the  result  of the  French  referendum  on  20  September  1992  was 
expressed  in the  New  York  declaration of  21  September  1992,  which  stated: 
"The  General  Affairs  Council  met  in extraordinary  session  in  New  York  on 
21  September. 
The  Council  warmly  welcomed  the positive  result  of  the  French  referendum  on 
the  Treaty  on  European  Union  signed  in Maastricht  on  7  February. 
The  Council  noted  with satisfaction that  certain Member  States  have  already 
ratified the  draft  Treaty,  and  that  ratification procedures  were  well 
advanced  in most  other Member  States.  They  attached  h1gh  priority to  the 
speedy  and  successful  conclus1on  of  the  process,  without  reopening  the 
( 2) 
present  text,  on  the  timing foreseen  in Article  R of  the Treaty. 
The  Council  also  welcomed  the  statement  issued  on  20  September  by  Economic 
and  Finance Ministers  meeting  in  Washington,  in which  they  expressed  the 
view  that  the  French  referendum result  will  ease  tension  1n  the  foreign 
exchange  markets  and  re1terated their  commitment  to  the  European  Monetary 
System as  a  key  factor for  economic  stability and  prosperity  in  Europe. 
(2)  The  relevant  part  of  Article  R  is  paragraph  2,  which  states:  "This  Treaty 
shall enter into  force  on  I  January  1993,  provided  that  all  the  1nstruments 
of ratification have  been  deposited,  or,  fail1ng  that,  on  the  first  day  of 
the  month  following  the _deposit  of  the  instrument  of  ratification  by  the  last 
s1gnatory State  to  take  this  step." 
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The  Council  welcomed  at  the  same  time  the  wide  debate  which  has  taken place 
in all the  Member  States  over  recent  months  with  regard  to  the  future 
development  of  the  European  construction.  They  pledged  their determination 
to  ensure  that  the  preoccupations  which  had  been  brought  to  the  forefront  in 
this  public  discussion will  find  specific  responses  in  the  future 
development  of  Europe  internally and  externally. 
The  Council  welcomed  the  Presidency's  decision to  convene  an early,  special 
European  Council  to  consider these  issues. 
The  Council  also welcomed  the  determination of  the  Presidency to  press  ahead 
qutckly  with  urgent  business,  including  the  completion  of  the Single  Market 
by  the  end of  1992,  and  the  negotiations  on  the  Community's  finances,  in 
accordance with  the  timetables  and  priorities set by  the  European  Council  in 
Ltsbon." 
Annex  3  gives  a  general  picture of  the  progress  of  ratification procedures  in the 
Member  States. 
-
SN  4364/92  EN - 56  -
oyd/LG/be 
1.  BELGIUM 
National  ratification procedure 
The  recommendation  for  Belgian  ratification of  the  Treaty  was,  as  a  first  step  in 
the  ratif1cation procedure,  put  before  the  Belgian Cab1net.  After  discuss1on  in 
the Cabinet,  the  text  of  the Treaty  was  sent  to  the  Council  of  State  for  comment. 
In  an  opinion  of  6  May  1992  the  Council  of  State held  that  Belgian  acceptance  of 
the Maastricht  Treaty  would  require  amendment  of Article  4  of  the  Const1tution 
concerning  the  right  of  foreigners  to  take  part  in  local  elections  in  Belgium. 
The  Council  of State  considered  that  the  amendment  of  the Constitution  should 
take  place before  ratification.  The  Council  of State's opinions  are  simply 
adv1sory,  and  the  Government  decided  that  the bill for  the  necessary  amendment  of 
the Constitution should not  be  tabled until after ratification had  taken  place. 
At  the  same  time  as  it was  submitted  to  the  Cabinet,  the  text  of  the  Treaty  was 
also  sent  to  the Councils  of  the  three  Belgian  language  communities  Wlth  a  view 
to  obtaining their consent  to  the  text  of  the Treaty.  The  Foreign Affairs 
Committee  of  the  Flemish Council  completed  its discussions  on  9  July  1992. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  language  communities  are  not  required  to  approve  the 
Treaty  as  such,  but  simply  those  parts  of  it which  fall  w1thin  their  sphere  of 
competence. 
The  actual  bill  for ratification of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  was  put  before 
Parl1ament  by  Government  on  26  May  1992.  It  was  d1scussed  1n  the  Fore1gn  Affairs 
Committee  of  the  Chamber  of Representatives,  which  recommended  approval  of 
ratification on  9  July  1992.  On  the  basis  of  the  Foreign Affairs  Committee's 
report,  the  Chamber  of  Representat1ves discussed  the bill on  13,  14  and 
15  July  1992.  The  bill  was  passed  by  the  Chamber  of  Representat1ves  without 
amendment  on  17  July  1992.  One  hundred  and  eighty-two  of  the  Chamber's 
212  members  took  part  in  the  vote.  Of  those,  146  voted  in  favour,  33  voted 
against  and  3  abstained.  Only  the  two  green parties  and  the  two  Flem1sh 
nationalist  parties  dissociated  themselves  from  the  bill.  The  bill  was  then  sent 
to  the  Senate,  where  it will  be  discussed  when  Parliament  reassembles  in October. 
It  is ant1cipated  that  the  Belgian  ratification process  will  be  completed  in 
October  1992. 
Belgium  Wlll  not  be  holding  a  referendum  on  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
SN  4364/92  EN - 57  -
oyd/LG/be 
Political debate 
There  is  wide  political  backing for  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  Belgium.  The 
Belgian  Parliament  made  its agreement  to ratification of  the Maastricht  Treaty 
conditional  on  a  favourable  Opinion  from  the  European  Parliament  on  the  Union. 
This  Opinion  was  given  at  the  European  Parliament's  plenary part-session  from 
6  to  10  April  1992.  An  opinion poll  carried out  by  the  daily newspaper  "Le  Soir" 
immediately after the  Danish  referendum  on  2  June  1992  showed  that  three  out  of 
four  Belgians  would  vote  "yes"  to  ratification if the  question  were  put  to  a 
referendum.  Thirty-seven per  cent  of  those  polled had  no  opinion  on  the matter. 
Reaction  to the Danish  referendum 
Immediately  after the  result  of  the  Danish  referendum on  2  June,  the  Belgian 
Foreign Minister  commented  that it was  necessary  to  pursue  the  course defined  by 
the  Maastricht  Treaty.  There  was  very  little official  Belgian  comment  on  the 
situation as  it stood  after the  Danish  "no".  The  Belgian press  was  likewise 
concerned  only  to  a  limited degree  with  the  result of  the  Danish  referendum. 
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2.  FRANCE 
National  ratification procedure 
Under  Article  54  of the  French Constitution  the  President  submitted  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  to  the  French  Constitutional  Council  on  11  March  1992  for its 
opinion  on  ~hether the Treaty  was  compatible  with  the  French  Constitution.  The 
Constitutional  Council  gave  its opinion  on  9  April  1992. 
In  that  opinion,  the  Constitutional  Council  took  the  view  that  Article  8b(1}  of 
the  Maastricht  Treaty,  on  the  right  to  vote  and  to  stand  as  a  candidate  at 
municipal  elections,  required  amendment  of Article  3  of  the  French  Constitution, 
which  gives only  French  nationals that  right.  It  also  held  that,  as  the  French 
Senate  was  constituted  by  means  of  indirect  elections  via  an  electoral  college 
composed  of  members  with  seats  on  the  French  Communal  Counclls,  and  as  the 
French Senate.  being  a  parliamentary  body,  took  part  in  the  exercise  of  national 
sovereignty,  only  French nationals  could  take  part  in  the  election of  Senate 
members.  On  the  other hand,  the  Const1tut1onal  Council  did  not  consider that 
Article  8b~2} of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  concerning elections  to  the 
European Parliament,  required  amendment  of  the  Constitution. 
In  the  monetary  area,  the Constitutional  Counc1l  considered  that  the  th1rd  phase 
required  amendment  of  the Constitution with  regard  to  the  following  points: 
- Article  B as  regards  the  establishment  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union, 
ultimately  including  a  single  currency; 
-Article G  amending  the  EEC  Treaty  by  including  the  following  new  prov1s1ons: 
Articles  3a(2),  105(2),  105a,  107,  109,  109g,  second  paragraph,  and  1091(4); 
the  other provisions  in Treaty Title VI,  Chapters  2,  3  and  4  and  in  Protocols 
Nos  3  and  10  to  the  extent  that  they  constitute  an  integral  part  of  the  said 
Articles. 
The  Constitutional  Council  considered  that  implementation  of  the objectives  of  an 
independent  European Central  Bank  (ECB),  of  an  ECB  monopoly  on  the  1ssue  of 
banknotes.  and  of  the  irrevocable fixing  of  exchange  rates,  followed  ultimately 
by  the  adoption  of  a  s1ngle  currency,  with  a  view  to  introducing a  common 
monetary  and  exchange-rate policy from  the  beg1nning  of  the  third  phase  depr1ved 
a  Member  State of  individual  powers  in an  area  where  the  essentlal  conditions  for 
the  exercise of national  freedom  of  action were  involved. 
Finally,  the Constitutional  Counc1l  considered  that  Article  100c(3)  concerning 
visa policy,  which  was  incorporated  in  the  EEC  Treaty  by  means  of Article  G, 
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required  an  amendment  of  the  French Constitution  from  1  January  1996,  the  date  on 
which  the  Council  would  start  adopting decisions  by  qualified majority,  since 
those  decisions  could  lead  to  infringement  of  the  essential  condition5  fer  the 
exercise  of  national  freedom  of action. 
The  Constitutional  Council's  overall  conclusion was  that  France  could  not  ratify 
the  Maastricht  Treaty without  first  amending  the Constitution as  a  result  of 
surrendering sovereignty  - as  defined  in  the  French Constitution  - over  the  right 
to  vote  and  to  stand  as  a  candidate  at  municipal  elections,  the  common  monetary 
policy and  the  common  visa policy. 
The  procedure  for  making  constitutional  amendments  is set  out  in Article  89  of 
the  French Constitution and  involves  a  series of discussions  in  the 
National  Assembly  and  the  Senate,  each  body  passing the  amendment  in  identical 
terms.  To  conclude  the  amendment  procedure  there  is a  choice  between  a 
Parliamentary Congress  consisting of  the  members  of both  the  National  Assembly 
and  the  Senate,  which  together must  adopt  the  proposed  amendment  by  a 
three-fifths majority  of  the  votes  cast,  or a  national  referendum. 
On  the  basis  of  the Constitutional Council's  opinion of 9  April  1992,  the 
French  Government  decided,  on  22  April  1992,  to  table  a  bill for  amendment  of  the 
French  Constitution. 
Art1cle  1  of  the  bill  amended  the  chapter  layout  of  the  1958  Constitution. 
Article  2  introduced  a  new  Chapter  XIV  in  the  1958  Constitution entitled 
"European  Union".  consisting of  two  new  Articles  88-1  and  88-2: 
- Article  88-1  stated  that  France,  with  regard  to  application of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  as  signed  on  7  February  1992  and  subject  to  reciprocity, 
consented  to  transfer of  the  necessary  powers  for  the establishment of  Economic 
and  Monetary  Union  and  for  the  laying down  of  rules  concerning  the  crossing of 
the  external  frontiers  of  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Community; 
- Article  88-2  stated that,  subject  to  reciprocity  and  with  regard  to  application 
of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  as  signed  on  7  February  1992,  nationals  of the  Member 
States  of  the  European  Community  resident  in  France  would  have  the  right  to 
vote  and  to  stand  as  candidates  at  municipal  elections.  They  could  not  serve 
as  mayor  or deputy  mayor  or  take part  in  the  election of  senators. 
The  proposed  constitutional  amendmeP.t  was  put  to  the National  Assembly  on 
22  Apr1l  1992  and  was  submitted  to  the  Legislative Committee  for discussion. 
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The  Legislative Committee of  the  National  Assembly  produced  a  part1al  report  on 
2  May  1992,  concerning  EMU,  for use  in  the  debate  on  the  constitutional 
amendments  connected  with  France's  ratification of  the Maastricht  Treaty.  The 
report  gave  a  run-down  of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  for  France  of 
co-operation within  the  EMS  compared  with  EMU. 
According  to  the  report,  the  French  monetary authorities  were,  under  the  EMS, 
subject  to  the  decisions  of  the  Bundesbank.  An  autonomous  French  monetary  and 
exchange-rate  policy would  involve  floating  the  franc  on  the  exchange  markets  and 
leaving  the  EMS,  with  the  same  negative effects  on  prices,  interest  rates  and 
competitiveness  as  the  United  Kingdom  suffered  before  the  pound  joined the  EMS 
exchange-rate  mechanism. 
The  view  was  that  the  French  economy's  main  problem  - unemployment  - was  fuelled 
by  a  German  monetary  policy  carried  out  by  a  German  body  independent  of  the 
Government,  on  the  basis of  interests  which  were  not  those  of  France. 
It was  concluded  that  the only solution  was  full  implementation of  Economic  and 
Monetary  Union,  which  would  not  involve  a  transfer of  French  powers  to  a  European 
body  but  on  the  contrary a  transfer of  actual  power  from  the  Bundesbank  to  the 
European  Central  Bank,  where  France  would  have  a  part  to  play  in  lnfluencing 
monetary  policy.  This  was  also  considered  to  be  the  only  way  to  avoid  a  de  facto 
DM-zone. 
The  report  concluded  by  expressing the wish  that  the  French  Parliament  should  be 
consulted  by  the  Government  on  questions  to  do  with  EC  financing  and  the 
EC  budget. 
On  5  May  1992  the  bill was  discussed  for  the first  time  in  plenary.  A procedural 
motion  tabled  by  the Gaullist  opposer of  the Treaty,  the  former  Social  Affairs 
Minister,  Philippe Seguin,  to  the effect  that  the bill should  not'be  discussed  in 
Parliament  and  that  there  should  be  a  referendum  instead,  was  rejected  by 
396  votes  to  101  with  72  abstentions.  The  motion  was  supported  by  53  of  the 
RPR's  126  members,  all  26  Communists,  5  of  the Socialist  Party's  271  members, 
3  of  the  UDF's  89  members,  1  of  the  Centre  Union's  40  members  and  3  of  the 
30  1ndependents.  Half  of  the  RPR  group  abstained  and  only  one  member  voted 
against.  The  bill was  then  sent  once  more  for  discussion  in  Committee. 
During  the  discussions  in  the  National  Assembly,  97  amendments  were  tabled  and 
the  Government  conf1rmed  orally that  the  Luxembourg  compromise  would  continue  to 
ex1st.  At  the  end  of  the first  reading  in  the  National  Assembly  on  13  May  1992 
the  Government's  b1ll  was  passed  with  the  following  substantive  amendments: 
- in Article  2  of  the Constitution,  on  the  flag  and  the  national  anthem, 
"le francais"  was  added  as  the  Republic's  official  language; 
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- in Article  74  of  the Constitution,  on  the  French  overseas  territories,  it was 
stipulated  that  their status  would  be  determined  in  a  special  framework  law; 
- the titla of  the Constitution's new  Chapter XIV  was  changed  from 
"European  Union"  to  "The  European  Communities  and  European  Union"; 
- Chapter  XIV  started with  a  new  Article  88-1  defining  the  Union  in  the  following 
terms:  "France  shall  be  a  member  of  the  European  Communities  and  the 
European  Union  consisting of States which,  in  accordance  with  the  founding 
Treaties,  have  freely  decided  to exercise some  of  their powers  in  common"; 
-the original bill's Articles  88-1  (on  EMU)  and  88-2  (on  the  right  to vote  and 
to  stand as  a  candidate at  municipal  elections)  became  Articles 88-2  and  88-3. 
In  Article  88-3  it was  stipulated  that  the  rules  for  the  exercise 
by  EC  nationals  of  the  right  to  vote  and  the  right  to  stand  as  a  candidate  at 
municipal  and  European  Parliament  elections would  be  laid down  in  a  separate 
law; 
- a  new  Article 88-4 was  introduced  into  the  Constitution stipulating that  the 
Government  would  submit  proposals  by  the  EC  Commission  involving provisions  of 
a  legislative nature  to  the National  Assembly  and  the Senate at  the  same  time 
as  the  proposals  were  submitted  to  the  EC  Council  of  Ministers.  Each  body  was 
to  give  an  op1n1on  on  these proposals  either in a  special  committee  or  in 
plenary  session  in accordance  with detailed procedural  rules  laid  down  by  law. 
The  bill was  passed  by  the  members  of the  National  Assembly  by  398  votes  to  77 
with  99  abstentions.  Those  in favour  consisted of  263  Socialists,  5  RPR,  77  UDF. 
39  Centre  Union  and  14  independents.  Those  against  consisted  of  5  Socialists, 
31  RPR,  7  UDF,  1  Centre  Union,  all  26  members  of  the  Communist  Party 
and  7  independents.  Three  socialists,  33  RPR,  5  UDF  and  3  independents 
abstained. 
The  amended  bill was  then  passed  on  immediately  for first  reading  in the  Senate, 
and  after discussion  in  committee  was  submitted  to  the  plenary  on  2  June. 
Discussions  in  plenary  were  suspended  on  3  June  when  the  result  of  the  Danish 
referendum  became  known  and  were  resumed  on  9  June.  After further discussion  in 
committee,  the  Senate,  on  17  June  1992,  passed  the bill approved  by  the 
National  Assembly  with  the  following  further substantive  amendments: 
- Articles  88-2  and  88-3  no  longer referred  to  the  actual  Treaty  on  European 
Union  of  7  February  1992,  but  to  the  content  of  that  Treaty,  to  cover  the  case 
1f  it became  necessary  to  make  consequential  adjustments  to  the Treaty  as  a 
result  of  one  or more  countries  not  joining the  Union; 
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- the  introduction of the  right  to  vote  and  the  right  to  stand  as  a  candidate  at 
municipal  elections  in Article  88-2  was  changed  from  an  obligation  to  an 
option.  and  it was  specified that  only  citizens of  the  Union  resident  in  France 
could  avail  themselves  of  those  rights.  It was  also  stipulated that  citizens 
of  the  8nion  could  not  hold  the post  of  mayor  or  deputy  mayor  or  take  part  in 
the  app,ointment  of senators.  The  provision  was  also  amended  so  that  the  Senate 
carried the  same  weight  as  the  National  Assembly  in  the  subsequent 
establishment  of the specific  implementing provisions  in  a  special  framework 
law; 
- Article 88-4 was  amended  so  that  the  National  Assembly  and  the  Senate  no  longer 
had  to give  opinions  on  proposals  for  EC  legislative acts,  but  could  adopt 
resolutions  in accordance  with  detailed  rules  laid down  in their respective 
rules or procedure; 
- Article 54  of  the Constitution  was  amended  so  that  a  minority of  60  members  of 
the  National  Assembly  or  60  members  of  the  Senate  could  in future  ask  to  have 
International  legal  obligations put  to  the  French  Constitutional  Council  for 
its opinion  on  whether  they  were  compatible  with  the  Constitution. 
The  text  thus  amended  was  adopted  by  192  votes  to  110.  Generally  speaking,  all 
Socialist  Party members,  UDF  members  and  Central  Union  members  voted  in  favour. 
The  RPR  group voted  against,  along with  2  socialists,  3  UDF  and  3  independents. 
When  the Senate  had  amended  the  National  Assembly's  text,  the  amended  bill  was 
sent  the  same  day  for  second  reading  in  the  National  Assembly;  on  the  following 
day,  18  June  1992,  the  National  Assembly  adopted  the  Senate's  text  without 
amendment  by  388  votes  to  43  with  2  abstentions.  All  RPR  members  apart  from  one 
walked  out  before  the  vote.  Those  who  voted  in  favour  consisted 
of  258  Socialists.  1  RPR,  73  UDF,  39  Central  Union  and  12  independents.  Those 
who  voted  against  consisted  of  all 26  Communists,  5  Socialists,  7  UDF,  1  Centre 
Union  and  4  independents.  Two  Socialists abstained. 
This  adoption  of  the  text  by  both bodies  in  identical  terms  fulfilled  the 
condition  la1d  down  in Article  89  of  the  Constitution for  the  conclusion of 
discussions  in the  two  chambers.  For  final  adoption  of  the  constitutional 
amendments.  President Mitterrand  then  decided  to  lay  the bill before  the  members 
of  the  National  Assembly  and  the  Senate  convened  in  Congress  at  Versailles 
on  23  June  1992.  After  a  short  debate  the Congress  passed  the  bill without 
further  amendment  by  592  votes  to  73  with  14  abstentions.  Of  the  875  members  of 
the Congress,  196  did  not  attend,  all  of  them  members  of  the  RPR.  Those  who 
voted  in  favour  consisted of  325  Socialists,  142  UDF,  104  Centre  Union,  5  RPR 
and  16  independents.  Those  who  voted  against  cons1sted  of  7  Socialists,  2  RPR, 
15  UDF,  t  Centre Union,  41  Communists  and  7  independents.  Three  Socialists, 
7  UDF  and  4  independents  abstained.  The  constitutional  amendments  were  thus 
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adopted  by  193  votes  more  than  the  required  three-fifths majority of  the  votes 
cast.  Parliamentary  adoption  of  the  constitutional  amendments  was  thus  concluded 
and  the  President  confirmed  the  law  on  25  June  1992. 
In  order  subsequently  to effect  actual  ratification of  the Treaty  by  means  of  a 
referendum,  in  accordance  with  the  President's decision,  the  Government, 
on  I  July  1992,  tabled  a  bill authorizing ratification of  the Treaty on 
European  Union.  On  the  same  day  the  President  issued  a  decree  on  submission of 
the  bill  to  the  French  people  by  means  of  a  referendum  on  Sunday 
20  September  1992  in accordance  with  Article  11  of  the Constitution. 
The  French electorate  had  to  vote  "yes" or "no"  on  the  following  question:  "Can 
you  approve  the bill authorizing ratification of  the Treaty  on  European  Union  as 
put  to  the  French  people  by  the  President  of  the  Republic?" 
The  referendum  was  binding. 
At  the  same  time  it was  decided  to  send  a  copy  of  the  ratification bill,  together 
with  the  f•.1ll  text· of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  and  a  short  summary  of  the 
main  elements,  to  each  of  the  38  million  French  electors.  The  texts  were  sent 
out  in  the  last  few  weeks  preceding  the  referendum. 
On  14  September,  with  support  from  70  Gaullist  members  of  the  Senate,  the  former 
Minister  for  the  Interior,  Charles  Pasqua,  asked  the Constitutional  Council  to 
adopt  a  position on  whether  the Treaty  on  European  Union  was  compatible with  the 
revised Constitution  in accordance  with  the  new  procedure  laid down  in Article  54 
of  the  Constitution.  On  2  September,  the Constitutional Council  ruled  that 
nothing  in  the  Treaty conflicted with  the  amended  French Constitution,  and  that 
authorization  of ratification could  legally go  ahead.  In  answer  to  the Senators' 
assertion  that  the Treaty  on  European  Union  was  no  longer  ratifiable  in 
accordance  with  its Article  R after the  Danish  "no",  the Constitutional  Council 
stated  that  the  situation with  regard  to  ratification procedures  in other 
countries  and  the  conditions  for entry  into  force  of  the Treaty  did  not  affect 
the  existence  of  the  international  obligation which  France  had  entered  into  by 
signing  the  Treaty  on  7  February,  and  therefore  in no  way  prevented  France's 
ratification of  it. 
In  the  referendum  on  20  September  1992  a  majority of  51%  of  the  votes  cast 
approved  the  law  on  France's  ratification of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union.  The 
turnout  was  nearly  70%,  which  is  a  relatively high  figure  for  France. 
On  23  September  the  French Constitutional  Council  proclaimed  the  following 
official  result,  covering  France,  the  overseas  countries  and  ter~itories and 
French  nationals  abroad: 
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Number  entitled to  vote:  38  305  534  ( 100. 0%) 
Total  number  of votes  cast:  26  695  951 
Number  of non-voters:  11  609  583  (30,31%) 
Blank  or  spoiled papers:  909  377  (2,37%) 
Total  number  of valid votes:  25  786  574 
- Yes:  13  162  992  (34,36%) 
- No:  12  623  582  (32,95%) 
The  turnout  was  thus  69,69%.  Of  the  valid votes  cast,  51,05%  said  yes 
and  48,95%  no. 
On  the  evening  of  20  September,  63  leading Gaullist  members  of  the  Nat1onal 
Assembly  referred  the  newly  adopted  ratification  law  to  the  Constitutional 
Council,  arguing f1rstly  that  the  referendum procedure  was  not  applicable  and 
secondly  that  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  was  not  ratiflable.  On  23  September 
the  Constitutional  Council  declined  to  express  an  opinion  on  a  law  adopted  by  the 
people,  on  the  grounds  that  it was  not  competent  to  do  so. 
On  24  September  1992  the  President  confirmed  the  law  authorizing  France's 
ratification of  the Treaty  on  European  Union  signed  in Maastricht  on  7  February. 
France's  instrument  of  ratification will  subsequently  be  deposited  with  the 
Ital1an Government  in  accordance  with Article  R of  the  Treaty. 
Political  Debate 
The  general  pattern running  throughout  the  results  of  the  votes  in  the  National 
Assembly,  the  Senate  and  the  Congress,  was  that  a  large majority of members  of 
the  Soc1alist  Party and  of  the  two  centre parties,  the  UDF  and  the  Centre  Union, 
supported  the  constitutional  amendments  and  therefore  also  ratificat1on of  the 
Treaty  on  European  Union.  On  the  opposite  wing,  the  Communist  Party  consistently 
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voted  against.  In  the  middle  was  the  next  largest  party,  the  RPR,  which  suffered 
a  gradually widening split.  After  the  first  reading  in the  National  Assembly, 
where  the  majority of  the  party abstained  and  a  large  minority  voted  against,  the 
party decided,  after growing  opposition  amongst  the members  of  the  Senate,  not  to 
take  part  in  the  vote  at  the  Versailles  Congress. 
The  debate  on  the  constitutional  amendments  also  showed  that  there  were  varying 
positions within all parties. 
While  only  a  few  members  of the  Centre  Union  and  Communist  Party did not  follow 
the  party  line,  in  the Socialist  Party  a  small  breakaway  group  formed  around 
former  Defence  Minister Jean-Pierre  Chevenement  to  oppose  the  constitutional 
amendments  and  the Treaty on  European  Union.  In  the  UDF  a  small  group also 
formed  around  Philippe  de  Villers  to  oppose  the Treaty,  while  an  increasing 
majority  ranged  themselves  alongside  the  party  leader,  former 
President  Valery  Giscard  d'Estaing.  The  considerably  larger opposing minority  in 
the  other right-wing opposition party,  the  RPR,  was  led  at  the  beginning  by 
former  Social  Affairs  Minister Philippe  Seguin  and  in  the  last  phase  of  the 
Parliamentary  discussions  was  also  supported by  the  leader of  the  RPR  group  in 
the  Senate,  former  Interior Minister Charles  Pasqua.  A smaller group,  led  by 
former  Prime  Minister Jacques  Chaban-Delmas,  supported  the  position  of the 
Socialist  Party,  the  UDF  and  the  Centre  Union.  Although  Jacques  Chirac 
undoubtedly  allowed  considerations  of party tactics  to  influence  the  party's 
non-attendance  at  the  Congress,  it was  not  possible  to  unite  the  party around  a 
common  position on  ratification. 
After  the  calling of  the  referendum  on  1  July  1992,  nearly all  parties made  a 
recommendation  to  the electors.  Of  the  five parties represented  in  Parliament, 
the Socialists,  the  UDF  and  the  Centre  Union  unconditionally supported 
ratification of  the  Treaty on  European  Union.  The  Communist  Party  was  equally 
unconditionally against.  In  the  case  of  the  RPR,  Jacques  Chirac  said  that  party 
members  had  a  free  choice  but  that  he  himself,  with  a  majority  of the party's 
leadership,  supported  ratification of  the  Treaty. 
Of  the  parties outside  Parliament,  one  environmental party,  the  "Generation 
Ecologie"  of  former  Environment  Minister Brice  Lalonde,  supported ratification 
along  with  the Socialists,  the Centre  Union  and  the  UDF.  The  other  environmental 
party,  the  Greens,  after an  indecisive  vote  amongst  the  party's  leadership, 
decided  to  leave  their members  a  free  choice,  while  the  party Chairman, 
Antoine  Waechter,  played  an  active personal  part  in  the  yes  campaign. 
Jean-Marie  Le  Pen's  far-right  party,  the  National  Front,  was,  like the  Communist 
Party,  unconditionally  opposed  to  the Treaty on  European  Union. 
In  addition,  a  number of  cross party and  apolitical  groups  took  stands  for  and 
against. 
The  two  co-ordinators  for  the  Government's  referendum campaign,  Cultural  Affairs 
and  Education  Minister Jacques  Lang  and  European  Affairs  Minister 
Elisabeth Guigou,  set  up  a  "National  Committee  for  a  Yes  Vote"  consisting of 
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some  300  leading personalities  in the  fields  of  culture,  entertainment  and 
science  under  the  chairmanship of author,  Eastern  Europe  expert  and  member  of  the 
French  Academy  Helene  Carrere  D'Encausse.  An  "International  Committee  for  a  Yes 
Vote"  was  also  set  up,  involving  a  number  of  European  personalities  who  supported 
a  "yes" vote  by  means  of "an  appeal  to  the  French  people". 
The  large majority of  French  business  leaders  were  unequivocally  in  favour  of  a 
"yes"  vote,  but  a  minority,  led  by  the  Chairman  of  Peugeot-Citroen, 
Jacques  Calvet.  and  the  Chairman  of  the  industrial  concern  CGE,  Pierre  Suard, 
campaigned  for  a  "no"  vote.  For  that  reason,  the  employers'  organization  for 
heavy  industry,  the  CNPF,  did  not  issue  any  recommendation,  but  the  Chairman, 
Francois  Perigot,  personally  led  an  active  "yes"  campaign.  Furthermore,  the 
Chairmen  of  the  associations  of  small  and  medium-sized  businesses  and  of  the 
liberal  professions,  along  with  the  French  banking  union,  supported  a  "yes"  vote. 
Despite  the  traditional  anti-EC  position of  the  largest  agricultural 
organization.  the  FNSEA.  it did  not  issue  any  recommendations  to  Its members.  On 
the  other hand,  the  smaller organizations,  the  MODEF  and  "Co-ordination  Rurale", 
campaigned  actively for  a  "no",  by  means  of  demonstrations  and  other  forms  of 
action  during  the  campaign. 
Most  trade unions  did  not  issue  any  formal  recommendations  to  their members. 
Amongst  those  which  did set  the  tone.  the  communist  CGT,  came  out  clearly against 
the Treaty,  while  the  moderately  left-wing trade  unions,  the  CFDT  and  the  CFTC, 
supported  the Treaty  on  the  grounds  that  it strengthened  labour  market  policy. 
The  traditionally pro-EC  trade  union.  Force  Ouvriere.  made  no  direct  or  indirect 
recommendations  one  way  or  the  other. 
The  French  European  Movement  conducted  a  very  active  "yes"  campaign,  including  by 
means  of  local  committees  throughout  the  country.  The  biggest  association  on  the 
opposition  side,  the  Movement  for Hunting,  Fishing,  Nature  and  Traditions  (CPNT), 
which  at  the  last  local  elections  won  2%  of the  votes,  conducted  a  more  subdued 
campaign  at  local  level. 
The  main  topics  in  the political debate  were  changeable.  During  the  National 
Assembly's first  reading  of  the  constitutional  amendments,  the  general  question 
of  the  surrender of sovereignty was  the  central  issue.  After  the  Government's 
assurance  that  the  Luxembourg  compromise  would  continue  to  exist,  the  majority 
came  round  to  the Government's  opinion  that  the  Treaty did  not  involve  any 
irrevocable  transfer of  national  powers  to  supranational  institutions,  but  simply 
the  voluntary exercise  in  common  of  some  of  the  Member  States'  national 
competence.  That  interpretation was  expressed  in  the  new  Article  88-1  of  the 
Constitution. 
In addition to  the  constitutional  amendments  concerning  the  right  to  vote  and  to 
stand  as  a  candidate at  municipal  elections,  the  common  monetary  policy  and  the 
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common  visa policy,  a  majority  in  the  National  Assembly  and  the  Senate  decided  to 
introduce  a  new  Article  into  the Constitution  requiring  the  Government  to  submit 
EC  Commission  proposals  with  legislative  consequences  to  both  chambers  for 
opinion. 
A majority  in  the  National  Assembly  and  the  Senate  also adopted  an  amendment  to 
Article  54  of  the Constitution  so  that  a  minority of 60  members  of  the 
National  Assembly  or 60  members  of  the  Senate  could  in future  request  that 
international  legal  obligations  be  referred  to  the  French Constitutional  Council 
for  an  opinion  on  whether  they  were  compatible  with the Constitution. 
In  addition,  on  29  June,  the  National  Assembly  adopted  a  proposal  for  amendment 
of the  provisions  on  the  drafting of  the  Finance  Bill,  whereby  Parliament  would 
set  a  yearly  ceiling in  the  Finance  Act  for. the State's payments  to  the  EC  budget 
and  authorize  transfers  to  the  EC.  It was  proposed  that  along  with  the  Finance 
Bill  the  Government  should  also  submit  the  EC  Commission's  provisional  budget 
proposals,  the  EC  Commission's  report  to  the  European  Parliament  on 
implementation  of  the  previous  year's  EC  budget  and  a  report  from  the  Government 
on  the  Community  measures  which  formed  the  basis  for  the  coming  financial  year's 
transfers  to  the  EC. 
In  a  report  of  8  July  1992,  the  National  Assembly's  EC  delegation proposed,  along 
the  lines of  the  subsidiarity principle,  that  national  parliaments  should  be 
authorized  to  determine  the  form  and  means  of  implementation  of  EC  directives. 
The  National  Assembly's  EC  delegation made  a  series of  concrete  proposals  to  that 
end.  As  yet,  the  Government  has  net  expressed  an  opinion  on  these  proposals. 
During  the  first  reading  in  the  Senate,  the  chief  topic was  the  introduction of 
the  right  for  citizens of  the  Union  to vote  and  to  stand  as  candidates  at 
municipal  elections.  After  lengthy negotiation with  the  Government,  the majority 
in  the  Senate  obtained  guarantees  that it would  not  be  possible  in  future, 
against  the Senate's wishes,  to  extend  the  right  to  vote  and  the  right  to  stand 
as  a  candidate  to  other foreigners  living  in France,  and  that  citizens of  the 
Union  would  not  be  allowed  to  take  part  in  the  indirect election of  members  of 
the  Senate  (see  new  Article 88-3  of  the Constitution).  It  is anticipated  that 
the  French  legislative  rules  on  the  residence  requirement  and  exerc1se  of  the 
right  to  vote  and  the  right  to  stand  as  a  candidate will  be  laid down  in  the 
context  of  the  negotiations  on  the  EC  implementing Directive  on  the  same  subject. 
Both  in  the  National  Assembly  and  in  the  Senate  a  persistent  theme  was  the  lack 
of  influence  of  French  MPs  in  the  EC  decision-making process.  Inspired  by  the 
Dan1sh  and  British models,  a  majority cutting across  all  shades  of  opinion  on  the 
Treaty  on  European  Union  voted  to  oblige  the  Government  to  submit  EC  Commission 
proposals  with  legislative  consequences  to  both  chambers  for  opinion.  The 
detailed procedural  rules  have  not  yet  been  laid down.  A majority  in  both 
chambers  also supported  the  introduction  in Article  54  of  the  Constitution 
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of  a  guarantee  allowing  a  minority  to  refer future  international  obligations  to 
the  Constitutional  Council  for  a  binding  opinion  on  whether  they  were  compatible 
With  the  Constitution.  Although  the  provisions  are  worded  in  a  general  fashion, 
the  debate  showed  that  they  were  mainly  aimed  at  subsequent  amendments  of  the 
Treaty  on  European  Union. 
The  constitutional  amendments  concerning  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  and  the 
common  visa policy did  not  play  a  very  large  role  in  the  parliamentary debates. 
The  debate  which  preceded  the  Congress's  adoption  of  the  constitutional 
amendments  was  characterized  by  general  points  of  view  in  the  run-up  to  the 
referendum  campaign.  The  need  for  peace  and  political  stability,  economic  and 
social  progress  and  an  assured  influence  for  France  in  Europe  was  put  forward  by 
the  Government.  the Socialist  Party,  the  Centre  Union  and  the  UDF  as  the  main 
argument  in  favour  of  ratification of  the  Treaty.  The  spokesmen  for  the 
opposition  emphasized  chiefly that  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  involved  an 
unacceptable  loss  of  France's  independence  and  national  identity vis-a-vis 
Germany. 
All  in all,  the  political debate  in  France  showed  a  steady political majority  -
also  outside  the  RPR  - in favour  of  ratification of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union. 
~hile  the  centre-left  pro-faction appeared  politically united,  the  opposition 
Side  was  spread  over  a  wide  field  from  the  far  right  to  the  far  left,  the  only 
common  ground  being  opposition  to  the  Treaty on  European  Union. 
Reaction  to  the  result  of the  French  referendum 
President  Mitterrand stated on  the  evening  of  the  referendum  that  there  were 
nelther w1nners  nor  losers.  The  day's  vote  was  binding  on  the  whole  of  France, 
but  he  respected  the  feelings  of  the "free citizens"  who  by  voting  "no"  wished  to 
protect  the  values  they  believed  in. 
The  same  evening,  Prime  Minister Pierre  Beregovoy  stated that  the  Government 
Without  exception  had  heard all  electors  that  had  raised  questions  and  were 
uneasy.  Everything  would  be  done  to  improve  the  building  of  a  more  democratic 
and  social  Europe.  France  needed  a  modern  agricultural  sector,  a  solid  currency 
and  a  more  balanced  labour market  situation. 
Former  President  Valery Giscard  D'Estaing said  that  those  who  had  voted  "no"  had 
points  which  had  to  be  listened  to  and  answered.  In  the  subsequent  debate  he 
pointed  in particular to  the  need  for  application of  the  principle of 
"closeness". 
Former  Prime  Minister Jacques  Chirac  said that  the  referendum  had  shown  that 
things  could  not  be  the  same  tomorrow  as  they  were  yesterday,  particularly when 
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it came  to  the  construction of  Europe.  It was  now  necessary  to  prepare  for  the 
future.  The  Europe  we  wanted  to  see  had  to  be  more  democratic,  closer to  daily 
reality,  more  rational  in  its defence  organization  and  had  to  express  greater 
solidarity with  the  new  democracies  in  the  East. 
FranQois  P€rigot,  Chairman  of  the  employers'  organization CNPF,  said that  the 
result  was  a  warning  to  the  Government,  which  had  largely underestimated  the 
French  people's  concern  over  the  current  economic  and  social  crisis.  He  urged 
the  Government  to  do  everything it could  to  rescue  France  from  this situation. 
Jean  Kaspar,  Chairman  of  the  moderate  trade  union  CFDT,  said that  it was  now 
necessary  to  provide  answers  to  the  concern  and  questions  about  democracy  and 
employment  which  had  been  raised  during  the  campaign.  It  was  time  to  role  up  the 
sleeves  and  get  on  with  the  job. 
Former  Interior Mlnister Charles  Pasqua said that  one  out  of  two  French  men  and 
women  had  listened  to  his  views,  voted  no  and  therefore  rejected  the  type  of 
organization of  Europe  which  was  being proposed,  i.e.  a  Europe  which  took  no 
account  whatsoever of  people. 
Former  Social  Affairs  Minister Philippe Seguin  said that  the  French  had 
demonstrated  the  will  to  take  their fate  in  hand  again  and  force  a  return  to  a 
situation where  politics held  sway  over all  conservative  and  technocratic 
aberrations. 
Former  Defence  Minister Jean-Pierre  Chevemement,  welcomed  the  left-wing's  "no" 
and  added  that  much  could  be  done  with  the  vast  citizens'  movement  which  had 
emerged  despite  the  mobilization of  the  establishment. 
With  the  people's  adoption  of  the  law  on  ratification of  the  Union  Treaty  in  the 
form  presented,  the  President  and  the  Government  and  the other "yes" parties  have 
at  the  same  time  maintained  that  renegotiation  of  the  Union  Treaty  is  ruled  out. 
The  Minister  for  European Affairs,  Elisabeth Guigou,  suggested  in  an  interview in 
"Liberation"  on  25  September  that  there  should  be  an  interpretative statement  on 
the  Un1on  Treaty  wh1ch  in her opinion  should  primarily relate  to  the  division of 
powers  between  the  Member  States  and  the  European  Community,  more  democratic 
co-operation,  closer  to  citizens'  concerns,  clarification of  the Treaty  and  a 
consolidation of  the  European  Monetary  System with  confirmation of  the  will  to 
move  to  the  third stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  in  1997  if already 
possible. 
The  Foreign Minister,  Rola~d Dumas,  suggested,  shortly before  the  referendum, 
holding  a  "clarificatory" parliamentary debate  in  the  National  Assembly  and  the 
Senate  on  implementation of  the  Union  Treaty.  In  his  opinion  such  a  debate 
should clarify three questions:  the  Danish  problem,  definition of  what  should  be 
carried out  in Brussels  and  what  by  national  Parliaments,  and  development  of 
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more  precise  control  by  national  parliaments  over  EC  co-operation.  Mr  Dumas 
repeated his  proposal  after the  referendum,  but  the  Government  has  not  yet 
adopted  a  position on  it. 
Reaction  to  the  Danish  referendum 
On  3  June  1992  the  French  Government  stated that  news  of  the  Danish  people's 
decision  had  been  received  with  disappointment,  and  repeated  what  was  said in  a 
joint  statement  at  the  Franco-German  summit  meeting  in  La  Rochelle  on 
22  May  1992,  namely  that  France  and  Germany  for  their part  would  implement  the 
Maastricht  accords  in full  and  called  on  the  other countries  to  do  likewise.  The 
Government  also stated  that  France  did  not  intend  to  accept  a  renegotiation  of 
the Treaty,  apart  from  certain procedural  arrangements  which  might  prove 
necessary. 
On  3  June  President  Mitterrand  and  Chancellor  Kohl  issued  a  joint statement  in 
which  both  countries  expressed  disappointment  at  the  result  of  the  Danish 
referendum.  with  a  slim majority,  and  confirmed  that  at  the  same  time  they  were 
firmly  resolved  to  implement  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  before  the  end  of  1992. 
The  possibility of  Danish  membership  of  the  Un1on  would  have  to  remain  open. 
France  and  Germany  also  emphasized  in  their statement  that  enlargement 
negotiations  with  the  EFTA  countries  would  begin  as  soon  as  possible  and  be 
rapidly completed. 
Afterwards  the  President  told  the  press  that  what  could  not  be  done  with  the 
Twelve  would  be  done  with  the  Eleven.  Renegotiation of  the  Treaty  was  quite 
unnecessary.  At  the  European  Council  meeting  in  Lisbon,  France  would  press  for 
early extension  of  the  Union  between  the  Eleven.  At  the  same  time  he  announced 
that  France  would  ratify the Maastricht  Treaty  by  means  of  a  referendum. 
On  3  June  the  Prime  Minister,  Pierre  Beregovoy,  stated  in  the  National  Assembly 
that  each  country's  sovereign  right  to  decide  its own  future  would  be  respected. 
The  disappointing  result  of  the Danish  referendum  would  not  affect  continuation 
of  the  process  towards  Union.  He  stated that  the  French  Foreign Minister's 
informal  consultations with  a  series  of  EC  partners  had  shown  that  they all 
shared  France's  view  of  the  situation  and  will  to  continue.  There  would  be  no 
possibility of  renegotiation. 
The  Foreign  Minister,  Roland  Dumas.  took  the  same  line  in  a  speech  made  to  the 
Senate  on  3  June. 
The  former  French  President,  Valery  Giscard  D'Estaing,  stated  immediately after 
the  Danish  referendum,  1n  the  European  Parliament  and  elsewhere,  that  - unless 
Denmark  changed  its mind  - a  clear political  signal  would  have  to  be  given  at  the 
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next  European  Council  meeting  on  how  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in its present  form 
could enter into  force  between  ten or eleven  Member  States.  A signal  of this 
kind  was  inevitable given  that  renegotiation  was  ruled  out.  Mr  Giscard  D'Estaing 
also  said  that  an  arrangement  whereby  one  Member  State  remained  with  the Treaty 
of  Rome  while  eleven Member  States went  further with  the Treaty of Maastricht 
would 'be  fragile  and  unmanageable  and  would  hinder  further  progress  in  European 
co-operation.  Confirmation  of  the  Danish  "no"  would  therefore mean  leaving  the 
Community  and  joining the  EEA. 
Former Social  Affairs Minister Philippe  Seguin  CRPR),  former  Interior Minister 
Charles  Pasqua  (RPR),  the  Communist  Party's General  Secretary Georges  Marchais, 
former  Defence  Minister Jean-Pierre  Chevenement  (Socialist Party),  and 
Philippe  de  Villers  (UDF)  told  the  press  on  3  June  that  the Treaty  on  European 
Union  had  no  legal  validity after the  Danish  "no",  and  that  the  ratification 
process  should  therefore be  stopped.  Their party groups  followed  this  line when 
discussions  resumed  on  the  constitutional  amendments  in the Senate. 
The  French  Foreign Minister stated  in  the  Senate  on  9  June  on  behalf of  the 
Government  that  the  ratification process  in France  and  in the  other  EC  Member 
States would  go  ahead  unchanged.  In  the  autumn  it would  be  seen whether  Denmark 
still intended  to  take  part  in  the  common  process  in which  it had  also  been 
involved  since  1972.  If that  were  so,  the  Maastricht  Treaty would  enter into 
force.  If,  however,  the  Danish people  continued  to  oppose  it,  the  consequences 
would  have  to  be  borne.  The  Treaty  as  a  whole  would  not  be  renegotiated,  but 
Member  States  would  make  the necessary  adjustments  so  that  the  Treaty  could  enter 
into  force  for  the  Eleven.  The  new  text  would  not  differ from  the  old except  for 
various  references  to  Denmark.  The  legal  basis  for continuation of  the 
rat1f1cation process  was  therefore  sound. 
The  French  Minister  for  European  Affairs  also  stated that  the  question  of  the 
Dan1sh  Presidency  of  the  EC  from  1  January  1993  could  not  be  settled until  the 
other eleven  EC  Member  States  had  completed  their ratification procedures  and 
Denmark  had  definitively announced  whether it was  going  to  ratify or not. 
As  in other  EC  countries,  the  Danish  "no"  gave  rise to  an  ongoing  public  debate 
on  democratic  control  of  the  EC  decision-making  process  and  on  application of  the 
principle of "closeness". 
The  Minister for  European  Affairs,  Elisabeth Guigou,  stated  in an  interview in 
"Liberation"  on  25  September that  the  Danish  "obstacle" was,  from  the  legal  point 
of  view,  2  more  serious  prcblem  than  the British one.  Politically speaking, 
however,  it was  the  same  thing.  In  her opinion,  much  of  the  concern  which  had 
been  expressed  in  Denmark  was  also  due  to  a  rejection of  a  centralized  and 
bureaucratic  Europe.  She  stated  that  France  would  do  everything possible  to  find 
a  solution  to  the  Danish  (and  the  British)  problem.  It was  not  of decisive 
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importance  if this  delayed  implementation  of  the  Treaty  by  a  few  weeks.  However, 
Madame  Guigou  considered  that  Denmark  should  say  "yes"  or "no"  to  the  Maastricht 
Treaty without  delay.  It  was  not  possible  to  agree  to  only  part  of  the  Treaty. 
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3.  GREECE 
National  ratification procedure 
The  parliamentary proceedings  for  the  ratification of  the Maastricht  Treaty  took 
place  at  a  specially convened  meeting  of Parliament.  At  a  plenary meeting  on 
20  July  a  27-man  committee  was  instructed to  go  through  the Treaty  and  place it 
before  the  full  Parliament.  The  committee  began  its proceedings  on  27  July,  and 
they  were  concluded  by  a  vote  on  31  July  1992. 
A referendum  on ratification could  have  been  held under  the  Greek Constitution. 
If  the  government  had  so wished  and  the  President  had  given his  approval,  a 
referendum would  have  been  possible. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  year it had  been  intended  to hold  a  parliamentary debate 
in  which  the  question of Greece's  membership  of  the  Western  European  Union  would 
also  have  been  discussed.  At  that  time,  it was  not  certain whether  the  Treaty 
could  be  ratified by  a  simple  majority  or whether  a  qualified majority was 
required  under  the  constitution.  As  it gradually  became  clear that  there  would 
be  an  overwhelming  majority  in  favour,  the  question  became  increasingly 
hypothetical  and  no  position was  really adopted  on  this  formal  problem. 
The  parliamentary debate was  accelerated,  without  waiting  to  discuss  membership 
of  the  Western  European  Union  at  the  same  time. 
With  the  exception of  the  Communists  and  the  Greens,  all parties  had  let it be 
known  in  advance  that  they  would  vote  in favour  of ratification.  The  Communists 
demanded  a  referendum. 
On  Friday  31  July  1992  the  Greek  Parliament  decided  to  ratify the Maastricht 
Treaty  by  286  votes  out  of  the  295  members  present  (the Parliament  has  a  total  of 
300  members). 
Political debate 
Right  from  the  start,  press  reports  on  the  parliamentary  debate  on  the  Maastricht 
Treaty  stated  that  the  atmosphere  was  one  of  harmony.  During  the  preliminary 
committee  discussions  the  Government  party's  representatives  argued  that  what  was 
involved  was  a  new  start which  would  not  destroy  the  EC  but  transform it into  a 
Union.  Rejection  would  not  be  advantageous  for Greece's  nogotiating position;  on 
the  contrary,  it would  for  no  reason  make  Greece  stand  out  as  an  exception.  The 
content  of  the  Maastricht Treaty was  fully  in  line  with  the  goals  Greece  had  set 
itself during  the  negotiations.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  would  give  the  EC  the 
necessary  framework  and  mechanisms.  It  was  also  stated that  Greece  would  not 
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wait  for  the Maastricht  Treaty  to  enter into  force  before  pressing  on  with 
further  work  on  the  Delors  II  package,  where  Greece  already  had  plans  for  the  use 
of  the  funds  it would  receive. 
The  opposition  criticized the  Government  for  having  acted  too hastily. 
Membership  of  the  Western  European  Union  should  have  been  dealt  with  at  the  same 
time  and  there  were still many  issues  of  great  concern.  It was  pointed  out  that 
the  convergence  requirements  could  have  negative  economic  repercussions  such  as 
unemployment.  The  Treaty would  be  of  no  help if the  government  continued  to 
pursue  the  same  economic  policy  as  at  present.  Similar criticisms were  made  by 
the  left-wing  coalition,  which  added  that  the  people  had  not  been properly 
informed.  The  Communists  said that  they  had  asked  for  a  dialogue  but  that  this 
request  had  been  rejected. 
During  the  plenary  debate  in  Parliament  approximately  130  members  and  all  the 
Ministers  concerned  spoke.  The  points  raised  were  the  same  as  mentioned  above. 
The  Economics  Mlnister.  Mr  Manos,  stressed  that  Greece  was  the  member  country 
which  would  gain  the  most.  The  country's  security would  be  reinforced at  a  time 
when  the  balance  of  power  was  changing  in  the  Balkans,  and  the  Treaty's  economic 
provisions  would  ensure  low  inflation,  low  interest  rates  and  a  stable currency 
together with  an  Influx of  funds  for  carrying out  infrastructure projects.  The 
Economics  Minister's  statement  also  reviewed  the  current  economic  situation  in 
Greece  and  privatization projects,  and  argued  that Greece  must  seek  its future  in 
Europe. 
Prime  Minister Mitsotakis  described  Greek  accession  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in 
general  terms  as  an  invitation to  take  up  a  challenge  which  must  be  met  at  all 
costs  and  as  an  agreement  which  would  shape  the  country's  future,  guarantee 
national  survival  and  increase Greece's  prosperity.  He  predicted  that  the 
Delors  II  package  would  be  ready  by  December.  This  would  help  in  implementing 
the  convergence  plan  and  the government's  stabilization programme  and  make  it 
possible  to  increase  productivity and  competitiveness  whilst  at  the  same  time 
removing  obstacles  to  economic  growth. 
The  common  foreign  policy would  underpin  Greece's  security.  Greece's  membership 
of  the  Western  European  Union  would  become  a  reality.  He  supported  enlargement 
of  the  Community,  but  at  the  same  time  pointed  out  that  new  members  would  have  to 
accept  not  only  the Community's  economic  but  also  its political  criteria. 
In  his  speech  Mitsotakis  also  said that  he  thought  Greece  would  join  the  European 
Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  stage  of  EMU  on 
1  January  1994. 
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He  stressed  that  European  Union  was  based  on  principles of solidarity,  mutual 
assistance  and  respect,  and  this made  the  Community  more  democratic  as  a  Union. 
The  European  Parliament's  role  and  powers  would  be  increased  and  new 
representative  fora would  be  created.  Finally,  with  the Maastricht Treaty  the 
whole  Community  would  achieve  the potential  for  constructing a  decentralized 
democratic  federation  in accordance  with  the  wishes  and  values  of  the  citizens of 
Europe. 
The  leader of  the  opposition,  Andreas  Papandreou,  said  that  there  was  no 
alternative if Greece  were  not  to  be  marginalized,  notwithstanding  the obstacles 
in  the  way.  Maastricht  was  a  ticket  to  a  difficult  and  unequal  battle  - unequal 
because  the  terms  had  been  devised  by  the northern members  of  the  Community. 
There  should  have  been  a  different  basis  for  Greek  membership of  EMU.  A united 
Europe  did  not  fit  in with  Maastricht.  It was  a  milestone  on  the  way  which  would 
be  passed.  On  the question of  enlargement,  he  said  that  this would  only  be 
possible after adoption  of  the  Delors  II package. 
The  leader of  the  left-wing alliance,  Maria Damanaki,  was  critical  in her support 
for  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  stressing that it  contained  faults.  Nevertheless,  it 
was  necessary  to  be  actively involved  and  play  an  active part  in  the  process 
leading  towards  economic  and,  in particular,  political  union. 
Together with  the  result  of the  parliamentary  debate,  the Greek  news  agency, 
A.N.A.  also  published  on  1  August  an  opinion poll  showing  that  57%  of  the 
population  considered  the Maastricht  Treaty to  be  advantageous  for Greece,  whilst 
12%  were  opposed  to  it. 
Opinion polls  are  published fairly rarely in Greece,  but  on  EC  issues,  opinion 
polls  conducted  by  the  EC  and  EC  statistical data are  frequently  quoted. 
Reaction  to the Danish referendum 
Following  the  considerable  interest  shown  immediately after the  referendum  there 
has  not  been  any  particular interest  in this  question. 
In  the  parliamentary debate  the  following  points  were  made  in  connection with  the 
result  of  the  Danish  referendum  on  2  June: 
Greece  would  not  be  able  to  improve  its negotiating position by  a  rejection  and 
would  simply  unwarrantedly stand  out  as  an  exception, 
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- the  EC  countries  had  taken  up  the  challenge  and  declared  their intention of 
pressing  on  with  ratification of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  by  the  end  of  the  year 
desp1te  its  rejection  by  the  Danish  voters.  The  Danish  voters  had  thrown  the 
12  countries  into  a  constitutional  crisis without  precedent  and  placed  a 
question  mark  over  the  drive  for  European  integration. 
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4.  THE  NETHERLANDS 
National  ratification procedure 
For  the  ratification of  the  Maastricht Treaty  a  bill was  drawn  up  with  comments 
on  the  individual  provisions of  the Treaty.  This  bill was  sent  to  the  Council  of 
State,  which  is  a  consultative  body  to which  every bill of  law  is  submitted 
before  being dealt  with  in  the  Lower  Chamber  of  Parlia~ent and  then  the  Upper 
Chamber.  All  three  bodies  may  put  questions  to  the  Government  and  these  must  be 
answered  to  the satisfaction of  the  party asking  the  question before  the matter 
can  proceed  to  the  next  stage  of  the  ratification procedure. 
Pursuant  to  the  decision of  the Council  of State,  it will  not  be  necessary  to 
amend  the  Netherlands'  Constitution  in  the  context  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  The 
Netherlands  Parliament  received  the  government's  ratification bill on  Wednesday, 
3  June  1992.  The  content  of  the bill was  broadly  in line with  the  proposal  which 
the  Government  had  referred  to  the Council  of State since  the  latter had  found  no 
reason  to  make  any  substantial  amendments. 
The  ratification  law  can  be  adopted  by  the  two  Chambers  by  a  simple  majority. 
However,  the  Netherlands'  constitution  (Articles  91  and  92)  provides  for  the 
possibility of requiring that  treaties  involving  a  greater transfer of 
sovereignty  than  laid  down  in  the constitution may  only  be  approved  if a 
2/3  majority  is achieved  in  both  Chambers. 
The  Constitution does  not  contain any  provisions  on  referenda  in connection with 
the  transfer of powers  to  international authorities. 
The  Lower  Chamber's  proceedings  on  the bill started in early summer  1992  with 
more  than  500  questions  being put  by  a  large number  of  Members  of Parliament 
representing all of  the  parliamentary parties. 
The  answers  to  the  questions,  which  were  sent  to  the  Lower  Chamber  on 
21  September  1992,  the  day  after the  French  referendum,  filled  some  250  pages. 
It  is  expected  that  these  answers  will  be  followed  by  further,  albeit  fewer, 
questions. 
The  Lower  Chamber's  debate  is  expected  to  take place  on  20  October  1992.  Once 
its text  - including  a  recommendation  that  the  Maastricht  Treaty  be  ratified  - is 
available,  it will  be  sent  to  the  Upper  Chamber.  This  is expected  to  be  done  at 
the  end  of  October. 
The  Upper  Chamber's  proceedings  on  the bill as  adopted  by  the  Lower  Chamber 
should  be  concluded at  the  beginning of  December  so  that  ratification can  take 
place  before  the  end  of  the  year. 
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Political debate 
There  is  broad  political  agreement  that  the  Netherlands  should  ratify the 
Maastricht  Treaty. 
The  parliamentary debate,  first  in the  Lower  Chamber  and  then  in  the  Upper 
Chamber.  is expected  to  confirm  this.  There  is nothing  to  suggest  that  anybody 
other than  representatives  from  the  very  small  opposition parties  on  both  the 
extreme  right  and  the  extreme  left,  which  altogether account  for  less  than 
one-tenth  of  the  members  of  the  two  Chambers,  intends  to  oppose  ratification by  a 
simple  majority or will  demand  amendments  to  the  constitution in  this  connection. 
There  may  however  be  a  majority  in  Parliament  in  favour  of  strengthening its role 
in  relation  to  the  Netherlands  Government  as  regards  the  national  procedure  for 
taking certain types  of  decision.  for  example,  particularly decisions  in  the 
context  of  judicial  co-operation or  the  common  foreign  and  security policy. 
Reaction  to  the  Danish  referendum 
The  Netherlands  Lower  Chamber  held  a  debate  on  10  June  1992  on  the  possible 
consequences  for  the  Netherlands  of  the  results  of  the  Danish  referendum  on  the 
Maastricht  Treaty. 
The  debate  showed  that  none  of  the  four  large political parties  supported  the 
small  green  left  wing  party's  proposal  for  a  consultative  referendum  in  the 
Netherlands  in  1992.  The  four  parties  together have  137  out  of  a  total  of  150 
seats  in  the  Lower  Chamber. 
The  Liberal  opposition party  and  the Christian  Democrat  Government  coalition 
party  rejected  the  idea of  a  referendum  as  the  Government  had  already  done.  The 
arguments  for  rejection were,  inter alia,  that  there  was  no  tradition  in  the 
Netherlands  of  holding  referenda,  that  the  Netherlands'  constitution did  not 
contain  any  provisions  on  referenda  and  that  the  Maastricht  Treaty  was  not  suited 
to  a  referendum. 
The  representatives  of  the  two  other  large parties,  the  second  Government 
coalition party,  the  Social  Democrats.  and  the  opposition Social  Liberals  party 
(D66)  were  also  against  a  referendum  in  the  present  case  but  were  willing  to 
consider  an  amendment  to  the  constitution which  could  allow  referenda  in  a  few 
years'  time,  for  example  on  the  results  of  the  planned  next  intergovernmental 
conference. 
There  was  broad  agreement  that  the  Government  should  take  the  lead  in  Increasing 
understanding  in  the  Netherlands  of  the  contents  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  its 
advantages.  The  D66  party  thus  proposed  debates  in  the  Netherlands  in  which 
opponents,  including  opponents  from  Denmark,  would  also  have  an  opportunity  to 
take  part. 
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The  Government  participants  in  the  debate,  the Christian  Democrat  Foreign 
Minister Hans  Van  den  Broek  and  the  Social  Democrat  State Secretary Piet  Dankert, 
stuck  in their contributions  to  the  line  agreed  at  the  special  EC  Foreign 
Ministers  meeting  in  Oslo,  i.e.  that  the  eleven other  countries  must  continue 
with  their ratification procedures.  This  line  was  supported  in Parliament. 
Requests  from  some  Members  of  Parliament  for  any  Danish wishes  to  be  treated with 
sympathy  were  rejected by  the Christian Democrat  spokesman  in particular on  the 
grounds  that  the  reasons  for  the  Danish  "no"  had  not  yet  been  properly 
established.  In  addition,  there was  general  opposition to  formally  re-opening 
the  negotiations  on  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
The  Netherlands  Judge  at  the  EC  Court  of  Justice,  P.J.G.  Kapteyn,  pointed out  in 
the  "Nederlands  Juristenblad"  in  June  1992  that it would  be  difficult  for  Denmark 
simultaneously  to  reject  the Maastricht  Treaty  and  remain  an  EC  member.  The 
Judge's  legal  article does  not  seem  to  have  started a  political debate  on  the 
issue  in  the  Netherlands.  The  article has  been  discussed  in  the  Danish  press. 
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5.  IRELAND 
National  ratification procedure 
The  issue  of  the  ratification of  the Single  European  Act  in  1986  was  submitted  to 
the  Ir1sh  Supreme  Court,  which  ruled  that  the  degree  of  transfer of  sovereignty 
involved  was  such  that  an  amendment  to  the  constitution  was  necessary.  A 
referendum  was  therefore  required,  which  took  place at  the  beginning  of  1987, 
before  the  S1ngle  Act  could  be  ratified.  Against  this  background  the  government 
decided  right  at  the  beginning of  the  negotiations  on  the  ratificat1on  of  the 
Maastr1cht  Treaty  that  the  result  should  be  put  to  a  referendum before  the  Treaty 
could  be  ratified. 
Immediately after the  European  Council  meeting  in Maastricht  in  December  1991, 
the  government  arranged  for  a  White  Paper  on  the  Maastricht  Treaty  to  be  drawn 
up.  The  White  Paper  was  submltted  at  a  government  meeting  on  9  April  1992  and 
published  on  23  April  1992. 
The  White  Paper  reports  on  and  explains  the  content  of  the  Treaty  and  puts 
forward  the  Ir1sh  Government's  position together with  the  expected  effects  for 
Ireland. 
During  the  negotiations  on  the Treaty,  Ireland  had  a  protocol  added  which  was 
Intended  to  ensure  that  the  Irish Constitution's provisions  on  "the  right  to  life 
of  the  unborn  child"  (prohibition on  abortion)  would  remain  an  Irish affair. 
Following  a  concrete  case  in  the  spr1ng of  1992  this  protocol  proved  inadequate. 
The  Irish Government  tr1ed  to  get  the  protocol  amended  but  this  was  rejected  by 
the  other member  countries  on  the  grounds  that  it would  entail  re-opening 
negot1at1ons  on  the  whole  Treaty.  The  twelve  member  countries  subsequently 
adopted  a  solemn  declaration  on  1  May  1992  and  the  White  Paper argues  that  this 
declaration will  in practice  be  just  as  effective  in  the  courts,  including  the 
EC  Court  of  Justice,  in  protecting  the  right  inter alia to  travel  out  of  Ireland 
freely. 
The  White  Paper  claims,  inter alia,  that  membership  of  the  Community  entails 
cons1derable political,  economic  and  social  advantages  for  Ireland.  As  a  member, 
Ireland  1s  In  a  better posit1on  to  1nfluence  decisions  affecting  Irish interests 
in  international  commercial,  economic  and  political negotiations.  Ireland  w1ll 
therefore  commit  itself  to  European  Union. 
After publication  of  the  White  Paper  the  Irish Government  submitted  a  bill  on 
5  May  1992  for  amending  the  Irish Constitution with  a  view  to  ratification of  the 
Maastr1cht  Treaty.  The  operative part  of  the  b1ll  contained  an  addit1on  to 
Article  29  of  the  Constitution,  concern1ng  international  relations,  empowering 
Ireland  to  ratify  the  Treaty  and  thus  become  a  member  of  the  European  Union.  The 
bill  contained  a  provision  ensuring  that  European  Community  legislation takes 
SN  4364/92  EN - 81  -
ley/AM/be 
precedence  over  Irish  legislation.  The  bill also  made  it possible  to  ratify  the 
European  Patent  Convention.  It  was  adopted  by  the  Irish Parliament  without  a 
vote  on  7  May  1992. 
The  planned  referendum  was  then  scheduled  for  18  June  1992  with  Irish voters 
being  asked  whether  they  approved  - yes  or no  - the  abovementioned  amendment  to 
the  constitution.  As  part  of  the  information  campaign,  every household  received 
a  15  page  pamphlet  which  in easily understandable  language  described  the 
consequences  of  Irish membership  of  the  Union.  It also  pointed  out  what the 
Union  did  not  cover  (e.g.  legislation on  abortion  and  general  compulsory military 
service). 
The  result  of  the  Irish referendum was  69%  of  votes  cast  in  favour  of 
ratification of  the  Maastricht Treaty  and  31%  against.  The  turnout  was  57%. 
Formal  ratification will  take  place  in the  autumn.  When  Parliament  assembles  in 
the  middle  of  October  it will  have  a  bill placed  before it.  After  this  has  been 
adopted,  the  ratification procedure  for  the  Maastricht Treaty will  pass  through 
the  two  Chambers  of  Parliament  and  the bill will  be  submitted  to  the  President 
for signature.  It will  then  be  possible  for  the  instrument  of  ratification  to  be 
deposited.  The  whole  of  this  procedure  should  be  concluded  before  the  end  of 
November. 
In  the  referendum  Prime  Minister  Reynolds  succeeded  in separating the  issue  of 
ratification of  the  Maastricht Treaty  from  the politically controversial  and 
legally  complex  issue  in  Ireland  of  an  amendment  to  the  Irish Constitution 
further  to  the  Irish Supreme  Court's  ruling in  the  abortion  case  in 
February  1992.  The  Government  has  announced  that  a  referendum will  be  held  on 
this  question  and  this  is expected  to  take place  in November  1992. 
Political debate 
Apart  from  the  small  new  Socialist party,  the  Democratic  Left,  together with  a 
few  independents  in  Parliament,  the  other parties  recommended  their voters  to 
vote  in  favour  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
Some  Members  of  Parliament  defied their own  party and  publically declared 
themselves  opposed  to  the  Treaty  on  the  grounds  of  the  abortion  issue.  This  was 
the  1ssue  that  induced  most  of  the  undecided  voters  to  vote  against  the  Treaty. 
Throughout  the negotiations  the  Government  was  concerned  that  the Treaty might 
result  in  obligations  which  would  directly entail  the  surrender  of  Ireland's 
traditional  neutrality.  Labour especially put  forward  very  strong political 
SN  4364/92  EN - 82  -
ley/AM/be 
arguments  against  the  Government.  It  was  however  able  to  accept  the  result  of 
the  Treaty negotiations  submitted  in this area. 
The  issue  of neutrality and  non-aligned  status  is  particularly  important  for 
Ireland.  Various  opponents  of  the Treaty  justified their position on  the  grounds 
that  they  did  not  wish  to  commit  Ireland  to  compulsory military service  in  a 
European  army.  This  argument  was  rejected  by  the  Government,  which  pointed  out 
in  the  White  Paper  that  the  question of  a  common  defence  policy would  only  be 
dealt  with  at  the  next  intergovernmental  conference  in  1996.  It  was  therefore 
not  an  issue  as  regards  the  position on  the  Maastricht  Treaty  but  would  be  put  to 
voters  in  a  referendum when  the  time  came.  Reference  was  also  made  to 
Article  J.4 of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  which  provides  that  the  policy  of  the  Union 
will  not  prejudice  the  specific  character of  the  security  and  defence  policy of 
certain  Member  States.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  does  not  therefore  interfere with 
Ireland's  non-aligned  status. 
The  middle-class  "F1ne  Gael"  party,  the  largest  opposition party,  argued  right 
from  the  start of  the  Union  negotiations  for  a  flexible  Irish attitude  on 
proposals  for  strengthening  the  security  and  defence  policy  dimension. 
Labour  and  the  Democratic  Left  both warned  that  care  should  be  taken  not  to 
over-estimate  the  economic  advantages  of  being  part  of  an  ever  more  integrated 
Europe.  The  essence  of  this  argument  was  that  it would  be  mainly  the  existing 
centres  of  growth  1n  Europe  which  would  further  1ncrease  their economic 
development  in  the  Union.  The  peripheral  regions  would  remain  comparatively  poor 
unless  they  received  considerably higher  financial  transfers  from  the  growth 
centres. 
The  same  two  parties  also  criticized  the  Treaty  for  not  taking  employment 
problems  sufficiently into  account.  If  Labour  subsequently  opted  in  favour  of 
the Treaty,  this was,  inter alia,  on  the  grounds  that  the Treaty's  social 
dimension  would  result  in  improvements  compared  with  current  Irish legislation. 
Reaction  to  the  Danish  referendum 
The  Irish Government  issued  a  statement  on  2  June  1992  in  which  it deeply 
regretted  the  result  of  the  Danish  referendum.  The  statement  pointed  out  that  it 
must  be  ensured  that  the  content  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  was  nevertheless 
realized. 
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6.  ITALY 
National  ratification procedure 
At  its meeting  on  17  April  1992  the  Italian Government  approved  a  bill for  the 
ratification of  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
After referral  to  Parliament,  the bill has  to  be  discussed  in the  two 
parliamentary  chambers,  the  Senate  and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  It  is dealt  with 
flrst  in  the  relevant  committees  - the  for.eign  affairs  committee,  the  finance 
committee  and  the  constitutional  committee.  After the  committee  stage,  the bill 
has  to  be  discussed  in plenary  in  the  two  chambers  and  it will  be  adopted  once 
the  two  chambers  have,  by  a  simple majority,  approved  the  same  text  authorizing 
the  Head  of State  to  ratify the Treaty. 
The  bill  for ratification of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  was  referred  to  Parliament  on 
29  April  1992,  but  discussion  in  the  foreign affairs committee  only  began  in  the 
middle  of  July  as  the  bill  lay  in  abeyance  pending  a  resolution  of  the  government 
crisis  {at  the  end  of  June  1992)  and  the  appointment  of the  committee  in  the 
newly  elected  Parliament. 
The  Senate  approved  the bill  on  16  September  1992  by  176  votes  in favour, 
16  against  and  1  abstention. 
The  plenary discussions  in  the  Senate  took  place  with  a  view  to  the  Senate 
dealing with  the  ratification bill before  the  French  referundum  on 
20  September  1992.  By  expediting the  Senate  proceedings  in  this way  the  Italian 
Government  wanted  to  send  a  positive signal  both  to  France  and  the  other Member 
States. 
The  Chamber  of  Deputies  began  its discussion of  the bill  at  the  beginning of 
October  and  its proceedings  are  expected  to  take  a  couple  of  months. 
The  ratification bill  is  extrem~ly simple,  containing only  three articles,  as 
follows: 
Article  1 
1.  The  President  of  the  Republic  is hereby  authorized  to  ratify  the  Maastricht 
Treaty  together with  the  17  attached  Protocols  and  the  Final  Act  containing 
33  Declarations,  done  at  Maastricht  on  7  February  1992. 
Article  2 
1.  The  international  act  referred to  in Article  shall be  wholly  and  fully 
implemented  as  from  the  date  upon  which  it enters  into  force  pursuant  to 
Article  R{2). 
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Article  3 
1.  This  law  shall  enter into  force  on  the  day  following  that  of its publication 
in  the  Official Gazette. 
Ratification of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  Italy will  require  certain 
constitutional  amendments  which  it is,  however,  intended  to  carry out  after 
ratification.  Involved  here  are,  inter alia,  the Treaty's provisions  on 
citizenship of  the  Union.  At  the  moment  it is  being considered  whether  other 
aspects  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  may  justify further adjustments  to  the  Italian 
Constitution. 
In  Italy,  constitutional  amendments  are  implemented  by  means  of  a  procedure 
whereby  the  two  chambers  of  parliament  debate  a  bill to  this  effect  twice  at  an 
interval  of  three  months.  After the  second  reading  the  bill  can  be  adopted  by  a 
simple  majority  in both  chambers.  If  1/5th of  the  Members  of  Parliament  in  one 
of  the  two  chambers  then  so  wish,  the  bill will  be  put  to  a  referendum.  This 
will  also  be  the  case  if 500  000  voters  or  5  out  of  20  regional  elected 
administrations  so  wish.  If,  on  the  other hand,  the bill for  constitutional 
amendment  is  adopted  by  at  least  a  2/3  majority  in  the  two  chambers  of 
Parliament,  it may  not  be  put  to  a  referendum. 
Political debate 
There  is  strong support  for  the Maastricht  Treaty  both  amongst  politicians  and  in 
the  population.  The  Italian  Parliament  made  its approval  of  the  Treaty 
conditional  on  the  European  Parliament's  Opinion  on  1t.  As  the  European 
Parliament  expressed  a  positive view  on  ratification of  the Treaty  by  the  member 
countries  at  its plenary meeting  on  6  to  10  April  1992,  this  condition has  been 
fulfilled. 
Reaction  to the Danish  referendum 
The  Italian Government  issued  a  statement  on  3  June  in  which  1t  express~d its 
regret  at  the  result  of  the  Danish  referendum.  The  statement  also  made  It  clear 
that  the  Italian Government  was  firmly  resolved  to  move  forward  towards  the 
construction  of  Europe  as  decided  in Maastricht. 
The  Italian Foreign  Minister  has  since stressed that  he  agrees  with  the 
Franco-German  position  (see  France  above)  even  if this  might  result  in  a  Treaty 
Without  Dan1sh  participat1on.  On  15  June  1992  - on  the  initlative of  the  Italian 
side  - the  Danish  ambassador  in  Rome  was  summoned  to  a  meeting  with  the  Italian 
State Secretary,  Senator Vitalone;  the  Italian  Foreign Ministry  issued  a  press 
communique  afterwards  stating that  Senator Vitalone  had  expressed  a  very  firm 
wish  on  the  Italian side  that  Denmark  should  be  able  to  continue  to  take  part 
fully  in  the  development  of  the  European  integration process  - in  which  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  was  of particular  importance  - inter alia because  the  cohesion 
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of  a  Union  consisting of  11  countries  and  a  European  Community  consisting 
of  12  could  create  complicated  legal  and  institutional  problems.  Senator 
Vitalone  wished  to  stress that  the  Italian position allowed  for  subsequent 
ratification of  the Maastricht  Treaty. 
The  Italian Foreign Minister  subsequently  referred  to  Denmark's  situation in  a 
statement  to  the  Italian foreign  affairs  committee  on  15  July on  the  European 
Council  meeting  in  Lisbon.  The  statement  expressed understanding  for  the  Danish 
Government's  difficulties  and  voiced  the  hope  that,  in spite of everything,  all 
the  ships  would  arrive  in port  together.  It  was  stressed  that  the  process  of 
Union  should not  be  brought  to  a  halt  by  one  participant who  could not  or would 
not  go  along with  the  rest  and  that  the  best  signal  for Denmark  would  be  for  the 
other countries  resolutely  to  continue  with  the  process of  ratification. 
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7.  LUXEMBOURG 
National  ratification procedure 
The  Maastr1cht  Treaty  was  ratified  on  2  July  1992  without  any  constitutional 
amendment  and  without  a  referendum  but  with  a  resolution  being  adopted  at  the 
same  time  to  the  effect  that  the  Constitution would  be  amended  later,  i.e.  before 
the  end  of  1994  as  a  consequence  of  Union  citizenship and  the  right  of 
fore1gners  to  vote. 
Luxembourg  deposited  its  instrument  of  ratification with  the  Italian Foreign 
M1n1stry  on  28  August  1992. 
The  Luxembourg  Foreign  Minister stated that  Luxembourg  would  ask  for  the 
directive  to  be  adopted  under  Article  8b  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  to  provide  for 
the  possib1lity  of  laying  down  the  following  conditions  at  national  level: 
- fixed  local  residence  for  a  period  of  10  to  12  years, 
- posts  such as  mayor  and  councillors  to  be  reserved  for  Luxembourg  nationals, 
- at  least  50%  of  candidates  on  any  voting  list  to  be  Luxembourg  nat1onals, 
- the  number  of  nationals  from  the  other Member  countries  to  be  limited  to  25%, 
and 
discussions  in  local  councils  to  be  conducted  in Letzeburgesch. 
The  Luxembourg  Constitut1on  contains  a  single prov1s1on  in Article  51  on  the 
hold1ng  of  referenda.  A referendum  must  be  based  on  a  specific  law  adopted 
either by  a  simple  or  a  qualified majority  (cf.  Article  114  of  the Constitution). 
Referenda  are  not  b1nding.  Under  the  Constitution there  is  no  legal  obligation 
to  hold  a  referendum  1n  the  case  of  a  transfer of  sovereignty  but  such  a  transfer 
may  of  course  give  rise  to  a  political or  legal  requirement  for  amendment  of  the 
Constitution pursuant  to  the  procedure  laid  down  for this purpose  (cf.  below). 
The  Government  placed  the  ratification bill before  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on 
9  March.  The  bill  was  discussed  by  a  special  committee  composed  of 
representatives  from  the  two  standing  committees,  the  foreign  affairs  committee 
and  the  economic  affairs  committee.  Once  the  committee  had  concluded  its 
proceedings,  a  written report  was  submitted  and  the  second  reading  took  place. 
The  matter  was  then  brlefly dealt  with  in  the  Council  of  State before  the  third 
reading. 
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The  first  vote  took place  on  22·  April  1992  with  36  of  the  64  members  of  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  voting  in  favour  of  the bill,  13  against  and  with 
6  abstentions. 
The  third  reading  commenced  on  30  June  1992.  The  basis  for  the  discussions  was 
an  opinion  from  the Council  of State concerning the  Maastricht  Treaty's 
compatibility with  the  Luxembourg  Constitution  and  the  positive views  expressed 
by  the special  committee  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies. 
The  debate  in the Chamber  of Deputies  and  in  the  media  concentrated  on  the 
question  of  citizenship of  the  Union,  in particular on  the  right of  foreigners  to 
vote  and  to  stand  for  election,  and  on  the question of  the  location  of  the 
EC  institutions,  especially the  future  European Central  Bank.  The  two  small 
parties  asked  for  both  a  referendum  and  renegotiation of  the  Maastricht Treaty. 
In  connection with  Union  citizenship and  foreigners'  voting rights  the  main 
opposition party,  the  Liberals,  argued  that  the Constitution had  to  be  amended 
before  the Treaty was  ratified.  During  the  third  reading  the  Liberals  changed 
their position and  the Constitution  is now  to  be  declared  revisable  during  the 
present  legislative period  so  that  the  necessary  constitutional  amendments  can  be 
made  before  the  end  of  1994.  As  regards  the  seat  of the  EC  institutions,  the 
Foreign Minister,  Jacques  Poos,  stated that  the  Luxembourg  Government  would 
continue  to  claim  the  rights  granted it under  the  1965  agreement. 
At  the final  vote  the  ratification bill was  adopted with  51  votes  in favour, 
6  against  and  3  abstentions.  The  Christian Socialist,  Socialist  and  Liberal 
Parties  voted  in  favour  and  the  Greens,  the  Communist  Party and  the  5/6  Party, 
also  called  the Pensioners'  party,  voted against. 
At  the  same  time  as  the  vote  on  the bill the  Chamber  of  Deputies  adopted  three 
resolutions  calling on  the  Government  to  do  the  following: 
Resolution  1  concerning Political  Union: 
- to  ensure  that  the  Union  respects  the  national  identities of member  countries 
and  the  principle of "closeness" and  does  not  develop  in  a  centralizing and 
bureaucratic direction, 
- to  ensure  that  any  enlargement  of  the  European  Community  does  not  prejudice its 
internal  cohesion or the  objectives  of  the  Union, 
- to  ensure  that  the  small  member  countries  continue  to be  guaranteed 
representation  in  the  Community  institutions as  equal partners, 
- to  work  for  transparency,  efficiency  and  democracy  in the  institutions, 
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- to  promote  the  closest  possible co-operation  between  national  parliaments  on 
Community  decisions, 
- to  continue  its information  campaign, 
- at  the  intergovernmental  conference  in  1996,  to  work  for  the  development  of  the 
Union's  social,  ecological  and  democratic  dimensions. 
Resolution  2  concerning  Economic  and  Monetary  Union: 
on  the  basis  of  a  number  of  pre-conditions  and  in co-operation with  the 
European  Parliament  and  management  and  labour,  to  take  the necessary budgetary, 
economic,  fiscal  and  institutional  measures. 
Resolution  3  requires  the  Government  to  ensure  that  the  date  of entry  into  force 
of  the  directive  on  the  right  to  vote  and  to  stand as  a  candidate  in municipal 
elect1ons  - which  is  to  contain  the  special  derogations  for  Luxembourg  in 
accordance  with Article  8b  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  - does  not  precede  the 
rev1sion  of  the Constitution. 
The  amendments  to  the  Luxembourg  Constitution as  a  result  of  Union  citizenship 
and  the  EC  right  to  vote  and  stand  for  election will  relate  in particular to 
Article  52  and  Article  107.  As  yet,  there  are  no  definitive proposals  for  new 
formulations  of  the  relevant  Articles  or  any  other  amending Articles  which  may  be 
required  as  a  result  of  Union  citizenship or voting  rights. 
The  procedure  for constitutional  amendments  is  laid down  in Article  114  of  the 
Constitution.  This  provides  for  the  legislative assembly  to  be  dissolved  after 
declar1ng  that  it intends  to  amend  the  constitution  and  to  reconvene  after new 
elections  to  be  held  at  the  latest  3  months  after dissolution.  The  intention is 
that  the  present  assembly will  make  the  relevant  declaration before  the  end  of 
the  present  parliamentary  per1od,  i.e.  the  middle  of  1994;  it will  draft  the 
const1tutional  amendments  and  continue until  the  end  of  its term  and  then  the 
newly  elected  assembly will  confirm  the  amendments  by  a  qualified majority  or 
quorum  (cf.  Article  114(4}(i}  of  the  Luxembourg  Constitution}. 
Political debate 
There  was  broad polltical  agreement  between  the  Government  parties  and  the  major 
opposition part1es  in  Luxembourg  concerning  the  advantages  of  ratification of  the 
Maastr1cht  Treaty.  The  Government  coalition of  Christian Socialists  and 
Social  Democrats  also  agreed,  together with  the  Liberals,  that  the  Luxembourg 
Constitution  should  be  amended  and  that  Luxembourg  should  have  a  derogation 
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from  some  of  the  prov~s~ons of Article  8b  concerning the  right  to  vote  and  to 
stand  as  a  candidate  in municipal  elections,  a  possibility  provided  for  in  that 
Article.  The  disagreement  between  the  Government  and  the  Opposition  concerned 
the  question of  the  extent  to  which  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution should  be 
made  before  or  - if this  were  the  outcome  - after ratification of  the Treaty. 
The  justification for  the  future  derogations  concerning municipal  elections will 
be  based  on  Luxembourg's  particular demographic  situation,  given that  28/29%  of 
the  resident  population,  or approximately  115  000  out  of  a  total  of 
400  000  inhabitants,  are  foreigners. 
The  Luxembourg  Social  Democrat  Party  issued  a  statement  in  connection with  the 
debate,  stressing the  Party's  main priorities as  regards  the Maastricht  Treaty: 
- clarification of  the  conditions  for  the  right  of  EC  nationals  to  vote  and  stand 
as  candidates  in municipal  elections, 
- defence  and  extension of  Luxembourg's  rights  as  a  full  partner in  the  context 
of  enlargement  of  the  EC, 
- reduction of  the  democratic  deficit, 
- avoiding  the  social  dimension  of  Europe  being  sacrificed  to  economic  growth, 
- a  strengthening of  environmental  policy, 
- Luxembourg  as  the  capital  of  Europe. 
Reaction  to the Danish  referendum 
Both  the  Luxembourg  Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign Minister expressed  their 
regret  at  the  result  of  the  Danish  referendum.  The  Prime  Minister stated that he 
d1d  not  think  there  would  be  any  renegotiation or that  the  other  EC  countries 
would  suspend their ratification procedures. 
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8.  PORTUGAL 
National  ratification procedure 
Parliamentary approval  is  required  for ratification of  the  Treaty  on  European 
Union  and  in  this  connection  amendments  will  be  made  to  the  Portuguese 
Constitution.  Under  Article  286  of  the  Constitution,  proposed  amendments  are  to 
be  adopted  by  a  2/3  majority.  The  proposed  amendments  concern  the  powers  of  the 
Portuguese  National  Bank  and  the  issue of  the  right  of  EC  nationals  to  take  part 
in mun1cipal  and  local  elect1ons. 
Theoretically,  the  possibility of  a  referendum  on  the  Maastricht  Treaty  in 
Portugal  cannot  be  excluded,  but  it must  be  considered  highly unlikely. 
The  proceedings  for  the  ratification of  the  Maastricht  Treaty will  take  place  in 
2  stages.  When  the  Portuguese  Parliament  begins  its autumn  session  on 
15  October  1992,  the  proposed  amendments  to  the Constitution will  be  debated, 
wh1lst  the  other aspects  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty will  be  dealt  with  in November 
on  the  basis  of  four  committee  reports,  thus  enabling  ratification to  take  place 
before  the  end  of  the  year. 
Political debate 
The  Communist  Party  (PCP),  parts  of  the  Socialist  Party  (PS)  and  the 
Socialist  Centre  Party  support  the  idea  of  a  referendum,  but  the  Government  Party 
(PSD),  which  has  an  absolute majority  in  Parliament,  is  against  the  idea. 
An  opin1on  poll  published  on  18  September  1992  showed  52,9%  of  the  population  in 
favour  of  ratification of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  with  21,6%  against  and 
23,3% abstaining.  16,7% of  those  questioned  had  never heard  of  the  Maastricht 
Treaty. 
Reaction  to  the  Danish  referendum 
The  Portuguese  Prime  Minister  and  then  President  of  the  European  Council, 
Cavaco  Silva,  1ssued  a  statement  on  3  June  1992  in which  the  Portuguese 
Pres1dency  regretted  the  Danish  declsion  not  to  take  part  in  the  development  of 
the  process  of  European  integration.  The  statement  also  pointed  out  that  the 
EC  member  countries  must  now  look  for  the  best  way  of  continuing  the  process 
towards  European  Un1on  decided  in  Maastricht. 
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9.  SPAIN 
National  ratification procedure 
On  1  July  1992  the  Spanish Constitutional  Court  determined  in a  unanimous  and 
binding decision  that  the provision  in  the Maastricht  Treaty on  the  right of 
Union  citizens  to  stand  as  candidates  at municipal  elections would  require 
amendment  of Article  13(2)  of  the Spanish Constitution,  which  merely  speaks  of 
the possibility of non-Spanish nationals being entitled  to vote  at  municipal 
elections. 
Amendment  of Article  13  can be  undertaken by  a  3/5 majority  in Parliament's  two 
chambers,  but  with  the possibility of  a  referendum  subsequently if  1/10 of  the 
members  of  one  of  the  two  chambers  so  request  no  later  than  15  days  after 
adoption  of  the proposed  amendment  (Article  167(3)  of  the Constitution). 
Immediately  after the  decision  by  the  Constitutional Court,  Government  placed 
before  Parliament  a  proposal  for  amendment  of Article  13  of  the Constitution  so 
that  non-Spanish  nationals  would  also  gain  the  right to  stand  as  candidates at 
municipal  elections.  The  proposal  received  support  from  all parties  and  was 
passed  by  Congress  and  the  Senate  on  22  and  30  July  1992  respectively,  entering 
into  force  on  28  August  1992. 
With  the  constitutional  amendment  adopted,  the  path is  clear for Parliament's 
discussion of  a  proposal  for ratification of  the Maastricht  Treaty.  The  proposal 
for  ratification of  the  Maastricht Treaty  was  submitted  in Congress  on 
10  September  1992.  Discussion will  take place  in both  chambers  of  Parliament  and 
is expected  to  be  completed  in  Congress  in October and  in  the  Senate  in  November. 
Political debate 
Broadly  speaking,  as  far as  can  be  judged all the political parties will  vote  for 
ratification of  the  Union  Treaty.  The  coalition of  the  left  (lzquierda Unida), 
of  communist  bent  with  17  members  in Congress,  has  been split over  the  question, 
as  to  date  8  of its members,  including  the  Chairman  (Julio Anguita),  have 
declared  that  they will  abstain while  the  remaining  9  intend  to  vote  in  favour. 
In  the  course  of  the  parliamentary discussion of  the Maastricht  Treaty,  interest 
will  largely  focus  on  the  extent  to  which  the  Spanish  requests  concerning 
economic  and  social  cohesion will  be  taken  into  account.  All  parties  in 
Parliament  concur with  the  Government  line  on  the  question  of  economic  and  social 
cohesion.  In  this  connection  the financial  reform  (the  Delors  II  package)  will 
be  brought  into  the  debate. 
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Another  subject  in  the  debate  is  the Government's  convergence  plan,  i.e.  Its 
economic  programme  for  being able  in due  course  to  meet  the  criteria for 
participation  in  the  third stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  Spain's  current 
economic  problems  and  the difficulties  faced  by  Spanish  industry  in  competition 
in  the  internal market  will  be  brought  into  the  debate  in this context. 
On  3  September  1992  Rodrigo  Rato,  the  spokesman  for  the  Conservative  Party 
(Partido  Popular),  stated to the  press  that  the Treaty would  be  bound  to  be 
re-read  in all  Member  States after what  had  happened  in  Denmark  and  after the 
debate  which  had  taken  place in France.  He  mentioned  in this  connection  that  if 
the  cohesion  resources  wanted  by  Spain  were  not  created  a  request  would  have  to 
be  made  for  extension of the deadlines  laid down  for meeting  the  conditions  for 
entering into  the  third stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  The  Chairman  of 
the  same  party,  Jose  Maria  Aznar,  stated that  the  Maastricht  Treaty  would  have  to 
be  reinterpreted  in  any  event. 
These  statements  drew  no  comments  from  Government,  but  on  8  September  1992  the 
Foreign  Min1ster,  Javier Solana,  informed  the press  that  Spain  would  implement 
the  ratification procedure  even if,  contrary to  expectations,  France  were  to  vote 
against  the  Maastricht  Treaty  on  20  September  1992. 
The  question  of consultative  referendum  on  the  Maastricht  Treaty will  possibly be 
raised  during parliamentary discussion.  Article  92  of  the  Spanish Constitution 
allows  for  the  possibility of  consultative  referenda  on  questions  of  far-reaching 
importance  If a  majority of Congress  members  approve  a  Government  proposal  to 
that  effect.  Prime  Minister Felipe Gonzalez,  whose  party holds  half  the  seats  in 
Congress.  has  rejected  the  idea of  a  consultative  referendum.  And  it is  regarded 
as  out  of  the  question  that  any  call  on  Government  to  bring  forward  a  proposal  on 
the  matter could  acquire  the  requisite  support  among  the majority of  Congress's 
members. 
Instead,  Government  intends  to  initiate an  information  campaign  concerning  the 
Treaty  on  European  Union.  The  campaign  will  include distribution of  certain 
publications  on  the Treaty  in  addition  to  the printing of  25  000  copies  of  the 
Union  Treaty  together with  the  Treaty  of  Rome  and  the  Single  Act. 
The  Treaty  text  will  be  sent  to  subscribers  to  the  Spanish Official Gazette  and 
to  local  authorities,  etc ..  as  well  as  being  sold  in bookshops.  A more  general 
review  of  the  current  EC  situation and  the  Union  Treaty will  be  issued  with a 
print  run  of  4  to  5  million,  for  distribution with  the  major daily papers.  etc. 
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Finally,  the State  radio  and  television station has  announced  that,  independently 
of  Government  and  political parties,  etc.,  a  series of  information programmes  on 
the  Union  Treaty will  be  broadcast. 
Reaction  to  the Danish  referendum 
The  Spanish Government's  reaction to  the  referendum  on  2  June  was  to  note  that 
the  European  process  must  continue  with or without  Denmark. 
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10.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
National  ratification procedure 
On  3  June  the British Prime  Minister  informed  the  House  of  Commons  of  the 
consequences  of  the  Danish  referendum  and  at  the  same  time  decided to  postpone 
the  ratification  procedure  in Parliament.  This  was  done  to  provide  an 
opportunity to  clarify the  legal  and  economic  Implications  of  the  Danish  no.  In 
his  statement  he  maintained  Government's  desire  to  implement  the 
Maastricht  Treaty.  He  considered  that  there  was  no  possibility  of  any 
renegotiation.  Denmark's  future  relationship  to  the  Union  must  now  be  determined 
within  the  months  to  come. 
The  British ratification process  entails passing  a  bill amending  the  "European 
Communities'  Act"  (the  UK  accession  law}.  The  bill  concerns  only those aspects 
of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  which  amend  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  The  b1ll  in  question 
has  to  be  adopted  by  a  simple  majority.  The  intergovernmental  aspects  do  not 
require  a  law  to  be  adopted  in  order to  be  ratified.  That  can  be  done  directly 
by  Government  under  United  Kingdom  legislation. 
Government  put  forward  the bill  immediately after the  opening  of  the  House  of 
Commons  on  6  May  1992.  Thereafter it was  passed  on  for  committee  discussion. 
The  second  reading  of  the bill for ratification of  the  Maastricht Treaty  was  held 
on  Thursday  21  May  1992.  The  debate  was  closed  by  a  vote  in  favour  of  moving  the 
bill  to  a  third  reading  with  336  votes  for  and  92  against.  The  majority  of 
Labour  members  abstained. 
Some  150  proposed  amendments  to  the  Government's  bill  have  been  put  forward. 
These  amendments  will  be  voted  on  individually or,  wherever  possible,  by  groups 
of  individual  proposals.  The  committee  stage  will  take place  before  the  full 
House  of  Commons.  and  thus  not  in  the  Select  Committee  for  European  Affairs 
(Parliament's  "Market  Committee"}.  In  the  final  (third}  reading  a  vote will  be 
taken  on  the entire.  and  possibly modified,  bill. 
Simply given  the  number  of  proposed  amendments,  the  debate  is  expected  to  be  very 
protracted,  possibly  drawing  out  over  many  days. 
The  bill  has  to  pass  before  the  House  of  Lords  before  receiving  Royal  Assent. 
The  United  Kingdom  has  no  written constitution,  with the  result  that 
constitutional  amendments  are  irrelevant. 
The  referendum  has  a  very  marginal  position  in  UK  political  tradition.  although 
it was  used  in  1975  following  the  renegotiations  on  the  United  Kingdom's  EC 
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membership.  In  the  current  debate  the  demand  is  being heard  for a  referendum, 
both  from  members  of  the  governing party and  from  Labour.  The  Prime  Minister, 
Mr  Major,  has  rejected  this possibility as  being at  variance  with British 
parliamentary  traditions  and  Parliament's  responsibility. 
Political debate 
Following  the  result  of  the  Danish  vote,  some  100  Conservative  MPs  called  on 
Government  to  attempt  to  have  the  Maastricht  Treaty  renegotiated.  The  criticism 
was  led  by  former  Conservative  MPs  now  sitting in  the  Lords  - primarily 
Baroness  Thatcher and  Lord  Tebbitt  - and  by  Conservative backbenchers  such  as 
Sir Teddy  Taylor  in  the  Commons. 
In  the  public  mind  the generally critical attitude  towards  the  Community  has 
increased  concurrently with  constantly  rising dissatisfaction with  the 
Government's  economic  policy  in  relation  to  the  long-awaited  economic  recovery, 
which  has  so  far failed  to  materialize.  The  reproach  is  increasingly being made 
to  the  Government  that  the  United  Kingdom's  economic  scope  is continually being 
curtailed as  a  result of what  is described  as  the  Community's  increasing powers. 
Following  the  European  Council  meeting  in  Lisbon  the  United  Kingdom  Government 
initiated a  major  clarification exercise  on  the  principle  of subsidiarity in the 
various  Ministries.  This  exercise  is expected  to  be  completed  in the  autumn. 
As  regards  Labour's  position on  ratification of  the Treaty,  the  party is  only  in 
the  process  of  elaborating its strategy following  the  election of  a  new  leader. 
The  party abstained  from  voting during  the  second  reading  of  the bill for 
ratification of  the  Treaty.  However,  for  the  time  being it continues  to  be  an 
open  question  to  what  extent  the  new  party  leader will  in  the  event  be  able  to 
maintain  that  position. 
The  party's  commitment  to  continuing integration of  the  United  Kingdom  into  the 
Community  is being maintained,  even  though  the  British opt-out  clause  from  the 
Social  Charter continues  to  cause  the  party difficulties. 
Reaction  to  the Danish  referendum 
As  stated  above,  on  3  June  1992  the  British Prime  Minister briefed the  Commons  on 
the  consequences  of  the  Danish  referendum. 
It  is anticipated  that  the parliamentary ratification process  will  be  resumed 
when  Parliament  convenes  in  October  following  the  summer  recess.  In  that  context 
a  general  EC  debate  will  be  held  in the  British Parliament. 
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During  the  special  debate  in  the  Commons  on  24  September  1992  on  the  British 
economic  situation,  the  Prime  Minister adverted  to  the  ratification of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty.  He  refused  to  hold  a  referendum.  At  the  same  time  he  stated 
that  the  ratiflcation process  would  be  resumed  once  Denmark's  intentions  were 
clear.  (4) 
Following  the  Cabinet  meeting  on  1  October  1992  the  Prime  Minister stated during 
a  radio  interview on  the  same  day  that  he  planned  to  submit  the  Maastricht 
ratification bill  for  a  third  reading  by  the  Commons  by  Christmas  or shortly 
thereafter. 
(4}  On  Denmark's  position  Mr  Major  sald:  "Although  the  Danish  people  narrowly 
voted  against  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  that  is  not  necessarily their  last  word. 
The  Danish  Government  plan  a  further  referendum.  But  if the  Danes  were 
unable  to  go  back  to  their people,  or  were  they  to  lose  again  that  further 
referendum,  then  the  Maastrlcht  Treaty  could  not  proceed.  It  would  not  be 
acceptable  for  the  eleven  to  go  ahead  without  Denmark  and  against  the  will  of 
the  Danish  Government  and  people.  That  cannot  happen.  And  it will  not 
happen. 
The  Danish  Government  will  publish  a  White  Paper  next  month  at  the  star~  of  a 
process  of  consultation.  It  would  not  make  sense  to  bring  the  Maastricht 
Bill  back  to  the  House  of Commons  before  we  know  clearly what  Danish 
intentions  are  and  when  and  how  they  propose  to  consult  their people  again. 
But  when  it is  known  we  must  consider further  examinat1on  of  the  Bill." 
Later  in  the  statement  Mr  Major  said:  "··.when we  are  clear that  the  Danes 
have  a  basis  on  which  they  can  put  the  Treaty  back  to  the1r electorate,  we 
shall  bring the  Maastricht  Bill  back  to  the  House  of Commons." 
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11.  GERMANY 
National  ratification procedure 
On  21  July  1992  the  Federal  Government  approved  the bill modifying  the 
German  Basic  Law  together with  the bill on  actual  ratification of  the Maastricht 
Treaty.  The  two  bills,  on  modification of  the  Basic  Law  and  on  ratification, 
were  brought  before  the  Bundesrat  on  23  September  1992.  Both bills were 
submitted  to  the  Bundestag on  8  October  1992.  The  bill amending  the  Basic  Law 
requires  a  2/3  majority  in  the  Bundesrat  and  the  Bundestag.  The  bill on  actual 
ratification requires  a  simple  majority in the  Bundestag  and  the  Bundesrat.  At 
present,  the  ratification procedure  is expected  to be  concluded  in December  1992 
(after the  European  Council  meeting  in  Edinburgh  on  11  and  12.12.1992 but  before 
the  end  of  the year). 
At  a  later date  in  the  year  the  Federal  Government  will  put  forward  a  bill on  the 
detailed  implementation  of  the  new  Article  23  on  the  transfer of  powers  to  the  EC 
and  the  question of  the  involvement  of  the  Lander  in the  German  decision-making 
process  on  EC  matters.  For  adoption,  the  law  requires  a  simple  majority  in  the 
Bundesrat  and  the  Bundestag. 
The  German  Basic  Law  contains  no  rules  on  a  referendum  in connection with  the 
transfer of  powers  to  international  bodies.  Neither the  governing  coalition 
parties  (CDU/CSU  and  the  FDP)  nor  the Social  Democrats  (SPD)  have  put  forward  a 
proposal  for  a  consultative  referendum. 
The  Federal  Government's  bill amending  the  Basic  Law  entails: 
- inserting a  new  Article  23  on  the  transfer of  powers  to  the  EC; 
-modifying Article  28  (local voting  rights); 
-modifying Article  88  (European  Central  Bank); 
-adjusting Article  115  (the  internal  procedure  between  the  Bundestag  and  the 
Bundesrat). 
The  main  content  of  Article  23  is: 
The  Federal  State's future  transfer of  powers  to  the  EC  requires  passing  a  law, 
to  be  adopted  by  both  the  Bundestag  and  the  Bundesrat.  If treaty amendments  in 
EC  co-operation are  involved  which  affect  the  content  of  the  German  Basic  Law, 
a  bill has  to  be  passed with  a  2/3  majority  in the Bundestag  and  the  Bundesrat, 
under  the  rules  governing  amendment  of  the German  Basic  Law. 
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Both  the  Bundestag  and  the  Bundesrat  will  co-operate  in  treating future  EC 
issues  at  national  level. 
- Where  areas  are  involved  which  are  of  exclusively Federal  competence  but  which 
affect  the  Lander's  interests,  the  Federal  Government  will  take  account  of  the 
Bundesrat's  position. 
- Where  areas  are  involved  which  are  preponderantly the  competence  of  the  Lander 
or where  the  Lander's  administrative practice is  affected  to  a  significant 
degree,  the  Federal  State will  take  decisive  account  of  the  Bundesrat's  views 
in  adopting  the  German  position. 
- Where  areas  are  involved  which  are  exclusively  of  Lander  competence,  the  German 
position within  the  relevant  EC  bodies will  be  put  forward  by  the  Lander. 
- The  involvement  of  the  Lander will  be  set  forth  in more  specific  terms  in  a  law 
to  be  adopted  by  both  the  Bundestag  and  the  Bundesrat. 
Political debate 
Apart  from  the  issue  of  Article  23  there  have  been  no  crucial  differences  of 
opinion  between  the  governing  coalition parties  regarding  ratification of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty. 
The  SPD  leadership adopted  the  party's  main  line  at  meetings  in March  and 
May  1992  respectively.  That  involves  acceptance  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  as  it 
stands.  Prior to  that,  a  lengthy discussion  was  conducted  within  the  party, 
during  which,  among  other things,  a  number  of  leading politicians apparently 
wanted  the  SPD  to  press  for  "subsequent  improvements"  to  the  current  negotiation 
outcome. 
Article  23  has  in  the  meantime  been  the  subject  of  discussions  between  the 
political parties  in  the  Constitutional  Committee  and  of negotiations  between  the 
Federal  Government  and  the  Lander,  most  of  which  are  SPD-governed. 
It  may  therefore  be  expected  that  in  December  1992  both  the  governing  parties  and 
the  SPD  will  vote  in  favour  of  the  constitutional  amendment  and  ratification 
bills. 
However,  the possibility  cannot  be  ruled  out  that,  in connection with  adoption  of 
the  abovementioned  bill on  German  implementation of  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  the 
Lander  and/or  the  SPD  might  make  demands  involving major modifications  to  the 
internal  German  EC  procedure.  Such  a  situation would  merely  involve  adjusting 
German  internal  legislation and  not  entail  any  requirement  to  amend  the 
Maastricht  Treaty. 
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It may  be  added  that  there  continue  to exist  circles which  do  not  want  an 
automatic  transition to  the  third stage of  EMU  on  Germany's  part.  Germany's 
participation,  even  in  a  situation where  it fulfils the Treaty conditions,  must 
be  preceded  by  prior approval  in  the  Bundestag  and  the  Bundesrat.  On 
25  September  1992,  the  German  Foreign Minister,  Mr  Kinkel,  stated before  the 
Bundestag that  the  Bundestag  and  the  Bundesrat  would  deal  with  the matter  before 
the  European  Council  meeting  in  1996  or  1998  took  a  decision. 
It  should  further  be  added  that,  despite  acceptance of  the  current  Maastricht 
Treaty  by  the  governing parties  and  the  SPD,  there  has  been  considerable 
dissatisfaction that  Germany's  high ambitions  were  not  fulfilled  in  the 
Intergovernmental  Conferences.  This  applies  in particular to  the  new  provisions 
on  the  powers  of  the  European  Parliament,  the  common  foreign  and  security policy, 
legal  and  internal matters  and  specifically the  lack of balance  between  the 
limited progress  in these  areas  and  the  far-reaching  EMU  provisions. 
There  are  no  regular opinion polls  in Germany  corresponding  to  the  Danish  ones 
prior to  2  June  1992. 
There  have  been  occasional  telephone polls,  in particular in the  German  mass 
media  {TV),  revealing widespread  scepticism on  parts of  the  Maastricht  Treaty, 
first  and  foremost  the projected abolition of  the  German  mark.  However,  as 
stated,  there  is no  possibility of making  direct  comparisons  between  attitudes 
towards  the  Maastricht  Treaty in opinion  at  large  as  between Germany  and  Denmark. 
Some  sections  of "opinion"  have  levelled  considerable criticisms at  the Treaty. 
For  exampl~.  some  60  economics  professors  have  voiced strong criticism of  the 
provisions  on  EMU  on  the  grounds  that  they  do  not  secure  adequate  European 
stability after transition  to  the  third stage. 
Following  the  criticism from  the  60  economics  professors  in  the  German  media  a 
statement  was  published  by  some  50  professors  speaking positively on  the 
EMU  Treaty. 
The  same  has  been  done  by  leading  representatives  of the  German  financial  sector. 
In  that  circle  too  there  has  been  criticism primarily of  the  "inadequate" 
guarantees  that  transition to  the  third stage  and  abandonment  of  the  German  mark 
will  lead  to  a  European  system  with  at  least  as  high a  level  of  economic  and 
monetary stability as  Germany  has  today. 
A number  of  law professors  have  publicly criticized other provisions  of  the 
Treaty.  It has  been stated inter alia that  the  European  Parliament  and  the Court 
of Justice do  not  exercise adequate  control  over the  Commission  and  the  Council 
with  regard  to  powers  concerning industrial policy,  the  labour market  and  social 
conditions,  c~lture and  education  and  consumer  protection. 
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Reaction  to  the  Danish  referendum 
On  3  June  1992  Germany  issued  a  joint  statement  together with  France  (see  section 
on  France).  The  statement  indicated  that  the  ratification process  would  proceed 
in  France  and  Germany  regardless  of  the  result  of  the  Danish  vote  and  that  the 
two  countries  were  striving for  ratification of  the Maastricht  Treaty  before  the 
end  of  the  year at  any rate in  11  and  preferably  in all  12  Member  States.  At  the 
same  time,  the  two  countries  stressed  that  the  door  was  being  kept  open  for 
Denmark  and  that  the prospects  for the  EC's  enlargement  must  not  suffer as  a 
result of  the  Danish  vote. 
The  result  of  the  Danish  referendum  received  considerable  coverage  in  the  German 
media  during the days  immediately  following it. 
On  a  number  of occasions,  and  most  recently in  connection with  Chancellor  Kohl's 
Government  statement  to  the  Bundestag  on  25  September  1992,  the  Federal 
Government  has  confirmed  its desire  to maintain  the  objective of  entry  into  force 
of the Maastricht  Treaty  on  1  January  1993.  The  Government  has  also vigorously 
maintained  that  the  door  is "open"  for  Denmark. 
The  Federal  Government  has  clearly stated the  desire that  Denmark  should  also 
accede  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  in that  connection  has  reiterated  the  German 
desire for accession negotiations  with  the  EFTA  candidate  countries  to  be 
initiated  in early  1993. 
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CHAPTER  VII 
THE  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  THE  ROME  TREATY 
AND  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
This Chapter takes  a  systematic look at the Maastricht Treaty,  in order to see 
how  it departs  from the existing Treaties.  The purpose is especially to 
consider whether it would be practically and  legally possible for the great 
majority of Member  States to co-operate under the new  dispensation while  just 
one or a  very  few  continue to take part in accordance with the old 
arrangements or something like them. 
The  Chapter accordingly examines  changes  and differences  in the institutional 
provisions,  including the decision-making procedures which the old and  new 
Treaties  lay down,  and  in the substantive rules  in various areas,  including 
some  which are not specifically regulated in separate chapters in the existing 
Treaties. 
2.  THE  TREATIES 
2.1.  THE  ORIGINAL  TREATIES 
The three original Treaties are the ECSC  Treaty,  which dates  from  1951,  and 
the Euratom Treaty and the Treaty on  European economic  co-operation, 
frequently referred to as the  "Rome"  Treaty,  both dating from  1957.  The  ECSC 
Treaty set out to safeguard peace  in Europe by establishing close economic 
co-operation between the Member  States in the coal  and steel industries.  The 
Euratom Treaty is likewise confined to  a  single field,  namely  atomic energy. 
The  EEC  Treaty lays the foundations of an ever closer union  among  the peoples 
of Europe,  and provides  for the establishment of  a  common  market  or customs 
union,  common  policies in agriculture and transport,  the co-ordination of the 
Member  States•  economic policies,  and  co-operation on  a  series of other 
subjects relating to the economy. 
The  institutional structure of the ECSC  Treaty differs  f~om that of the other 
two  Treaties in being more  supranational in design.  (S)  The  cornerstones of 
the ECSC  structure were  four  institutions.  The  High Authority was  given 
far-reaching powers to regulate the coal  and  steel industry in the six 
countries.  The  High  Authority's activities were  subject to control by  a 
( 5)  The central player in the ECSC  Treaty is the High Authority, whereas in the 
two  later Treaties the Council is more  important. 
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Council  composed  c~ Ministers  from  the Member  States'  Governments,  a 
Parliamentary Assembly  composed  of delegates  from the Member  States's 
parliaments,  and  a  Court of Justice. 
In the  EEC  Treaty the High Authority was  replaced by the Commission. 
Decision-making  power  was  given to the Council,  which  was  required to consult 
the European Parliament.  As  in the ECSC  Treaty,  there was  also a  Court of 
Justice which  was  to interpret and  review the application of the Treaty. 
Over  the years the original Treaties were  amended in a  number of  revisions, 
which until the Single Act were  mainly  concerned with institutional matters. 
The  first revision was  the Merger  Treaty of 1965,  which established common 
institutions for all three Communities.  The  Budget  Treaties of  1970  and  1975 
expanded the European Parliament's role in the drawing up  and  approval  of the 
European  Community  budget.  There  was  also the decision that the European 
Parliament would  be elected directly,  beginning  in  1979. 
European political co-operation developed  from  1970  onward  as  a  purely 
intergovernmental  form  of  co-operation alongside the original Treaties. 
basis  here  was  not  a  Treaty but  three reports  (the  Luxembourg Report of 
the Copenhagen  Report of  1973  and the London  Report  of  1981)  which  the 
Member  States  accepted  as  a  basis  for  co-operation. 
The 
1971, 
From  the mid-1970s  there has  also been  intergovernmental co-operation between 
the Member  States on  justice and  home  affairs.  This takes place through  a 
number  of  channels  set up  on  an  ad  hoc  basis outside the Treaty  framework,  and 
in some  cases  links up  with political co-operation.  Cases  of this kind 
include  immigration,  policy on  asylum,  and  co-operation in the field of civil 
law. 
Since the end  of the  1970s there has been  economic  and monetary  co-operation 
between the Member  States.  This  takes place outside the  framework  of the 
Treaty. 
2.2.  THE  SINGLE  EUROPEAN  ACT 
The  Single Act  represented the most  far-reaching rev1s1on of the  EEC  Treaty to 
date.  Its structure is similar to that of the Maastricht Treaty.  It consists 
of  two pillars,  which clearly separate co-operation  through the  Community 
machinery  proper  from  intergovernmental co-operation  (foreign policy 
co-operation). 
The  first pillar builds on the EEC  Treaty:  it amends  both the substantive  and 
the institutional provisions.  It expands  and  clarifies the areas of  Community 
authority  (the environment,  research and technological development,  economic 
and social cohesion),  streamlines the decision-making  process  by  introducing 
majority voting in the Council,  and  strengthens the  European Parliament's role 
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by  introducing the co-operation procedure  and  the assent procedure. 
The  second pillar represents  a  codification of European political 
co-operation,  which had  been going on since 1970.  But  this foreign-policy 
co-operation continues to be an  intergovernmental matter.  Decisions  continue 
to be taken by  unanimous  vote,  in the  form  of  "common  positions" which do  not 
directly affect citizens or businesses in the Member  States and are not 
subject to judicial review. 
The  Single Act  left co-operation on  justice and  home  affairs unregulated by 
the Treaties. 
This was  the body of treaties which  formed  the point of departure for the 
intergovernmental  conferences  on political union and economic  and monetary 
union;  it consisted of  a  series of acts which  had  so tb speak been 
superimposed one on top of the other and expanded in step with the development 
of the Community.  The  Maastricht Treaty follows the same principles of 
structure as were  applied earlier in the Community's history. 
The  following  chapters concentrate on the EEC  Treaty,  as the changes to the 
ECSC  and  Euratom Treaties are merely  consequent  on  the  changes  to the 
EEC  Treaty. 
2.3.  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
The Maastricht Treaty is the most  comprehensive  rev~s~on of the Treaties since 
the foundation of the Community.  It is structured in three pillars,  bound 
together by  common  introductory and  final provisions. 
The Maastricht Treaty is divided  into seven Titles,  between them comprising 
Articles A to s. 
The  common  introductory provisions are set out  in Title I,  which  comprises 
Articles A to F;  they deal with the objectives of the  Union,  fundamental 
principles,  and rules governing the Union  as  a  whole. 
Amendments  to the EEC,  ECSC  and  Euratom Treaties are set out  in 
Titles II to IV,  comprising Articles G to  I  (the first pillar).  The 
Maastricht Treaty continues along the lines of the  Singl~ Act  by  further 
clarifying and  building on the powers  conferred by  the  EEC  Treaty,  further 
streamlining the decision-making process by  means  of majority voting  in the 
Council,  and developing the decision-making procedures  which the Single Act 
had  introduced. 
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The  second pillar is Title V,  comprising Articles J  to J.11;  it extends the 
treaty provision for  intergovernmental  foreign-policy co-operation.  Title VI, 
which  comprises Articles K  to K.9,  brings  into the  system of the Treaty the 
machinery for  co-operation in the  fields of  justice and  home  affairs which  has 
been  in operation outside the Treaty since the 1970s.  This  is comparable to 
what  was  done with European political co-operation  in the Single Act. 
The  final provisions,  which  apply to all three pillars,  are set out in 
Title VII,  comprising Articles L  to S;  the clauses  in the  EEC  Treaty covering 
amendments  to the Treaty and the enlargement of the  Community  are here made 
applicable to the Union  as  a  whole. 
A  series of protocols  and declarations are also attached to the Maastricht 
Treaty which  supplement or interpret its wording  in  a  range  of  areas. 
The Maastricht Treaty establishes separate decision-making rules  for  each of 
the three pillars.  The  existing institutions,  Council,  Parliament,  Commission 
and  Court  of Justice,  are  employed  for all three pillars.  The  Council  becomes 
the deciding  body  in foreign policy and  in co-operation on  justice,  in place 
of the earlier meetings  of  foreign ministers  and of ministers  for  justice and 
home  affairs.  The  preparatory stages were  previously divided into three 
separate  systems.  A  single  system is now  established for preparation and  for 
decision-making,  but the rules governing the actual taking of decisions  are 
different in the first,  second  and third pillars. 
It is worth  noting that the Treaty itself sets  a  series of deadlines  for  its 
implementation.  These  are  spread over the period from  1993  to  1999  (see 
Annex  1). 
The  Treaty also lists a  number  of subjects to be considered at the next 
intergovernmental  conference,  in  1996  (see Annex  1  hereto). 
To  sum  up,  the structure of the Maastricht Treaty builds on the  same  method  as 
has  been applied in the past.  As  in the Single Act,  a  clear distinction is 
maintained between  co-operation in the Community  framework  (the first pillar) 
and  intergovernmental co-operation  (the  second  and third pillars).  The 
inclusion of  intergovernmental  co-operation on  justice and  home  affairs 
follows  the  same  principle as the  inclusion of European political co-operation 
in the Single Act.  This  makes  co-operation more  systematic  and  more 
transparent. 
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2 • 4.  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  OBJECTIVES  AHD  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
The  common  provisions set out the principles which  apply to the Maastricht 
Treaty as  a  whole,  that is to say both to the Community  (the first pillar)  and 
to the intergovernmental co-operation mechanisms  (the  second and third 
pillars). 
It is here  stated that the Maastricht Treaty  "marks  a  new  stage in the process 
of creating an  ever closer union  among  the peoples  of Europe,  in which 
decisions are taken  as  closely as possible to the citizen".  This  formulation 
is a  development  of the wording in the Rome  Treaty.  The  preamble to the Rome 
Treaty spoke of the Community  being  "determined to lay the foundations of  an 
ever closer union  among  the peoples of Europe". 
The objectives of the Union  are defined as  follows  (Article B): 
"- to promote  economic  and  social progress which is balanced and sustainable, 
in particular through the creation of an  area without  internal frontiers, 
through the strengthening of economic  and social cohesion and  through the 
establishment of economic  and monetary union,  ultimately including  a 
single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; 
to assert its identity on the international scene,  in particular through 
the implementation of  a  common  foreign  and  security policy including the 
eventual  framing of  a  common  defence policy,  which might  in time  lead to a 
common  defence; 
to strengthen the protection of the rights and  interests of the nationals 
of its Member  States through the  introduction of  a  citizenship of the 
Union; 
to develop close co-operation on  justice and  home  affairs; 
to maintain in full the aquis  communautaire  and build on it with a  view to 
considering,  through the procedure referred to in Article N(2),  to what 
extent the policies  and  forms  of co-operation introduced by this Treaty 
may  need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms  and the institutions of the Community." 
This  general provision on the objectives of the Union also makes  express 
reference to the principle of  subsidiarity,  which  is defined by the first 
pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. 
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Article C  lays  down  the principle of the single institutionai framework,  and 
the principle of consistency  and  continuity between the pillars and  in the 
Union's  foreign-policy activities as  a  whole. 
Provision is made  for the European  Council to provide the Union with the 
necessary  impetus  for its development  and to define its general political 
guidelines.  The  European  Council  is to submit to the European Parliament  a 
yearly written report on  the progress  achieved by the Union. 
The principle of legality,  that is to  say the principle that  any  act must  have 
a  legal basis in the Treaty,  is laid down  as  a  general principle  governing the 
workings  of the Union. 
A  number  of  fundamental  principles are then stated:  these include respect  for 
the national  identities and  systems  of government  of the Member  States,  and 
respect  for  fundamental  human  rights  and  freedoms,  which the  Union is to 
uphold. 
3.  CO-OPERATION  IN  THE  COMMUNITY  FRAMEWORK  (ROME  TREATY  AND  FIRST  PILLAR) 
3.1.  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES  IN  THE  ROME  TREATY  AND  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
(FIRST  PILLAR) 
The  fundamental  principles,  objectives and tasks set out  in the  Rome  Treaty 
are taken further  and built on in the Maastricht Treaty,  in  line with the 
development  of the Community  up to the Maastricht  Treaty and with the  new 
codification of the areas  of  co-operation in the Union.  The  term "European 
Economic  Community"  is to be  replaced by  the term  "European  Community",  which 
better reflects the broader  and  more  modern  sphere  in which  it is now  to 
operate.  The  new  Treaty in fact  makes  express provision for  co-operation in  a 
number  of the non-economic  areas with which  the  Community  has  in the past 
concerned itself despite the absence of any  such express provision. 
Article  2  of the Rome  Treaty,  on the objectives of the  Community,  now  provides 
that the Community  is to have  as its task to promote environmentally 
sustainable development,  high  employment,  a  high  level of social  protection, 
and  economic  and  social cohesion.  The  Article thus reflects  a  far broader  and 
more  modern  approach,  balancing  economic  and  non-economic objectives. 
The  same  applies to the description of the areas of  Community  action in 
Article  3  and Article 3a.  These  include both the areas  of co-operation 
inserted into the Treaty  by the Single Act  in 1986  (environmental policy, 
research  and technological  development  and  economic  and  social cohesion)  and 
the areas  now  inserted by the Maastricht  Treaty  (such  as education,  health, 
social affairs,  development  assistance and  consumer  policy).  The list also 
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mentions energy,  civil protection and tourism,  which  are not specifically 
referred to elsewhere  in the Treaty and which thus continue to be based on 
general provisions,  and  on Article 235  in particular.  In a  declaration 
annexed to the Treaty it is stated that the treatment of these three spheres 
will be examined at the next  intergovernmental  conference in  1996 on the basis 
of  a  report to be  submitted by the commission. 
Article 3a deals with economic  and monetary union. 
Articles  3  and  3a thus spell out the areas of Community  co-operation falling 
within the  statement of objectives  in Article 2. 
The  three fundamental  principles governing the working of the Community  are 
confirmed: 
the principle of  legality  (Article 4(1)  of the Rome  Treaty,  Article  3b  of 
the Maastricht Treaty); 
the principle of  solidarity  (Article  5  in both Treaties); 
the principle of non-discrimination  (Article  7  of the Rome  Treaty, 
Article  6  of the Maastricht Treaty). 
Article 3b  of the Maastricht Treaty adds  a  new  leading principle,  the 
"closeness" principle. 
The  Treaty defines the principle in negative terms:  the Community  is to take 
action  "only if and  insofar as the objectives of the  proposed  action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member  States and  can therefore •••  be better 
achieved by the Community". 
This means  that the commission  and the Council  have  always to  show  why  a 
particular action can be better achieved by the Community.  The  "closeness" 
principle has  far-reaching  implications  for the division of  labour between the 
Community  and the Member  States. 
The  first steps towards translating the  "closeness"  principle into practice 
were  taken in the conclusions of  the European  Council meeting  in Lisbon on  26 
and  27  June 1992.  It is there stated that the Commission and  the Council  are 
to report to the European Council meeting  in Edinburgh  on  11  and  12  December 
on the procedural  and practical steps to implement  the principle. 
The  third sentence in Article 3b  confirms the principle of proportionality, 
which  requires that means  be  in reasonable proportion to ends.  The  measures 
taken to achieve  a  given objective  should  go  no  further than necessary. 
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The  general principles of  law  have  been described  in more detail in Chapter II 
above. 
To  sum  up,  the  statement of objectives  and  the description of the community's 
areas of activity which  are laid down  in the Maastricht Treaty go  a  great deal 
further to cover what  the  Community  actually does.  The  inclusion in the 
Treaty of the  "closeness"  principles  and proportionality emphasizes the  change 
of  course which the Union  is undertaking,  towards  a  division of  labour  in 
which  every level  - region,  nation or Community  - handles the tasks to which 
it is best suited. 
3.2.  THE  ROLES  OF  THE  INSTITUTIONS  -NEW  INSTITUTIONS 
The  four  institutions,  the Council,  the Commission,  the European  Parliament 
and the Court of Justice,  maintain their traditional roles  in pillar 1  of the 
Maastricht Treaty.  Annex  4  is a  diagram  showing the typical  Community  method 
and the  international method  of taking decisions. 
The Maastricht Treaty creates  a  shift in the  powers  of  the institutions in 
favour  of the Council  and the European  Parliament. 
The  Council will adopt  the principle of majority decisions  as the dominant 
rule for pillar 1.  The  main  exceptions are in the areas of co-operation on 
indirect taxation,  culture and  industrial policy and  in parts of the areas of 
co-operation on  economic  policy,  research,  the environment,  social  and 
employment  policy,  economic  and  social  cohesion  and visas. 
The question of the role of the European Parliament  has  been  on the agenda on 
every occasion the Community  has  discussed changes  in the institutions.  As 
the Community  has  developed  from  a  narrow economic  union to a  broader 
Community  encompassing  a  number  of other areas of  co-operation the focus  has 
come  to rest increasingly on the degree of democratic control and  legitimacy 
of the Community's  decision-making process.  The  introduction of direct 
elections to Parliament  in  1979  gave it a  democratic  mandate without  a 
corresponding increase in its limited powers. 
The  Single European Act  was  the Member  States'  first step in the process of 
remedying  what  has  gradually become  known  as the democratic deficit; it 
introduced the co-operation procedure  and the assent  procedure.  These 
procedures  give the Parliament  a  more  active role  in the legislative process. 
The Maastricht Treaty further  strengthens Parliament's role in two  areas. 
Firstly,  Parliament's legislative powers  are increased by the introduction of 
the co-decision procedure in Article· 189b,  which extends the co-operation 
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procedure  introduced with the Single Act  in 1986.  Annexes  5  and  6  give more 
details of the procedure. 
The Maastricht Treaty also extends 
assent procedures  can be  applied. 
Maastricht Treaty in 14  areas:  see 
in 8  areas:  see Annex  8. 
the areas  in which the co-operation and 
The  co-operation procedure is used in the 
Annex  7.  The  assent procedure is used 
Thus  the Maastricht Treaty strengthens Parliament's role in order to increase 
its democratic  legitimacy. 
Secondly,  Parliament's control powers  are  increased in four  fields. 
Article 206  gives it increased powers  to examine the  Community  budget. 
Articles  138c  and  138d give it the right to set up  Committees of  Inquiry and 
hear citizens'  petitions.  Article 138e sets up  a  European Ombudsman. 
In addition,  Parliament has the power to subject the members  of the Commission 
as  a  body to a  vote of  approval. 
As  a  further part of the question of  increasing democratic  legitimacy,  the 
Conference discussed the question of the role of national parliaments  and 
democratic  control of the Community.  The  talks resulted in a  declaration on 
the role of national parliaments in the European Union establishing the 
importance of the national parliaments'  participation in the Union.  The 
declaration stresses the need  for  an  increased exchange of  information between 
national parliaments  and the European  Parliament and  for Commission proposals 
for  legislation to be submitted to national parliaments in good time  for 
information or possible examination.  It also calls for the national 
parliaments  and the European Parliament to meet  together as  required in a 
Conference of the Parliaments  in order to be consulted on the main  features of 
the Europaan Union. 
There are references to the national parliaments in a  number  of other 
provisions of the Treaty.  For  instance,  the  "closeness"  principle in Article 
3b  and  its reflection in the  new  specific Treaty provisions  can be  seen as 
respect for the role of the national parliaments. 
On  the initiative of the Danish Government  a  declaration.has been  added 
concerning transparency in Community  co-operation.  The declaration recommends 
that the  Commission  submit to the Council  no  later than  1993  a  report  on 
measures  designed to  improve  public access to the information available to the 
institutions. 
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In order to ensure that  Member  States fulfil their Community obligations steps 
have  been taken to give the Court of Justice the capacity to impose  a  fixed 
penalty or fine on  a  Member  State failing to comply with a  judgment. 
The Maastricht Treaty sets up  a  new  Committee  of the Regions 
(Articles 198a-c).  This is established using the model  used for  the Economic 
and Social  Committee with the·same  number  of representatives from  each 
country.  The  individual Member  States appoint the representatives  on  the 
Committee.  The  Committee  must  be consulted on questions of  regional policy 
and on questions within the fields of education,  culture,  health  and 
trans-European networks. 
As  already mentioned,  a  European Ombudsman  on the Danish model  is also 
introduced  (Article 138e).  He  is to receive complaints  direct  from citizens 
or conduct  inquiries on  his own  initiative to establish maladministration.  If 
maladministration is established,  the institution concerned  has  three months 
in which to respond.  Finally,  Article 4  establishes the Court of Auditors as 
a  Community  institution in its own  right. 
To  summarize,  we  can state that the  changes  in the roles of  the  institutions 
are characterized by  a  stronger shift towards  decentralization and the 
regional level.  In addition,  a  greater effectiveness  has  been created in the 
decision-making  system through majority decisions  in the Council,  and 
democratic  legitimacy has  been  increased through the  strengthening of the role 
of Parliament.  Lastly,  better guarantees that Community rules will be 
complied with have  been created. 
3.3.  DECISION-MAKING  PROCEDURES 
Annex  4  shows  the traditional Community method.  It can  be  seen that there are 
various procedures  for  decision-making within European  co-operation  (pillar 1) 
which  involve Parliament to varying degrees. 
These  five procedures are not  changed  by  the Maastricht Treaty.  They  are: 
- consultation; 
- co-operation; 
- assent; 
- budget procedures  and 
- notification of Parliament. 
The  Treaty extends the  areas of application of these  procedures,  which are 
otherwise unchanged. 
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The  co-decision procedure is an entirely new  form of co-operation between 
Parliament  and the Council.  Annex  5  shows  the procedure in diagram  form.  As 
can be  seen,  the procedure builds on the co-operation procedure  introduced 
into the Treaty by the Single Act  and described in Article 189c. 
The  co-decision procedure contains two essential new  aspects.  It incorporates 
a  forum  - the Conciliation Committee  - for direct negotiations between the 
Council  and  Parliament.  This  aspect was  not present in the co-operation 
procedure,  which talks only of written communication between the Council  and 
Parliament. 
The Conciliation Committee is composed of  an equal  number  of representatives 
of the Council  and of Parliament  and  takes decisions by  agreement  between the 
two  sides which each reach agreement  separately,  the Council representatives 
by  a  qualified majority of their members  and the Parliament representatives by 
a  simple majority of theirs. 
The other new  aspect is that Parliament  is given the power to reject a 
proposed act.  Where  the co-operation procedure tightens up the voting 
requirements  on the Council  (unanimity)  if the Parliament rejects a  proposal, 
the Parliament is given the right in the co-decision procedure to block 
adoption of the act.  In this procedure,  therefore,  legislation cannot be 
adopted if one of these two  institutions refuses to co-operate. 
The  Commission's  role is unchanged  in the phases before  and after the 
Conciliation Committee,  in other words,  the Commission retains its right to 
amend  or withdraw its proposal at any time throughout the decision-making 
procedure.  However,  at the Conciliation Committee  stage the Commission may 
not  amend  or withdraw its proposal. 
3.4.  FORMS  OF  DECISIONS 
A distinction must  be made  between the  form  and the content of the acts which 
the Community  may  adopt. 
Their  form  is set out in Article 189,  which defines the five classic types of 
acts:  the regulation,  directive,  decision,  recommendation  and opinion.  In 
addition there is the special  form  of  judicial act  known  as  a  ruling. 
With  regard to the content of the acts,  the Maastricht Treaty uses three terms 
for decisions  which the council may  adopt:  measures,  actions  and  incentive 
measures.  These  are defined in more  detail in Article  189. 
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This  was  a  result of the desire by the Member  States to  indicate that 
decisions of narrower  scope  can exist in certain areas. 
Incentive measures  and  actions therefore typically cover programmes,  projects 
and  campaigns  for which  financial  support  may  be received  from the_ Community. 
The  fact that these are  narrower  in scope  is emphasized  by the express 
exclusion of  any  form  of harmonization of  laws  and  administrative provisions 
with regard to incentive measures within the areas of  education,  culture and 
health. 
The distinction between  form  and  content therefore  implies the following:  the 
form  of decisions  and their legal implications  are described in Article 189. 
The  scope of their content  follows  from the wording of the text of the Treaty 
with regard to the specific areas of co-operation. 
A specific act may,  varying  from  case to case,  take the  form  of  any of the 
known  types  of  legal act.  Thus,  for  example,  there is nothing to prevent  an 
incentive measure taking the  form  of  a  regulation,  but the content of the act 
may  not  go  beyond the bounds  of what  the Treaty sets out  for the  area of 
co-operation in question. 
3.5  AREAS  OF  CO-OPERATION 
3.5.1.  EXISTING  TREATY  PRINCIPLES 
Annex  9  summarizes  the areas  of  co-operation laid down  in the Maastricht 
Treaty.  It can be  seen that in  some  cases the text has  not  been  changed by 
the Maastricht Treaty.  In other cases the only thing that has changed  is the 
decision-making procedure to be used.  In yet other cases both the procedure 
and the  substance of the text have  been  changed.  Lastly,  some  provisions  have 
been  added  and  others repealed. 
3.5,1.1.  AREAS  OF  CO-OPERATION  WHERE  THE  TEXT  IS  UNCHANGED 
A  number  of  areas of  co-operation have  not  been affected by  the Maastricht 
Treaty,  for  example,  the  common  agricultural  and  fisheries policies 
(Articles  38 to 47),  the original provisions on the establishment  of  a  customs 
union  and  the elimination of quantitative restrictions between Member  States 
(Articles  9  to 37).  The  common  rules on  competition  including the anti-
dumping  rules are also maintained  (Articles  85  to  91),  as  are the rules on the 
association of the overseas  countries  and territories  (Articles  131 to 136a). 
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As  we  have  already mentioned in this section,  the areas of co-operation have, 
however,  been placed in a  new  context which guides the way  in which the 
provisions  are to be applied.  The  new  underlying principles in the Maastricht 
Treaty,  including,  for example,  the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality,  therefore also apply to these areas.  The  areas of 
co-operation are also covered by the Treaty's  statement of aims.  As  already 
mentioned,  the Treaty introduces  a  number  of  new objectives,  such as 
sustainable growth respecting the environment,  a  high  level of social 
protection and  economic  and social cohesion.  The practical significance of 
this is that the Member  States,  in formulating the  common  agricultural policy, 
for  instance,  are obliged to guarantee  sustainable growth respecting the 
environment. 
3 • 5 • 1.  2 •  AREAS  OF  CO-OPERATION  WHERE  TEXT  HAS  BEER  AMENDED  AS  REGARDS  THE 
DECISION-MAKING  PROCEDURE 
In  a  number of areas of co-operation the decision-making procedure alone has 
been changed,  while the content of the provisions remains the  same.  This  is 
primarily the result of the strengthening of Parliament's role in the  law-· 
making process. 
The  co-decision procedure is introduced for the internal market 
(Article  lOOa),  the free  movement  of  labour  (Articles  49,  54,  56  and  57)  and 
the free movement  of services  (Article 66).  Previously there was  a 
co-operation procedure with Parliament  for all these provisions. 
In the rules on the harmonization of  indirect taxation the obligation to 
consult the Economic  and Social  Committee  has  been  introduced  (Article 99). 
3 • 5. 1.  3 •  AREAS  OF  CO-OPERATION  WHERE  THE  TEXT  HAS  BEER  AMENDED  AS  REGARDS  BOTH 
THE  DECISION-MAKING  PROCEDURE  AND  THE  CONTENT 
In by  far the majority of the areas of  co-operation changes  have  been made  to 
the existing texts which  affect both the decision-making procedure  and the 
content.  In this section we  will deal with each area of co-operation 
separately. 
Transport 
A  new  area of co-operation,  "measures to  improve transport safety",  has  been 
introduced for transport policy  (Article 75(l)(c)).  This extension of the 
scope of transport co-operation is a  clarification of  how  the original Article 
has  been interpreted.  In other words,  it is a  continuation of the current 
legal situation. 
The  decision-making procedure  is changed  from that of  consulting Parliament to 
the co-operation procedure" 
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Commercial  policy 
Rules  applying solely to the transitional period  (Articles 111  and  114)  are 
repealed,  as  is Article 116.  In contrast,  the declarations of  intent and 
rules  concerning harmonization of the aid  systems  for  exports to third 
countries remain unchanged. 
There  is a  minor  change  in the rules regarding the  execution of  commercial 
policy measures  in that,  where Member  States were previously able to take the 
necessary measures  independently  in cases of urgency,  they must  now  first 
request authorization from  the Commission  (Article  115). 
With regard to the  decision-making procedure  (Article  113)  there is now 
reference to the general Article  on  the conclusion  of  agreements  between the 
Community  and other States/international organizations.  The effect of the 
change is that Parliament must  give its assent to agreements  of major 
significance.  ~) 
Employment  and social policy 
In the Treaty itself  (pillar 1),  only minor  changes  are made  in the field of 
labour  law.  In Article 2  it is stated that the tasks of the  Community  include 
promoting a  high level of  employment  and  of  social  protection.  The title of 
the relevant Chapter is changed  from  social policy to social policy, 
education,  vocational training and  youth.  In the provisions  on the Social 
Fund,  the Fund's tasks are widened to include adaptation to industrial changes 
and  changes  in production systems,  in particular through vocational training 
and retraining. 
Where  the implementation of the Social  Fund  provisions is concerned,  the 
procedure is changed  from  consultation of  Parliament to the co-operation 
procedure. 
As  a  result of the  fact that no  agreement  was  reached with the United  Kingdom 
at the Intergovernmental  Conference  on  reinforcing the provisions of  the  EEC 
Treaty in this field,  the  12  Member  States adopted  a  Protocol  which enables 11 
of  them to make  use of the Community's  institutions,  proc~dures and mechanisms 
in seeking greater co-operation between them  on  social  and  employment  policy. 
The  Agreement  among  the  11  comprises three main  changes  in particular. 
Firstly,  the aims  of  co-operation are set out.  Secondly,  qualified majority 
(6)  In other words,  agreements with significant impact on the budget,  agreements 
establishing  a  specific  institutional  framework  and  agreements  involving 
amendment  of an  act  adopted by the co-decision procedure. 
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voting is introduced and minimum  requirements  are set for  a  broad spectrum of 
areas  covered by the Social Charter of  1989.  Thirdly,  a  detailed system is 
established for  involving the social partners  in dialogue. 
The  goal of co-operation is to promote  employment,  improved  living and working 
conditions,  proper social protection,  dialogue between management  and  labour, 
the development  of human  resources with a  view to lasting high employment,  and 
the combating of exclusion  from the labour market. 
Qualifi&d majority voting and the co-operation procedure are introduced in the 
areas of: 
improvement  in particular of the working environment to protect workers' 
health and  safety  (identical to the previous provisions), 
working conditions, 
the  information and  consultation of workers, 
equality between men  and  women  with regard to labour market opportunities 
and treatment at work,  and 
the integration of persons  excluded  from  the labour market. 
In the areas of: 
social security and  social protection of workers, 
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, 
representation and collective defence  uf the interests of workers  and 
employers, 
conditions of employment  for third-country nationals  legally residing in 
Community territory, 
financial  contributions  for promotion of employment  and  job-creation, 
the Council is to act unanimously when  adopting minimum  requirements. 
Pay,  the right of association,  the right to strike and the right to  impose 
lock-outs are expressly excluded  from  the relevant provisions in the Agreement 
between the 11. 
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The  Agreement  between the  11  also includes the principle that the Community 
will not  intervene  in fields where  management  and  labour are better able to 
reach their own  agreement  in preference to agreement at  Community  level.  The 
Commission  is to consult management  and  labour  about guidelines  and possible 
proposals,  and the parties are allowed nine months  in which to come  to an 
agreement.  The  implementation of  such agreements is to be either through the 
national member  organizations representing management  and  labour or,  at the 
request  of management  and  labour,  through  Community  legislation.  Finally, 
provision is made  for the possibility that Community directives may  be 
implemented nationally by  management  and  labour. 
Environmental policy 
The  chapter on  environmental policy,  inserted by the Single Act,  is reinforced 
by the Maastricht Treaty in both content  and  procedures. 
As  noted earlier,  the principle of sustainable growth  is introduced,  with 
respect  for the environment  being one  of the  general principles for the whole 
of pillar 1  of the Maastricht Treaty  (Article 2). 
To  the goals in environmental policy flowing  from the Single Act,  the 
Maastricht Treaty adds  an  international dimension  (Article 130r(l)).  This 
reflects to a  large extent the increased role which  the  Community  is playing 
at international  level  in the field of the  environment. 
In the basic principles it is stated further  that Community  policy is to  aim 
at a  high  level of protection,  with the addition of the precautionary 
principle that the  environment  should be  given the benefit of  any  doubt  and 
that intervention should begin even  where there is  no  more than  a  risk to the 
environment. 
There is also  a  more  strongly worded provision to the effect that 
environmental protection is to be  integrated  into the definition and 
implementation of  Community  policies in other fields. 
A safeguard clause is introduced allowing the Member  States to take 
provisional national measures  in relation to all Community  legislation of 
relevance to the environment. 
As  regards decision-making,  unanimity  and  consultation of Parliament  is 
replaced by qualified majority voting  and the co-operation procedure.  However, 
there are three exceptions requiring  a  unanimous  vote: 
provisions primarily of  a  fiscal  nature, 
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measures  concerning town  and country planning,  with the exception of waste 
management  and measures of  a  general nature,  and management  of water 
resources,  and 
measures  significantly affecting a  Member  State's choice between different 
energy sources  and the general structure of its energy supply. 
In these fields the previous provision applies that the Council can decide by 
unanimous vote that these fields  may  be  moved  in whole or in part into the 
area of qualified majority voting.  Where  the Council  adopts pluriannual action 
programmes,  this is to be  a  joint decision with Parliament  (Article 130s(3)). 
On  the subject of  finance,  the principle of national  financing is upheld.  A 
special rule is introduced that a  Member  State may  benefit  from  a  temporary 
exemption and/or receive aid  from the Cohesion  Fund if the implementation of  a 
legislative act  involves especially high costs  for that state. 
A Member  State is allowed to maintain or introduce tougher protective measures 
than other countries.  This must  be  notified to the Commission  and  must  be 
compatible with the Treaty. 
Vocational training 
The  new  section on vocational training amplifies the existing Article 
considerably.  The  new  Treaty sets out to create what  amounts  to a  vocational 
training policy. 
The  aims  of  Community  action are defined as: 
facilitating adaptation to industrial changes,  in particular through 
vocational training and retraining, 
improving initial and continuing vocational training in order to 
facilitate vocational integration and  reintegration into the  labour 
market, 
facilitating access to vocational training and  encouraging mobility of 
instructors and trainees,  particularly young people, 
stimulating co-operation on training between educational or training 
establishments  and  firms, 
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developing exchanges  of  information  and  experience  on  issues  common  to the 
training systems  of the  Member  States. 
It is further stated that the Community  is to  foster co-operation with 
non-Community  countries  and  international organizations. 
The type of decision that can be  taken is defined as  a  measure,  excluding  any 
harmonization of the laws  and regulations of the Member  States. 
As  for the decision-making procedure,  it is to be the  co-operation procedure 
with Parliament.  Previously,  Parliament has  not  been  involved in the 
vocational training field. 
Under  the  EEC  Treaty,  the Council  could take  a  decision by  simple majority.  In 
the  new  Treaty provision is made  for the tighter requirement  of  a  qualified 
majority vote. 
Research  and technological development 
In  terms  of content,  only  limited changes  have  been made  to  the provisions on 
research and  technological  development.  The  aims  (set out in Article 130f(l)) 
have  been widened to  include "all the research activities deemed  necessary by 
virtue of other Chapters of this Treaty".  This  opens  up  scope for  research in 
new  areas,  e.g.  consumer  policy,  and  in areas  covered  in the EEC  Treaty but 
only given  a  specific Chapter  in the Maastricht  document. 
It is also  stated that all research activities are to be  carried out  on the 
basis of these specific provisions. 
As  for the decision-making procedure,  the  Framework programme is to be rolled 
forward  on  a  unanimous  vote but  in  a  joint decision with Parliament,  in place 
of the consultation with Parliament required in the previous text.  Specific 
implementing programmes  are to be  adopted  by qualified majority after 
consultation of Parliament.  Previously the co-operation procedure  with 
Parliament was  required.  The  aim is to enable  specific programmes  to be 
adopted  more  quickly in the  future. 
Economic  and social cohesion 
The  Single Act  introduced  a  separate Chapter  for  economic  and social  cohesion. 
The  new  Treaty provisions update  and  supplement the original terms. 
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The  statement of  aims  lays  down  that economic  and social cohesion is to be 
taken into account  not only,  as previously,  in the  formulation of  community 
policies but also in their implementation,  in other  words  when  the Commission 
makes  its proposals. 
The  Commission  is to report on progress towards  achieving economic ·and  social 
cohesion every three years.  If specific action proves  necessary outside the 
purview of the structural Funds,  these actions are to be decided by unanimous 
vote of the Council after consultation of Parliament  and the Economic  and 
Social Committee. 
A major  innovation in this area is the establishment,  by  31  December  1993,  of 
a  Cohesion Fund.  The  Fund is to make  financial contributions to projects in 
the fields of the environment  and trans-European networks  in the transport 
infrastructure sector in Member  States where  gross  domestic product per capita 
is less than  90%  of the Community  average. 
The  procedure for decisions concerning the  structural Funds,  that is,  setting 
their tasks,  priority objectives and  organization as well as their general 
rules,  requires the Council to act unanimously with the assent of Parliament. 
The  new  Committee of the Regions  and the Economic  and Social Committee  are to 
be consulted.  The  same  procedure applies to the implementation of the Cohesion 
Fund. 
The  main principles for the establishment of the Cohesion Fund  are set out in 
a  separate Protocol to the Treaty. 
State aids 
In the  prov~s~ons on State aids,  the only change is  aimed at greater clarity; 
it adds  an  item to the  forms  of State aid deemed compatible with the Treaty. 
Article 92(3)(d)  [the present  (d)  becomes  (e)]  now  specifies "aid to promote 
culture and heritage conservation where  such aid does  not affect trading 
conditions  and  competition in the Community  to an extent that is contrary to 
the  common  interest". 
As  for decision-making procedures,  the new  element  is consultation of 
Parliament  (Article 94). 
Economic  and monetary union 
Article 102a(2)  of the EEC  Treaty  (as  amended  by the Single European Act) 
stipulates that any  further development of  economic  and monetary policy must 
be decided within the  framework  of  a  new  intergovernmental conference.  The 
first stage of  EMU  began on  1  July 1990  and was  implemented by  two  Council 
Decisions without  any  amendments to the Treaty.  The Maastricht Treaty, 
however,  makes  specific provision for the second and third stages 
SN  4364/92  EN - 120  -
of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  making  several  amendments to the EEC  Treaty 
(Article  102a et seq.).  A  number  of Protocols  and Declarations also deal 
with economic  and  monetary  co-operation. 
The  following is a  summary  of the  second  and third stages of  EMU.  A  more 
detailed discussion of this subject is to be  found  in Chapter VIII. 
The  Community's  economic  policy is to be  conducted  in accordance with the 
principle of  an  open market  economy with  free  competition,  favouring  an 
efficient allocation of resources. 
Economic  policy will  remain  a  national matter during the second  and third 
stages but will be regarded as  a  matter of  common  concern and  Member  States 
will coordinate their economic policies.  Broad guidelines will be  formulated 
for the  economic policies of the Member  States  and the Council  shall monitor 
economic  developments  in each Member  State.  If the economic policy of  a 
Member  state is not consistent with the broad guidelines,  the Council  may  make 
the necessary recommendations,  which  may  be  made  public  (once the Treaty has 
entered into force). 
With effect  from  1  January  1994,  when  the  second stage begins,  a  number  of 
restrictions shall apply to the monetary  and  budgetary policies pursued by 
Member  States.  It will be prohibited,  for  example,  to finance government 
budget deficits by monetary means  (i.e.  by printing money)  or for public 
authorities to have privileged access to the capital market.  In principle, 
the Community will not  be  liable for  Member  States'  commitments.  Beginning 
in the second  stage,  Member  States must  also endeavour to avoid any excessive 
government  deficits.  The  procedure  for dealing with  such deficits will  come 
into force  as  from the  second stage,  but there will be  no  specific obligation 
on  Member  States to avoid  such deficits.  Only  in the third stage will it be 
possible to impose disciplinary measures. 
With effect  from the beginning of the  second  stage the  new Treaty provisions 
on the free movement  of capital  (Articles  73b  to 73q)  will also come  into 
force.  Broadly  speaking,  these  new  Treaty provisions are taken  from the  1988 
council Directive on  the liberalization of capital movements.  A  Protocol was 
added to the Treaty under which  "Denmark  may  maintain the existing legislation 
on the acquisition of  second  homes".  Full provision has  thus  been made  for 
the maintenance of the Danish  legislation on  summer  residences. 
In the  realm of monetary policy the most  important  aspect of the  second stage 
will be the establishment of  a  European Monetary Institute  (EMI),  which will 
take the place of the Committee of Governors  of the Central  Banks.  During 
this stage monetary policy will  remain  a  matter for  national governments. 
The tasks of the  EMI  will be  as  follows: 
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to strengthen co-operation between the  national central banks; 
to strengthen the co-ordination of monetary policies; 
to monitor the functioning of the European Monetary  System,  to hold 
consultations on  issues relating to currency policy or affecting the 
stability of financial  institutions and markets; 
to facilitate the use of the ecu;  and 
to oversee the development  of the ecu clearing system. 
It shall also be the task of the EMI  to prepare for the third stage of EMU, 
including the preparation of the  instruments  and  procedures necessary for 
implementing  a  single monetary policy in the third stage. 
From  the start of the third stage exchange rates will be  fixed  and  a  common 
currency will in fact be  introduced.  The  European Central Bank  and the 
European  System of Central Banks will be established and will fully  implement 
the common  monetary  and  exchange-rate policy. 
During this stage there will also be  an  economic  obligation to avoid excessive 
government deficits and  the Council will be  empowered to take measures against 
any  Member  State which  does  not meet this obligation.  For the transition to 
the third stage a  special decision-making procedure has  been  laid down 
(Article 109j(2)).  A Protocol to the Treaty lays  down  the conditions for 
Member  States making  the transition to the third stage. 
Special Protocols deal with the transition of Denmark  and the United Kingdom 
to the third stage.  In the case of Denmark  the Government is to notify the 
Council whether Denmark  wishes to participate in the third stage.  Should 
Denmark  not wish to participate,  it will  have the  same  status as those 
countries which  have  an  exemption on  grounds  of insufficient convergence. 
Denmark will not be  bound  in advance by the obligations which  apply during the 
third stage.  At  any later date Denmark may  request to participate in the 
third stage of  EMU. 
The  decision-making procedures will be governed by  the special  EMU  rules which 
differ from the institutional provisions applicable to other  common  policies. 
This is because of the  special role played by the ESCB  and,  in particular, 
because Member  States will continue to have responsibility for  economic 
matters. 
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The  European  Council will play  a  special role in the appointment  of the 
ESCB  Board  and  in the discussion of the general guidelines for economic 
policy.  The European Council will also take the decision on the transition 
to the third stage. 
As  regards  the Commission's role,  EMU  may  mean  some  departures  from the 
traditional  system  (sole right of initiative and unanimity)  if the Council 
amends  the Commission's proposal.  The  Commission is obliged to  respond to 
any  Member  State's request  for  an  initiative.  In certain cases  the unanimity 
requirement is waived  so that the Council  can  amend  a  proposal  from the 
Commission  by  a  qualified majority. 
In the  EMU  context the European  Parliament plays  a  much  less  prominent  role 
than it does  in other areas of co-operation.  The  general economic provisions 
simply state that Parliament is to be  kept  informed  and  that it is to be 
consulted on the decision concerning the transition to the third stage.  The 
assent of Parliament is required for  any  amendments to the Statute of  the  ESCB 
and  for  a  number  of separate issues there is  a  co-operation  procedure with 
Parliament  (cf.  Annex VII). 
International agreements 
Article  228  lays down  the procedure  for the conclusion of agreements  between 
the  Community  and  one or more  States or international organizations.  The 
Maastricht Treaty brings together the procedural  arrangements  for all 
international agreements  which  come  under the first part of  the Treaty but do 
not relate to Economic  and Monetary  Union.  This  includes the procedural 
rules  for association agreements with  non-member  countries  (Article 238)  and 
trade agreements  (Article 113). 
The  influence of the European  Parliament  is strengthened by  the  new provisions 
in that its assent is required for all agreements  which  have  important 
budgetary implications  for the Community  and  for  any  agreements entailing 
amendment  of  an  act  adopted on the basis of  a  common  position. 
3.5.2.  NEW  LEGAL  BASIS 
The  Maastricht Treaty lays  a  new  legal basis  for certain types of 
co-operation.  In all the areas  concerned the  Community ·has  taken action  in 
the past,  either at international  level  (in the form of  non-binding 
legislation such as  Council  conclusions  and resolutions)  or  under general 
articles of the Treaty  such  as Article  lOOa  concerning the internal market or 
Article  235,  which  enables the necessary action to be  taken  to attain 
objectives in the  context of the  common  market. 
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The  new  provisions provide a  clearer definition of the EC's  role and  redefine 
the legal basis for  Community  action.  The  individual chapters,  by  specifying 
the type of  instrument which the Community  may  adopt,  place limits on what the 
community  can  do  in the areas  concerned. 
3.5.2.1.  CO-OPERA~IOH IH  SPECIFIC  AREAS 
Education 
The  purpose of the provisions  concerning education is to establish a  clear 
legal basis in the Treaty for the Community's  activities in the educational 
field.  The  Community  has already turned its attention to education and  a 
number  of  Council resolutions  have  been adopted on  co-operation in this area. 
As  regards higher education in particular,  legislation has  been adopted  on the 
basis of Article 128  (e.g.  the ERASMUS,  COMETT  and  LINGUA  programmes)  and 
Article  49  (e.g.  the Directive on  a  general  system  for the recognition of 
higher education diplomas  awarded  on  completion of professional education and 
training of at least three years'  duration).  The  European  Court of Justice 
has  ruled that much  of the educational sector is already covered by the Treaty 
of  Rome. 
The  new  provisions set the following  aims  for  Community  action: 
developing the European dimension in education,  particularly through the 
teaching and dissemination of the  languages  of Member  States; 
encouraging mobility of students  and teachers; 
promoting co-operation between educational establishments; 
developing exchanges of  information and experience on  issues  common  to the 
educational systems  of the Member  States; 
encouraging exchanges  of young people and  youth leaders; 
encovraging development  of distance education. 
Another  aim is to foster  co-operation with  non-member  countries  and with 
international organizations active in the field of education,  in particular 
the Council  of Europe. 
The Treaty stipulates that such  Community  action is to supplement that of the 
Member  States  and that the cultural  and  linguistic diversity of the latter is 
to be  respected. 
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Member  States will continue to be  responsible  for the content of teaching  and 
for the organization of their educational  systems. 
The type of measures which the Council  may  take are defined  as  "incentive 
measures",  which  means  (as explained in Chapter  2.4)  that the Community  may 
provide  support  for  national or  common  programmes  and projects.  Any 
harmonization of national  laws  and  regulations is explicitly ruled out. 
This  is in line with the principle of subsidiarity.  The  new provisions also 
enable the Council,  acting on  a  proposal  from  the Commission,  to  address 
non-binding  recommendations to the Member  States. 
Measures will be  adopted under the  joint decision-making procedure involving 
Parliament and the Council,  which will act by  a  qualified majority.  The  new 
Committee  of the Regions  and  the  Economic  and  Social Committee must be 
consulted before  any measures  are adopted. 
Culture 
The  Community  has been contributing to culture since the end  of the 1970s  and, 
as  in  the  field of  education,  various decisions,  resolutions  and  conclusions 
have  been  adopted.  These  include the European media  programme,  the promotion 
of books  and  reading,  training for  cultural administrators,  a  European 
cultural network  and the translation of European works  of  a  cultural nature. 
Under  the  new  article the  Community  is to  support  and  supplement  the  action of 
the Member  States,  while respecting their national  and  regional diversity and 
at the  same  time bringing the  common  cultural heritage to the fore. 
The  main areas  for  Community  action are: 
improvement of the knowledge  and  dissemination of the culture  and  history 
of the European peoples; 
conservation and  safeguarding of cultural heritage of European 
significance; 
non-commercial  cultural exchanges; 
artistic and  literary creation. 
As  in the field of  education,  international co-operation is encouraged, 
particularly co-operation with the Council  of  Europe.  This  reinforces  a 
development  which  has  already begun  and which will continue to play an 
important part. 
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The  type of decisions the Council  can adopt  are also described here  as 
incentive measures.  Any  harmonization of the  laws  and regulations of the 
Member  States is excluded under this provision.  Furthermore,  the Council  can, 
acting unanimously,  make  non-binding decisions on cultural matters. 
Unanimity is required for the decision-making process in the field of culture. 
The  Parliament acts jointly with the Council through the joint decision-making 
procedure.  The  cultural chapter is thus  an  exception to the general rule of 
having  a  qualified majority and  involving the Parliament  (research is also 
similarly exempted).  As  in the field of education,  the Committee of the 
Regions  is consulted. 
The  Community will take cultural aspects into account  in any action in other 
areas  covered by the Treaty.  This  means  in practice that when  measures  are 
drawn  up cultural matters will be  considered and  included in projects carried 
out  under other provisions of the Treaty. 
Public health 
The  new  prov~s~ons on public health broadly reflect previous Community policy. 
A number  of Council resolutions  have  been adopted,  particularly in connection 
with the prevention of major health scourges  and drug dependence.  These 
include decisions  on the setting up of  joint action programmes  such as  "Europe 
against cancer"  and  "Europe against AIDS". 
A range of directives have  also been  adopted on the marketing of 
pharmaceuticals,  foodstuffs  and medical  equipment.  The  Directive on the 
labelling of tobacco  products  and the mutual  recognition of training are also 
part of this policy. 
The  Community  is thus contributing towards  ensuring a  high level of  human 
health protection by  encouraging co-operation between Member  States and,  if 
necessary,  lending support to their action.  The  Commission  may,  according to 
the provisions  and  in close contact with the Member  States,  take any useful 
initiat~ve to promote  such co-ordination. 
Community  action is directed towards  the prevention of diseases,  in particular 
the major health scourges,  including drug  dependence,  by  promoting research 
into their causes  and their transmission,  as well  as  health information.  It is 
also stated that health protection requirements  shall  form  a  constituent part 
of the Community's  other policies. 
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The  Community  and the Member  States shall foster co-operation with third 
countries  and  international organizations. 
The  instruments of the policy are the  same  as  for education and  culture.  The 
Council  can thus  adopt  incentive measures.  As  in the other areas  any 
harmonisation of the  laws  and  regulations of the Member  States is excluded. 
Furthermore,  the Council may,  acting by  a  qualified majority on  a  proposal 
from the Commission,  adopt  non-binding measures.  The  Committee of the Regions 
and the Economic  and Social Committee  are consulted  before  a  decision is 
taken. 
Consumer protection 
In the original Treaty of  Rome  as  amended  by the SEA  (Article 100a(3)), 
consumer protection is specifically mentioned:  the  Commission  in its 
proposals  on the approximation of the provisions laid down  by  law,  regulation 
or administrative action in connection with the internal market  shall take  as 
a  base  a  high  level of protection. 
A range  of  regulations  and directives have  been  adopted  on  the basis of this 
and other provisions at Community  level,  e.g.  the directives on the labelling, 
presentation and  advertising of  foodstuffs,  consumer protection in the 
indication of the prices of foodstuffs,  the  approximation of provisions of the 
Member  States  on misleading and unfair advertising,  consumer  protection in 
respect of contracts negotiated away  from  business premises,  the approximation 
of the provisions of the Member  States concerning liability for defective 
products,  product  safety and  package holidays. 
The  new  provisions of the Treaty  make  consumer protection an  independent  item, 
which means  that the  Community is contributing to a  high level of  consumer 
protection,  partly through the internal market  and  partly by specific action 
to support  and  supplement  the policy pursued by the  Member  States. 
It is stressed that such action shall not prevent any  Member  State from 
maintaining or introducing more  stringent protective measures. 
Decisions  on  specific action are  adopted  by qualified maj'ority  in co-operation 
with the Parliament  and  following  consultation of the Economic  and Social 
Committee. 
Trans-European networks 
In  connection with co-operation on trans-European networks the Community  has 
in recent years initiated a  number  of activities and projects on transport, 
energy  and  telecommunications. 
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The  new  provisions on trans-European networks  in the areas of transport, 
telecommunications  and  energy infrastructures are related partly to the 
internal market  and partly to economic  and  social cohesion.  This  is reflected 
in the Treaty in a  specific reference to these two  areas of co-operation.  All 
Member  St.ates  should be able to benefit  from the Community's  work  on 
co-operation on trans-European networks. 
The  aim of the  Community  action is to promote the interconnection and 
interoperability of national networks  as well  as access to such networks.  The 
need to link peripheral regions with the central regions of the Community  is 
specifically mentioned. 
In order to achieve these objectives the  Community: 
shall establish guidelines covering,  for  example,  projects of  common 
interest; 
shall  implement  any action that may  prove  necessary to ensure the 
interoperability of the networks; 
may  support the financial efforts made  by the Member  States for projects 
of  common  interest,  particularly through feasibility studies,  loan 
guarantees or interest-rate subsidies; 
may  also contribute through the Cohesion  Fund to the financing of specific 
projects in Member  States in the area of transport  infrastructure. 
A further provision requires Member  States to co-ordinate their national 
policies among  themselves.  The  Community  may  also decide to pursue 
co-operation with third countries to promote projects of mutual  interest. 
The  decision-making procedure varies according to whether the aim is to 
produce general guidelines or adopt specific decisions. 
General guidelines are adopted by qualified majority jointly with the 
Parliament.  Specific decisions  involve the Parliament only through the 
co-operation procedure.  The  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and the Committee of 
the Regions  are consulted in both cases. 
Guidelines  and  projects of  common  interest which relate to the territory of a 
Member  State shall require the approval of the Member  State concerned. 
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Industry 
Specific sectors of  industry  (the motor  industry,  shipbuilding,  textiles and 
clothing,  data processing and electronics,  footwear)  have been targets for 
action for  many  years  now. 
The  new  provisions  on  industrial policy state that the Community's task shall 
be to ensure the conditions necessary  for the competitiveness of the 
Community's  industry.  Action shall be  aimed  at: 
speeding up  the adjustment of  industry to structural changes; 
encouraging  an  environment  favourable to initiative and to the development 
of  undertakings  throughout the Community,  particularly small  and medium-
sized undertakings; 
encouraging  an  environment  favourable to co-operation between 
undertakings; 
fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of 
innovation,  research  and technological  development. 
The  Community's  action shall be  in accordance with  a  system of open  and 
competitive markets  and  shall not provide  a  basis for the introduction by the 
Community  of  any measure which  could  lead to a  distortion of competition. 
The  preferred instruments of industrial policy are national  instruments.  The 
Member  States shall consult one  another and  co-ordinate their activities if 
necessary.  The  Community  shall help to implement the targets through the 
activities and policies  introduced  in connection with other provisions  in the 
Treaty,  e.g.  in connection with the internal market  or research  and 
technological development.  A third possibility is to adopt specific measures 
to support the activities of the Member  States. 
The  decision-making procedure  for the adoption of specific measures  is based 
on  unanimity  following consultation of the European  Parliament and the 
Economic  and Social  Committee. 
Development  co-operation 
There  has  been  a  special provision  for  development  co-operation in the Treaty 
for  associated countries and territories  (the  former  colonies of the Member 
States)  since the  Community  was  first established  (Lome  Conventions). 
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As  early as the  1960s the Community  instituted development  co-operation with 
other countries  and  a  number  of  Community  instruments were established, 
including the generalized tariff preference  scheme  and  food  aid.  This 
development  co-operation was  based on general provisions in the Treaty, 
particularly Article 235. 
The  new  specific provisions on development  co-operation in the Treaty 
generally reflect and consolidate the policy so far pursued. 
The  introductory provisions establish that the Community policy is 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member  States and is designed to 
foster: 
the sustainable economic  and  social development  of the developing 
countries,  and  more  particularly the most  disadvantaged  among  them; 
the  smooth  and gradual integration of the developing countries into the 
world  economy; 
the campaign  against poverty in the developing countries. 
Furthermore,  community  policy in this area shall contribute to the general 
objective of developing and  consolidating democracy  and  the rule of  law,  and 
to that of respecting human  rights and  fundamental  freedoms.  Account  shall be 
taken of the objectives for  development policy in the other policies of the 
Community. 
With reoard 
shall  adopt 
programmes. 
development 
to the resources required to achieve these aims the Community 
the necessary measures,  which may  take the form of multiannual 
The  Member  States shall,  furthermore,  co-ordinate their 
policies as  in the past and may  undertake  joint action. 
As  regards  finance,  the European  Investment  Bank  shall contribute to the 
implementation of measures  and the Member  States shall contribute if necessary 
to the  implementation of Community  aid programmes.  m 
As  elsewhere the international aspect of co-operation is stressed.  The 
Community  may  conclude  and  negotiate  agreements  in accordance with Article 228 
(see above). 
Decisions  are  adopted by qualified majority on the basis of the co-operation 
procedure with the Parliament.  This  does  not,  however,  apply to co-operation 
(7)  The  European Development  Fund  is still outside the budget,  cf.  explanatory 
notes. 
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with  overseas  countries  and territories which  have  not  achieved  independence, 
where  unanimity is still required,  cf.  Article 136. 
Sanctions 
The  Community  has  in the past and  on the basis of Article 113  imposed  economic 
sanctions under  foreign policy on,  for  example,  the  Soviet Union,  Iran,  South 
Africa,  Argentina,  Iraq and  Serbia-Montenegro. 
There  is now  a  new  provision enabling the Community  to introduce  international 
sanctions on the basis of  a  joint opinion or  joint action adopted under 
provisions  on  joint foreign  and  security policy and  breaking off either fully 
or partially or restricting economic  relations with  a  third country. 
In such  cases the council  adopts  a  decision on  a  proposal from the Commission 
acting by  a  qualified majority in order to  implement  necessary emergency 
measures. 
Citizenship of the Union 
The  first pillar of the Maastricht Treaty  introduces Citizenship of the Union 
for all persons holding the nationality of  a  Member  State. 
Citizenship of the Union provides  for: 
right of abode with the restrictions laid down  in the Treaty and  in the 
implementing provisions, 
the right to vote  and to stand as  a  candidate at municipal elections, 
the right to vote  and to stand  as  a  candidate in elections to the European 
Parliament  in the Member  State in which  he  resides, 
protection by  diplomatic  or consular authorities of any Member  state when 
in the territory of  a  third country, 
the right to petition the European  Parliament and to apply to  an 
Ombudsman. 
The  provisions  of the Treaty must  be  implemented on  adoption  of the  EC  Acts. 
Conditions  may  be  associated with the rights given  to Citizens of the Union  in 
connection with right of abode  as was  the case  in previous directives.  For 
example,  it is still possible to withhold the right  of  abode  if the person in 
question does  not  have  sufficient resources  for  his  keep  or  has  no  health 
insurance. 
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The  Council  may  adopt provisions on the right of abode which will make  it 
easier to secure the right of  abode,  but this presupposes unanimity and 
assent. 
As  far as the right to vote and to stand as  a  candidate at municipal elections 
and  for the European Parliament  and the enforcement  of diplomatic protection 
are concerned,  final dates  have  been set for  adoption of the implementing 
legislation.  In the case of municipal elections more detailed provisions and 
any specific exemptions must  be  adopted by  31  December  1994;  for the European 
Parliament the final date is 31  December  1993.  The  Council decides,  acting 
unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. 
It is furthermore  laid down  that rules for diplomatic protection shall be 
drawn  up  by  31  December  1993  and that the Member  States must  before that date 
start relevant international negotiations in order to ensure  such protection. 
It is finally laid down  that the member  countries can consolidate and  extend 
the above rights acting unanimously. 
Ratification at national level is,  however,  required before this comes  into 
force.  The  introduction of Citizenship of the Union  does  not give citizens of 
the other Member  States rights other than those mentioned  above,  including 
social rights. 
Visas 
Under  the Maastricht Treaty visa policy has  been made  an  integral part of EC 
co-operation,  unlike the other aspects of co-operation in the fields of 
justice and  home  affairs,  which will continue to be  the subject of 
co-operation between the Member  States,  cf.  below. 
The  Council,  acting unanimously until 1  January  1996  and thereafter by 
qualified majority,  determines the third countries whose  nationals must  have  a 
visa to cross the external borders of the Member  States.  In an  emergency 
situation involving  a  sudden  inflow of nationals, the council,  acting by  a 
qualified majority,  may  introduce  a  visa requirement  for  a  period not 
exceeding six months  even before  1  January  1996.  This  p~ovisional requirement 
may  be made  permanent by the Council  acting unanimously. 
The  decision-making procedure is thus different  in the periods before and 
after 1  January  1996.  Before  1  January  1996  decisions will be  adopted 
unanimously  and after the Parliament has  been  consulted.  After  1  January  1996 
decisions will be taken by  a  qualified majority  and  likewise after the 
Parliament has  been consulted.  Where  visas are concerned the Commission is 
also obliged to submit  a  proposal if a  Member  State  so requires. 
Member  States shall maintain  law  and order and  safeguard internal security. 
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Energy,  civil protection and tourism 
The  Treaty does  not  include a  special paragraph on energy,  civil protection 
and tourism but these areas are mentioned  in the list of  Community activities 
(Article 3).  They  are thus covered  by the Treaty.  The  actual  shape of 
Community  policy in these areas is affected by other provisions  in the Treaty, 
e.g.  the provisions on environment  and,  where  energy is concerned,  the 
provisions on  the  development  of trans-European networks.  Community policy, 
must,  furthermore,  be based,  as before,  on existing general provisions,  such 
as Article 100a on the internal market  and Article 235.  On  the basis of these 
and other provisions  in the existing Treaty a  number  of legal acts have 
already been adopted.  In the field of  energy these measures  include decisions 
on  the aims  of  common  energy policy,  protection of  supplies,  energy 
conservation,  new  technologies  and the internal energy market.  On  the subject 
of civil protection they include mutual  support in the event of natural or 
technological disasters  and the  introduction of  a  common  European  emergency 
number.  For tourism they  include  firm projects  forming  part of the European 
Year  of Tourism  1990  and plans for the management  of tourism. 
In  a  declaration annexed to the Treaty it is stated that the question of 
specifying these areas in the Treaty will be  examined  on the basis of  a  report 
from  the Commission at the next  intergovernmental  conference in  1996. 
4.  CO-OPERATION  BETWEEN  THE  MEMBER  STATES  (PILLARS  2  AND  3) 
4.1.  THE  ROLES  OF  THE  INSTITUTIONS 
European political  (foreign policy)  co-operation and  co-operation in the 
fields  of  justice and  home  affairs have  so far  not  been the responsibility of 
the institutions of the  EC.  Decisions  on political co-operation have  been 
taken by the countries'  foreign ministers at  special meetings.  Decisions on 
co-operation on  justice and  home  affairs have  been taken at special meetings 
by the Justice and  Interior Ministers.  The ministers'  meetings  on political 
co-operation were  prepared  by  the political directors,  and  those on 
co-operation on  justice and  home  affairs partly by  senior officials  from the 
Ministries of Justice and the  Interior and partly by  a  whole  range of  special 
ad-hoc  groups  covering various  aspects of co-operation.  To  some  extent 
co-operation has  also been  co-ordinated by  a  group  of co-ordinators. 
Under the Maastricht Treaty it was  decided to use the established 
institutions,  i.e.  the Council,  Commission,  European Parliament  and  Court of 
Justice,  for all three pillars,  but with different rules of procedure  for  each 
pillar.  The result is that the Council  takes decisions on all pillars of the 
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Treaty while the roles of the three other institutions in relation to the 
pillars 2  and  3  differ  from their roles in relation to the pillar 1.  This  can 
be  seen in Annex  4. 
The result is that preparations for decisions are made  under the same  system, 
with the Permanent Representatives  Committee  in Brussels  (Coreper)  acting as 
joint preparatory body.  This creates consistency,  ensures greater 
transparency and  improves  co-ordination.  Experience had  shown that the main 
problem was  co-ordination in a  divergent  system  (e.g.  the integration of 
economic  and political aspects of  foreign policy). 
Even though familiar institutions are being used for  co-operation between 
States,  there are special rules to govern the institutions'  responsibilities 
in this area.  This is due partly to the fact that co-operation is still 
between  separate States and partly to the fact that these areas make  special 
demands  on the decision-making system  (e.g.  it is often necessary when dealing 
with matters of  foreign policy to take decisions with the minimum  loss of 
time). 
The Council  is the decision-making body as  in the case of EC  co-operation. 
However,  where  foreign policy is concerned the European  Council establishes 
the main principles and guidelines for the common  foreign and security policy 
and decides whether  joint action shall be  taken  in a  given area.  The  Member 
states have the right to take the initiative.  As  a  general  rule,  the 
Commission will,  under the new provisions of the Treaty,  also be able to take 
the initiative  (cf.  Annex  4).  The  Court of Justice has  no  jurisdiction in the 
field of foreign policy and  justice.  The  only area in which the Court of 
Justice is competent is on questions relating to the demarcation between 
EC  co-operation and co-operation between the Member  States.  The  Court of 
Justice can also,  within the  framework of  agreements  which may  be  drawn  up  in 
the area of justice,  also assume responsibility for interpretation.  The 
European Parliament has  a  restricted role in both areas  in that it must  be 
consulted on  important aspects of co-operation.  It is,  furthermore,  regularly 
kept  informed. 
4.2.  DECISION-MAKING  PROCEDURES 
The main rule for  both areas is that decisions are taken by the Council  acting 
unanimously,  except  on matters of procedure.  A declaration attached to the 
Treaty on  common  foreign  and  security policy states that Member  States should, 
as  far  as possible,  avoid preventing  a  unanimous  decision where  a  qualified 
majority exists in favour of that decision. 
In  the areas in which the Council,  acting unanimously,  decides that joint 
action shall be taken the Council  shall define those matters on which 
decisions  are to be taken by  a  qualified majority  (Articles J.3  and  K.3  and 
K.4).  A  special decision-making procedure is included in the Treaty  for the 
adoption of  joint action  (Article J.3). 
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The  Parliament is consulted as  indicated on the most  important aspects of 
policy and  is kept  regularly  informed. 
4.3,  FORMS  OF  DECISION 
Regulations,  directives,  etc.  cannot  be  adopted  in the  same  way  as  in the case 
of  Community  co-operation. 
As  before,  joint opinions  can be  adopted  and  the Member  States will endeavour 
to co-ordinate their policies  jointly.  In the fields  of  justice and  home 
affairs conventions may  also be  adopted.  The  fact  that co-operation is laid 
down  by the Treaty does  not  mean that any  change has occurred in the nature of 
co-operation,  which  remains  co-operation between Member  States. 
The Maastricht Treaty introduces the term  "joint action".  Whenever  the 
Council  decides  on  the principle of  joint action it shall lay down  the 
specific  scope,  the general  and  specific objectives and  the means,  procedures 
and conditions  for its implementation. 
Joint actions  commit  the Member  States  in the positions they adopt  and  in the 
conduct of their activity.  Should there,  however,  be any major difficulties,  a 
Member  States may  abstain  from participating in joint action,  and  may  refer 
the matter to the Council  (Article J.3,(7)),  which  shall discuss it and  seek 
appropriate solutions. 
As  far  as the actual  implementation of  joint actions is concerned,  the 
conclusions of the European  Council  in Maastricht make  clear the main  areas of 
foreign policy subject to joint action.  It is clear from the list that  joint 
action can be very varied in nature.  Four  areas are mentioned: 
the Conference  on Security and  Co-operation in Europe  (CSCE), 
matters  concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear  weapons, 
disarmament  and  arms  control policy in Europe,  including 
confidence-building measures, 
economic  aspects of security policy,  particularly the monitoring of 
transfers of military technology to third countries  and  arms  exports. 
On  matters of  justice and  home  affairs  joint action may,  for  example,  involve 
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specific programmes  and projects in areas  such  as  information  systems or 
courses  for  customs officials and the police. 
4.4.  AREAS  OF  CO-OPERATION 
4.4.1.  CO-OPERATION  ON  FOREIGN  POLICY 
This  section describes the important  changes  in European Political 
co-operation  (EPC),  which  has  been repealed and replaced by the provisions of 
the Maastricht Treaty on  common  foreign  and  security policy. 
First,  co-operation has  been extended to cover  "all areas of foreign  and 
security policy"  while EPC  co-operation was  restricted to "the political and 
economic  aspects of security"  (Article J.l as  compared with Article 30,  6a of 
the Single European Act). 
Second,  instruments  governing foreign policy have  been reinforced.  Closer 
co-ordination of the policies of the Member  States is envisaged  (Articles J.l 
and J.2)  and the new  instrument  - joint action- is introduced. 
Third,  it has been decided that the diplomatic  and consular missions of the 
Member  States and  the Commission Delegations in third countries and 
international conferences,  and their representations to international 
organizations,  shall co-operate in ensuring that the  common  positions  and 
common  measures are complied with and  implemented. 
Fourth,  co-operation is extended to include the eventual  framing of  a  common 
defence policy which might  in time lead to a  common  defence  (Article J.4). 
The Western European  Union  (WEU)  may  be asked to elaborate and  implement 
decisions and actions of the Union which  have  defence  implications.  NATO  is 
still the basis for defence of the NATO  countries and the policy of the Union 
shall be  compatible with the security and  defence policy of  NATO.  The 
countries which  are members  of the WEU  have outlined the role of the WEU  and 
its links with  NATO  and the Union  and  have  produced  a  declaration on the 
strengthening of the operational role of the  WEU.  The  Declaration, 
furthermore,  contains  an  invitation to Denmark,  Greece  and  Ireland to accede 
to the WEU  or to become  observers.  Other European members  of  NATO  are offered 
associate membership. 
The  Treaty allows the  prov~s~ons governing defence to be revised at the 
intergovernmental  conference  in 1996  on the basis of  a  report to be presented 
by the Council  to the European council  in  1996 evaluating progress made  and 
experience gained. 
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4.4.2.  CO-OPERATION  IN  THE  FIELDS  OF  JUSTICE  AND  HOME  AFFAIRS 
Co-operation in the fields  of  justice and  home  affairs has  so far  been 
conducted outside the EC  system  in a  number  of different  fora.  The  Maastricht 
Treaty also covers the areas  in which there has  already been co-operation. 
Matters  considered to be of  common  interest are broad  and  cover: 
asylum policy; 
rules governing the crossing by  persons  of the external borders of the 
Member  States  and the exercise of controls thereon; 
immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries 
(conditions of entry and residence,  bringing families  together,  access  to 
employment  and measures  against unlawful  residence); 
combating drug abuse; 
combating  fraud  on  an  international  scale; 
judicial co-operation in civil matters; 
judicial co-operation in criminal matters; 
customs  co-operation; 
police co-operation for the purposes of preventing  and combating 
terrorism,  unlawful  drug trafficking and  other serious forms  of 
international  crime,  including if necessary certain aspects of  customs 
co-operation,  in connection with the organization of  a  system for 
exchanging  information within  a  European  Police Unit  (Europol). 
In these areas the Member  States  shall  inform  and  consult one another  in order 
to ensure co-ordination. 
The  instruments  are  common  positions  and  agreements  and the  new  "joint 
actions".  In  a  declaration appended to the Final Act  asy~um policy is given 
special priority for  joint action. 
The  Council,  acting unanimously,  may  decide to transfer one of the above  areas 
of co-operation  (excluding co-operation  in criminal matters,  customs 
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co-operation and police co-operation),  to  EC  co-operation  (Article 100c, 
pillar 1).  In this case the Council  also determines the relevant voting 
rules.  The decision to transfer  a  subject to pillar 1  has,  however,  to be 
ratified by the Member  States before the decision can  come  into force.  The 
ratification conditions  in Article K.9  correspond to those under Article 201 
pillar 1)  on the EC's  own  resources.  In a  declaration annexed to the Treaty 
the Member  States agree that,  on the basis of  a  report  from the Commission the 
council will consider the possibility of transferring,  by the end of 1993, 
asylum policy to EC  co-operation. 
5.  FINANCIAL  PROVISIONS  (BUDGE~) 
The  Member  States contribute to the Community's  own  resources  according to a 
special scheme  adopted by the Council,  acting unanimously,  and ratified by the 
national parliaments.  The  Member  States'  contributions to the budget are not 
allocated to separate areas of co-operation but  cover all the work of the 
Community. 
In the case of co-operation between the Member  States on the  common  foreign 
and  security policy and  on  justice and  home  affairs the Council,  acting 
unanimously,  may  decide that expenditure on action shall be taken  from  the 
general Community  budget.  In this way  actions under pillars 2  and  3  can also 
be  included in the budget. 
One  area is excluded  from the principle of  not  allocating the Member  States' 
contributions to the budget to individual  areas of co-operation.  In the 
Protocol  on  social policy it is stated that the financial effects of 
co-operation between the 11  countries which are party to this provision do  not 
apply to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and  Northern  Ireland,  which is 
excluded  from  the extended co-operation on social policy. 
The  Treaty does  not indicate whether non-participation in specific areas of 
co-operation by  a  Member  State shall have  budgetary or financial  implications. 
6.  THE  QUES~ION OF  PARALLEL  EXIS~ENCE 
This  can  be  summarized  in three po1.nts. 
First,  the provisions of the Treaty regarding the Community's various areas of 
competence  are defined  and  set out in detail,  including  a  detailed Treaty-
based plan  for  EMU,  and  the Community's  decision-making structures are 
strengthened.  Apart  from the visa questicn  and  the right to vote and to stand 
in local elections  in connection with Cit.t.zenship of the Union,  there is no 
questio~ of actually extending the EC's  area of competence,  in that all areas 
of  co-operation have  - in the past as well  - been considered in the Community 
on the basis of general  Treaty provisions.  The  main  innovation is that the 
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explicit reference in the Treaty to  a  series of areas of co-operation  now 
establishes clearer boundaries for  Community  competence.  Furthermore, 
independent  justification is provided for the Community's  influence  in the 
areas of co-operation concerned,  which  up to  now  has been based mainly on 
economic  premises,  e.g.  internal market provisions.  As  regards 
intergovernmental  co-operation on  Community  foreign  and  security policy and 
justice and  home  affairs the Treaty in some  cases provides for  a  continuation 
along similar lines,  and  in others  for  an  extension of  co-operation. 
Secondly,  it is the familiar institutions, i.e. the Council,  Commission, 
European Parliament  and Court of Justice,  which will be  involved  in 
intergovernmental  co-operation,  albeit on  a  different footing. 
Thirdly,  basic principles are established,  such as  respect for national 
identity,  the principle of  "closeness"  and the principle of  legality,  to which 
all co-operation is subject,  including that between States.  The principle of 
"closeness"  limits the Community's  influence,  in favour  of decentralization. 
The  legal  framework  has  no  provision for parallel existence between the Treaty 
of  Rome  and  the Maastricht Treaty,  in other words  for one or more  Member 
States to continue to operate according to the Treaty of Rome  and/or 
simultaneously accept parts of the Maastricht Treaty,  whilst the other Member 
States adhere  fully to the Maastricht Treaty. 
By  far the majority of the innovative measures  contained in pillar 1  of the 
Maastricht Treaty  (the  Community)  develop or consolidate existing Treaty 
provisions.  For this reason alone it must  be  accepted that it will be 
extremely difficult to "separate" the  innovative measures  in pillar 1  of the 
Maastricht Treaty  from  those provisions which  already exist  in the Treaty of 
Rome. 
As  far as pillar 2  (common  foreign  and  security policy)  and  pillar 3  (justice 
and  home  affairs)  of the Maastricht Treaty are concerned,  it must  be  assumed 
that there will not  be  any  insurmountable  legal problems if one or more  Member 
States remain  apart,  whilst the others move  forward. 
The  common  Introductions  and  Final  Provisions contain rules  on the admission 
of  new  Member  States and  adjustments to the Treaties  whic~ apply to all the 
Treaties.  Article  237  of the Treaty of  Rome  on  enlargement of the  Community is 
repealed  and  replaced by Article 0  of the Maastricht Treaty,  which  states that 
new  countries may  apply to become  members  of the Union. 
Article  236  on  amendment  of the Treaty is repealed  and  replaced by Article  N, 
which  states that  future  intergovernmental  conferences  shall determine 
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amendments  to the Maastricht Treaty and  shall be attended by the Member  States 
which  are signatories to the Treaty. 
These provisions having been moved  from pillar 1  to the  common  final 
provisions applying to all the Treaties,  it must be  said that the legal 
situation is unclear  in that Articles 0  and  N would  not apply to a  Member 
State which  continued to operate on the basis of the present Treaty situation. 
For example,  the enlargement negotiations with the EFTA  countries would be 
based on Article o of the Maastricht Treaty.  Insofar as this Article does  not 
apply to all Member  States, there must  be  some  doubt  about whether enlargement 
negotiations will take place with all Member  States or only those which are 
covered by the Maastricht Treaty. 
Considering in particular the horizontal  amendments  which the Maastricht 
Treaty makes to the existing Treaties,  it is extremely difficult in legal and 
practical terms to imagine  a  situation in which  some  Member  States operate on 
the new  basis,  whilst others still operate on the old one. 
For  a  start, it is hard to imagine,  from  the practical and  legal points of 
view,  how  it could be possible for  some  Member  States to operate on the  new 
basis and  others on the old one.  The  problems  here are three-fold:  principles, 
decision-making procedures  and  substance. 
- The  general principles of the Treaty are amended  in a  number of respects, 
including the introduction of the principle of "closeness"  and the principle 
of taking the environment  into account  in all areas of action.  It is 
practically inconceivable that these horizontal principles,  which  serve to 
delimit the institutions'  competences,  should not  apply to all partners.  A 
Member  State wishing to continue to operate under the existing Treaties is 
likely to have difficulties when it wants  a  regulation to be  adopted which 
cannot be  adopted  according to the new  basis because it would  be 
inconsistent with,  for example,  the principle of  "closeness". 
- Various  new  decision-making procedures are  introduced,  which in particular 
reflect the fact that Parliament,  the Committee of the Regions  and to a 
certain extent the Economic  and Social  Committee  are involved in new  ways. 
Furthermore,  various  aspects of the Council's voting rules have  been 
amended.  It will be impossible in practical/legal terms· to have,  for 
example,  two  different parliamentary procedures or two different sets of 
Council  voting rules  (e.g.  on  environmental  issues,  unanimity  and 
deliberation according to the rules of the old Treaty,  and  a  qualified 
majority and  co-operation procedure according to the Maastricht Treaty). 
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- A whole  series of substantive changes  in the Treaty basis  are  introduced, 
which will considerably complicate the drafting and  implementation of 
specific legislation based  on  one Treaty in respect of  some  Member  States 
and  another Treaty in respect of the rest. 
- Economic  and  Monetary  Union  is one  example of the  introduction of  new  rules 
regarding substance  and  new  institutions for the purpose of co-operation. 
This will take place in stages,  and the Maastricht  arrangements  already make 
provision for  Denmark to elect either to join in or stay out at stage three. 
From  a  practical/legal point  of view it is therefore necessary to 
differentiate between horizontal  amendments  and  other amendments. 
- As  far  as  horizontal amendments,  the general overriding objectives,  the 
general principles which  apply to all or  a  number  of  areas,  and the 
institutional provisions  including decision-making procedures  and voting 
rules are  concerned,  it will be  practically impossible  for  some  Member 
States to operate on the basis of the  new  Treaty and  others  on  the basis of 
the old one. 
- As  for the  amendments  relating to the individual areas of co-operation,  from 
the legal point of view the  introduction of  a  special  status cannot be ruled 
out.  A special status would  mean  that  EC  rules,  including the general 
co-operation objectives,  would  not  apply to all Member  States.  This will 
give rise to various delimitation problems  which may  be  brought  before the 
Court  of Justice.  It is also conceivable that a  test case to establish 
whether or not  a  special status  is  compatible with the Treaty  system may  be 
brought  before the Court  of Justice. 
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CBAP~ER VIII 
ECONOMIC  AHD  MONE~ARY UNION 
1.  I~RODUC~IOH 
This  Chapter first of all gives  a  historical account of the process  leading up 
to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the establishment of 
Economic  and Monetary Union between the Member  States of the European 
Community.  This is followed  by  a  description of the details,  including the 
formal  and  substantive changes  in the sphere of co-operation which the 
provisions will bring about  compared with existing co-operation structures 
within the Community.  Stage  2  of Economic  and  Monetary  Union will not entail 
changes of  substance  compared with co-operation at present.  During that phase 
the Member  States retain full powers  concerning monetary policy.  In stage 3 
economic  policy must  be  adapted  in the light of rules concerning excessively 
large budget deficits.  Apart  from this,  economic  policy will remain within 
the national sphere of  competence  in stage 3  as well. 
Pursuant to its Article R,  the Maastricht Treaty will enter into force on 
1  January  1993  or on the first day of the month  following the deposit of the 
instrument of ratification in Rome  by the last signatory State to take this 
step.  However,  only a  few of the Treaty's provisions concerning Economic  and 
Monetary  Union will enter into force then.  This is because the process 
leading up to full Economic  and Monetary Union  is divided into three stages. 
Stage  1  began  on  1  July 1990.  Pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty,  stage 2  will 
come  into force  on  1  January  1994  and  stage 3  between 1  January  1997  and 
1  January  1999  for the Member  States concerned.  The Maastricht Treaty's 
provisions concerning economic  and monetary union enter into force during this 
period,  but the provisions entailing significant substantive changes to 
economic  policy co-operation do  not  come  into force until stage 3,  and only 
for those countries which go  into that stage.  As  and when  the provisions of 
the Treaty enter into force,  the present Treaty provisions are superseded,  and 
secondary  EC  legislation will also be  adopted on the basis of the provisions 
of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Both  Denmark  and the United Kingdom  have  Protocols allowing them to adopt  a 
special position with regard to stage  3  of Economic  and  Monetary Union,  but 
the  UK  Protocol differs  from  the Danish Protocol on  a  number  of points. 
2.  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND 
There  have been various plans to establish an economic  and monetary union 
between the Community  Member  States since the end of the 1960s,  but they all 
have  a  series of  common  features,  for  example the definition of 
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economic  and monetary union  as  an  irrevocable  locking of exchange rates,  full 
convertibility,  free movement  of capital  and  a  common  monetary policy.  In 
addition,  the various plans  have  generally included  a  recommendation that a 
single currency be  introduced. 
2 • 1,  THE  WERNER  PLAN 
At  the European  Summit  meeting in The  Hague  in December  1969  a  Committee was 
set up  under the chairmanship of Pierre Werner,  the then Prime Minister of 
Luxembourg.  The  Committee  was  given the task of working out  a  concrete plan 
to achieve  economic  and monetary union.  Its report was  submitted in 
October 1970.  The  report  recommended  establishing economic  and monetary union 
in three stages  covering  a  total period of ten years.  To  achieve full 
economic  and monetary union,  the report  concluded that it would  be necessary 
to set up  two  common  decision-making centres,  one  for  economic  policy and  a 
common  central bank  system.  The  report also  recommended  introducing  a  single 
currency. 
Successive European Summit  meetings  confirmed the intention to establish 
economic  and monetary union.  At  the Paris  Summit  held  from  19  to 
21  October  1972,  which was  attended by  Denmark,  the  following  statement was 
issued:  "The  Heads  of State or of Government  reaffirm the determination of 
the Member  States of the enlarged European  Communities  irreversibly to achieve 
economic  and monetary union.  The  necessary decisions  should be taken in the 
course of  1973  so  as  to allow the transition to the  second  stage of  economic 
and monetary union  on  1  January  1974,  with  a  view to its completion not  later 
than  31  December  1980". 
As  a  result of the economic crisis that developed  in  1973  and  1974  and the 
Member  States'  diverse reactions to it, it proved  impossible to  implement the 
Werner  Plan which  did not  have binding legal  force. 
2.2.  MONETARY  CO-OPERATION 
However,  results were  achieved in the monetary  sphere in the 1970s.  With the 
collapse at the beginning of the  1970s  of post-war  international monetary 
co-operation within the  framework  of the  International Monetary  Fund  (the 
Bretton Woods  system),  the  EC  countries rapidly created the  "snake"  under the 
Basel  agreement  of April  1972.  This co-operation continued with  a  changing 
membership,  but with  Denmark  as  a  permanent  member,  until the European 
Monetary  System  (EMS)  started up  on  13  March  1979. 
The  purpose of the  EMS  was  to create a  zone of monetary stability in Europe. 
co-operation is based on  an  agreement  between the European  Community 
countries,  and  is therefore not,  formally  speaking,  one of the areas of 
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co-operation covered by  the Treaty of Rome.  The most.important aspect of 
monetary  co-operation is the Member  States'  obligation to defend bilateral 
exchange rates,  including the possibility of borrowing unlimited amounts  from 
the other central banks.  There are two  fluctuation margins,  the normal band 
of  +/-2.1/4%  and the broad band of +/- 6\  around the bilateral exchange rates. 
The ecu was  introduced in the context of the EMS.  It is a  basket of 
currencies,  with each currency accounting for  a  fixed proportion.  All  EC 
currencies are  now  contained in the basket. 
All the Community  Member  States are,  formally  speaking,  members  of this 
system,  but the major decisions about  changes  in exchange rates,  etc.,  are 
taken by the Member  States which  are in the exchange rate mechanism  (ERM),  and 
which  have  therefore undertaken to maintain fixed bilateral fluctuation 
margins  for their currencies.  At the moment,  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  the 
Netherlands,  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  Germany  are in the exchange rate 
mechanism's  normal  band.  Italy is,  formally  speaking,  in the narrower band, 
but has  suspended its intervention obligation.  Portugal  and  Spain are  in the 
exchange rate mechanism's broad band.  The  United Kingdom  and Greece  are not 
in the exchange rate mechanism. 
Decisions  on exchange-rate adjustments  in the context of the EMS  are taken by 
common  agreement  between the participating countries.  This  was  already the 
practice with the  "snake"  in the 1970s,  but was  formalized with the 
establishment of the EMS.  Experience has  shown that it has  had  a  genuine 
impact,  since both small and  large countries have  been denied devaluations as 
big as they originally wanted.  The  EMS  has therefore provided a  good starting 
point  for  the adaptation of economic  policy and hence made  a  considerable 
contribution towards bringing inflation under control.  From  1987  to September 
1992  there were  no  adjustments of the bilateral exchange rates for currencies 
in the narrower band. 
The  continuing process of market integration as a  result of the  customs union 
and  the  internal market entails increased mutual economic  dependence  between 
EC  countries.  An  important  factor  in this connection is the liberalization of 
capital movements  between Member  States,  contributing to. the ever closer 
integration of financial markets  and  institutions.  This  has resulted in an 
increased interest in and  a  greater need  for  closer co-ordination of economic 
and monetary policy.  Last but not  least,  where the free movement  of capital 
and  stable exchange rates are concerned,  it is very  important to participate 
in more  extensive monetary  co-operation in order to continue to ensure 
monetary stability.  Likewise,  it is a  prerequisite for stable exchange rate 
conditions that there are reasonably uniform trends  in inflation,  etc.  Wi.th 
fixed  exchange rates,  excessively  large differences in the trends in the 
underlying economic  conditions will,  over  a  period,  result  in large shifts in 
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the relative competitiveness of the individual countries,  and therefore 
ultimately require either a  change  in exchange rates or  a  change  in economic 
policy,  including structural policy,  in order to restore the conditions of 
competition between the  countries. 
The  EMS  was  established at  a  time when  inflation in Europe  was  rampant. 
Politicians reacted by placing the  emphasis  on the  achievement of monetary 
stability.  Some  Member  States had difficulties in fully satisfying the 
economic  and political requirements  involved in the maintenance of  exchange 
rates.  However,  several countries,  including France,  discovered that 
devaluation did not help to resolve the underlying  economic  problems  but 
mainly resulted in higher inflation.  The  EMS-related  fixed  exchange rate 
policy was  therefore widely accepted during the 1980s. 
Another  reason  why  the emphasis  in  economic  policy was  moving to  a  greater 
extent towards  achieving monetary stability was  the fact that Germany  had, 
generally speaking,  achieved positive and  stable economic  results with  a  firm 
low inflation policy.  In  a  number  of other Member  States,  on the other hand, 
there  was  generally lower  growth  and  higher unemployment  rates.  With  a  view 
to achieving the  same  degree of  confidence characteristic of  German  economic 
policy,  the Member  States sought,  through the exchange rate mechanism,  to 
bring their inflation rates closer to the German  level.  Stable exchange rate 
trends vis-a-vis the German  mark  and  hence the other members  of the exchange 
rate mechanism  have  been  a  key element of this policy.  At  the same  time,  such 
a  policy lacks credibility unless the Member  States'  other economic policy is 
organized in accordance with it, as can be  seen  from  recent experience.  The 
fixed  exchange-rate policy in Denmark  since 1982  has  been  a  central feature of 
economic policy. 
As  a  result of  a  more  consistent stability-orientated economic policy,  the 
other Member  States'  interest  and  inflation levels  had to  a  large extent 
fallen at the end of the 1980s  and  the beginning of the  1990s to the levels 
prevalent before the high  inflation period.  However,  in a  number  of other 
fundamental  economic  areas there are still considerable differences between 
Member  States.  One  important  area is public  finance,  where  some  Member  States 
will  have to reduce their public budget deficits if they· are to inspire 
greater confidence in their economic policy.  For  example,  maintaining  a  large 
public deficit for many  years,  together with the accumulated  burden of debt, 
may  push up  interest rates because of uncertainty  about whether the country 
will be able to pay off its debts  smoothly.  Some  EC  countries are therefore 
permanently  confronted with the  need  for  constant  adjustment  of their economic 
policy. 
Member  States are satisfying the requirements to a  greater extent in a  fixed 
exchange rate  system.  This is reflected  among  other things  in the fact that 
exchange-rate adjustments  have  been less  frequent  since 1983,  and  the 
adjustments  in the period up  to  1987  were generally smaller than hitherto. 
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Where  the day-to-day administration of  co-operation is concerned,  it is also 
significant that fluctuations  between  currencies have generally been much 
smaller than the margins would have  allowed.  The  currency stability achieved 
within the EMS  is therefore in sharp contrast to the exchange-rate movements 
between the main  international currencies,  with the dollar in particular,  but 
also the yen,  fluctuating widely  in relation to the EMS  currencies.  It is 
significant in this connection that economic  integration between the European 
countries is much  greater than for example between  Europe  and the USA.  The 
exchange rates of  a  number of European  currencies,  including the other 
Scandinavian currencies,  also fluctuated considerably in the 1980s,  among 
other things because they were partly linked to the dollar.  Several of these 
countries have  now  linked their currencies to the ecu  (see point 2.4 below). 
The  fact that exchange rates have  fluctuated very little has meant that there 
has been no  need  for major interest rate fluctuations  in EMS  countries. 
Furthermore,  within the EMS  major variations in nominal  exchange rates in 
relation to the underlying economic  conditions have been avoided.  The  trend 
in the exchange rates of the main currencies,  on the other hand,  has at times 
been divorced  from the underlying economic  conditions in the individual 
countries. 
Experience with the  EMS  in the 1980s  contributed to the plans for the further 
strengthening of monetary co-operation in the  Community.  Even  though the aim 
of the  EMS  is to achieve  a  higher degree of monetary stability in Europe, 
currencies can vary by  up to 4,5%  in relation to one  another in the normal 
fluctuation margin.  Exchange-rate adjustments  cause unwanted capital 
movements  and disturb trade  and  investment.  In addition,  in such situations 
the level of interest rates comprises  a  risk premium  on account of the 
markets'  fear of  losing out  as  a  result of the exchange rate adjustments.  As 
the EC  countries have  made  only limited use of exchange rate adjustments  for 
economic policy purposes  since 1987,  a  reduction in uncertainty will reduce 
the risk element  in the interest rate which  can therefore be  lowered.  An 
irrevocable locking of  exchange rates is needed to ensure the complete  removal 
of uncertainty about  exchange rate movements  between Community  currencies. 
This  in turn necessitates  a  common  monetary policy,  which therefore forms  part 
of stage 3  of  Economic  and Monetary Union while stage 2 ·can be  regarded as  an 
extension of the gradual  development  of the  EMS  that occurred in the 1980s. 
For  example,  new  rules were  adopted  in 1985  to strengthen the ecu  and  in 1987 
the Basel-Nyborg agreement  helped to strengthen intervention co-operation. 
2.3.  THE  DELORS  REPORT 
on the Treaty front,  the plans to establish economic  and monetary  union were 
kept  on  a  back burner until the end of the  1980s.  At  the European Council 
meeting  in Luxembourg  in December  1985  agreement was  reached on the Single 
European Act  which  contained the necessary  amendments  to the Treaty of Rome 
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with  a  view to achieving the internal market.  It also contained  a  separate 
chapter with the  subheading  "Economic  and Monetary  Union",  which  specified 
among  other things that the  further  development  of economic  and monetary 
co-operation entailing institutional changes necessitates  an  amendment  of the 
Treaty. 
In the course of  1987  and at the beginning of  1988 proposals were  made  by 
various parties concerning closer European  economic  and monetary co-operation. 
A major  contribution which helped to spark off this debate was  a  letter and  a 
memorandum  which the then French Finance Minister Balladur sent to his 
colleagues  in the Community  in 1988  calling for  a  considerable  strengthening 
of monetary  co-operation and  for  an  examination of related institutional 
questions.  Following  a  series of  initiatives which  had  general  support the 
European Council  meeting in Hanover  in June  1988  set up  a  Committee  under the 
chairmanship of  Commission President Jacques Delors.  The  heads  of the central 
banks  in the Community  and three independent experts also took part in the 
proceedings of the Committee,  which  was  given the task of  studying and 
proposing  concrete stages  leading towards  economic  and monetary  union.  It 
submitted the Delara report  in April  1989.  The  report  sets out the principal 
features of  economic  and monetary union  and  lays  down  a  phased plan for 
achieving it. 
According to the report the principal  features  of economic  union are as 
follows: 
a  single market within which  persons,  goods,  services  and capital can move 
freely; 
- a  competition policy and  other measures  which are aimed at strengthening 
market mechanisms; 
- common  policies aimed  at structural change  and  regional  development,  and 
- macroeconomic  policy co-ordination,  including binding rules for budgetary 
policies. 
The  principal  features  of monetary  union  are as  follows: 
- assurance of total and  irreversible convertibility of currencies; 
- complete  liberalization of  capital transactions  and  full integration of 
banking  and  other financial markets,  and 
- elimination of margins  of  fluctuation  and the irrevocable  locking of 
exchange rate parities. 
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The  report also recommends  a  single currency,  but this is not  regarded as 
being  absolutely essential in order to establish Economic  and Monetary Union. 
At the  same  time,  it emphasizes the need for  a  common  monetary policy. 
A major difference compared with the Werner  report  of  1970 is that in the 
Delors report it is not  regarded as necessary to set up  a  common  economic 
policy decision-making centre.  Superposed  frameworks  for finance policies 
laid down  at national level are regarded as being sufficient to secure the 
economic stability of the Union.  There  are  a  number of arguments  in  favour of 
finance  policy being established at national level,  including the subsidiarity 
("closeness")  principle. 
As  already mentioned,  the report  recommends  phased  progress towards Economic 
and Monetary  Union.  According to the report,  stage 1  does  not entail 
institutional changes,  but will be  used  among  other things to clarify the time 
frame  and the institutional changes  needed to establish Economic  and Monetary 
Union.  Stage 2  should be  a  comparatively short transitional phase primarily 
intended to enable the Member  States to become  familiar with joint 
decision-making in connection with the management of monetary policy.  Stage  3 
would  see the final establishment of Economic  and Monetary Union with a  common 
monetary  and exchange-rate policy.  Lastly,  the report emphasized that the 
entire process constitutes a  whole  and that  a  decision to initiate the first 
phase is a  decision to complete the entire process. 
At the European council meeting held in Madrid  from  25  to 27  June  1989 the 
objective of establishing Economic  and Monetary Union  was  confirmed,  and it 
was  decided to start the first phase  in the process leading  up to union  on 
1  July 1990.  At  the  same  time it was  decided to convene  an  intergovernmental 
conference on the changes  needed to the Treaty of Rome  in order to establish 
Economic  and Monetary  Union. 
2.4.  DANISH  EXPERIENCE  WITH  MONETARY  CO-OPERATION 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods  system in the early 1970s,  Denmark, 
unlike other Nordic  countries,  has persisted with an exchange-rate policy 
involving close co-operation with other western European countries,  especially 
the EC  Member  States.  This  is reflected in the present  low level of inflation 
in Denmark  and  the fall  in interest rates in the course of the 1980s.  Binding 
co-operation also brings with it various  advantages,  in that in principle 
unlimited resources are available to defend the Danish kroner.  The Danish 
fixed-rate policy has  achieved a  high degree of  confidence,  which would  have 
been difficult with a  policy of unilateralism,  as illustrated by experience 
since  1990.  On  17  May  1991  Sweden  changed the course of its exchange-rate 
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policy;  instead of basing the crown  on  a  basket of currencies,  it issued a 
unilateral declaration of its intention to keep it within  a  band of +/-1,5% 
around  a  fixed  rate against the ecu.  On  several occasions  both before and 
after the Swedish  declaration,  there was  pressure on the Swedish  crown whilst 
the Danish kroner  remained  untroubled.  Finland,  recently,  was  unable to 
maintain its unilater~lly declared exchange rate against the ecu. 
A  number  of European countries  sought closer co-operation with the EMS 
countries.  First of all,  in 1990,  Norway tied its currency to the ecu.  Sweden 
followed,  as mentioned,  in May  1991,  and  between June  1991  and  September  1992 
the Finnish mark was  also tied to the ecu.  It is the declared objective of the 
Finnish authorities to establish a  new  fixed rate against the ecu as  soon as 
circumstances permit.  Cyprus  has  also tied its pound  to the ecu.  However, 
unilateral action of this type cannot,  of  course,  instill the  same  degree of 
confidence,  as the countries concerned are not  represented in the decision-
making bodies.  Some  of  them have  also expressed  a  wish to  join the EMS 
exchange  rate mechanism,  but  none  has  so  far managed  to do  so.  The decisive 
difference  is that maintaining exchange rates  is  a  market  responsibility of 
all EMS  members,  but those countries  whose  currency is tied to the ecu  as 
described have to  defend their exchange rates  alone,  even if they have  credit 
agreements  with the central banks  of  EC  Member  States. 
Danish  exchange-rate policy within the  framework  of EC  co-operation has 
stabilized the exchange rate for  the kroner  against the currencies of the 
country's most  important trading partners,  an  effect which has  become  more 
pronounced  as the other Nordic countries  (with the exception of  Iceland)  have 
tied their currencies to the ecu.  Around  75%  of Danish exports  go to EC  Member 
States or countries which  have unilaterally tied their currency to the ecu. 
3.  SCOPE  OF  THE  EMU  PROVISIONS 
The  provisions  on  Economic  and Monetary  Union  are part of the first pillar of 
the Maastricht Treaty  and  include: 
- Article B of the introductory provisions,  in which the objectives  are set 
out, 
-Articles 2,  3a  and  4a  (objectives), 
-Articles 73a to  73h  (provisions  on  capital liberalization), 
-Articles 102a-109m  (provisions  on  Economic  and Monetary Union), 
- various protocols  and  declarations. 
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4.  ENTRY  I~O FORCE  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  AND  ASSOCIATED  AMENDMENTS 
In  conjunction with the entry into force of the Treaty,  various provisions it 
contains will also be directly applicable.  These are: 
-the provisions  on objectives in Articles  B,  2,  3a  and  4a  (see section 4.1 
below); 
- Article 73h  on capital movements  (applicable only until the start of  stage 
two  on  1  January 1994).  This Article does  not  involve  any  amendment  to the 
legal position as laid down  in the fourth Directive on capital 
liberalization  (88/361/EEC); 
- Article 102a on economic policy objectives,  with special reference to the 
general objectives of the Community  as defined in Article 2  (see section 4.1 
below), 
Article 103  on  co-ordination of economic  policies  (see section 4.2  below); 
-Article 103a(l),  which authorizes the Council,  with reference to the 
provisions of the Treaty,  to decide upon  measures  to be  implemented if 
difficulties arise in the  supply of certain products  (see Article 103(4)  of 
the current Treaty); 
-Article 109c(l)  on the Monetary Committee  (see section 4.2  below); 
- Article 109d,  which is an  institutional innovation within the Treaty of 
Rome,  to  a  certain extent supplementing the Commission's unqualified right 
of initiative.  This Article makes it formally possible for the Council or a 
Member  State to request the Commission to make  a  recommendation or  a 
proposal relating to certain specific areas.  The  Commission  is not  legally 
bound to make  a  recommendation or a  proposal,  but  is obliged to examine  the 
request and  submit its conclusions to the Council; 
- Article 109h on support  from the Community  for  a  Member  State in the event 
of balance-of-payments difficulties,  Article 109i  on  protective measures  in 
the event  of  a  balance of payments crisis,  and Article 109m  on the European 
Monetary  System.  These Articles replicate Articles 108,  109,  107  and  102a of 
the present Treaty; 
- Article 109g on the freezing of the present currency composition of the ecu 
basket  (see section 4.2  below); 
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- Protocol  on  the acquisition of  second  homes  in Denmark  (see section 4.3 
below). 
4.1.  PROVISIONS  SETTING  OUT  OBJECTIVES 
As  far  as  Economic  and Monetary  Union  is concerned,  these are Articles B,  2, 
3a  and  4a.  The  most  important  innovation is  a  reference to the objective of 
setting up  an  economic  and monetary union  and  introduction of  a  single 
currency.  Article 2  in the common  introductory provisions to the first pillar 
and Article B  in the  common  introductory provisions to the entire Treaty 
contain the objective of establishing an  economic  and monetary union.  Other 
objectives  include: 
- sustainable  and non-inflationary growth,  respecting the environment; 
- a  high degree of  convergence of economic  performance; 
- a  high level of employment; 
- a  high level of social protection; 
the raising of the standard of  living and quality of life (the  former  is 
also mentioned  in the existing Treaty); 
- economic  and  social cohesion; 
- solidarity among  Member  States. 
Both Articles  3a  and  4a are new  in relation to the existing Treaty.  The  main 
content  of Article 3a is a  reference in paragraph  1  to the fact that Member 
states'  economic policies are to be closely co-ordinated.  Paragraph  2  refers 
to the irrevocable fixing of  exchange  rates  leading to the  introduction of  a 
single currency,  the ecu,  and the definition and  conduct  of  a  single monetary 
policy and  exchange-rate policy,  the primary objective of both of which  shall 
be to maintain price stability.  Paragraph  3  refers to various guiding 
principles for the Member  States'  and  Community  economies,  i.e.  stable prices, 
sound  public  finances  and monetary  conditions  and  a  sustainable balance of 
payments. 
Article  4a states that in accordance with the procedures  laid down  in the 
Treaty,  a  European  system of  Central Banks  and  a  European Central  Bank are to 
be  established.  This  is of significance for  stage three only. 
The  only effect of entry into force of these Articles is that the objectives 
of the European  Community  are reformulated  in relation to the existing Treaty. 
It is not possible to adopt  secondary  legislation on  the sole basis of these 
provisions.  However,  the provisions setting out the objectives have  acquired  a 
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certain importance  in connection with the other provisions of the Treaty,  in 
that these objectives can be cited in conjunction with the implementation of 
secondary  legislation. 
4. 2.  OTHER  ARTICLES  WHICH  EHTBR  INTO  FORCE  AT  THE  SAME  TIME  AS  THE  MAASTRICHT 
TREATY 
The  main provisions which enter into force at the  same  time as the Treaty are 
Article 103  on  co-ordination of economic policies,  Article 109c(1)  on the 
Monetary Committee,  and Article 109g on the freezing of the present currency 
composition of the ecu basket. 
Article  103  states that the Council shall draft broad guidelines for the 
economic policies of the Member  States and the Community;  these will then be 
discussed by the European Council.  Provision is made  for multilateral 
surveillance,  the underlying principle of which is that each Member  State 
regards its economic  policy as  a  matter of  common  interest.  As  part of the 
multilateral surveillance procedure,  the Council will discuss the economic 
situations in the Community  and the Member  States in order to assess whether 
they are consistent with the general guidelines - although these are not 
binding.  The  Council  can then decide by  a  qualified majority to make 
recommendations to  a  Member  State whose  economic policy is not considered to 
be consistent with the general guidelines,  though  each Member  State continues 
to have the final word on its economic policy. 
The  provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and  any  subsequent legislation will 
not  only replace the existing Treaty provisions but also the existing Council 
Decision  (90/141/EEC)  on multilateral surveillance and preparation of an 
annual  economic report,  etc.,  but they do not  contain any  amendments  of  a 
substantive nature. 
Article 109c(1)  provides for the continuation of the Monetary  Committee 
referred to in Article 105(2)  of the present Treaty.  This  Committee  has  a 
large number  of advisory functions  and  serves,  among  others,  the Council of 
Ministe~s for Economic  and Financial Affairs.  In the new  Treaty these 
functions  are emphasized with reference to specific Treaty provisions. 
The  first paragraph of Article 109g  states that the  currency composition of 
the ecu basket will not  be  changed after the Treaty  has entered into  force.  At 
the moment,  the Danish kroner is in the basket to the value of 19,76 ere, 
which  corresponds to a  weight of approximately  2,5%. 
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4.3.  DANISH  LEGISLATION  ON  HOLIDAY  HOMES 
The  Treaty  Protocol  on  the  acquisition of  property  in  Denmark  was  formulated  as 
the  basis  in  EC  law  for  Denmark's  present  rules  on  the  right  of  foreigners  to 
acquire  second  homes  in  Denmark.  At  present  the  basis  of  these  rules  in  EC  law 
is  Art1cle  6(4)  of  the  fourth  Directive  on  capital  liberalization  and 
Article  2(3)  in  the  two  Directives  on  the  right  of  residence  for  pensioners  and 
the  so-called  group  of  rights.  The  Protocol  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty  is 
formulated  as  an  exception  to  the Treaty  as  a  whole  and  hence  to  EC  leg1slation 
as  a  whole.  The  text  of  the  Protocol  can  be  amended  only  by  amend1ng  the Treaty. 
4.4.  CONSEQUENCES  OF  DANISH  NON-PARTICIPATION  ON  THE  ENTRY  INTO  FORCE  OF  THE 
MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
As  descr1bed  the  Community's  objectives  will  be  changed  when  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  enters  1nto  force.  If  a  country  in  this  situation  is  not 
covered  by  these  provisions,  co-operation  as  a  whole  may  come  to  be  governed  by 
two  sets  of paragraphs  on  objectives.  That  would  raise  a  series  of  problems  not 
only  of  a  formal  legal  nature  but  also  of  a  politlcal  nature.  One  of  the  many 
examples  is  the  introduct1on of  legal  acts  in which  the  recitals  refer to  the 
objectives  of  the  Community.  If the  legal  act  in  question  is also  to  apply  to  a 
country  not  covered  by  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  1n  future  this  w1ll  presumably  not 
be  poss1ble  Wlthout  special  references  regarding  that  country. 
As  far  as  the  procedure  referred  to  in Article  103  is  concerned,  in  the  present 
Treaty  it  already  appears  that  Member  States  consider their economic  policy  as  an 
issue  of  common  interest.  The  multilateral  deliberation procedure  has  likewise 
already  been  introduced  on  the  basis  of  a  Council  Decision  (90/141/EEC)  on  the 
attainment  of  progressive  convergence.  That  Dec1sion  also  makes  it clear that 
multilateral  deliberation  covers  all  aspects  of  economic  policy,  and  gives 
authorization  to  issue  recommendations  to  a  Member  State.  Thus,  laying  down  this 
procedure  in  the  Treaty  primarily  means  a  formal  strengthening  of  the  procedure. 
As  regards  the  general  guidelines,  these  may  presumably  be  compared  with  the 
annual  econom1c  report  which  is  drawn  up  and  adopted  by  the ·Council  once  a  year 
within  the  framework  of  existing co-operation.  The  annual  report  includes 
recommendat1ons  to  Member  States  on  the  organization of  economic  policies  and  has 
no  legal  effect. 
The  prov1s1on  accord1ng  to  which  the  ECU  basket  does  not  change  was  introduced 
primar1ly  for  the  sake  of  the  flnancial  markets'  view  of  the  ecu.  At  present  the 
ecu  basket  1s  revised  at  five-year  intervals  in  order  to  take  account  of  changes 
1n  the  values  which  have  arisen  as  a  result  of  exchange-rate  adJustments  and 
sim1lar  factors.  The  last  adjustment  of  the  basket  took place  in  1989.  The 
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provision is  intended  to  strengthen confidence  in  the  ecu  on  the  financial 
markets  when  they  no  longer have  to  live with  uncertainty  as  to  how  far  the 
basket  will  be  revised  in  the  future. 
The  provision  may  also  be  expected  to  produce  effects  for  a  country  regardless 
whether  the  country  is  in  the Treaty  or not.  Given  that  the  share  of  the  other 
eleven  Member  States'  currencies  in the  ECU  basket  does  not  change,  it will  not 
be  possible  for  the  share  of  the  currency  concerned to  change  either. 
The  basis  for  the  Monetary  Committee  is  transferred to  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  If 
a  country  is  not  covered  by  that  part  of  the  Treaty,  it will  no  longer  be 
represented  on  that  Committee,  whose  discussions  on  a  number  of  areas  form  the 
basis  for  the  work  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs 
in  part1cular.  If the  country  concerned  can  nonetheless  still participate in 
that  Committee,  a  decision will  be  taken either to maintain  two  parallel 
committees  or,  on  a  similar ad  hoc  basis,  to  invite the  country  to  take  part  in 
the  Committee  which  is  based  on  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  In  both  cases  the 
country's  real  influence  can  be  expected  to  be  considerably  reduced. 
To  summarize  it may  be  said that,  in  comparison  with ex1sting  co-operation  on 
economic  policy,  the  entry  into  force  of  the Treaty will  not  in  itself mean  any 
essential  change  in  terms  of  substance.  It will  merely  involve  a  number  of 
formal  changes  in  the  basis  for  co-operation.  However,  full  participation in the 
co-ordination of  macro-economic  policy  1s  generally regarded  as  decisive  for  the 
functioning  of  the  EMS.  It will  therefore  be  of  essential  significance for  a 
Member  State's continued  full  participation in exchange-rate  co-operation  that  it 
is  covered  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  other  Member  States  by  the  provisions of 
the  Maastricht  Treaty  discussed  here  which  relate  to  economic  and  political 
co-operation  and  which  are  expected  to  enter into  force  at  the  same  time  as  the 
Maastricht  Treaty. 
A number  of practical/legal questions  also arise  - with  regard  to  the  horizontal 
amendments  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  see  Chapter  VII. 
5.  PROVISIONS  WHICH  ENTER  INTO  FORCE  ON  1  JANUARY  1994,  INCLUDING  IN  CONNECTION 
WITH  THE  TRANSITION  TO  THE  SECOND  STAGE 
A number  of  provisions  come  into  force  on  January  1994: 
- Articles  67  to  73  of  the present  Treaty will  be  replaced  by  Articles  73b  to 
73g; 
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- the  second  stage  for  achieving  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  enters  Into  force  in 
accordance  with  Article  109e(l).  With  this  the  Treaty's  provisions  concerning 
this  stage enter  into  force,  including  in particular Articles  104  to  104b  and 
parts  of  Article  104c.  These  Articles  include  some  fundamental  prohibitions 
designed  to  secure  economic  stability; 
- the  European  Monetary  Institute  (EMil  will  be  established  in accordance  with 
Article  109f(1).  The  statute  of  the  institution,  which  will  function  only  in 
the  second  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  is  laid  down  in  a  special 
Protocol  to  the  Treaty. 
5. 1.  THE  PROVISIONS  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  ON  CAPITAL  MOVEMENTS 
On  1  January  1994,  under Article  73a,  Articles  67  to  73  of  the  present  Treaty 
Will  be  replaced  by  Articles  73b  to  73g  inclusive  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  This 
means  in general  terms  that  the  present  rules  in  the  fourth  capital 
l1beralization  Directive  as  a  ma1n  rule  acquire  treaty status  and  direct  effect. 
Article  73b  of  the  Treaty  stipulates  that  payments  are  completely  free  both 
between  EC  countries  and  between  EC  countries  and  third  countr1es.  However 
those  Member  States  which  on  31  December  1993  enJoy  a  derogation  on  the  basis  of 
EC  law,  which  In  this  case  means  the  fourth  Directive  on  capital  liberalization, 
may  maintain  such  derogations  (see  Article  73e).  This  is  of  relevance  only  to 
Portugal  and  Greece.  In  the  Interim,  restrictions vis-a-vis  third  countries 
which  apply  at  the  end  of  1993  may  be  maintained  (see  Article  73c)  and  in 
addition  the  Council,  acting unanimously,  can  adopt  further  restrictions.  though 
also  only  in  relation  to  third  countries. 
Articles  73f  and  73g  contain so-called  safeguard  clauses.  Article  73f  provides 
for  the  possibility of  the  Council  taking  safeguard measures  where  capital 
movements  to  or  from  third countries  cause,  or threaten  to  cause,  serious 
difficulties  for  the  operation  of  economic  and  monetary  union.  Such  measures  may 
be  maintained  for  a  maximum  period  of  six months.  Article  73g  allows  Member 
States  or  the  Council  to  1ntroduce  restrictions  on  capital  movements  or  payments 
to  and  from  th1rd  countries  for  political  reasons.  Measures  1ntroduced  by 
1ndiv1dual  Member  States  can  be  abolished  by  the  Council. 
5.2  FREE  MOVEMENTS  OF  CAPITAL  AND  TAX  CONTROL 
Under  Article  73d  the  provisions  on  free  movement  of  capital  may  not  interfere 
with  the  right  of  Member  States  to  take  all  requisite  measures  to  prevent 
infringements  of  national  law  and  regulations,  In particular  in  the  field  of 
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taxation  and  the  prudential  superv1s1on  of  financial  institutions,  or  to  lay  down 
procedures  for  the  declaration of  capital  movements  for purposes  of 
administrative  or statistical  information,  or  to  take  measures  which  are 
justified on  grounds  of  public policy or public  security.  Moreover,  it will 
continue  to  be  possible  to  impose  restrictions  on  the  right  of  establishment 
which  are  compatible  with  the  Treaty.  At  the  same  time  it is emphasized  that 
where  Member  States maintain  the  right  to  introduce  the  measures  referred  to, 
these  must  not  constitute  a  means  of arbitrary discrimination or  a  disguised 
restriction  on  the  free  movement  of capital  and  payments. 
In  addition,  Member  States  have  the  right  to  apply  the  relevant  provisions  of 
their tax  law  which  distinguish  between  tax-payers,  who  are  not  in  the  same 
situation with  regard  to  their place  of  residence  or with  regard  to  the  place 
where  their capital  is  invested.  At  the  same  time  in  a  Declaration annexed  to 
the  Treaty  Member  States  have  given  a  political undertaking,  though not  a  legaL 
one,  not  to  introduce  any  additional  tax  legislation on  the  basis  of  the  above 
provision after the  end  of  1993. 
5.3.  THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  DANISH  NON-PARTICIPATION  IN  CONNECTION  WITH  THE 
PROVISIONS  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  ON  CAPITAL  MOVEMENTS 
In  terms  of  content,  the  provisions  of Articles  73b  to  73g  deviate  only  to  a 
limited  extent  from  the present  provisions  on  capital  movements  as  contained  in 
the  fourth  Directive  on  the  liberalization of  capital  (88/361/EEC),  but  do,  as 
mentioned,  involve  the  decisive  difference  that  the provisions  of  the  Treaty  have 
direct  legal  effect. 
With  regard  to  the  provisions  allowing Member  States  to maintain  their tax 
control  legislation,  the  wording  of Article  73d  will  strengthen the  basis  for 
Danish  tax  control  law  under  the Treaty. 
An  additional  essential difference  between  the  Directive  and  the  new  text  of  the 
Treaty  is  the  stronger  emphasis  on  the  principle  of free  capital  movements  in 
relation  to  third countries,  the  "erga omnes"  principle.  As  Denmark  introduced 
the  cap1tal  liberalizations  on  1  October  1988  on  the  basis of  the  erga  omnes 
principle,  acceptance  of  these  Articles  of  the  Treaty  will not  require  any  change 
in  the  current  state of  Danish  law. 
In  the  ev~nt of  Denmark  not  taking  par~  in  the Treaty,  the  problem  is  more 
complicateo.  The  Treaty's present  Articles  concerning capital  movements, 
including  Article  67,  which  is  the  basis  for  the  fourth  Directive  on  the 
liberalization of  capital  will  be  repealed.  This  will  mean  that  the 
fourth  Directive  on  the  liberalization of  capital will  also  cease  to  exist  fer 
co-operation based  on  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  In  such  a  case,  for  any  possible 
parallel  co-operation  covering  all  twelve  countries it would  have  to  be  ensured 
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that  Article  67,  and  consequently also  the  fourth  Directive  on  capital 
liberalization,  continued  to  apply.  In  this  way,  within  the  overall  co-operation 
process  there  will  arise  a  situation  involving  two  broadly  speaking  ide~tical 
sets  of  legal  regulations  on  the  capital  movements.  To  the  extent  that 
supplementary  legislation has  to  be  introduced  in this  field it may  realistically 
be  expected  that  the  eleven  countries  co-operating  on  the  basis  of  the  Maastricht 
Treaty will  reach  agreement  on  the  drafting  of  the  provisions.  Thereafter the 
same  legislation can  presumably  be  introduced  within  co-operation  covering all 
twelve  member  States  withDut  any  great  adjustments.  However,  this  must  be 
expected  to  occur  without  any  form  of negotiation  inasmuch  as  the  other 
11  countries  constitute  a  qualified majority.  In this  situation Denmark  cannot 
therefore  be  expected  to exercise real  influence  on  the  framing  of  any  possible 
future  legislation. 
It  should  be  added  that  the  second  home  rule  mentioned  here  is  contained 
inter alia in  the  fourth  Directive  on  capital  liberalization. 
5.4.  THE  PROVISIONS  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  CONCERNING  THE  SECOND  STAGE  OF 
ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION 
Under  Article  109e(1),  the  second  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  will  enter 
into  force  on  1  January  1994.  At  the  same  time  a  series  of  provisions  in  the 
Treaty  will  also enter into force.  First  and  foremost,  three  basic  prohibitions 
will  come  into force: 
- Article  104,  which  prohibits public  authorities  from  having  access  to  credit 
with  national  central  banks  (monetary  financing); 
Article  104a(1),  which prohibits  public authorities  from  being  given  any  form 
of  privileged  access  to  financial  institutions; 
-Article  104b(1),  which  provides  that  neither  the  Community  nor other Member 
States  will  be  liable for  a  g1ven  Member  State's public  debt  (no-bail-out 
clause). 
Under Article  104a(2),  by  1  January  1994  the  Council  will  have  laid  down  more 
specific definitions  on  the prohibition barring public  authorities  and  bodies 
from  having privileged  access  to  financial  institutions.  At  the  same  time,  under 
Article  104b(2)  the  Council  may  specify definitions  relating  to  the  other  two 
prohibitions  in  the  period  between  the.Treaty's  entry  into  force  and  the 
beginning  of  the  second  stage.  However,  the  actual  prohibition  laid  down  1n  the 
Treaty  only  enters  into force  at  the  same  time  as  the  second  stage. 
Legislation  against  the  monetary  financing  of public authorities  and  the  ban  on 
pr1v1leged  access  to  financial  Institutions for  public  authorities  can 
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be  expected  to  boost  the  confidence  of  the  financial  markets  in  the  economic 
policy of  the  countries  taking  part  in  the  second  stage  and  in  the  financial 
systems. 
The  three  fundamental  prohibitions  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty  correspond  to  current 
practice  in  Denmark,  so  that  the basis  for  economic  policy will  not  change.  In 
Denmark  the  public deficit  has  not  been  financed  in  the  form  of  an  overdraft  with 
the  National  Bank  for  many  years,  as  there  has  been  an  understanding  between 
Government  and  the  National  Bank  that  State debt  should  be  covered  by  the  sale of 
Government  bonds.  Accordingly,  the  public authorities  do  not  have  any  form  of 
privileged  access  to  the  financial  institutions  in  Denmark. 
Ultimately,  the provision  that  neither the  Community  nor  other Member  States  are 
to  be  liable  for  the  deficit  of  a  given  Member  State  corresponds  to  the  situation 
today.  Denmark  naturally has  no  interest  in  taking  over  the  debt  obligations  of 
other Member  States. 
In  addition,  a  number  of  the  Treaty's  provisions  concerning excessive  government 
defic1ts  enter  Into  force  but  only with  regard  to  the  procedures.  The  actual 
prohibition of  excessive  government  deficits  and  possible  counter-measures  are 
contained  in  the  provisions  of  Article  104c(1),  (9)  and  (11),  which  enters  into 
force  only  in  the  third  stage. 
In  the  second  stage  Article  109e(4)  will  apply,  whereby  Member  States are  to 
endeavour  to  avoid  excessive  government  deficits.  There  is  thus  no  question  of  a 
legal  obligation  in  this  area  in  the  second  stage.  The  second  paragraph  means 
that  the  Commission  will  examine  the  development  of  the  budget  in the  individual 
Member  States with  a  view  in  particular to  assessing whether budgetary discipline 
is  being  maintained.  The  assessment  will  be  based  on  whether  the  ratio of  the 
actual  or planned  government  deficit  to  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  exceeds  a 
reference value  which  a  Protocol  to  the  Treaty  sets at  3%  of  GDP.  However,  it is 
not  only  the  absolute  level  of  the  government  deficit which  is decisive,  as  the 
Treaty  contains  two  qualifications:  Where  the  government  deficit  in percentage 
GDP  has  declined  substantially  and  continuously  and  reached  a  level  that  comes 
close  to  3%,  or,  alternatively,  the  excess  over  that  figure· is only  exceptional 
and  temporary  and  the  government  deficit  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  remains  close  to 
the  3%,  this  criterion may  be  regarded  as  having  been  met. 
In  addition,  the  percentage  of  GDP  acc~unted for  by  government  debt  will 
correspondingly  be  less  than  60%  of  GDP.  Here  again  a  qualification  is  inserted, 
as  the  criterion may  be  regarded  as  having been  met  where  the  percentage  of  debt 
is sufficiently diminlshing  and  approaching  60%  of  GDP  at  a  satisfactory pace. 
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Under  Article  104c(3)  in  the  first  instance it is  the  Commission  which  undertakes 
an  assessment  of  whether  the  criteria are  satisfied.  If  in  the  assessment  of  the 
Comm1ss1on  this  IS  not  the  case,  or if the  Coffi~:ssion  otherwise  considers  that 
there  1s  a  risk  of  an  excessive  deficit  in  a  Member  State,  it will  prepare  a 
report  on  the  s1tuation.  Together  with  the  Monetary  Committee,  the  Commission 
will  address  an  opinion  to  the  Council.  On  the  basis  of  the  two  opinions  the 
Council  will  then  take  over  the  examination  and  assessment  of  whether  there  is  a 
question  of  an  excessive  budget  deficit  in  a  given  Member  State.  In  the  context 
of  the  examination  by  the  Council,  the  Member  State whose  situation  is being 
discussed  will  have  the  opportunity  to  put  forward  any  observations  it may  wish 
to  make.  Only  after this  procedure  will  the  Council  assess  by  a  qualified 
maJority,  during  which  process  the  Member  State  in  question  will  also  have  a 
vote,  whether  there  can  be  said  to  be  an  excessive  budget  deficit.  Thus  the 
ultimate  assessment  of  whether  a  given  budget  deficit  IS  excessive  will  involve  a 
political  decision. 
If  the  Council  establishes  that  the  budget  defic1t  is  excessive,  it will  make  a 
recommendation  to  the  Member  State  concerned  with  a  view  to  bringing  that 
s1tuat1on  to  an  end  with1n  a  given  period.  This  recommendation  will  not  be  made 
public.  If  at  the  end  of  the  per1od  laid  down  the  Council  is able  to  establish 
that  there  has  been  no  effective  action  in  response  to  its  recommendat1on,  it may 
decide  to  make  its  recommendat1on  public.  This  decision  will  be  taken by  a 
qual1f1ed  major1ty,  and  the  Member  State  with  the  excess1ve  def1c1t  Wlll  not  take 
part  1n  the  vote. 
No  more  far-reachlng  sanctions  are  available  to  the  Council  in  this  phase. 
The  Council  will  formally  abrogate  the  decisions  taken with  regard  to  an 
excessive  budget  def1cit  to  the  extent  that  the  situation has  been  corrected.  If 
the  Counc1l  which  lnitiated the  procedure  to  counter  an  excessive  budget  deficit 
has  made  public  a  recommendation,  a  communication  will  accordingly  be  issued  that 
an  excess1ve  budget  deficit  in  the  Member  State  concerned  no  longer  exists. 
If  1t  had  been  in  force  the  principle  of  avoiding  an  excessive  budget  deficit 
would  not  have  created  problems  for  Denmark  over  a  period  of  many  years.  In 
add1t1on,  1t  must  be  emphasized  that  - as  has  been  stated  - in  the  second  phase 
the  Council  does  not  have  any  form  of  sanctions  at  its disposal  but  can  only  make 
recommendations.  The  Council  can  already  make  recommendations  to  Member  States 
under  ex1sting mult1lateral  supervis1on.  The  results  of  the multilateral 
supervlston  can  also  be  made  publ1c  by  a  spec1al  dec1sion. 
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5.5  INDEPENDENCE  FOR  THE  NATIONAL  CENTRAL  BANKS 
Under  Article  109e(5),  the  Member  States  are  to  ensure  the  independence  of  the 
national  central  banks  by  the  end  of  the  second  stage  at  the  latest.  Article  108 
states  that  that  independence  is  to  be  ensured  at  the  latest  at  the  date  of  the 
estabishment  of  the  ESCB.  Independence  means  in particular  (see  inter alia 
Artlcle  107)  that  the  governors  of  the national  central  banks  may  not  receive 
1nstructions  from  the national  authorities.  The  Protocol  on  the  ESCB  furthermore 
contains  a  number  of  more  technical  provisions  and  more  detailed provisions  which 
stipulate  inter alia that  the  governors  of  the  national  central  banks  must  be 
appointed  for  a  period of  at  least  5  years.  The  date  by  which  these  obligations 
must  be  fulfilled  cannot  be  decided  definitively since  no  final  date  has  been  set 
for  the  establishment  of  the  European  System of Central  Banks.  Under 
Article  1091(1),  the  System  of Central  Banks  will  be  deemed  to  have  been 
estubllshed as  soon  as  the  Executive  Board  has  been  appointed.  Under  the  same 
provis1on,  this will  occur  immediately after the  decision  has  been  taken  to  move 
on  to  the  third stage  or  by  1  July  1998  at  the  latest.  The  obligation to  comply 
with  Article  108  will  therefore  become  effective  late  in the ·second  stage. 
As  a  result  the  law  on  Denmark's  National  Bank  can  be  expected  to  require 
amendment.  The  obligation  does  not  have  any  significance  in  practice  since  the 
Foketing  and  the  Government  do  not  give  the  National  Bank  political directives. 
5.6.  THE  EUROPEAN  MONETARY  INSTITUTE 
In  the  second  stage  monetary  policy  continues  to  fall  within national  competence. 
On  the  institutional  level,  the  European  Monetary  Institute  (EMI)  will  be 
established  (see  Article  109f(1}  and  the  Protocol  on  the  statute of  the  EMI).  In 
practice  the  EMI  will  be  a  continuation of  the  present  Committee  of  Governors  of 
Central  Banks. 
The  seat  of  the  EMI  has  not  been  fixed  but  will  be  decided  on  by  the  end  of  1992. 
The  Institute will  be  directed  by  a  Council  consisting of  a  President  and  the 
Governors  of  the  national  central  banks.  The  President  will  be  appo1nted 
following  mutual  agreement  of  the  governments  of  the  Member'  States  on  a 
recommendat1on  from  the  Committee  of  Governors.  The  vice-President  will  be 
elected  amongst  the  Governors  of  the  central  banks.  Most  of  the  decisions  in  the 
Counc1l  of  the  EMI  will  be  taken with  a  simple  majority,  with  each  member  having 
one  vote.  The  President  of  the  Counci~ and  a  member  of  the  Commission  have  the 
r1ght  to  take  part  in meetings  of  the  Council  of  the  EMI  without  having  any 
vot1ng  r1ghts.  In  relation to  their roles  at  the  EMI  the  members  of  the  Counc1l 
of  the  EMI  will  be  independent  and  in this  context  may  neither seek nor  take 
instructions  from  their governments. 
The  EMI  will  become  the  monetary  co-operation organization of  the  second  stage. 
With  the  advent  of  the  second  stage,  the  present  Committee  of  Governors  will  be 
dissolved,  as  will  the  European  Monetary  Co-operation  Fund  (EMCF).  The  Committee 
of  Governors  was  originally established  in  1964,  but  its legal  basis  was  revised 
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In  March  1990  by  a  Council  Decision  (90/142/EEC).  The  Committee  decides  on  the 
framework  for  co-operation  between  the  central  banks  of  the  EC  countries, 
including  primarily  :he  supervision  and  control  of  European  Monetary  Co-operation 
(EMC)  (see  historical  Introduction).  Today,  the  EMCF  mainly  has  a  bookkeeping 
function  for  transactions  connected  with  co-operation within  EMC. 
The  EMI  will  take  over  the  tasks  of  the  Committee  of  Governors  and  at  the  same 
time  will  acquire  some  new  ones  in  relation  to  the  preparation of  the  third 
stage.  Under Article  109f(2)  and  the Statute,  the  EMI's  tasks  are  to: 
- strengthen  co-operation  between  the  national  central  banks; 
- strengthen  the  co-ordination  of  the  monetary  policies of  the  Member  States, 
with  the  aim  of  ensuring price stability; 
- monitor  the  functioning  of  the  European  Monetary  System; 
-hold consultations  concerning  issues  falling Within  the  competence  of  the 
national  central  banks  and  affecting  the  stability of  financial  institutions 
and  markets; 
take  over  the  tasks  of  the  European  Monetary  Co-operation  Fund,  which  is  to  be 
dissolved; 
- facilitate  the  use  of  the  ecu  and  oversee  its development,  including the  smooth 
functioning  of  the  ecu  clearing system; 
- hold  regular consultations  concerning  the  course  of  monetary  policies  and  the 
use  of  monetary  policy  instruments; 
- normally  be  consulted  by  the  national  monetary  authorities  before  they  take 
decisions  on  the  course  of  monetary  policy  in  the  context  of  the  common 
framework  for  ex  ante  co-ordination. 
Today,  these  tasks  of  co-operation  on  monetary  and  exchange~rate policy  already 
fall  to  the  Committee  of  Governors. 
In  preparation for  the  third  stage  the  EMI  will  furthermore: 
- prepare  the  instruments  and  the  procedures  necessary  for  carrying  out  a  single 
monetary  policy  1n  the  third  stage; 
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- promote  the  harmonization,  where  necessary,  of  the  rules  and  practices 
governing  the  collection,  compilation  and  distribution of statistics in  the 
areas  within its field of  competence: 
- prepare  the  rules  for  operations  to  be  undertaken by  the national  central  banks 
in  the  framework  of  the  European  system of  Central  Banks  (ESCB); 
- promote  the  efficiency of cross-border payments; 
- supervise  the  technical preparation of  ecu  banknotes; 
- specify the  framework  for  the  activity of  the  ESCB.  However,  this  work,  to  be 
carried out  by  the  EM!,  is merely preparatory in that  the  framework  will  be 
adopted  only  once  the  ECB  has  been established. 
As  something  new  in relation to  existing co-operation between  central  banks,  the 
EMI  will  have  the  possibilty of managing  foreign-exchange  reserves.  However,  it 
will  only  be  able  to  do  so  on  behalf of  the  central  banks,  which  must  request 
such  action and  profits  and  losses  from  management  will  be  for  the  account  of  the 
central  bank  concerned. 
Furthermore,  in  the  same  way  as  the  Commission  the  EM!  will  once  a  year draft  a 
report  on  the  state of preparations  for  the  third stage of  Economic  and  Monetary 
Union.  In  particular,  the  reports will  examine  whether  Member  States' 
legislation on  the national central banks  is  in accordance  with  the Treaty,  which 
primarily means  that  their independence  is assured.  The  degree  of  economic 
convergence  will  also  be  assessed  (see Treaty,  Article  109j(1)}. 
In  order to  carry out  its tasks  the  EM!  will  be  endowed  with  a  number  of  powers, 
which will  mean  that it can: 
- formulate  opinions  or  recommendations  on  the  overall  orientation of monetary 
policy  and  exchange-rate  policy  as  well  as  on  related measures  introduced  in 
each  Member  State; 
- submit  opinions  or recommendations  to  governments  and  to  the Council  on 
policies  which  might  affect  the  internal  or external  monetary  situation in the 
Community  and,  in particular,  the  functioning  of  the  European  Monetary  System; 
- make  recommendations  to  the  monetary  authorities  of the  Member  States 
concerning  the  conduct  of their monetary policy; 
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- decide  to publish its opinions,  subject  to  unanimous  agreement  in  the  Council. 
In  addition,  the  Council  will  consult  the  EMI  on  any  Community  legal  acts  within 
its field  of  competence,  just as  the Council  can  decide  unanimously  to  transfer 
to  the  EMI  other  tasks  relating  to  the preparation of  the  third  stage. 
The  EMI  will  be  the  forerunner  of  the  ECB  and  will  dissolve  itself as  soon  as 
the  ECB  1s  established  at  the  time  of  transition to  the  third  stage.  The  EMI  -
in  common  with  the  Committee  of  Governors  today  - has  no  decisive  influence  over 
Member  States'  monetary  policy,  which  will  remain  within their national 
competence  during  the  second  stage.  By  building up  an  institution and  a  team  of 
staff,  the  EMI  will  contribute  towards  a  smooth  transition to  the  third stage  in 
which  monetary  and  exchange-rate  policy will  be  transferred  to  Community  level 
for  those  countries  which  enter  the  third  stage.  This  means  that  the  third  stage 
must  be  prepared  at  technical  level.  Part1cipation in  the  third stage will, 
however,  be  determined  only  by  the  provisions  of  the Treaty,  including  the  two 
special  Protocols  on  the  subject  for  Denmark  and  the United  Kingdom. 
5.7.  THE  EFFECTS  OF  DENMARK  STANDING  OUTSIDE  THE  PROVISIONS  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT 
TREATY  ON  THE  SECOND  STAGE  OF  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION 
If  Denmark  does  not  take part  in  the  second  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union, 
from  the  beginning of  the  second  stage  Denmark  will  be  outside  the  EMI  and 
therefore  in  practice  outside  co-operation  on  monetary  and  exchange-rate policy. 
This  is  because  all practical functions  relating to  the  EMS  will  be  taken  over by 
the  EMI.  It  should  be  noted  that,  regardless  of  the fact  that  the  formal  basis 
for  monetary  co-operation  is  the  Basle  Agreement  which  was  entered  into by  the 
central  banks  in  the  Community,  this will  be  reassessed  before  the  second  stage, 
1nter alia because  institutionally it is  based  on  the  Committee  of  Governors  of 
the  Central  Banks,  which,  as  mentioned,  will  be  dissolved. 
At  the  same  time  Denmark  will  be  outside  the  formal  framework  for  co-ordination 
of  general  economic  policy which  is  accorded  increasing  importance  for  the 
funct1on1ng  of  the  EMS.  One  view  is that  a  country  cannot  be  accorded  the  right 
of  exchange-rate  adJUStment  initiatives  1f it is not  fully  included  in  the 
co-ord1nat1on  of  economic  policy.  At  the  same  time,  Denmark  will  ipso  facto  be 
deprived  of  an  opportunity  to  put  its view  to  the  other  EC  countries. 
The  problem  with  a  country  not  being  included  in  the Treaty  is  that  the  Treaty 
and  the  Statutes  concerning  the  EMI  do  not  take  account  of  the  situation in  which 
a  Member  State  does  not  participate  in  the  second  stage  of  economic  and  monetary 
union.  This  is  taken  into  account  as  far  as  the  European  Central  Bank  is 
concerned  (see  below).  The  second  stage will  involve  only  a  very  small  number  of 
changes  in  co-operation  and  these will  be  institutional  in nature.  The  Treaty 
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and  the  Statutes  do  not  therefore  allow for  the  possibility that  a  Member  State 
might  not  participate  in the  second  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union. 
Even  if the  EMI  prepares  the  third  stage  the  Member  States  not  involved  in  the 
second  stage  will  be  obliged to  take  part  in  the  third stage  and  at  the  same  time 
it is  a  tradition in monetary  co-operation  that  all countries  are  involved  in the 
preparatory work.  Thus,  the  United  Kingdom  was  involved  in much  of  EMS 
co-operation  throughout  a  period of  eleven years  without  taking part  in  the 
exchange  rate  mechanism. 
The  third countries  which  have  sought  to  achieve  closer association with  the  EMS 
have  achieved  very  little.  Thus,  a  few  years  ago  Norway  sought  to  be  admitted  to 
currency  co-operation but  met  with  a  real  refusal.  Thus,  Norway  - and  Finland  -
only  secured  a  number  of agreements  with  the  central  banks  of  the  Community  on 
mutual  credit facilities  in  the  event  of  a  currency  crisis.  Sweden  recently  made 
exploratory enquiries  regarding  association with  the  EMS  but  the  discussions  have 
not  been  concluded.  Notwithstanding  that  the  EMS  agreements  provide  an 
opportunity for  association of  European  countries  with  close  links,  the  attitude 
in  a  number  of  Member  States  is  that  the  economic  co-ordination necessary for 
full  participation  in  EMS  co-operation is  only possible  through  full 
participation in  the  Community's  economic  and  political co-operation. 
Against  this  background  a  country  can  hardly  be  expected  to have  the  opportunity 
to participate fully  in exchange-rate  co-operation if that  country  does  not 
participate  in  the  second  stage  and  therefore  in that  part  of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty. 
To  what  extent  leaving full  EMS  co-operation will  entail major  economic 
repercussions will  depend  on  whether  the  financial  markets  view  the  alternative 
association which  the  country  concerned  is  able  to  achieve  in  the  field  of 
currency  co-operation  as  being sufficient  to  lend  credibility to its fixed  rate 
policy. 
In  such  a  situation the  security of  Danish  fixed  rate policy will  therefore  be 
clearly  reduced  in  comparison  with  the  situation in which  there  is full  Danish 
participation in  currency  co-operation. 
5.8.  PROTOCOLS  FOR  DENMARK  AND  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM  CONCERNING  POSSIBLE 
NON-PARTICIPATION  IN  THE  THIRD  STAGE  OF  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION 
In  two  different  Protocols  to  this Treaty,  Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom 
reserved  the  right not  to participate  in  the  third stage of  economic  and 
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monetary  union.  In  short,  as  will  be  seen  below,  the  Protocols  imply  that 
Denmark  and/or the  United  Kingdom,  given  a  particular  set  of circumstances,  have 
no  rights  or  obl1gations  in respect  of  the  common  monetary  po1i~y. 
The  establishment  of  the  ESCB  and  ECB  will  mean  closing  down  the  EMI.  However, 
this  does  not  mean  that  Denmark  and/or  the  United  Kingdom  will  remain  completely 
excluded  from  monetary  co-operation if Denmark  does  not  participate  in the  third 
stage.  Hence  a  General  Council  will  be  set  up,  within the  framework  of  the  ECB 
and  this  will  comprise  Member  States  with  a  derogation possibly  including  Denmark 
and  the  United  Kingdom.  The  General  Council  will  be  responsible  for  the 
furtherance  of monetary  co-operation  among  all  the  Member  States.  Thus  a  way  has 
been  created  within  the  framework  of  the  ECB  of  involving  in monetary 
co-operation  those  Member  States unwilling or unable  to participate in the  third 
stage. 
The  Dan1sh  Protocol  means  that  Denmark  - should it not  participate in  the  third 
stage  - will  receive  treatment  in accordance  with  this Treaty on  a  par with 
Member  States  which  require  a  derogation  on  the  grounds  of their economic 
situation.  States  with derogation  status  include  those  which  may  not  be  in  a 
position  to  move  to  the  third  stage  because  they  do  not  fulfil  the  convergence 
conditions  (see  Article  109k(1)  of  the Treaty).  The  provisions  concerning  the 
Articles  from  which  such  States  are  excluded  appear in the Treaty's  general 
provision.  In  contrast,  the  United  Kingdom  Protocol  is very  long  and  makes 
direct  reference  to  the  provisions  from  which  the  United  Kingdom  would  be  exempt, 
should it not  wish  to participate in  the  third  stage. 
Both  protocols stipulate  that  the governments  of  the  countries  concerned  shall 
notify  the  Council  of  their position  concerning participation in  the  third  stage 
before  the  Council  makes  its  assessment  under Article  109j(2)  of  the  Treaty  (see 
paragraph  1  in both protocols).  That  assessment  will  on  the  one  hand  identify 
the  Member  States  which  fulfil  the  conditions  for  moving  to  the  third  stage,  and 
on  the  other  hand  decide  in  1996  whether it is  appropriate  for  the  Community  to 
enter the  third  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union.  Should  Denmark  or  the 
United  Kingdom  not  wish  to  move  to  the  third  stage,  they  will  not  be  taken  into 
account  in  1996  when  it comes  to  deciding  whether  there  is  a  majority  of  Member 
States  able  to  move  to  the  third  stage  before  it  can  begin.  Thus  both countries 
will  be  able  to  decide  for  themselves  whether  they  wish  to  enter the  third  stage, 
and  if so  when.  A desire  to  enter  the  third  stage  at  a  later date  triggers  off  a 
procedure  whereby  the  Commission  and  the  ECB  submlt  a  report  on  how  far  the 
convergence  conditions  have  been  fulfilled  (see  paragraph  4  in  the  Danish 
Protocol  and  paragraph  10  of  the  United  Kingdom  Protocol). 
The  provisions  on  which  Articles  are  not  applicable to Member  States  with  a 
derogation  are  laid  down  in Article  109k{3)  to  (6): 
Article  104c{9)  and  (11):  paragraph  9  is the  provision  in the  procedure 
regarding  excessive  deficits,  which  states  that  the  Council  may  give 
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notice  to  a  Member  State  to  take  measures  to  reduce  its deficit within  a 
specified  time-limit.  Paragraph  11  contains  the  counter-measures  which  the 
Council  can  apply  as  a  last  resort.  Such  measures  include  requiring a  Member 
State  to  publish  additional  information before  issuing securities,  inviting the 
European  Investment  Bank  to  reconsider its  lending policy  towards  the  Member 
State  concerned,  requiring  payment  of  a  non-interest-bearing deposit  to  the 
Community  and  imposing fines  of  an  appropriate  size; 
Article  105(1),  (2),  (3)  and  (5):  the  provisions  defining the  primary  objective 
and  basic  tasks  of  the  ESCB; 
Article  105a:  this  authorizes  the  ECB  to  issue  banknotes  and  to  determine  the 
size  of  the  issue; 
- Article  108a:  this  defines  the  legal  powers  conferred  on  the  ESCB  and  ECB  to 
carry  out  their tasks,  and  includes  a  definition of  the  legal  effect  each  of 
those  powers  involves; 
- Article  109:  this  provision  covers  the  single  monetary  policy  and  exchange-rate 
policy  and  the  allocation of  powers  between  the  Council  and  the  ECB  in  this 
field; 
Article  109a(2)(b):  this  provision sets  out  the  institutional  framework  for  the 
ECB's  Executive  Board,  including  a  description of who  can  be  appointed  to  the 
Board. 
As  further evidence  that  Member  States  with  a  derogation  have  no  rights or 
obligations  in  respect  of  monetary  policy,  it is specified  in Article  109k(4} 
that  "Member  States"  in Articles  105( 1).  (2)  and  (3).  105a,  108a,  109  and 
109a(2)(b)  shall  be  read as  "Member  States without  a  derogation".  In  addition 
Article  109k(5)  stipulates  that  the  voting rights  of  a  Member  State  with  a 
derogation  shall  be  suspended  for  the  purposes  of  the  aforementioned  Articles  of 
the  Treaty. 
Apart  from  the  Articles  referred  to  in Article  109k,  a  number  of Articles  state 
directly  that  they  cover only  Member  States without  a  derogation.  This  is  the 
case  with  the  following  Articles: 
-Article  1091(1),  second  indent,  which  covers  the  appointment  of  the  ECB's 
Executive  Board  after the  third stage has  commenced; 
Article  1091(4),  which  concerns  the  establishment of  the  conversion rates 
between  national  currencies  and  the  ECU  and  the  rates at  which  those  currencies 
shall  be  irrevocably  fixed; 
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Article  1091(5},  which  covers  the  adoption  of  the  conversion  rate  for  a 
currency  in  a  Member  State  whose  derogation  has  been  abrogated. 
In  the  same  way  as  1n  the  Treaty  itself,  the  Protocol  on  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB 
and  of  the  ECB  specifies  the  provisions  from  which  a  Member  State with  a 
derogation  shall  be  exempt.  The  exemptions  in  the  Protocol  both  echo  those  in 
the  Treaty  and  1ntroduce  a  number  of  exemptions  of  a  more  technical  nature.  See 
Annex  10  for  a  survey  of  the  Articles  concerned.  However,  it should be  noted 
here  that  Art1cle  48  of  the  Statute stipulates  that  central  banks  of  Member 
States  w1th  a  derogation  shall  not  pay  up  their subscribed  capital  to  the  ECB.  A 
decis1on  may  therefore  be  taken  to  pay  in  a  minimal  percentage  as  a  contribution 
to  the  operational  costs  of  the  ECB. 
Just  as  a  Member  State with  a  derogation  is  exempt  from  a  number  of  provisions  in 
the  Treaty,  there  are  a  number  of  provisions  which  no  longer  apply  to  Member 
States  moving  to  the  third  stage  but  which  continue  to  be  applicable  to  a 
Member  State  with  a  derogation.  Such  is  the  case  with Articles  109h  and  109i 
and  also  109m  (see  the  section  on  the  provisions  which  enter  into  force  at  the 
same  time  as  the  Treaty}. 
At  the  same  t1me  Article  43(2)  of  the  Statute specifies  that  the  central  banks  of 
Member  States with  a  derogation  shall  retain their powers  in  the  field  of 
monetary  pol1cy. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  Danish  Protocol  differs  in  a  number  of  respects  from 
the  United  Kingdom  one.  Paragraph  5  of  the  latter Protocol  specifies  a  number  of 
Articles  from  which  the  United  Kingdom  will  be  exempt.  The  United  Kingdom  will 
be  excluded  from  the  rights  or obligations  laid  down  in certain Articles  which 
will  apply  to  Denmark.  These  include: 
Article  3a(2),  which  sets  out  the  objective.  Exemption  from  this  provision 
gives  complete  freedom  with  regard  to  the  aims  of  irrevocable  fixing  of 
exchange  rates,  introduction  of  the  single  currency  and  conduct  of  a  single 
monetary  policy  and  exchange-rate  policy; 
Article  104c(1),  which  states  that  Member  States shall  avoid  excessive 
def1c1ts.  The  United  K1ngdom  will  however  continue  to  be  covered  by 
Art1cle  109e(4)  which  stipulates  that  Member  States  shall  endeavour  to  avoid 
excessive  budget  deficits  (see  paragraph  6  of  the  Protocol); 
- Article  105(4)  which  sets  out  an  obligation to  consult  the  ECB  regarding  the 
1ntroduction of  national  laws  within its f1eld  of  competence; 
- Article  107  which  provides  that  neither the  ECB  nor  a  national  central  bank 
shall  seek  or  take  instructions  from  national  author1ties; 
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- Article  108,  which  obliges  Member  States  to  ensure  that  their national 
central  banks  gain their independence  no  later than  the  date  of  establishment 
of  the  ESCB  (see  above). 
In  the  same  way  as  for  Denmark,  the  United  Kingdom's  voting  rights  are  likewise 
suspended  in  the  circumstances  described  in  these  Articles  (see paragraph  7  of 
the  Protocol).  It  is  also  stipulated  in  that  paragraph  that  the  United  Kingdom 
shall  not  participate  in  the  appointment  of  the  ECB's  Executive  Board  under 
Articles  109a(2}(b)  and  1091(1)  of  the Treaty,  a  stipulation echoed  in  the 
provisions  concerning  Denmark.  Paragraph  6  of the  Protocol  lists the  Articles 
which  continue  to  apply  to  the  United  Kingdom.  This  is  the  same  provision  as  in 
the  Danish  Protocol  (see  above). 
Paragraph  8  lists all  the  Articles  in  the  Statute  which,  where  appropriate,  do 
not  apply  to  the  United  Kingdom.  Paragraph  10  compares  a  number  of  Articles with 
those  from  which  Denmark  would  be  excluded  should  it not  wish  to participate in 
the  third  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union.  The  Treaty  provisions  concerning 
the  ESCB  and  the  ECB  are  repeated  in  the  statute establishing  those  institutions. 
In  order  to  ensure  that  the  United  Kingdom's  derogations  from  the Treaty  and  from 
the  Protocol  on  the  Statute of  the  ESCB  and  the  ECB  correspond  with  each other, 
it  has  however  also  been  necessary  in  certain cases  to  exempt  the  United  Kingdom 
from  a  number  of  Articles  in  the  Statute  from  which  Denmark  is not  exempt. 
Paragraph  9  of  the  Protocol  lays  down  that  the  transitional  provisions  in  the 
Protocol  on  the  Statute of  the  ESCB  concerning  the  General  Council  in 
Articles  44  to  48  shall  continue  to  apply if the  United  Kingdom  does  not  move  to 
the  third  stage,  whether  or not  there  is any  Member  State with  a  derogation.  The 
purpose  of  this  provision  iS  of  course  to  secure  the  United  Kingdom's 
participation in monetary  co-operation within  the  Community.  The  provisions  of 
paragraph  9  are  necessary  adjustments  because  the  United  Kingdom  will  not 
officially be  treated  as  a  Member  State with  derogation  status.  The  same  applies 
1n  the  case  of  paragraph  10  of  the  Protocol,  which  concerns  the  cancellation of 
the  special  arrangements  for  the  United  Kingdom. 
Finally,  paragraph  11  stipulates  that  the  United  Kingdom  Government  may  maintain 
its  "ways  and  means"  facility with  the  Bank  of  England  notwithstanding 
Articles  104  and  109e(3)  of  the Treaty until  it decides  to  move  to  the  third 
stage.  This  facility  means  that  the  United  Kingdom  Government  has  the  right  to 
draw  on  a  Bank  of  England  account  and  thus  amounts  to  a  form  of  monetary 
financing. 
5.9.  PROVISIONS  AND  PROTOCOL  ON  THE  TRANSITION  TO  THE  THIRD  STAGE  OF  ECONOMIC  AND 
MONETARY  UNION 
Articles  109j,  k  and  1  lay  down  the  general  provisions  on  transition to  the  third 
stage. 
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During  the  second  stage,  the  Commission  and  the  European  Monetary  Institute will 
submit  reports  on  the  progress  made  1n  achieving  the  conditions  for  mov1ng  to  the 
th1rd  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union.  The  reports  will,  in particular, 
assess  how  far  Member  States  have  promulgated  the  necessary  legislation  to  ensure 
the  1ndependence  of  the  nat1onal  central  bank  and  how  far  a  high  degree  of 
sustainable  econom1c  convergence  has  been  achieved  as  a  precondit1on  for  taking 
part  in  the  third  stage. 
The  requirements  for  economic  convergence  are  specified  in more  detail  in  a 
Protocol  to  the  Treaty. 
Whether  a  Member  State fulfils  the  requirements  for  economic  convergence  will  be 
assessed  mainly  on  the  basis  of  the  following  criteria: 
- adequate  price  stab1l1ty; 
- whether  the  Member  State  has  an  excessive  budget  deficit; 
- whether  the  country  has  participated  in  the  narrow  band  of  the  exchange  rate 
mechan1sm  for  at  least  two  years  without  severe  tensions  and  without  on  its  own 
1nit1at1ve  having  devalued  its  currency  against  any  other  Member  States 
currency; 
- whether  the  interest  on  long-term  bonds  does  not  differ unduly  from  that  of 
countries  w1th  the  lowest  1nflation rate. 
The  following  figures  for  fulfilment  of  the  first  and  last  requirement  are  given 
as  a  gu1deline: 
prices  must  have  risen no  more  than  1  1/2  percentage  points  over  the  average 
rate  of  pr1ce  rises  in  the  best  three  countries  with  the  lowest  price 
inflat1on  and 
- the  long-term  1nterest  on  bonds  may  not  exceed  by  more  than  2  percentage  po1nts 
the  average  of  the  best  three  countries  w1th  the  lowest  rate  of  pr1ce 
1nflation. 
Both  these  guidel1ne  rates  are  to  be  measured  for  a  period of  one  year  before  the 
Sltuation  1s  rev1ewed. 
Apart  from  the  convergence  situat1on,  the  reports  will  also  deal  with  the 
development  of  the  ecu,  the  results  of  the  1ntegration of  markets,  the  situation 
and  development  of  the  balances  of  payments  on  current  account  and  the 
development  of  unit  labour  costs  and  other price  indices. 
On  the  basis  of  these  reports,  the  Council  will  assess  whether  each  Member  State 
fulf1ls  the  requirements  for  moving  to  the  third  stage  and  hence  for  adopting  a 
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single  currency.  The  Council  will  in addition assess  how  far  a  majority  of 
Member  States  fulfil  this  requirement. 
The  Council  will  subsequently  recommend  its findings  to  the  European  Council  of 
Heads  of State or Government,  which  will  decide  no  later  than  31  December  1996 
whether  a  majority  of  Member  States fulfil  the  requirements  for  entry  into  the 
third  stage  and  hence  for  the  adoption  of  a  single  currency.  The  Heads  of State 
and  Government  will  also  decide  whether it is appropriate  for  the  Community  to 
enter  the  third stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  and  if so  set  the  date  for 
the  beginning of  the  third stage. 
The  decision  on  whether  to  proceed  to  the  third stage  at  the  end  of  1996  does  not 
therefore  follow  automatically  as  a  result  of  the  economic  situation in  the 
Member  States. 
Should  the  date  for  transition to  the  third stage  not  be  set  by  the  end  of  1997, 
that  transition will  automatically  take  place  on  1  January  1999.  In  that  case 
the  Heads  of  State  and  Government  will  before  1  July  1998  decide  which  Member 
States  fulfil  the  convergence  conditions  for  transition  to  the  third stage  and 
hence  can  adopt  the  single  currency.  This  will  constitute  the  beginning of  the 
third  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union.  Thus  at  this  juncture  there will  be 
no  requirement  for  a  major1ty of  Member  States  to  be  in  a  position  to  enter  the 
third  stage. 
In  decisions  on  the  transition  to  the  third stage,  the  Council  - including  the 
European  Council  of  Heads  of State or Government  - shall  act  by  a  qualified 
majority. 
The  EC's  decision-making procedure  for  the  transition  to  the  third stage is 
summarized  in  the  flowchart. 
In  a  Protocol  to  the  Treaty,  entitled "Protocol  on  the  Transition  to  the  Third 
Stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union",  all  the  Member  States,  including  the 
United  Kingdom,  declare  that  movement  to  the  third stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary 
Union  is  irreversible.  They  go  on  to  declare  that  they  wili  respect  the will  for 
the  Community  to  enter swiftly  into  the  third stage  and  that  no  Member  State 
shall  prevent  the  entering  into  the  third stage.  Finally,  the  Protocol 
stipulates  that  if by  the  end  of  1997  the  date  for  the  beginning of  the  third 
stage  has  not  been  set,  the  Member  States  concerned,  the  Community  institutions 
and  other  bodies  involved  shall  expedite  all preparatory  work  during  1998  in 
order  to  enable  the  Community  to  enter  the  third  stage  irrevocably  on 
1  January  1999. 
The  Protocol  serves  as  an  illustration of  the  political will  to  complete  the 
establishment  of  economic  and  monetary  union. 
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Member  States  which  do  not  fulfil  the  conditions  for transition  to  the  third 
stage  w1ll  receive  a  derogation  (temporary  exempt1onl.  In  such  cases,  the 
Council  will  at  least  once  every  two  years  review  the  s1tuation  to  see  whetheL 
the  countr1es  concerned  fulfil  the  conditions  for  participation  1n  the  third 
stage.  Furthermore,  the  countries  concerned  will  themselves  be  entitled  to  ask 
the  Council  to  re-assess  their situation. 
Member  States  not  taking part  in  the  third  stage  will  not  participate  1n 
dec1sions  concerning  the  single monetary  policy  and  exchange-rate  pol1cy;  nor 
will  the  Governors  of  their central  banks  be  members  of  the  Governing  Council  of 
the  European  Central  Bank. 
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Flowchart  showing  the  Community's  decision-making  procedure  for  transition to  the 
third  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union. 
109j(1) 
Reports  from  the  European  Monetary  Institute 
and  the  Commission 
109j(2) 
The  Council  assesses whether: 
- each  individual  Member  State fulfils  the 
conditions 
- a  majority fulfil  the  conditions 
I 
I  Sends  recommendation 
109j(3} 
Before  31  December  1996  the  European  Council 
must  decide  whether: 
- a  major1ty  fulfil  the  conditions 
- it is  appropriate  to  move  to  the  third stage 
I  I 
I 
109j(3} 
Yes 
I 
I  third  indent 
No  I 
I 
I 
109j(4} 
The  European Council  sets 
the  date  for transition to 
the  third stage 
If  no  date  has  been  set  by  the  end  of  1997, 
the  Council  must  assess  whether  each 
lndividual  Member  State fulfils  the  conditions 
I 
I  Sends  recommendation 
109j(4} 
Before  1  July  1998,  the  European  Council  must 
conf1rm  which  Member  States 'fulfil  the 
necessary  conditions 
109j(4) 
Third  stage starts on  1  January  1999 
Note:  When  the  European  Council  has  to  take  formal  decisions  in  connection with 
transition  to  the  third  stage,  it will  constitute itself as  a  formal  Council  with 
legal  competence  to  take  such  decisions.  Hence  the  reference  in the Treaty  to 
"the Council,  meeting  in  the  composition of  Heads  of State or Government".  All 
decisions  will  be  taken  by  qualified majority. 
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So  a  General  Council  will  be  set  up,  consisting  of  the  Governors  of  the  central 
banks  of  all  the  Member  States  and  the  President  and  Vice-President  of  the 
Executive  Board.  The  General  Council  will  In  particular be  responsible  for  the 
furtherance  of  monetary  policy co-operation  between  all  the  Member  States,  and 
Will  continue  in  existence  for  as  long  as  there  are  Member  States  not 
participating in  the  third  stage. 
The  obligation  to  endeavour  to  avoid  excessive  budget  deficits also  applies  to 
those  Member  States  with  a  derogation,  but  the  Council  will  be  unable  to  take 
action  against  such  States. 
6.  THIRD  STAGE  OF  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION 
This  section  reviews  the  provisions  in  the Treaty  which  enter  Into  force  in  the 
participating States  at  the  beginning  of  the  third stage.  Member  States  not 
partiCipating  from  the  beginning of  the  third  stage will  therefore  not  be  covered 
until  they  enter  the  third  stage.  The  provislons  are  as  follows: 
- Article  103a(2)  on  the  financial  assistance  arrangements; 
-Article  104c(1),  (9)  and  (11)  on  the  obligation  to  avoid  excessive deficits  and 
the  measures  the  Council  can  take  In  specific  circumstances; 
- Article  105  on  the  pr1mary  obJeCtlve  and  basic  tasks  of  the  System of 
Central  Banks; 
- Art1cle  105a  on  the  issue of  banknotes; 
- Article  107  on  the  independence  of  the  central  banks; 
Art1cle  109  on  the  common  exchange-rate policy  and  participation  in 
international  monetary  co-operation  and  Articles  109a  and  b  on  Institutional 
questions  concerning  the  European  Central  Bank; 
-Article  109c(2),  second,  third  and  fourth  indents  on  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Comm1ttee; 
- Art1cle  109g  on  the  fiXIng  of  the  value  of  the  ecu. 
For  all  pract1cal  purposes,  these  are  provisions  needed  for  the  fixing  of 
exchange  rates,  the  subsequent  adoption  of  the  ecu  as  a  single  currency  and  the 
establ1shment  of  a  common  monetary  policy. 
In  the  th1rd  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  union.  responsibility  for  monetary 
and  exchange  rate  policy will  pass  to  the  Community.  The  European  System of 
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Central  Banks,  compr~s1ng the national  central  banks  together with  the  European 
Central  Bank,  will  take  over  responsibility for  monetary  policy. 
The  task of  the  System  of  Central  Banks  is  to  formulate  and  take  charge  of  the 
Community's  common  monetary  policy.  It  has  the  task  of  conducting  intervention 
on  the  exchange  rate  market  and  as  part  of  that  to  manage  Member  States'  exchange 
reserves,  but  not  to  take  over  ownership  of  those  reserves.  In  addit1on,  the 
System  of  Central  Banks  must  ensure  that  the  payments  system  functions. 
The  System  of  Central  Banks  will  take  sole  responsibility for authorizing the 
issue  of  banknotes  in  the  Community.  Banknotes  may  be  issued  both  by  the 
national  central  banks  and  by  the  European Central  Bank.  Coins  will  continue  to 
be  issued  in  the  Member  States,  although  the  European  Central  Bank  will  approve 
the  size of  the  issue.  At  the  same  time  the  Council  will  be  able  to  lay  down 
common  prov~s~ons on  specific technical  aspects  so  as  to  ensure  that  coins  are 
able  to  circulate  throughout  the  Community  without  difficulty. 
The  Central  Bank  itself will  be  run  by  a  Governing  Council  and  an  Executive 
Board.  The  Governing  Council  will  comprise  the  members  of  the  Executive  Board 
and  the  Governors  of  the national  central  banks.  The  members  of  the  Executive 
Board  are  appointed  for eight  years  and  their term  of  office is  not  renewable. 
Both  the  national  central  banks  and  the  European  Central  Bank  must  be  independent 
of  government.  On  trans1tion  to  the  third stage,  the  legislation governing  the 
national  central  banks  must  be  changed  to  fulfil  this  requirement.  The 
United  Kingdom  will  therefore  by  virtue  of its special  Protocol  be  exempt  from 
this  requirement,  insofar  as  it does  not  wish  to  participate  in  the  third stage. 
Governments  and  Community  institutions may  not  seek  to  influence decisions  by  the 
national  central  banks  and  the  European  Central  Bank.  Identical  provisions 
concerning  the  Commission  are  already  in existence. 
The  Council  may  unanimously  and  with  the  assent  of  the  European  Parliament  vote 
to  transfer certain supervisory  functions  with  regard  to  credit  institutions  to 
the  European  Central  Bank. 
In  most  EC  Member  States it is  the  central  bank  which  supervises  financial 
1nstitutions etc. 
To  increase  publ~c awareness,  the  ECB  will  address  an  annual  report  to  the 
Counc1l,  the  European  Parliament  and  th'e  Commission.  In  addition,  the  members  of 
the  Executive  Board  will  go  before  the  relevant  committees  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  explain  the  Bank's  policy if asked  to  do  so.  It will  also  publish 
quarterly  reports.  The  President  of  the  Council  and  members  of  the  Commission 
have  the  right  to participate in Governing Council  meetings  but  will  have  PO 
vote.  The  President  of  the Council  may  submit  proposals  for  discussion  by  the 
Governing  Council. 
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The  allocat1on  of  powers  between  the  System  of Central  Banks  and  the political 
authorities  as  regards  exchange-rate  policy means  that  the  ECB  will  assume 
responsibility  for  the  dai:y  conduct  of  exchange-rate  policy.  The  Council  may  -
after  consulting the  ECB  - unanimously  enter into  formal  exchange-rate  agreements 
between  the  ecu  and  non-Community  currencies.  Within  the  framework  of  any  such 
exchange-rate  agreements,  the  Council  - after consulting the  ECB  - may  vote  by  a 
qualified  major1ty  to  adjust  or possibly  abandon  the  central  rates  for  the  ecu. 
In  the  absence  of  formal  exchange  rate  agreements,  the  Council  - after consulting 
the  ECB  - may  formulate  general  orientation for  exchange-rate  policy  in relation 
to  non-Community  currencies.  However,  these  orientat1ons  must  be  without 
prejud1ce  to  the  primary  object1ve  of  the  ESCB  to  maintain  price stability. 
Acting  by  a  qualified majority,  the  Council  - after consulting  the  ECB  -must 
decide  on  the  position of  the  Community  at  international  level  as  regards  1ssues 
of  particular relevance  to  economic  and  monetary  union.  Who  lS  to  represent  the 
Community  in  this  area  is  a  matter  for  the  Council,  acting  unanimously,  to 
dec1de. 
A declaration  is  also  annexed  to  the  Treaty,  wherein the  Community  affirms  its 
readiness  to  co-operate  on  currency matters  with  other  European  countr1es  and 
w1th  those  non-European  countries  with  which  the  Community  has  close  economic 
ties. 
As  an  excess1ve  budget  deficit will  have  an  adverse  influence  on  the  common 
monetary  arrangements,  the  Council  in the  third  stage  of  economic  and  monetary 
union  must  offer the possibility of  taking  additional  measures  in  respect  of  a 
Member  State  wh1ch  ma1ntains  an  excessive  defic1t.  Such  measures  can  be  taken 
only  in  respect  of  countries  partic1pating  in  the  third  stage. 
If  a  Member  State  persists  in  failing  to  put  into  practice  the  recommendations  of 
the  Council,  the  Council  may,  in  the  th1rd  stage,  order  the  Member  State 
concerned  to  take,  within  a  specified  time  limit,  measures  for  the  deficit 
reduct1on  which  is  judged  necessary  by  the  Counc1l  in  order  to  remedy  the 
s1tuat1on.  In  such  a  case,  the  Counc1l  may  request  the  Member  State  concerned  to 
subm1t  reports  in  accordance  with  a  specific  timetable. 
As  long  as  a  Member  State  fails  to  comply  with  such  a  decision,  the  Council  may, 
as  a  last  resort  decide  to  apply  one  or more  of  the  following  measures: 
- to  require  the  Member  State  concerned  to  publish  additional  information  before 
1ssu1ng  bonds  and  securities; 
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- to  invite  the  European  Investment  Bank  to  reconsider  its  lending policy  towards 
the  Member  State  concerned; 
- to  require  the  Member  State  concerned  to  make  a  non-interest  bearing deposit 
into  Community  funds; 
to  impose  fines  of  an  appropriate  size  on  that Member  State. 
Finally,  the Treaty  allows  for  the  possibility of  financial  help  to  a 
Member  State  in serious difficulties  in the  third  stage.  Although this  applies 
to  "exceptional  occurrences  beyond  its control",  the Council  may,  acting 
unanimously,  decide  to  grant  financial  assistance  from  the  Community.  Such 
assistance will  be  accompanied  by  economic  and  political  conditions.  In 
addition,  the  Council,  acting  by  a  qualified majority,  may  decide  to  grant 
assistance  to  a  Member  State with serious  economic  problems  caused  by  natural 
d1sasters. 
The  financial  loan  arrangement  may  be  used  to  help  improve  convergence  within 
economic  and  monetary  un1on. 
The  possibility already  exists  for  the  Community  to  grant  loans  accompanied  by 
economic  and  political  conditions  to  a  Member  State with  balance-of-payments 
problems. 
The  Treaty  of  Rome  currently gives  a  Member  State  the  right  to  take  measures 
should  unexpected  balance-of-payments  problems  occur.  This  right  is maintained 
in  the  second  stage.  Should  the measures  taken  by  the  Member  State  concerned  not 
be  commensurate  with  the  extent  of  the  problem,  the  Council  may  subsequently 
dec1de  to  revoke  them. 
These  provisions  will  continue  to  apply  in  the  case  of  Member  States  not 
part1cipating  1n  the  th1rd  stage. 
7.  SUMMARY 
It  1s  clear  from  the  above  account  that  if Denmark  does  not  participate  in  the 
Maastricht  Treaty provisions  on  economic  and  monetary  union  up  to  and  into  the 
second  stage,  there  will  be  mounting  economic  uncertainty in  a  number  of  sectors 
and  great  practical  problems  in  relation  to  existing co-operation. 
The  provisions  in  the  Treaty  concerning  the  second  stage  of  economic  and  monetary 
un1on  do  not  involve  any  significant  substantive  changes  to  existing 
co-operation.  Monetary  policy will  remain  a  national  matter  in  the  second  stage. 
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The  Maastricht  Treaty  includes  a  Protocol  allowing  Denmark  to  adopt  a  position 
individually  and  independently  on  whether  Denmark  will  participate  in  the  third 
stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union. 
Among  the  problems  which  will  arise  in  particular if there  is  no  participation in 
the  second  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  there  IS  the  fact  that  Denmark 
must  1n  practice  expect  to  drop  out  of  fundamental  areas  of  monetary  co-operation 
(EMS)  and  to  be  obliged  to  work  out,  through negotiations  with  the  other 
countr1es,  an  arrangement  for  Denmark's  monetary  association with  the  other 
countries  in  the  EC,  albeit  without  participating in  the  decision-making 
mechanisms. 
Given  that  the  EC  countries'  monetary  co-operation will  continue  to  constitute 
the  basis  for  a  zone  of  monetary  stability in  Europe,  it will  be  in  Denmark's 
interest  to  continue  to  be  closely associated with  such  co-operation.  A lesser 
association  than  the  present  one  may,  however,  be  expected  to  create greater 
uncertainty  about  the  Danish  interest  rate  and  it  is  to  be  anticipated  that 
Denmark's  Influence  in  co-operation will  be  considerably  reduced  as  the  real 
decisions  must  be  expected  to  be  taken  In  co-operation  between  the  other 
countries. 
As  regards  the  provisions  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty  which  concern  the  period  up  to 
and  Including  the  second  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union,  the  following 
applies  inter alia: 
the  provisions  governing  capital  movements  are  in  line  with  the  legislation 
which  Denmark  has  already  implemented; 
the  provisions  concerning  the  second  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  do 
not  alter  the  substance  of  current  co-operation; 
- in  the  second  stage,  the  Member  States  retain  full  powers  with  regard  to 
monetary  policy while  the  organization  of  co-operation  (EMil  is,  generally 
speaking,  a  continuation  of  existing  co-operation  between  the  central  banks, 
albe1t  under  a  new  name  and  new  institutional  structure.  However,  the  EMI 
takes  over responsibility  for  surveillance  of  co-operation· on  exchange  rates; 
- in  the  European  Central  Bank  which  is  set  up  in  the  third  stage,  a  well-defined 
"opt-out  position"  is  provided  for  those  countries  that  either do  not  w1sh  to 
or  cannot  join  the  third  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  Such  an 
"opt-out  position"  1s  not  provided  for  under  the  second  stage. 
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CHAPTER  IX 
EXTREME  OPTIONS  AND  OUTLINE  SOLUTIONS 
Article  R of  the  Maastricht  Treaty provides  that  the Treaty  "shall  be  ratified by 
the  high  Contracting Parties  in  accordance  with  their respective  constitutional 
requirements",  that  the  instruments  of  ratification must  be  deposited  with  the 
Government  of  the  Italian Republic  and  that  the  Treaty "shall enter into force  on 
1  January  1993,  provided  that  all  the  instruments  of ratification have  been 
deposited,  or failing that,  on  the  first  day  of  the  month  following  the  deposit 
of  the  instrument  of  ratification by  the  last  signatory State to  take  this step." 
It  would  therefore  appear  that  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  in its current  form,  as 
signed  by  twelve  Member  States,  can  only enter into force  if all  twelve  Member 
St  t  . f  .  ( 8)  a  es  rat1  y  1t. 
The  current  Treaty  bas1s  (the  Treaty  of  Rome  with  later amendments,  including  the 
Single  Act  and  the  Maastricht  Treaty)  contains  no  provisions  that  take  account  of 
the  situation that  arose  as  a  result  of  Denmark's  referendum  of  2  June  1992. 
This  chapter discusses  the  question of  Denmark's  possible position  in  future 
co-operation. 
The  standpoints  adopted  by  other Member  States  and  during  the  debate  in Denmark 
and  in other countries  form  the  starting-point. 
By  way  of  introduction,  a  description is given of  the  various  forms  of  economic 
co-operation.  This  is  followed  by  an  outline of  the  extreme  options  for  a  Danish 
solution,  i.e.  either withdrawal  from  the  European  Communities  and  accession  to 
the  EEA  Agreement  which  comprises  the  current  EFTA  countries,  or full  endorsement 
of  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  This  is  followed  by  a  survey  of outline solutions. 
1.  FORMS  OF  ECONOMIC  CO-OPERATION 
Four  levels  of  economic  co-operation  may  be  described,  rangi~g from  the  least 
comprehensive,  i.e.  a  free-trade  area,  to  the  most  comprehensive,  namely  an 
economic  and  monetary  union.  The  intermediate  stages  are,  respectively,  a 
customs  union  and  an  internal  market. 
(8)  The  question  of  the  possibilities for bringing  current  co-operation 
unilaterally  to  an  end  is  discussed  in  Annex  11. 
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A free-trade  area  is  defined  as  an  area without  internal  customs  and  quantitative 
restrictions  but  without  a  common  external  customs  tariff and  a  common  commercial 
pol1cy  v1s-a-v1s  third  countries.  Thus,  countries  in  a  free-trade  area  maintain 
dlfferent  external  customs  rates.  This  means  that  1n  the  context  of  trade 
relations  a  d1stinction needs  to  be  made  between  goods  originating in  the  Member 
States  and  in  third  countries.  Only  products  manufactured  in  or which  have 
undergone  cons1derable  alterations within  the  geographical  boundaries  of  the 
free-trade  area  are  covered  by  the  free-trade  area. 
A concrete  example  of  a  free-trade  area is  the  agreement  between  the  original  7 
EFTA  countries  which  was  concluded  in  1959.  The  EFTA  Agreement  entailed  free 
movement  for  the  EFTA  countries'  industrial  products,  whereas  customs  rates  and 
external  commercial  policy  remained  a  matter of national  responsibility.  In  1973 
the  EFTA  countries  and  the  EC  entered  into  corresponding free-trade  agreements 
for  industrial  products. 
A customs  union  differs  from  a  free-trade  area  in  including  a  common  customs 
tar1ff  and  a  common  commercial  policy  vis-a-vis  third  countries.  Together  with 
the  common  agricultural  policy  the  customs  union  constituted  one  of  the  two 
or1ginal  cornerstones  of  the  Commun1ty. 
In  addit1on  to  the  customs  union,  the  internal  market  comprises  the  free  movement 
of  goods,  services,  capital  and  persons  without  internal  border  controls.  Under 
the  S1ngle  Act,  a  tlmetable  was  laid  down  for  the  completion  of  the  internal 
market  by  31  December  1992. 
The  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  encompasses  all  the  previous  stages  of  economic 
co-operat1on,  free  trade  area,  customs  union  and  the  internal  market,  but  in 
addition  involves  co-ordination of  the  Member  States'  economic  policies.  In  an 
econom1c  and  monetary  union  an  actual  common  monetary  policy  is established, 
accompanied  by  the  fixing  of  exchange  rates. 
2.  THE  EEA  AGREEMENT 
One  extreme 
2  May  1992. 
expected  to 
option  for  a  solution is  the  EEA  Agreement  which  was  signed  on 
Nat1onal  ratif1cation  is  1n  progress  in  the  19  "countries  and  is 
be  completed  by  1  January  1993. 
Danish  association with  co-operat1on  based  on  the  EEA  Agreement  would  in  such  a 
case  need  to  be  negotiated.  Association  would  mean  that  Denmark  leaves  current 
EC  co-operation  and  takes  up  a  new  position as  a  non-member. 
The  EEA  Agreement  is  someth1ng  of  a  hybrid  among  the  four  abovement1oned 
fundamental  forms  of  econom1c  co-operat1on.  The  Agreement  establ1shes  a 
free-trade  area  and  an  internal  market,  but  not  a  customs  union.  There  is 
therefore  no  common  customs  tariff and  commercial  policy  vis-a-vis  third 
countr1es,  and  consequently the  EFTA  countries  do  not  participate  in  the 
Community's  wide-ranging external network  of bilateral  and  multilateral 
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co-operation  and  commercial  agreements.  The  EEA  Agreement  also  means  that  the 
EFTA  countries  do  not  take  part  in  the  common  agricultural  and  fisheries  policy 
and  the  agreeement  does  not  provide  for  free  trade  in  agricultural  and  fishery 
products.  The  EEA  Agreement  provides  a  basis  for closer co-operation  in  a  number 
of  related areas.  However  the situation is not  that  the  EFTA  countries  adopt  EC 
legal  acts  in  these  areas,  but  that  there  is  co-operation,  for  example  in  the 
form  of  the  establishment  of  common  activities  and  mutual  exchange  of  information 
(see  below). 
As  regards  the  institutional prov1s1ons,  the  fundamental  principle underlying  the 
EEA  Agreement  is  that  the  EC  institutions  remain  fully  autonomous.  Thus  the  EFTA 
countries  do  not  participate either in  EC  institutions or in  formal 
decision-making procedures,  although  they  are  involved  in the  decision-making 
process  in having  an  opportunity  to  express  their views  before  the  EC  takes  a 
decision. 
The  EEA  Agreement  is  a  highly  comprehensive  body  of treaty  prov1s1ons  structured 
as  follows:  Part  I  contains  the  general  principles  and  objectives,  Parts  II  -VI 
cover  the  material  provisions,  Parts  VII  and  VIII  comprise  the  institutional 
provis1ons  together with  the  financial  mechanisms  (9)  and,  finally,  Part  IX 
contains  the  general  and  final provisions.  In  addition,  a  large  number  of 
protocols  supplementing  and  elaborating on  these  treaty texts  have  been  appended 
to  the  EEA  Agreement. 
The  main  feature  of  the  EEA  Agreement  is the  establishment  of  an  internal  market 
with  free  movement  of  goods  and  services,  labour  and  capital between  the  19 
countr1es. 
Thus  the  EC's  internal  market  is  extended  under  the  Agreement  to  include  the  EFTA 
countries,  which  adopt  EC  legislation governing  the four  freedoms  (free  movement 
of  goods,  persons,  services  and  capital).  In  addition,  common  rules  on 
competition  are  established as well  as  rules  on  State  aid,  which  means  that  the 
EFTA  countries  partly adopt  common  EC  law  and  partly to  a  certain extent,  accept 
the  EC  Court  of  Justice's supervision and  enforcement  of  these  rules.  The  EFTA 
countries'  concrete  adoption  of  EC  legal  acts  is specified  in  a  series of  Annexes 
to  the  Agreement  which  contain lists of  the  Acts  covered  by  the  EEA  Agreement. 
The  cut-off  date  for  the  acts  currently  covered  by  the  Agreement  is  31  July  1991. 
Specific  rules  apply  in  the agricultural  and  fishery  products  sectors.  As 
regards  trade  in  agricultural  products,  the  Agreement  is  confined  essentially to 
a  political  commitment  whereby  the  partners  undertake  to  continue  their efforts 
with  a  view  to  achieving progressive  liberalization of agricultural  trade.  In 
continuation of  this,  the  partners will  carry out  at  two-yearly  intervals  reviews 
(9)  Economic  aid  from  the  EFTA  countries  for  Greece,  Ireland  ,  Portugal  and 
Spain. 
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of  the  conditions  of  trade  in agricultural products.  Thus  there  is  no  free 
access  to  the  market  for agricultural  products  under  the  EEA  Agreement. 
In  the  fisheries  area  a  special  Protocol  has  been  attached  to  the  Agreement  which 
regulates  access  to  the  market  for  fishery products.  For  the  EFTA  countries' 
products,  three  categories  are  in operation viz.  products  which  gain  free  access 
to  the  market,  products  for  which  there  is  a  progressive  reduction  In  customs 
duties  and  products  which  are particularly sensitive and  are  therefore not 
liberalized. 
As  regards  resources,  the  EFTA  countries'  counter-concession is partly that  the 
EC's  share  of  the  maximum  cod  catch in Norwegian  waters  is  consolidated  at  2,9% 
(instead  of  2, 14%)  and  partly that  Norway  also  grants  further  cod  quotas  outside 
the  bilateral  agreement  and  Iceland allocates  3  000  tonnes  of  redfish  in  exchange 
for  a  quota  of  30  000  tonnes  from  the  EC's  capelin  quota  in  Greenland  waters. 
Certain existing  arrangements  are  consolidated  in relation to  Sweden. 
As  regards  the  transport  sector,  the  EFTA  countries  adopt  the  common  transport 
pol1cy  as  regards  transport  by  road.  In  connection with  this  a  separate 
agreement  was  concluded  between  the  EC  and  Austria  and  Switzerland  on  the 
conditions  governing  transit  by  road  through  these  two  countries.  On 
1  January  1993  the  EFTA  countries will  also  adopt  the  common  air transport  rules 
and,  with  a  few  exceptions,  the  common  rules  governing  shipping  and  rail 
transport. 
Moreover,  the  EEA  Agreement  adds  a  number  of  so  called  horizontal  provisions  of 
special  relevance  to  the  four  freedoms,  for  instance provisons  on  co-operation  in 
the  field  of  social  and  labour  market  policy,  consumer  protection,  the 
environment,  statistics  and  company  law.  There  are  areas  of  co-operation  in 
which  the  EFTA  countries  adopt  a  number  of  legal  acts  while  the  EC  Commission  and 
the  EFTA  Surveillance Authority  take  appropriate  account  of  a  number  of  other 
acts. 
The  EEA  Agreement  also  entails  more  intensive  co-operation  in  a  number  of  related 
areas  such  as  environment  policy,  social  and  labour market  policy,  education, 
research  and  technological  development,  consumer  policy,  small  and  medium  sized 
enterprises,  tourism,  the  audio  visual  sector and  civil  protection.  In  these 
related  areas  the  EFTA  countries  do  not  adopt  EC  legislation but  merely 
co-operate  in  the  form  of: 
- participation in  EC  framework  programmes,  specific programmes,  projects  or 
other actions; 
- establishment  of  joint  activities  in specific  areas; 
- formal  or  informal  exchange  or provision of  information; 
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- joint  efforts  to  encourage  certain activities  throughout  the  territory of  the 
Contracting Parties; 
- parallel  legislation of  identical  or similar content; 
co-ordination,  where  this  is  of  mutual  interest,  of efforts  and  activities via, 
or  in  the  context  of,  international  organizations,  and  of  co-operation with 
third  countries. 
As  regards  the  decision-making process  and  the  institutional provisions  the 
following  applies: 
The  fundamental  principle underlying  the  EEA  Agreement  is  that  at  no  stage  in  the 
decision-making  process  do  the  EFTA  countries participate  in  formal  EC  decisions. 
The  EEA  Agreement  is  characterized  by  the  fact  that  two  different  decision-making 
systems  are maintained.  The  EC's  decision  making  process  therefore  remains 
unchanged  for  the  EC  countries.  The  EFTA  countries  retain  a  right  to  be  heard  at 
all  stages  in  the  decision-making process  starting from  the  Commission's 
preparation  and  submission  of  a  proposal  unt1l  its final  adoption  1n  the  Council. 
The  EFTA  countries  are  also  admitted  to  a  number  of  the  committees  which  are 
responsible  for  the  administration of  legal  acts,  but  do  not  participate in  the 
final  decis10n. 
The  two  decision-making  systems  are  bound  together  by  common  bodies:  the 
EEA  Committee  and  the  EEA  Council.  The  EEA  Committee  is  made  up  of 
representatives  at  official  level  of  the  19  participating countries,  while  the 
EEA  Council  is set  up  at ministerial  level  and  has  general  political 
responsibility. 
The  actual  decision  to  add  new  law  to  the  EEA  Agreement  is  taken  unanimously  in 
the  EEA  Committee  or,  where  no  agreement  can  be  obtained  in  that  forum, 
unanimously  in  the  EEA  Council.  Where  no  agreement  is  reached,  those  parts  of 
the  EEA  Agreement  to  which  the  disputed  legislation refers  may,  as  a  last  resort, 
become  inoperative.  The  Agreement  furthermore  provides  the possibility for 
Introducing  safeguard  measures  in  cases  in which  it can  be  shown  that  there  are 
serious  and  persistent  economic,  social  or environmental  difficulties  of  a 
sectoral  or regional  nature.  However,  previous  consultation in  the  EEA  Committee 
1s  requ1red. 
As  regards  legal  disputes  which  concern  the  interpretation  and  application  of 
concrete  acts,  a  procedure  for  the  settling of  disputes  has  been  set  up  with  the 
obJective  of  ensuring  legal  uniformity.  EFTA  sets  up  an  institutional 
counterpart  to  the  EC's  surveillance authorities  and  court.  Where  disparities 
arise  in  the application of  law  between  the  EEC  and  EFTA,  a  solution is first 
sought  within  the  EEA  Committee  which,  if it  agrees,  can  request  that  the 
EC  Court  of  Justice  deliver  a  binding preliminary ruling.  Where  no  agreement  can 
be  reached  to  allow  the  EC  Court  of  Justice  to  act  as  supreme  authority  for  the 
settlement  of disputes,  parts  of  the  agreement  may  be  suspended  or safeguard 
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measures  may  be  introduced.  Binding arbitration could  be  requested  for  the 
resolution  of  disagreements  about  the  concrete  form  of such  measures.  However, 
1n  matters  of  competition  the  EC  Court  of Justice  has  final  jurisdiction over 
purely  EC  cases  and  mixed  competit1on  cases  concerning  the  business  practice  of 
enterprises  with  a  considerable  turnover  both  in  the  EC  and  in  EFTA. 
This  system for  the  treatment  of  legal  disputes  was  negotiated  after the  EC  Court 
of  Justice  had  failed  to  approve  the  system originally agreed. 
A Jo1nt  Parliamentary  Committee  is  also  set  up  which  can  express  opinions  on 
co-operatlon  1n  the  form  of  reports  and  resolutions. 
As  regards  the  further development  of  the  EEA  Agreement  it  may  be  noted  that  4  of 
the  7  countries  covered  by  the  Agreement  have  appl1ed  for  access1on  to  the 
Maastricht  Treaty.  Moreover,  Norway's  Prime  Minister  stated that  he  was  in 
favour  of  Norway  requesting  membership  of  the  EC  Union  before  the  end  of  the 
year.  This  means  that  at  the  time  - 1995  according  to plan  - when  the 
5  countries  accede  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty  (see  Chapter  III  on  enlargement)  the 
EEA  Agreement  will  only  comprise  Iceland  and  Liechtenstein.  In  this  sense  it may 
be  concluded  that  the  EEA  Agreement  represents  an  intermed1ate  stage  on  the  way 
to  full  membership  of  the  European  Union. 
Annex  12  gives  Denmark's  and  the  EFTA  countries'  total exports  to  the  EC  from 
1974  to  1991.  As  shown,  exports  rose  both  for  Denmark  and  the  EFTA  countries, 
with  58%  of  total  exports  in  1991  going  to  the  EC.  These  f1gures  stress  the 
economic  dependence  of  the  EFTA  countries  and  Denmark  on  the  EC  and  are  one  of 
the  fundamental  reasons  behind  the  EFTA  countries'  request  for  participation  1n 
the  Union,  so  as  to  acquire greater influence  in  the  establishment  of  the  trade 
conditions  governing  the  EFTA  countries'  exports. 
To  sum  up,  it  may  be  said  that  what  characterizes  the  EEA  Agreement  is  thus  the 
adoption  by  the  EFTA  countries  of  EC  legal  acts  on  the  1nternal  market  and  the 
common  competition  policy  and  rules  governing  State aid.  The  EEA  Agreement  does 
not,  however,  1nvolve  a  customs  union  and  a  common  trade policy vis-a-vis  third 
countries  while  the  common  agricultural  and  the  fisheries  policy  are  not  covered 
by  the  EEA  Agreement.  The  EEA  Agreement,  in addition,  provides  a  basis  for 
closer co-operation  in  a  number  of  horizontal  and  related  areas.  In  the  related 
areas,  Including  the  environment,  the  EFTA  countr1es  do  not  adopt  EC  legal  acts 
but  there  is non-binding  co-operation.  From  an  institutional  point  of  view,  the 
EEA  Agreement  1s  characterized  by  the  maintenance  of  full  autonomy  on  the  part of 
the  EC  Institutions.  Thus  there  is  no  EFTA  participation  in  EC  institutions  or 
in  formal  decision-maklng procedures  although  there is  consultation  and  the 
setting up  of  special  EEA  bodies.  As  regards  the  further  development  of 
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the  EEA  Agreement,  the  prospect  is that  5  of  the  7  participating countries  will 
withdraw  with  a  view  to  securing accession  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
3.  THE  CONSEQUENCE  OF  AN  EEA  SOLUTION 
This  Chapter deals  with  central  parts  of  the  Treaty of  Rome  from  which  Denmark 
will  be  excluded  in  the  event  of  an  EEA  solution  and  it illustrates  the  type  of 
problems  Denmark  will  be  facing if existing co-operation areas  are  transferred 
back  to national  jurisdiction. 
3.1.  INSTITUTIONAL  CONSEQUENCES 
In  the  event  of  withdrawal  from  the  Treaty of  Rome,  Denmark  will  not  be  able  to 
participate  in  the  common  EC  institutions,  the  Council,  the  Commission,  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  Court  of  Justice  and  will  be  excluded  from  the 
EC  decision-making process.  Like  the  other  EFTA  countries,  Denmark  will 
therefore  not  take  part  in  the  Council's  establishment  of  common  positions  and 
the  adoption  of  decisions,  although it will  be  consulted  on  questions  related  to 
the  EEA  Agreement.  Decisions  to  add  new  EC  law  to  the  EEA  Agreement  or  to 
suspend  parts  of  the  EEA  Agreement  will  be  taken  in  the  EEA  Joint  Committee  and 
in  the  EEA  Council,  as  referred  to  above.  The  EC  Court  of Justice will, 
similarly,  have  final  jurisdiction in  joint  competition  cases  and  in  cases  where 
the  EEA  Committee  requests  that  the  Court  of  Justice deliver a  binding 
preliminary  ruling.  However,  Denmark  will  not  be  able  to  appoint  Danish  judges 
to  the  Court  of Justice.  The  same  applies  to  committees  set  up  to  administer  a 
number  of  legal  acts.  Denmark  will  be  admitted  to  a  number  of  these  Committees 
but  will  not  be  involved  in final  decision making. 
Compared  with  the  current  situation where  Denmark  is  a  member,  there  will 
therefore  be  a  considerable  reduction  in  the  influence  which  results  from  full 
participation  in  EC  institutions  and  decision-making procedures. 
As  regards  co-operation areas  not  covered  by  the  EEA  Agreement,  such  as  the 
common  agricultural  policy,  Denmark  would  obviously  have  no  ~nfluence on  the 
fram1ng  of  Community's  policies. 
3.2.  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
A cornerstone  of  the  Treaty of  Rome  is  the  common  agricultural policy,  from  which 
Denmark  will  be  excluded  in the  event  of  an  EEA  solution.  Under  Article  39  of 
the  Treaty of  Rome  the  objectives  of  the  common  agricultural  policy are  to 
increase agricultural  productivity,  to  ensure  a  fair standard of  living for  the 
agricultural  community,  to  stabilize markets,  to  ensure  the  availability of 
supplies  and  to  ensure  that  supplies  reach  consumers  at  reasonable prices. 
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The  common  agricultural  policy is  based  on  three  fundamental  principles:  market 
unity,  Community  preference  and  financial  solidarity. 
The  main  instrument  of  the agricultural  policy  is  the  common  organization  of  the 
market  within  the  EC  and  the  common  rules  at  the  EC's  external  borders.  Under 
that  system  a  guaranteed  minimum  internal  price is maintained  and  supported 
through  measures  (buying-in)  designed  to  reduce  supply.  Externally,  a  variable 
import  duty  is  levied,  which  means  that  the  imported  commodity  is  not  lower  than 
the  target price.  In  addition,  export  refunds  are  granted,  corresponding  to  the 
difference  between  the  world  market  price  and  the  target  producer price,  so  that 
farmers  receive  the  same  price  whether  they  sell  on  the  free  internal  market  or 
to  third  countries. ( 10) 
The  other main  instrument  Is  the  structural  policy,  which  consists  partly of  a 
number  of horizontal  measures  such  as  modernization aid,  aid for  training  and 
early  retirement  arrangements,  and  partly of  special  regional  programmes  to 
support  regions  with  specific problems. 
The  agricultural  policy  was  developed  In  the  1960s  when  the  security of  supplies 
was  the  major  consideration.  Throughout  the  years  there  have  been  a  number  of 
reforms  of  the  agricultural  policy  as  a  result  of  the  overriding  problem  facing 
EC  agricultural  policy  of  ever-increasing rising surplus  stocks  and  agricultural 
expenditure.  The  most  recent  reform,  in  May  1992,  introduced  a  shift  from  price 
support  to  more  direct  support,  for  example  aid  per hectare  and  premium 
arrangements. 
Denmark  is  among  the  countries  which,  as  net  exporters  of  agricultural  products, 
have  clearly benefited  from  the  common  agricultural  policy  in  the  form  of  secure 
access  to  the  market  for  Danish  products,  secure  prices  for  farmers  and  hence  a 
secure  development  of  earnings  in  the  agricultural  sector.  Annex  13  shows  the 
trend  of  payments  from  the  Guarantee  and  Guidance  Section of  the  EAGGF  to 
Individual  Member  States  and  per  capita.  It  appears  that  payments  to  Denmark 
rose  from  1973  to  1991  and,  looked  at  per  capita,  Denmark  is  the  country which 
receives  the  largest  payments  after  Ireland  with  1  728  kroner per capita.  This 
does  not  Include  the  economic  advantage  constituted  by  the  fact  that  the  sale of 
agricultural  products  to  the  other  11  Member  States  takes  place  at  EC  prices, 
which  are  higher  than  world  market  prices. 
In  a  situation  in  which  Denmark  was  no  longer  a  member  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  and 
acceded  to  the  EEA  Agreement,  a  whole  series  of direct  consequences  for 
agricultural  policy  could  be  mentioned. 
(10)  This  system  easily  covers  the  bulk  of  agricultural  products. 
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This  would  first  of all  mean  a  transition to  national  financing,  as  Denmark  would 
be  excluded  from  the  Community's  joint  financing  system.  Moreover,  access  to  the 
market  for agricultural  products  would  have  to  be  negotiated  and  agreed  on 
b1laterally with  the  EC  product  by  product.  Such  negotiations  would  be  of  the 
same  nature  as  the  bilateral  agreements  which  the  current  EFTA  countries  have 
entered  into  with  the  Community,  whereby  only partial  liberalization is  involved. 
A conceivable  situation might  be,  similar  to  what  applies  with the  EEA  fisheries 
agreement,  that  certain sensitive products  would  only  have  limited  access  to  the 
Community  market.  In  such  an  event,  the prices  which  farmers  would  receive  would 
not  be  guaranteed  by  the  common  pricing system but  would  in the  event  have  to  be 
secured  under  national  guarantee  systems.  It  would  be  for  Denmark  to  decide  to 
what  extent  export  refunds  financed  by  Denmark  would  be  granted  for  exports  to  EC 
countries  and  to  the  rest  of  the  world  market.  This  would  involve  extensive 
structural  adjustments. 
Transferring agricultural  policy  back  to  a  purely  national  level  furthermore, 
means  that  Denmark  will  have  to  negotiate  on  its  own  at  international  level  with 
other States  and  in  international  fora  such  as  GATT,  the  FAO  and  the  OECD.  The 
Community  negotiates  as  a  body  and  hence  with  greater  force  in such  fora  and  has 
entered  into  a  considerable  number  of  agreements  with  third  countries.  A 
possible  Danish  withdrawal  from  bilateral  and  multilateral  Community  agreements 
may  be  expected  to  give  rise  to  considerable  problems. 
In  the  event  of  an  EEA  solution,  Denmark  would  be  excluded  from  the  common 
fisheries  policy.  The  main  feature  of  the  fisheries  policy is  the  resources  and 
conservation policy  whereby  catch possibilities for  individual  stocks  are 
distributed  on  an  annual  basis after negotiations  with  the  third  countries 
involved  and  are  distributed internally on  the  basis of  a  fixed  distribution 
scale. 
If  Denmark  were  no  longer  a  member  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  it would  not  be 
possible  for  Danish  fishermen  to  fish outside  Danish waters  without  a  special 
agreement. 
F1shing  rights  outside  the  Danish  fishing  zone,  including in  EC  waters,  could 
only  be  obtained if Denmark  could  offer corresponding  catch possibilities  in  the 
Dan1sh  zone. 
The  fisheries  sector organizes its  mark~t in  the  same  way  as  the  agricultural 
sector.  The  pr1ces  which  fishermen  are  guaranteed  through  minimum  price 
arrangments  would  in  that  case have  to  be  secured  through  national  arrangments. 
As  a  net  fish  exporter with  the  emphasis  on  the  EC  market,  Danish  fishery 
products  would  be  subject  to  EC  customs  duties.  Access  to  the  market  would  have 
to  be  negotiated bilaterally with  the  EC  product  by  product,  in the  same  way  as 
the  current  EFTA  countries  have  entered  into agreements  with  the  EC  whereby 
market  liberalization only  applies  to  limited areas. 
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3.3.  THE  CUSTOMS  UNION  AND  THE  COMMON  COMMERCIAL  POLICY 
As  described  above,  the  EEA  Agreement  does  not  involve  co~~Jn external  customs 
tariffs  and  a  common  commercial  policy.  Under  the  Treaty  of  Rome  the  right  to 
issue  binding  customs  provisions  is  transferred  from  national  law  to  Community 
law,  while  a  common  commercial  policy  is  established,  in  particular with  regard 
to  changes  in duty rates,  the  conclusion  of tariff and  trade  agreements,  and  the 
achievement  of  uniformity  in  liberalization measures,  export  policy and  measures 
to  protect  trade. 
Throughout  the  years,  the  Community  has  entered  into  a  whole  series of bilateral 
and  multilateral  co-operation  and  commercial  agreements  and  has  since  1960 
negociated  as  a  single entity  in  the  GATT  negotiations.  In  this  way  the  EEC 
countries  have  jointly acquired  greater negotiating power  than  they  would  have 
individually. 
It  IS  difficult  to  gain  a  clear  idea  of  the  legal  and  substantive  consequences  of 
Withdrawal  from  the  customs  union  and  the  common  commercial  policy,  Inter alia as 
a  result  of  Denmark's  changed  commercial  position. 
The  Community  is  a  participant  in  a  large  and  complex  international  network  of 
trade  relations;  a  transfer back  to  national  level  of  the  authority for entering 
into  such  agreements  may  be  expected  to  give  rise  to considerable  problems.  In 
that  case  Denmark  would  have  to  uphold  and  enter into  International  trade 
agreements,  including  the  securing of  access  to  the  market  on  a  national  basis 
and  would  in  that  case  have  to  work  out  national  arrangements  to  take  over  the 
many  agreements  entered  into  by  the  Community. 
As  at  1  December  1991,  Denmark  was  covered  by  971  agreements  with  third  countries 
entered  into  by  the  EC,  which  would  have  to  be  transformed  into  national 
agreements  through  new  negotiations  between  Denmark  and  those  countries. 
3.4.  OTHER  AREAS  OF  CO-OPERATION 
In  the  event  of  an  EEA  solution,  Denmark  will  be  excluded  from  the  co-operation 
areas  which  result  from  and  have  been  extended  on  the  basis  of  the  Treaty  of 
Rome,  and  which  are  financed  from  the  common  EC  budget.  This  includes  In 
particular projects  concerning  environment  policy,  social  and  labour market 
policy,  economic  and  social  cohesion.  r~search and  technological  development.  the 
assoc1ation  of  overseas  countries  and  territories,  the  transport  policy  and 
vocational  training policy.  As  described  in Chapter VII,  the  Community  has  in 
addition  to  this,  on  the  basis  of,  for  example,  Article  235  and  Article  100a  of 
the Treaty  of  Rome,  included  areas  such  as  health,  culture,  consumer  policy  and 
development  policy. 
Denmark  has  set great  store  by  a  number  of  these  policies  such  as,  for  example, 
environment  policy  and  social  and  labour market  policy.  EC  acts  have  been 
adopted  in all  of these  areas  and  common  programmes  and projects  have  been 
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implemented,  and  the  Community  takes  part  in  international  activities  and 
co-operation  in  these  areas. 
The  types  of  legislation and  programmes  that  Denmark  will  not  participate in 
framing  and  will  not  automatically take part  in  are,  for  example,  the  research 
framework  programmes  and  related specific programmes,  the  action  programme  for 
small  and  medium-sized  enterprises,  the  extensive Community  legislation  in  the 
environment  sector,  the  action programme  for  implementation of  the Social  Charter 
of  the  Fundamental  Social  Rights  of  Workers  and  the  activities of  the  structural 
funds. 
The  European  Monetary  System provides  the  framework  for  European  financial  and 
monetary  poli~y co-operation.  The  EMS  was  established  in  1979  outside  the 
framework  of  the  Treaty  as  co-operation between  the  Member  States'  central  banks, 
and  express  reference  is made  to  the  EMS  in Article  102a  of  the Treaty  of  Rome. 
This  provision  was  included  in  the Treaty of  Rome  through  the  Single  Act. 
Moreover,  the  Treaty  of  Rome  contains provisions  on  the  co-ordination of  the 
Member  States'  economic  policies  with  a  view  to  ensuring  the  equilibrium of  the 
balance  of  payments,  maintaining  confidence  in their currencies,  ensuring a  high 
level  of  employment  and  a  stable  level  of  prices  (Article  104}.  Within  the 
framework  of  the  EMS  it has  been  possible  to  create  a  zone  with greater monetary 
stab1lity,  while  co-operation  on  exchange  rates  has  led  to  greater price 
stability and  lower  inflation  in  the  EC  as  a  whole.  If  a  country  withdraws  from 
the  EMS,  this  is  bound  to  create uncertainty  about  exchange  rate policy  and 
economic  policy. 
If  Denmark  had  to  leave  the  Treaty of  Rome,  it would  be  doubtful  whether 
EMS  membership  could  be  fully  maintained.  Denmark  would  most  probably  be  in  the 
same  position  as  current  third countries  in relation to  the  EMS. 
EMS  co-operation  thus  contains  a  provision  to  the  effect  that  close  European 
countr1es  may  be  associated with  the  EMS.  In  practice,  this  involves  a 
unilateral  adjustment  to  the  fixed  rate strategy  which  characterizes  the  EMS  and 
to  economic  and  monetary  development  in the  Community.  Thus.  Norway,  Sweden  and 
F1nland  have  linked  their currencies  to  the  ecu,  a  link which  Finland  has 
provisionally  had  to  give  up.  In all  cases it amounts  to  a  unilateral  national 
decision not  involving  any  commitments  for  EC  central  banks,  and  hence  there  is 
no  question  of  Community  responsibility.  ( 11 }  These  countries  therefore  bear 
sole  market  responsibility for  their exchange  rates.  It  further  follows  that 
these  countries  have  no  influence  on  co-operation  concerning  the  EMS. 
(11}  The  central  banks  of  Norway  and  Finland  have  established  a  short-term credit 
facility with  the  EC  central  banks. 
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As  described  in Chapter VII,  European  Political Co-operation  CEPC}  was  included 
in  the  Treaty  through  the  Single Act.  Where  a  country  remains  outside  the  Treaty 
of  Rome,  it follows  that  this  c~n~try does  not  take  part  either  in  the  joint 
co-ordination  and  preparation  of  common  positions  on  major  foreign  policy matters 
and  that  It  remains  outside  the  multilateral  network  for  dealing with external 
events  and  conflicts  which  the  Community  represents. 
In  the  last  few  years  in particular,  i.e.  after the  opening-up  of  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe,  the  experience  has  been  that  the  dividing  line  between  foreign 
economic  matters  and  foreign  policy has  been  eliminated.  Hence  the  need  for  an 
ever greater degree  of  co-ordination.  In  line  with this,  the  EC  has  become  the 
central  forum  which  is  lncreasingly  being  used  to  achieve  coherence  in  combined 
Community  relations  with  the  external  world. 
Any  country  which  remains  outside  the  Treaty  of  Rome  will  not  have  any  access 
either to  the  wealth  of  information  which  IS  exchanged  on  a  dally basis  between 
the  co-operation partners.  Information  on  decisions  taken  in  the  context  of 
political  co-operation will  have  to  be  obtained after  the  events. 
It  may  be  noted  that  the  extreme  option  represented  by  Danish  accession  to  the 
EEA  Agreement  entails  considerable  retrograde  steps  both  as  regards  participation 
In  decision-making  procedures  and  Institutions  and  in  relation  to  the  substantial 
fields  of  co-operation  covered  by  the  Treaty of  Rome.  The  EEA  Agreement  amounts 
to  a  considerable  reduction  in  the  influence  which  is  acquired  from  full 
participation  in  EC  institutions  and  decision-making procedures.  Moreover 
fundamental  policies  in  the Treaty  of  Rome  such  as  the  common  commercial  policy 
and  the  common  agricultural policy  are  not  covered  by  the  EEA  Agreement.  A 
transfer of  such  policies  back  to national  jurisdiction and  financing  would 
involve  considerable  drawbacks  and  expenditure  for  Danish  society.  This  applies 
both  to  the  protection of  Denmark's  interests  and  to administrative effects,  as 
it is  to  be  expected  that  a  long  series  of  laws,  regulations,  etc.  would  have  to 
be  lmplemented  to  replace  EC  rules. 
In  addition,  the Treaty  of  Rome  contains  a  number  of co-operation areas  such  as 
environment  and  social  and  labour market  policies  by  which  D~nmark has  set  great 
store.  Cont1nued  membership  of  the  EMS  should  also  be  seen  as  crucial  in  view  of 
Denmark's  dependence  on  international  trade.  Joint  co-operation  on  fore1gn  and 
security pol1cy  gives  common  European  interests greater force  in dealing with 
foreign  policy events  and  conflicts.  Only  full  membershlp  of  the  Maastricht 
Treaty will  make  it  possible  to  take part  in  shaping future  European 
co-operation,  including  the  negotiations  on  enlargement. 
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4.  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
The  other extreme  option  for  a  solution would  be  full  endorsement  of the 
Maastricht  Treaty.  The  other Member  States have  clearly stated,  inter alia in 
the  Oslo  Declaration,  that  they  want  Denmark  to participate. 
During  debates,  especially  in a  number  of Member  States,  the  wish  was  expressed 
that  Denmark  could  reassess  the  matter  in the  light  of developments,  including in 
particular the  position the  other Member  States  take  but  also  in the  light  of  the 
clarifications,  especially with  regard  to  the  "closeness" principle,  which  have 
been  initiated by  the  European  Council.  This  matter will not  be  further 
discussed  here  and  reference  is  made  to  the  previous  chapters,  in particular 
chapters  II,  VII  and  VIII. 
The  following  examples  may  be  given  to  illustrate which  types  of difficulties 
would  arise  in  the  event  of  a  country not  fully  endorsing  the Maastricht  Treaty: 
(1)  The  Community  section  (pillar  1)  lays  down  a  series  of  co-operation  areas 
which  the  Community  also dealt  with  before without  any  specific basis  in  the 
Treaty.  Whereas  culture,  consumer  policy,  health,  trans-European  networks 
and  development  co-operation used  to  be  based  on  other  (mainly  economic) 
Articles  in  the  Treaty  such  as  Articles  235  and  100a,  pillar  1  now  provides  a 
clear  legal  basis  for  such policies.  Practically speaking  this  means  that 
clearer limits  are  set  for  the  extent  of  EC  competence  within  each  individual 
area.  In  certain areas  these clarifications mean  reduction of  the  EC's  scope 
for  action.  The  curtailment  of  the  EC's  scope  for  action is  reflected partly 
in  a  limitation of  the practical  scope  of  decisions  and  partly in  the 
concrete criteria which  form  the  basis  of  individual  sections.  For  example, 
it is  now  expressly  ruled  out  in certain sections  that  reference  be  made  to 
harmonization  ~f the  Member  States'  laws  and  administrative provisions,  which 
is not  legally  excluded  under  the  Treaty of  Rome.  Such  demarcation  is 
further  emphasized  by  the  fact  that  the  principle of "closeness"  and  the 
principle  of  proportionality  - closeness  in decisions  and  moderation  in  the 
means  applied  - are  guidelines  for  the  Community  section· as  a  whole 
(pillar  1). 
Where  a  country  remains  outside pillar 1  of  the Maastricht  Treaty,  this  means 
for  example  that  the  country  does  not  participate in Community  programmes  and 
projects  which  are  adopted  on  the  basis  of  the  new  provisions  in  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  on  culture,  health,  consumer  protection,  trans-European 
networks  etc.  To  date,  Denmark  has  helped  shape  Community  policies  in  these 
areas  but  it will  not  be  possible  in future  to  obtain financial  support,  for 
example  to  implement  national  programmes  in these  areas.  An  example  could  be 
the  ERASMUS  programme  (exchange  of university students),  which  was  adopted 
earlier on  the  basis of Article  128  of the Treaty of  Rome.  Under  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  an  extension  of  or adjustment  to  the  ERASMUS  programme 
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would  be  based  on  Article  126  of  the Maastricht  Treaty,  which  would  not  apply 
to  a  country  that  remains  outside  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  Denmark  will 
thc~2fore not  be  covered  by  an  extension  of  or  adjustment  to  the  ERASMUS 
programme.  The  same  argument  can  be  applied  in  respect  of  the  other 
co-operation areas.  Consumer matters,  health  and  culture  were  previously 
dealt  with  on  the  bas~s.  for  example  of Article  100a  of  the  Treaty of  Rome. 
A number  of  directives  and  regulat1ons  have  been  adopted  for  example,  the 
Directive  on  the  labelling of  tobacco  products,  the  rules  governing  use  of 
additives,  programmes  on  consumer  information  and  rules  on  product  liability. 
The  Maastricht  Treaty provides  such  co-operation areas  with  an  independent 
Treaty basis  and  Denmark  would  thus  remain  outside  Community  co-operation  in 
these  areas. 
(2)  As  regards  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  the  following  examples  may  be 
mentioned: 
The  Maastricht  Treaty  does  not  provide  for  the  situation where  a  Member  State 
remains  outside  the  second  stage  of  the  EMU,  in which  monetary  policy  remains 
under  national  JUrisdiction.  During this  stage  the  European  Monetary 
Institute  (EMil  is  set  up,  which  takes  over all  Institutional  and  practical 
dut1es  regarding  European  Monetary  Co-operation  (EMC).  If  Denmark  remains 
outside  the  EMI,  it will  not  take  part  in  financial  and  monetary 
co-operation,  nor  Will  it  take  part  in co-operation  on  the  co-ordination  of 
economic  policy.  The  result  is  that  it will  be  impossible  to  maintain  full 
Danish  participation  in  EMC.  It  will  be  necessary  to  negotiate  another, 
looser  form  of  association similar to  the  arrangements  which  Norway  and 
Finland  have  secured.  In  that  case  it Will  be  impossible  to  maintain 
Denmark's  Influence  on  financial  and  monetary policies.  There  will  no  longer 
be  a  safety net  under  the  Danish  Krone,  increasing  the  risk  of  anxiety  about 
its  rate.  The  demands  on  economic  policy will  in any  case  be  greater  and 
there  will  be  an  increased  risk of higher  interest  rates  in  the  event  of 
disturbances  on  the  currency  markets. 
(3)  As  regards  Intergovernmental  co-operation,  mention  can  be  made  of  close  links 
between  foreign  policy  (pillar 2),  foreign  economic  policy  (pillar  1)  and 
parts  of  co-operation  in  the  fields  of  JUStice  and  home  affairs  (pillar 3). 
The  international  crises  which  are  currently  raging  in the  EC's  Immediate 
neighbourhood,  e.g.  in  Yugoslavia,  Iraq,  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  in 
the  CIS  affect  all  three  pillars  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
Where  countries  have  worked  out  a  common  position or  common  action within  the 
framework  of  the  common  foreign  and  security policy  to  introduce  sanctions 
against  third  countries,  this  decision  can  be  Implemented  on  the  basis  of 
pillar  1.  Under  the  new  Article  228a  in  the  Community  section  (pillar  1), 
the  Member  States  can  thus  decide  to  reduce  or break  off  economic  relations 
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with  a  third  country.  A country  which  remains  outside  the Maastricht  Treaty 
will,  however,  neither  be  covered  by  the  new  Article  228a nor  by  common 
foreign  and  security policy co-operation.  In  such  a  situation,  a  country 
might  be  able  to  join  in economic  sanctions  on  the  basis  of  Article  113  of 
the Treaty  of  Rome  or alternatively follow  the  other eleven  countries  on  the 
basis  of  a  national  decision.  However,  that  country  would  not  be  able  to 
influence  the  decision  to  introduce  sanctions  taken  within  the  framework  of 
the  common  foreign  and  security policy.  Where  that  country  did  not  introduce 
the  same  sanctions  either,  the  probable result  would  be  that  the  eleven other 
countries  would  choose  to  impose  border controls  to  ensure  that  products  from 
the  third country  affected  by  the  joint sanctions  did  not  gain access  to  the 
( 12)  common  market. 
(4)  The  Maastricht  Treaty  lays  the  foundations  for further  development  of 
co-operation on  asylum  policy within  the  framework  of  co-operation  in  the 
fields  of  justice and  home  affairs.  To  date,  asylum  co-operation has 
resulted  in  common  procedural  rules  for determining  the  Member  State which 
must  process  an  application for  asylum  (Asylum  Convention).  The  declaration 
annexed  to  the Maastricht  Treaty  creates  a  basis,  partly for  the 
establishment  of  common  material  rules  to  apply  in  individual  Member  States 
in  the  area of  asylum,  and  partly for  ensuring that  before  the  end  of  1993  a 
position  is  taken  on  the  transfer of  the  asylum policy  to  EC  co-operation. 
Any  country  that  does  not  participate  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty will  therefore 
have  no  influence  on  or  cannot  expect  to  be  covered  by  the further 
development  of  co-operation  on  asylum. 
5.  OUTLINE  SOLUTIONS 
As  appears  from  Chapters  VII  and  VIII,  the  text  of  the Treaty itself does  not 
provide  for  the  situation whereby  one  or  more  Member  States  continue  to  adhere  to 
the  Treaty  of  Rome  whilst  the  other  Member  States  proceed with  the  Maastricht 
Treaty.  Tne  Treaty  of  Rome  and  the  Maastricht  Treat~ are  in~ertwined and 
interwoven  both  from  an  institutional  and  procedural  point  of  view  and  from  the 
point  of  view  of  substance. 
The  Community  section enlarges  on  and  clarifies  the  spheres  of  competence  that 
are  covered  by  the  Treaty of  Rome.  The,new provisions  of the Treaty delineate 
more  clearly  the  extent  of  the  Community's  powers  and  make  it easier to  arrive at 
decisions  as  the qualified majority  becomes  the  predominant  voting  rule. 
Moreover,  the  European  Parliament  is  involved  to  a  greater extent  in  the 
decision-making  process. 
A situation in which  a  country  remains  outside pillar  1  of  the Maastricht  Treaty, 
entails  consequences  in all  co-operation area,  with  changes  being  involved either 
(12)  The  same  reasoning will  apply  to  the  situation  in  which  a  country  only  takes 
part  in pillar  1  of  the  Union Treaty. 
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as  regards  the  substance  or  the  decision-making  procedure  used.  Only  the 
original provisions  on  the  establishment  of  a  customs  union,  agricultural  and 
fisheries  policy,  competition  policy  and  the  provisions  on  the  association  of 
overseas  countries  and  territories  remain  unchanged  under  the Maastricht  Treaty. 
It  would  therefore  be  extremely  difficult  for  the  two  sets  of Treaty provisions 
on  EC  co-operation  to  operate  simultaneously. 
As  regards  intergovernmental  co-operation,  European Political Co-operation  (EPC) 
is  replaced  by  the  new  Treaty's  provisions  on  the  common  foreign  and  security 
policy.  The  existing co-operation  in  the  fields  of  justice  and  home  affairs  is 
also  replaced  by  the  relevant  provisions  in  the  new  Treaty. 
X  X  X  X 
The  range  of  possible  options  for  Denmark's  future  relationship with  the  EC  may 
be  outlined  as  below.  In  the  interests of  a  systematic  approach,  the  outline 
solutions  have  been  listed with  the  least  far-reaching  solution  for  the  twelve 
Member  States  given  first  and  the  most  far-reaching solution for  the  twelve 
Member  States  given  last.  In  between  these  two  extremes  a  number  of  intermediate 
outline  solutions  are  listed.  It  should  be  stressed that  no  appraisal  is 
Involved  of  the political  feasibility or  the  economic  effects  of  these  outline 
solutions. 
5.1.  OUTLINE  SOLUTION  1:  TREATY  OF  ROME  WITH  EFFECT  FOR  TWELVE  MEMBER  STATES 
This  outline  solution  would  only  apply  if the  Maastricht  Treaty  were  dropped  for 
one  reason  or another.  As  the  international,  economic  and  political  developments 
- which  were  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  the  Maastricht  Treaty negotiations  -
remain  unchanged,  it is  to  be  expected  that  steps  would  at  the  same  time  be  taken 
to  continue  the  co-operation provided  for  in  the Maastricht  Treaty. 
5.2.  OUTLINE  SOLUTION  2:  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  WITH  EFFECT  FOR  ELEVEN  MEMBER  STATES. 
EEA  AGREEMENT  WITH  EFFECT  FOR  DENMARK 
This  outline solution  would  involve  Denmark  negotiating Danish  withdrawal  from 
the  EC  with  the  11  Member  States.  Denmark  would  also  negotiate  Danish 
participation  In  the  EEA  with  the  11  EC  Member  States  and  the  7  EFTA  countries. 
The  outcome  of  these  negotiations  would  be  ratified  by  the  11  EC  Member  States, 
the  7  EFTA  Member  States  and  Denmark  in  ~ccordance with  their national 
constitutional  procedures. 
The  result  of  this  outline  solution would,  as  described  above,  be  that  Denmark's 
influence  on  decisions  concerning  the  areas  of  co-operation  covered 
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by  EEA  co-operation  would  be  considerably  reduced.  In addition,  there  is the 
fact  that  the  EEA  Agreement  does  not  include  fundamental  co-operation areas  such 
as  agricultural  policy,  fisheries  policy,  environmental  policy,  etc.  and 
participation  in  foreign  policy,  judicial  and  monetary  co-operation  is  confined 
to  the Member  States. 
It  cannot  be  ruled out  that  Denmark  may  be  able  to negotiate bilaterally with  the 
11  EC  Member  States  the  addition of  certain Annexes  to the  EEA  Agreement,  for 
example  concerning agriculture  and  fisheries.  It  is  to  be  expected  that  any  such 
negotiations  would  be  based  on  the  principle of national  funding  so  that  the 
negotiations  would  in actual  fact  be  concerned  with  access  to  the  11  EC  Member 
States'  markets  for agricultural  and  fishery products.  As  regards  fisheries 
there  would  also  have  to  be  negotiations  on  access  to  fishery  resources. 
5.3.  OUTLINE  SOLUTION  3:  AMENDMENT  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  WITH  EFFECT  FOR 
TWELVE  MEMBER  STATES 
This  outline solution would  in  fact  involve  renegotiation  of  the Maastricht 
Treaty.  The  result  would  be  that  the Treaty of  Rome  would  continue  to  apply  to 
the  12  Member  States  and  that  a  new  intergovernmental  conference  would  be 
convened. 
This  outline solution would  apply  in  a  situation where  the  other Member  States 
had  carried out  their ratification procedures  at  national  level  and  in some  cases 
effected  constitutional  changes.  In  the  Oslo  Declaration,  the  other  Member 
States stated their position that  the Maastricht  Treaty was  not  renegotiable. 
5.4.  OUTLINE  SOLUTION  4:  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  WITH  EFFECT  FOR  ELEVEN  MEMBER 
STATES.  THE  ROME  TREATY  APPLIES  TO  DENMARK 
This  outline solution would  mean  that  Denmark  would  not  ratify the Maastricht 
Treaty.  On  the  other hand,  Denmark  would  agree  to  the  11  Member  States 
implementing  the  Maastricht  Treaty following  ratification.  This  would  require  an 
international  agreement  between  the  12. 
As  stated  in Chapters  VII  and  VIII,  the  Maastricht  Treaty  was  negotiated  as  a 
Treaty  amending  and  supplementing  the  Treaty  of  Rome  and  that the Treaties are 
thus  intertwined. 
It  would  appear necessary  from  a  practical  and  legal  point  of  view for Denmark  to 
accept  the  amendments  which  the  Maastricht  Treaty  contains  with  regard  to  the 
decision-making procedures  and  the  institutions  and  which  cover  the  current  scope 
of  the  Treaty of  Rome. 
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It  is therefore  probable that  a  situation in which  it was  in practice necessary 
to  manage  one  legal  basis  for  the  Eleven,  i.e.  Li.1e  Maastricht  Treaty,  and  two 
legal  bases  for  Denmark,  i.e.  the  Treaty  of  Rome  and  certain horizontal 
provisions  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  would  result  in  considerable practical  and 
legal  confusion. 
The  present  outline  solution  simply  involves  Denmark  accepting  changes  to  the 
decision-making procedures  and  institutions  and  does  not  therefore  require 
Denmark  to  surrender more  of  its  sovereignty  in accordance  with  §  20  of  the 
Constitutional  Act.  Denmark  would  on  the  other hand  not  take part  in further 
development  of  the  Union,  e.g.  the  forthcoming  enlargement  negotiations  and 
Governmental  Conferences.  This  means  that  the  Eleven  Member  States  could  decide 
on  enlargements  and  greater co-operation without  Denmark  having  any  say. 
5.5.  OUTLINE  SOLUTION  5:  ADDITIONS  TO  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  WITH  EFFECT  FOR 
TWELVE  MEMBER  STATES 
Thls  outllne solution  involves  Denmark  ratifying  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and 
participating in co-operation  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  other Member  States. 
The  Twelve  Member  States  would  negotiate  certain additions  to  the 
Maastricht  Treaty,  in  order to  supplement  and  clarify its provisions. 
An  example  of  this  is  the  current  consideration being given  to  elaborating the 
"closeness" principle. 
Additions  could  take  the  most  appropriate  form  in each  individual  case. 
Moreover,  derived  or  secondary  EC  law  could  be  relevant.  It  can  for  example  be 
pointed  out  that  it would  be  relevant  to  look at  the  Council's  Rules  of  Procedure 
in  connection  with  the  question of  openness  in  the  Council. 
5.6.  OUTLINE  SOLUTION  6:  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  WITH  EFFECT  FOR  ELEVEN 
MEMBER  STATES 
This  outline solution  involves  Denmark  agreeing that  the  eleven  Member  States 
implement  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  cf.  outline  solution  4.  Denmark  would  negotiate 
and  ratify  a  special  arrangement.  That  would  cover  the  Treaty  of  Rome  but  differ 
from  outline solution  4  in  that  Denmark  would  agree  to parts  of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  which  substantively  amend  the Treaty of  Rome.  This  outline 
solution  does  not  involve  two  legal  bases  for  Denmark  unlike  outline solution 4. 
It  involves  one  legal  basis  for  Denmark,  i.e.  the  special  arrangement. 
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It  would  be possible  to  consider certain additions  concerning  Denmark  in 
connection with  the  special  arrangement. 
5.7.  OUTLINE  SOLUTION  7:  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  WITH  A SPECIAL  STATUS  FOR  DENMARK 
This  outline  solution,  like outline  solution  5,  involves  Denmark  ratifying the 
Maastricht  Treaty.  There  would  be  negotiations  between  Denmark  and  the  other 
eleven  Member  States  on  certain further special  rules  for  Denmark.  The  precise 
legal  form  would  have  to  be  negotiated.  Individual  additions  which  interpret  or 
clarify provisions  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty with  regard  to  Denmark  can  also  be 
discussed. 
5.8.  OUTLINE  SOLUTION  8:  MAASTRICHT  TREATY  WITH  EFFECT  FOR  THE  TWELVE.  POSSIBLE 
TIME  LIMIT  ON  DANISH  INVOLVEMENT 
This  outline solution  could  be  considered if Denmark  had  to  decide  to  ratify  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  in  the  light  of  the  new  situation obtaining when  the  other 
eleven  Member  States  have  applied  their national  constitutional procedures  and 
ratified  the  Treaty. 
It  should  be  noted  that  this  sort  of participation in  the  Maastricht  Treaty  could 
be  limited  in  time  so  that  Denmark  can  re-assess  the situation at  some  subsequent 
date.  This  could  be  achieved  through  the  law  which  the  Danish  Parliament  adopts 
as  a  basis  for  ratification by  Denmark. 
6.  GENERAL  COMMENTS 
The  above  8  outline solutions  raise  three  further  questions,  namely  the 
consequences  for  Denmark,  the  consequences  for  the  eleven Member  States  and  the 
question  of  a  time  limit. 
Regarding  the  consequences  for  Denmark,  it should  be  noted  that  the  bill 
concerning  Denmark's  accession  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty has  been  dropped 
following  the  result  of  the  referendum  on  2  June  1992.  Leaving  aside  the 
situation in outline  solution  1,  the  Government  would  in  the'7  other situations 
have  to  submit  a  new  bill to  the  Danish  Parliament,  which  would  in any  case  be 
dealt  with  on  the  basis  of  §  19  of  the  Constitutional  Act  and  in  the  case  of  some 
of  the  outline  solutions  on  the  basis  of  §  20  of  the  Constitutional  Act. 
Regarding  the  consequences  for  the  other eleven  Member  States,  reference  should 
be  made  to  Chapter  VI  concerning their ratification procedures.  Whether  or not 
new  ratification procedures  were  necessary would  depend  on  the particular outcome 
of negotiations.  A provisional  assessment  suggests  that  in the  case  of  those 
outline solutions  (1,  2,  4  and  6)  where  Denmark  does  not  ratify the 
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Maastricht Treaty,  it is  to  be  expected  that  most  of  the  other Member  States 
would  have  to  ratify  a  second  time,  possibly using  a  simplified  and  therefore 
swifter procedure.  In  :he  case  of  those  outline  solutions  where  Denmark  does 
ratify the Maastricht  Treaty  (5,  7  and  8),  this  would  have  to  depend  on  more 
detailed  assessment  of  the  outcome  of negotiations. 
Regarding  the  question of  a  time  limit,  it should  be  noted  that  insofar as 
Denmark  would  have  to  enjoy  conditions  other  than  those  applying  to  the  Eleven 
Member  States,  it is  probable  that  most  of  the  other Member  States  would  in  the 
nature of  things  want  a  time  limit  on  such  conditions.  This  could  be  achieved 
either by  a  date  or by  an  event  (such  as  enlargement  or until  the  next 
Governmental  Conference).  In  exchange,  Denmark  would  be  given  the  option of  a 
s1mplified procedure  for  accession  to  full  co-operation.  This  could  be  done 
e.g.  by  application of  a  "Faeroes"  clause  (Article  227(5)(a)  of  the  Treaty  of 
R  )  (13)  orne  . 
(13)  That  provision  reads  as  follows: 
"This  Treaty  shall  not  apply  to  the  Faeroe  Islands.  The  Government  of  the 
Kindgom  of  Denmark  may,  however,  give notice,  by  a  declaration deposited  by 
31  December  1975  at  the  latest  with  the  Government  of  the  Italian Republic, 
which  shall  transmit  a  certified copy  thereof  to  each  of  the  Governments  of 
the  other Member  States,  that  this Treaty shall  apply  to  those  Islands.  In 
that  event,  this Treaty  shall  apply  to  those  Islands  from  the first  day  of 
the  second  month  following  the  deposit  of  the  declaration." 
The  declaration  referred  to  in  the  provision  has  not  been  made. 
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CHAPTER  X 
PROSPECTS  FOR  EUROPEAN  CO-OPERATION 
Since  1947  European  co-operation  in  both  the  economic  and  foreign  policy  spheres 
has  been  moving  1n  the  direction of  increasing  integration.  This  has  not  been  a 
smooth  process,  but  viewed  over  the  last  45  years  the  tendency  has  been  quite 
clear.  It  is  also  very  obvious  that  moves  in this direction have  been  stepped  up 
in  the  last  few  years  - the  Single  European  Act,  consideration of  the  future  role 
of  the  Western  European  Ur-ion  (WEU)  and  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
Another  striking aspect  is  the  enlargement  of  the  EC.  From  the  founding  of  the 
Coal  and  Steel  Commun1ty  in  1952  unt1l  1972  (a  per1od  of  20  years)  there  existed 
what  may  be  described  as  the  European  Economic  Community  of  the  same  six 
countr1es  -Germany,  France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg.  On 
1  January  1973  the  EC  was  enlarged  to  include  the  United  Kingdom  and  Ireland.  On 
1  January  1981  the  EC  was  enlarged  to  include  Greece.  On  1  January  1986  the  EC 
was  enlarged  to  include  Spain  and  Portugal. 
In  recent  years,  the  EFTA  countries,  Austria,  Sweden,  Finland  and  Switzerland 
have  appl1ed  for  membership  of  the  EC.  Turkey,  Cyprus  and  Malta  have  also 
applied.  Th1s  means  that  seven  countries  are  currently apply1ng.for  membershlp 
of  the  EC. 
The  EC  has  concluded  Association  Agreements  ("Europe  Agreements")  with  Poland, 
Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia.  These  Agreements  contain  a  clause  which  prepares  the 
way  for  membershlp.  They  do  not  specify  any  timetables  or  conditions  for  such 
membersh1p. 
At  the  meeting  of  the  European  Counc1l  in  Lisbon  in June  1992,  it was  stated  that 
the  agreement  on  greater co-operation with  the  EFTA  countries  had  paved  the  way 
for  openir.g  access1on  negotiations  with  those  EFTA  countries  seek1ng  membershlp. 
It  was  also  stated  that  such  negotiations  should  lead  to  an  early  conclusion. 
Official  negotiation  would  be  opened  immediately  after the ·Maastricht  Trea1y  was 
ratified  and  agreement  had  been  achieved  on  the  future  financ1ng  of  the  EC 
IDelors  II  Package). 
On  th1s  basis,  the  conceivable  develop~ents  in  the  1990s  are  as  follows: 
- Failure  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  to  enter  into  force  will  be  tantamount  to 
placing  a  question  mark  over  the  last  45  years  of  co-operation  and  integration 
1n  European  economics  and  politics.  ln  s~ch a  situation it is  to  be  expected 
that  co-operation within  the  EC  would  continue.  It  cannot,  however,  be  ruled 
out  that  it will  become  more  and  more  difficult  to  ensure 
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that  Member  States  comply  With  the  principles  and  concrete  rules  of  the  Treaty. 
Th1s  could  happen  In  a  situation where  one  or more  Member  States  consider 
re-or1entat1ng  thelr interests  as  a  consequence-of  such  a  development.  It  is 
far  from  certa1n  that  there  would  be  the  political will  to  carry  out 
enlargement  of  the  EC  in  such  a  situation.  The  extent  and  degree  to  which  such 
lncipient  renat1onalization  would  prevail  over  current  co-operation  is  very 
difficult  to  assess  at  the  present  time. 
- If  the  Maastricht  Treaty  does  not  enter into  force,  a  core  group  of  European 
States will  probably  emerge  as  wishing  to  continue  economic  and  political 
1ntegration.  That  might  be  possible  on  the  basis  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
Those  European  States  which  did  not  wish  to  take  part  in  such  a  development 
would  join in  a  looser association  through  a  process  of  negotiation which  could 
take  a  number  of  years.  Such  a  development  would  involve  the  European  States 
gradually  separating to  form  a  number  of  groups  depending  on  the  extent  to 
wh1ch  they participated  1n  the  process  of  ever-closer  European  co-operation. 
- If political  agreement  IS  reached  by  the  Twelve  Member  States  and  the  future 
new  members  about  the  degree  of  economic  and  polltical  Integration which  should 
form  the  basis  for  European  co-operatlon  founded  on  the  existing  EC,  all 
members  - both  old  and  new  - will  have  the  same  status  With  the  same  r1ghts  and 
obligations.  This  approach  formed  the  framework  for  enlargement  of  the  EC  In 
1973,  1981  and  1986.  That  is  the  approach  beh1nd  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  the 
approach  on  which  EC  Member  States  and  applicant  countries  have  hitherto  based 
their thinking. 
- The  Maastricht  Treaty will  enter  into  force  at  the  same  t1me  as  its practical 
application  adjusts  to  changed  condltions  and  new  currents  in  the  European 
picture.  Th1s  was  made  clear by  the  referenda  1n  Denmark  and  France.  It  is 
also  shown  by  the  1ncreasing  interest  in  concepts  such  as  greater democratic 
control,  more  decentralization  and  greater  closeness  as  well  as  greater 
openness  and  more  transparency  in  the  decision-maklng process.  Both  the 
President  of  the  Commiss1on  and  a  number  of political  leaders  from  the 
Member  States  have  seen  the  necessity  of  changing  course  In  this  way  in order 
to  allay people's  fear  of  a  decision-making  process  whic~ 1s  controlled  by  a 
small  el1te  over  the  heads  of  the  people.  There  seems  to  be  increasing 
awareness  that  this  problem  must  be  solved  in  a  way  which  ensures  that  the  EC 
and/or  the  European  Union  are  seen  by  the  cit1zens  of  the  Member  States  as 
bod1es  wh1ch  solve  a  number  of  problems  that  are  important  to  them.  Questions 
of  this  nature  could  be  solved  In  the  actual  text  of  the  Treaty  or elsewhere 
(add1t1ons  to  the  text,  etc.).  A comblnation  of  both  possibilities  could  be 
envisaged. 
The  ab1l1ty  to  deal  With  Member  States'  problems  while  at  the  same  time 
cont1nu1ng  and  developing  co-operat1on  has  also  been  demonstrated  in  specific 
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f1elds.  For  example,  EMS  co-operation  since  1979  has  been  forged  outside  the 
framework  of  the  EC  Treaties.  The  small  group  of  countries  originally 
participating in  such  co-operation  (fixed  exchange  rates)  was  gradually extended 
to  1nclude  eleven  of  the  total  of  twelve  Member  States.  In  the  week  before  the 
French  referendum,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Italy had  to  abandon  co-operation  on 
fixed  exchange  rates  (ERM).  Both  countries stated  that  they  wished  to  rejoin at 
a  later  time.  Eight  of  the  Member  States  have  joined  in  a  specific  form  of 
co-operation  (Schengen  Agreements)  on  greater co-operation  in  the matter of 
movements  across  frontiers,  etc.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  includes  a  special 
Protocol  for  the  United  Kingdom  concerning  the  section  on  improving  conditions  on 
the  employment  market  and  in  connection  with  that  market  (the  social  dimension). 
The  Danish  Protocol  and  the  United  Kingdom  Protocol  on  Economic  and  Monetary 
Union  come  into  the  same  category. 
It  1s  not  therefore  in principle unknown  in  the  EC  for  one  or more  Member  States 
to  be  granted  special  status.  Such  status  has  in previous  cases  been  recognized 
and  1n  the  present  case  negotiated at  the  time  when  the  Member  States  decided  to 
press  ahead  with  co-operation  in  the  field  in question.  Such  special  status  has 
also  been  given  to  one  or more  countries  in  specific well-defined areas.  At  the 
same  time,  moreover,  decisions  have  been  taken  in  this  connection which  make  it 
possible  for  the other Member  States  to  continue  developing  co-operation 
irrespective  of  the  special  status of  one  or more  countries.  Finally,  1t  has  in 
all  cases  been  laid  down  tha~  Member  States having special  status may  give  up 
that  status  and  jo1n  in  conti~uing co-operation  involving  the  other  Member 
States. 
Co-operatlon  from  1952  until  1958  within  the  framework  of  the  European  Coal  and 
Steel  Community  and  from  1958  until  the  present  within  the  framework  of  the 
Treaty of  Rome  has  proved  its ability to  overcome  crises.  This  was  shown  in  1954 
when  France  was  not  able  to  ratify  the  draft  Treaty on  the  European  Defence 
Commun1ty.  It  was  demonstrated  in  the  early  1960s  when  the  first  negotiations  on 
enlargement  of  the  EC  failed.  It  was  shown  again  for  a  year  and  a  half after 
1965  when  France  pursued  the  empty  chair policy.  It  was  demonstrated  in 
1974-1975  when  the  United  Kingdom  raised  the  question  of  the  conditions  govern1ng 
1ts  access1on  including United  Kingdom  payments  to  the  EC  tiudget  and  again  1n 
negot1ations  on  the  United  Kingdom's  position regarding  the  EC  budget  1n  the 
1980s.  These  experiences  show  that  there  is  a  strong will  to  overcome 
d1ff1culties  in order to  maintain  the  results  achieved  and  be  able  to  continue 
w1th  co-operation. 
If  trends  in  the  1990s  are  assessed  1n  the  light  of  the  experience  acquired,  1t 
seems  likely that  the  next  ten  years  will  be  characterized  by  a  number  of  major 
rounds  of negotiations,  one  of  which  has  already  been  arranged  for  1996.  It  is 
also  to  be  expected  that  there will  be  ongoing  adjustments  and  adaptations  tc.  a 
greater extent  than  before  in  order  to  deal  with  new  tendencies  and  consequently 
also  new  requests  for  co-operation.  It  is not  certain that  all  Member  States 
will  part1cipate  in  every  aspect  of  co-operation;  but  it is  to  be  assumed  that 
any  actual  ncn-particlpation  in aspects  of  co-operation  must  be  negotiated  at  the 
time  when  the  relevant  Treaty  or similar agreement  is  concluded.  The  political 
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des1re  1s  to  keep  all  Member  States  involved  together  1n  the  central  aspects  of 
co-operat1on.  This  will  also  be  the  case  when  enlargement  to  include  the 
EFTA  countr1es  enters  the  p1cture.  It  is  clear that  the  EC  is  not  thinking  1n 
terms  of  anything  less  than  full  and  total  membership  for  the  EFTA  countries. 
Neither  the  Comm1ss1on's  statements  on  Article  237  of  the  Treaty  nor political 
statements  by  the  Member  States  give  any  support  for  the  view  that  access1on  of 
the  EFTA  countries  could  involve  anything other  than full  membership  with  the 
correspond1ng  r1ghts  and  obligations.  The  fragmentat1on  of  co-operatlon  between 
the  Member  States  into  two  or  more  groups  could  occur  only  in  the  event  - and 
with  the  effect  - of  happenings  in relations  between  the  Member  States  so  drastic 
that  1t  w1ll  become  necessary  to  envisage  quite  substantive  changes  not  only  to 
present  plans  for  developing  co-operation,  including the  Maastricht  Treaty,  but 
also  to  established  and  already existing forms  of  co-operation. 
D1scuss1on  1n  recent  months  1n  the  Member  States  and  a  number  of  applicant 
countries  indicates  that  the  elaborat1on  of  a  pol1tical  decision-making  process 
wh1ch  satisfies  the  desire  for greater  transparency  of  the  process  and  the 
allocat1on  of  responsibility is high  on  the  agenda  for  the  next  few  years.  Th1s 
quest1on  had  not  hitherto  assumed  a  high profile  - or at  least  not  to  the  extent 
wh1ch  occurred  after the  Danish  and  French  referenda.  It  is hardly  by  chance 
that  such  demands  are  being  made  at  the  very  t1me  when  the  Maastricht  Treaty  1s 
po1sed  to  launch  a  process  of  European  1ntegration.  It  seems  natural  and 
inevitable  that  dec1sions  of  the  type  which,  perhaps  not  immediately  but  possibly 
later,  the  Maastr1cht  Treaty will  enta1l,  should  be  subject  to  greater democrat1c 
control  than  dec1s1ons  within  the  framework  of  the  known  Commun1ty. 
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ANNEX 
TIMETABLE  FOR  THE  PROGRESSIVE  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  MAASTRICHT  TREATY 
1992 
Number  of  Commissioners/Members  of  the  European  Parliament  (Declaration}: 
-to be  discussed  by  31.12.1992 
Decision  on  the seat of  the  EMI  (EMI  statute}: 
-to be  decided  by  31.12.1992 
Accession  to/observer status  in  WEU  (WEU  Declaration of  the Nine): 
-discussions  to  be  completed  by  31.12.1992 
Asylum  (Declaration): 
- harmonization  of  asylum  policy  aspects  by  beginning  of  1993. 
1993 
Asylum  (Declaration): 
-Council  to  discuss  transition  to  1st  pillar by  31.12.1993. 
Right  to  vote  and  stand  as  candidate  in elections  to  European  Parliament 
(Article 8b(2)): 
-relevant  provisions  to  be  adopted  by  31.12.1993. 
Diplomatic  consular protection of  Union  citizens  (Article 8e): 
-Member  States  to  draw  up  rules  by  31.12.1993. 
Cohesion  fund  (Article  130d}: 
-to be  set  up  by  31. 12.1993. 
Right  to  information  from  EC  institutions  (Declaration): 
- CommlSSlon  to  submit  report  no  later than  1993. 
Institution of  EC  ombudsman  (Article  138e). 
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Second  stage of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (Article  109e): 
-to be  introduced  on  1.1.1994 
ray/HM/kr 
Ban  on  privileged access  to financial  institutions  (Article  104a): 
- complementlng provisions  by  1.1.1994 
Right  to vote  and  stand as  candidate  in municipal  elections  (Article Bb): 
-relevant prov1sions  to  be  adopted  by  31.12.1994 
Police co-operation  (Declaration): 
- whether  to  extend  such  co-operation  to  be  discussed  in  1994. 
1995 
Removal  of restrictions on  capital movements  (Article  73e): 
- derogat1ons  to  end  on  31.12.1995 
Visas  (Article  100c): 
- prov1s1ons  on  un1form  format  by  31.12.1995 
Cohes1on  (Article  130b): 
- Comm1ssion  to  submit  report  end  of  1995/beginnlng of  1996. 
1996 
Visas  (Article  100c): 
-transition to  qualified-majority decisions  in Council  on  1.1.1996 
Organizational  framework  of  the  ESCB  (Article  109f): 
-to be  laid  down  by  the  EMI  by  1.1.1996 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (Article  109j(3)): 
- European  Council  possibly  to  set  date  for  beg1nning  of  third  stage 
Evalution  of  Common  Foreign  and  Security Policy  (Articles J.4 and  J.10): 
- report  to  European  Counc1l  in  1996 
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New  Intergovernmental  conference,  rev1s1on  of  the  Treaty  (Article  N(2)): 
The  following  Articles  of  the  Treaty  on  Euro9ean  Union  contain  provisions  which 
may  be  d1scussed  at  the  1ntergovernemental  conference  scheduled  for  1996: 
- Art1cle  8(5) 
- Artlcles  J.4  and  J. 10 
- Declarat1on  No  1 
- Artlcle  189b  (8) 
- Declaration  No  16. 
1998 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (Article  109j(4)): 
- conf1rmat1on  by  1.7.1998  of  which  Member  States  can  part1c1pate  1n  the  third 
stage. 
1999 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (Article  109j(4)): 
- thlrd  stage  to  beg1n  on  1. 1.1999  unless  an  earl1er date  has  been  set. 
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ANNEX  2 
EFTA  COUNTRIES'  RATIFICATION  PROCEDURES  IN  CONNECTION  WITH  POSSIBLE  ACCESSION  TO 
THE  EUROPEAN  UNION 
General: 
The  following  is  an  account  of  the  ratification procedures  for  accession  to  the 
European  Community  in  the  four  EFTA  countries  which  have  already applied  for 
membership,  i.e.  Sweden,  Finland,  Austria  ana  Switzerland,  together  with  Norway 
wh1ch  1s  expected  to  apply  for membership  at  the  end  of the year.  The  countries 
are  treated  individually but  in  such  a  way  ttat it should  be  possible  to  compare 
the  ratification procedures  of all  five  EFTA  countries. 
For  the  sake  of  clarity 1t  is pointed  out  that  the  European  Council  stipulated at 
its meeting  in  Lisbon  on  26  and  27  June  1992  that  applicant  States must  negotiate 
on  membershlp  of  the  European  Union  rather  than  of  the  European  Community. 
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Finland 
Finnish  accession  to  the  European  Community  and  the  concomitant  surrender of 
legislative,  executive  and  JUdicial  powers  cannot  occur without  adJustment  of  the 
Finnish  constitution currently  in  force.  Where  Parliament  adopts  a 
constitutional  amendment  on  third  reading  by  a  simple  maJority,  it must  be 
confirmed  by  at  least  two-thirds  of  the  votes  cast  in Parliament  after Parliament 
reconvenes  following  fresh  elections  in order  to  enter  into  force. 
It  should,  however,  be  pointed  out  that  the  Finnish constitution provides  for  the 
possibility of  the  relevant  constitutional  amendment  being declared  urgent  by 
five-sixths  of  votes  cast,  whereupon  it can  be  adopted  by  the  same  Parliament  by 
two-thirds  of  the  votes  cast  for  immediate  entry  into  force. 
Finland  has  no  constitutional  provision  requiring  a  referendum  on  Finland's 
accession  to  the  EC.  However,  the  Finnish  government  has  announced  that,  when 
the  final  negotiation  results  are  in  due  course  available,  the  people  Will  be 
given  the  opportunity  to  express  their opinion  In  a  referendum.  A Finnish  law  on 
accession  to  the  European  Community  must  be  adopted  by  Parliament  by  at  least 
two-thirds  of  the  votes  cast. 
The  constitutional  law  Situation of  Finnish  entry  into  the  EC  IS  currently  being 
examined  by  a  parliamentary  committee  which  will  In  due  course  submit  specific 
proposals  on  the  procedure  to  be  followed. 
The  new  law  on  self-government  for  Aland,  which  enters  into  force  on 
1  January  1993,  provides  as  follows:  where  a  provision  of  an  international  treaty 
concluded  by  Finland  conflicts  with  the  law  on  self-government  for  Aland,  a  law 
on  the matter  must  be  enacted  for  the  provision  to  be  valid  for  Aland.  The  law 
must  be  adopted  by  Parliament  in accordance  with  rules  67  and  69  of its rules  of 
procedure  and  by  the  Lagting  of  Aland  by  at  least  two-thirds  of  the  votes  cast. 
SN  4364/92  El - 207  -
ray/HM/kr 
Norway 
Under  the  Norwegian  constitution  a  decision  on  accession  to  the  EC  Will  require  a 
maJority  of  three-quarters  of  the votes  cast  in  Parliament  with  at  least 
two-thirds  of  the  member5  present. 
The  Norwegian  constitution  does  not  provide  for  the  referendum  instrument.  There 
is  however  nothing  In  the  constitution to  prevent  the  holding of  a  referendum  on 
Norway's  accession  to  the  European  Comfllunity,  and  there  is polltical  agreement 
that  such  a  referendum  sh~uld be  conducted.  According  to  the  Norwegain 
constitution a  referendu~ on  accession  to  the  EC  is nonetheless  not  binding  s~nce 
the  authority  to  transfer state powers  to  an  international  alliance  is vested 
solely  in  Parliament  (acting  by  a  three-quarters  majority  as  already stated).  To 
make  such  a  referendum  legally binding it would  therefore  be  necessary  to  carry 
out  a  constitutional  amendment  under  the  conditions  described  below. 
Whether  a  possible  referendum  has  a  consultative  or binding  character has  proved 
to  be  a  politically relevant  question  in  the  recent  EC  debate  in  Norway  because 
some  parties  and  individual  members  on  the  "no"  side  in  Parliament  have  stated 
that  they  would  not  necessarily,  in  their voting  on  Norwegian  accession  to  the 
EC,  abide  by  a  "yes"  from  a  consultative  referendum. 
The  question  has  been  asked  In  the  Norwegian  EC  debate  whether  Norwegian 
accession  to  the  European  Community  can  be  carried out  under  the  present 
constitution or whether  a  consitutional  amendment  is required.  In  this 
connection  much  stress  has  been  placed,  as  In  the  Danish  debate,  on  whether 
accession  Involves  a  transfer  of  powers  in more  than  "an obJectively  limited 
area"  (Article  93  of  the  constitution). 
The  deadline  for  submission of proposals  for  constitutional  amendments  for 
adoption  in  the  1993-1997  legislative period  expired  on  30  September  1992.  By 
that  date  no  less  than  14  proposals  had  been  submitted  by  various  members  of 
Parliament  solely  for  amending  Article  93  of  the  constitution.  Together,  the 
proposed  amendments,  which  are partly  formulated  as  alternatives,  touch  upon  all 
the  abovementioned  questions.  In addition,  several  of  the  proposals  involve  a 
reduction  from  three-quarters  to  two-thirds  in  the  required  qualified majority  In 
Parliament. 
Under  the  constltUtion the  proposals  submitted  cannot  be  examined  until  after the 
next  parliamentary  elections  In  September  1993.  The  substantive  aspects  of  the 
indlVIdual  proposals  will  be  ~iscussed and  where  appropriate  adopted  complete  and 
unchanged  by  the  Parli3ment  e1ected  at  that  time.  The  adoption  of  constitutional 
amendments  requ1res  the  support  of  two-thirds  of  the  memoers  of  Parliament. 
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It  should  be  noted  that  neither in  the  consitution nor  anywhere  else  in  Norwegian 
legislation  are  deadlines  laid  down  for  ratificaton procedures  or  referenda. 
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Switzerland 
Swiss  accession  to  the  European  Community  requires  no  amendment  of  the 
const1tut1on. 
Once  the  accession  negot1at1ons  are  completed  the  government  will  submit  a  report 
to  Parliament  proposing that  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  be  ratified.  The 
announcement  must  be  examined  and  adopted  unchanged  by  a  simple  majority  in  the 
two  chambers  of  the  National  Assembly:  the  National  Assembly  and  the  Cantonal 
Council  (whlch  consists  of  two  members  from  each  canton  directly elected  by  the 
citizens of  the  cantons).  Proposals  for  amendments  cannot  be  submitted.  The 
ratification procedure  is  in practice  almost  the  same  as  the  procedure  for 
amending  the  constitution. 
The  Swiss  constitutlon prescribes  both  a  national  referendum  and  cantonal 
referenda  for  Swiss  accession  to  the  European  Community.  In  the  national 
referendum  the  accession bill  must  be  adopted  by  simple  majority  of  the  votes 
cast  throughout  the  country  and  there  must  at  the  same  time  be  a  majority  in  a 
maJorlty  of  the  cantons.  The  cantonal  referenda  are  thus  not  referenda  of  the1r 
own  so  much  as  a  method  of  measuring  whether  there  is  agreement  evenly  throughout 
Switzerland.  There  must  therefore  be  a  simple  majority  in  13  and  a  half  cantons. 
There  are  26  cantons,  of which  six are  semi-cantons  each  accounting  for  one  half 
when  the  maJOrlty  is  made  up  in obligatory national  referenda. 
The  entire ratification procedure  can  be  assumed  to  take  bet~Jeen  ten  and  twelve 
months. 
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Sweden 
Sweden's  accession  to  the  EC  requires  an  amendment  to  the  SwediSh  constitution. 
The  possibility of  surrendering  sovereignty in  the  Swedish  constitution is  not 
suffiCiently extensive  to  include  EC  membership.  It only  enables  sovereignty  to 
be  transferred  to  a  limited  extent  to  International  organizations  for  peaceful 
co-operation  (I.e.  to  organizations  similar  to  the  UN  or  to  international 
courts).  The  timetable  for  Sweden's  ratification of  the  law  on  accession  to  the 
European  Community  will  be  determined  by  the  procedure  for  amending  the 
constitution. 
A proposal  for  the  amendment  of  the  constitution  must  be  adopted  by  Parliament 
twice  with  an  Intervening  parliamentary  election.  The  first  submission  must 
occur at  the  latest  9  months  before  the  election.  The  second  adoption  takes 
place after  the  parliamentary election has  taken  place.  Adoption  in  Parliament 
IS  by  simple  majority. 
The  Swedish  government  has  set  itself the  goal  of  Sweden's  accession  to  the  EC  on 
1  January  1995.  If  this  timetable  IS  to  be  adhered  to,  the  constitutional 
amendment  must  be  submitted  to  Parliament  for  the  first  time  no  later than 
18  December  1993,  I.e.  nine  months  prior to  the  next  ordinary parliamentary 
election  on  18  September  1994.  The  ratification procedure  could  under  these 
circumstances  take  about  one  year. 
It  would  be  possible  to  shorten  the  ratification period  if an  extraordinary 
parliamentary  election  were  held  between  the  two  votes  in  Parliament.  The 
constitution  could  then  be  amended  Independently  of  the  set  dates  for  ordinary 
parliamentary  elections.  It  would  also  be  possible  for  the  constitutional 
committee  to  exempt  a  proposal  for  constitutional  amendment  from  the  requirement 
that  It  be  laid  before  Parliament  no  later than  nine  months  before  an  election. 
The  Swedish  constitution provides  for  the  possibilty of  holding  both  consultativ 
and  binding  referenda.  A consultative  referendum  may  In  principle  be  held  at  any 
time.  A decision  to  hold  a  consultative  referendum  1s  taken  by  Parliament  by 
adopting  a  law  on  the  matter.  Binding  referenda  can  be  held  on  certain subJects 
(constitutional  amendments,  approval  of  binding  international  agreements 
requ1r1ng  constitutional  amendments,  and  in  the  event  of  a  surrender  of 
soverelgnty). 
In  all  three  cases  the  same  rules  for·conducting  the  referendum  apply.  Where  at 
least  one-tenth  of  the  members  of  Parliament  submit  a  proposal  to  that  effect, 
and  at  least  one-third  of  members  vote  for  it,  a  bind1ng  referendum  must  be  held. 
An  application  for  the  holding  of  a  referendum  must  be  submitted  no  later than 
fifteen  days  after Parliament  adopts  the  relevant  proposal  for  the  first  time. 
Binding  referenda  must  be  held  at  the  same  time  as  parliamentary elections.  A 
proposal  is  rejected  where  the  maJority  of  those  voting  vote  against  the  proposal 
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and  constitute  more  than  half  of  those  who  cast  valid  votes  at  the  concurrent 
parllamentary elections,  otherwise  the  proposal  becomes  the  subject  of  definitive 
decision  in  Parliament. 
The  government  and  the  opposition  agree  that  there  should  be  a  referendum  on 
Sweden's  accesslon  to  the  EC.  It  remains  to  be  decided  whether  the  referendum 
should  be  blnding or consultative.  Should  it be  dec1ded  that  the  referendum  1s 
to  be  binding,  it will  have  to  be  held  in conjunction  with  the  parliamentary 
election on  18  September  1994  if the government's  ambition  that  Sweden  should 
become  an  EC  member  on  1  January  1995  is  to  be  fulfilled. 
Once  the  ccnstitutional  amendment  and  the  referendum  have  been  carried out, 
Parliament  will  be  able  before  the  end  of  1994  to  vote  on  the  law  on  Sweden's 
accession  to  the  EC,  dealing  wlth  the  transfer of  sovereignty.  The  preparations 
for this  vote  can  take  place  in parallel with Parliament's  proceedings  on  the 
amendment  of  the  constitution. 
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Austria 
The  Austr1an  const1tut1on  cons1sts  partly  of  an  actual  const1tut1on  dating  from 
1920  Wlth  subsequent  amendments  and  partly of  a  number  of  laws  and  sect1ons  of 
laws  with  const1tutional  force.  Austria's  accession  to  the  European  Community 
affects  fundamental  constitut1onal  matters,  and  a  referendum  is  therefore 
obl1gatory  under  the  Austr1an  constitut1on. 
Once  Austria's  accession negotiat1ons  with  the  EC  are  completed,  an  enabling b1ll 
on  Austria's  accession  to  the  EC  1s  expected  to  be  laid  before  the  Austrian 
Parl1ament,  where  the  Nat1onal  Council  (the  popularly  elected  chamber  w1th 
183  members)  must  adopt  the  bill  by  a  two-thlrds  majority  of  votes  cast.  The 
b1ll  must  then  be  adopted  by  the  same  maJority  by  the  Federal  Council  (whose 
63  members  are  elected  by  the  parl1aments  of  the  federal  states). 
The  bill  w1ll  subsequently  be  submitted  to  the  people  in  a  referendum.  The 
referendum,  wh1ch  1s  b1nding,  requ1res  only  a  s1mple  majority  of  votes  cast. 
There  is  thus  no  requ1rement  concern1ng  the  s1ze  of  the  turnout. 
Follow1ng  the  referendum  the  bill  (providing  1t  has  not  been  reJected)  w1ll  be 
la1d  before  the  Federal  Pres1dent.  Once  he  has  signed  1t  the  enabl1ng  act  -with 
constitut1onal  force  - w1ll  be  deemed  to  have  been  definltively  adopted  and  the 
actual  rat1f1cat1on  procedure  under  international  law  can  then  beg1n. 
After  the  referendum,  the  proposal  for  an  accession treaty  - which  w1ll  have  been 
d1scussed  by  the  two  chambers  of  Parl1ament  either prior to  or  concurrently  with 
the  adopt1on  of  the  enabl1ng bill  - w1ll  be  la1d  first  before  the  Nat1onal 
Counc1l  and  then  before  the  Federal  Counc1l.  Both  chambers  must  adopt  the 
proposal  by  a  two-thlrds  maJOrlty of votes  cast.  With  the  Federal  Pres1dent's 
s1gnature  of  the  accession  treaty,  authorization  to  ratify  is  s1multaneously 
given.  However,  It  cannot  be  ruled  out  that  the  two  chambers  may  decide  to  adopt 
the  access1on  treaty  proposal  before  the  referendum,  but  this  does  not  alter the 
fact  that  ratif1cation  cannot  take  place  until  after  the  referendum. 
Since  there  are  by  and  large  no  set  deadlines  for  the  ind1vidual  stages  of  the 
procedure,  the  ent1re  procedure  can  be  conducted  with1n  three  or  four  months. 
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ANNEX  3 
Progress of ratification procedures  from  May  to Ju1y  1992 
National  Constitu- iv1ay  June  July 
decision  tional 
on ratifi- amendments 
ca~ion 
Denmark  No  None  12.5.92  2.6.92· 
Adoption  Heferen-
by  dum 
Parliament 
Bel~ium  To  be  made  17.7.9:2 
after  Adoption 
ratifi- ~f rati-
cation  fication 
bill by 
Chamber  of 
Deputies 
. 
France  Yes  Yes  23.6.92 
AmenO.ment  - of \.:url- .  stitution 
- 31.7.92.  Greece  Yes  N0nP. 
'  Ratifi-
I  cation 
Nether- None  Council o 
lands  State 
positive 
opinion 
Ireland  (Yes)  Yes  5.5.92·  18.6.92. 
Bill on  .Ket'er-
consti- en  dum 
tutional 
amendment 
SN  4364/92 
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-
National  Constitutiona  May  June  July 
decision  on  t~mendments 
ratificat1on 
Italy  To  be  made 
after 
ratiflcat1on 
Luxem- Yes  Before  end  Co unci 1  of  2.7.92: 
bourg  of  1994  State:_  Ratifi-
positive  cation 
ORin_ion 
Portugal  To  be  made 
after 
ratlffcation 
Spain  Yes  30.7.92: 
constitution 
al  amend-
ment  adopted 
United  None  First and 
Kinqdom  second 
reading  in 
House  of 
Commons 
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National  Constitutional  May  June  July 
decision  on  .!mendments 
ratification 
Germany  Yes  21.7.92: 
Federal 
Government 
approved 
constitutiona 
:~.mendment 
:ind 
ratification 
ili 11 
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Progress  of ratification procedure  from  August  to December  1992 
August  September  October  November  December 
Denmark 
i 
Belgium  Discussion 
in Senate. 
~atification 
::xpected to 
be  completed 
in October 
France  20.9.92: 
Referendum 
Greece 
Nether- E;xamination  Examin-
lands  in Second  at  ion 
Chamber  end~  completed 
in Upper 
I  Chamber. 
l 
~iatific-
ation by 
::nd  of 
:rear 
- -
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August  September  @ctober  November  December 
I--
Ireland  Ratific-
ation  by 
both 
Chambers 
of 
Parliamen1 
I 
It.aJ..v  16.9.92  Chamber  of 
Adoption of Deputies 
ratificatior begins 
bill by  ·=xamination 
Senate  of bill 
-
Luxembou.r ~ 28.8.92 
Deposit 
of 
ratific-
at  ion 
instrument 
Portugal  Ratificatio 
discussion 
begins 
'  I 
I 
Spain  Examination  Examinatio  I 
by  Congress  by Senate. 
expected to Ratific-
be·  !it  ion 
~oncluded  expected 
to be 
concluded 
in 
November 
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August  !November  -- September  October  December 
-- -
United 
Kingdom 
Germany  Constitu- Constitu- Ratifica-
tional  tional  tion by 
amendment  amendment  Bundesrat 
and ratifi- and ratifi- and 
cation  cation  Bundestag 
bills laid  bills  Ratifi-
before  brought  cation 
Bundesrat  before  expected 
Bundestag  before 
end  of 
year 
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ADEX  5  Oecis1on-making  procedure  (1)  Art.  189b  (co-decision  procedure)  and  Art.  189c  (co-operation  procedure), 
cf.  Art.  189a  (role of  Commission) 
Art.  189c 
reje:ct  2) 
Commission  submits  proposal 
l 
Europea~ Parliament  del1vers  Opinion 
Council  adopts  cdmmon  oosition. 
I  . 
Sent  to  European  Parl1ament  with  full  information 
from  Council  and  Conmission 
European  Pilrl i'!melnt' s  C~:>t~':!~$  d::pend  on  p1·ocedure  (3) · 
approve  I 
coi!iilon  position/ 
no  action 
I 
Council  adopts 
no facti on/ 
approve 
I  Council 
Art.  189b 
indicate 
that  intends 
to  reject  (  2) 
co!ncil  may 
propose  amendments  (2} 
Commi),,,n '''""''' 
its  re-examined 
proposa 1  to  Counc i 1 , 
giving  opinion  on 
European  Parliament 
amendments  not 
accepted  (3) 
Council 
may  (  3'~ 
adopt 
(unanimity) 
I 
allow  to 
lapse 
adopts  convene  Conciliation 
Committee  for  further 
inrormat1on 
European  Parliament 
Council's  options  (3): 
adoptl  CoTllTli ss ion's 
re-examined  proposal 
(qualified najority) 
I 
adopt 
European 
Parliament's 
amendments 
not  accepted 
by  Commission 
(unanimity) 
amend 
re-examined 
proposal 
(unanimity) 
allow 
to 
lapse 
approve  all 
European 
Parliament 
amendments, 
amend  common 
position  and 
adopt;  1  f  so: 
I 
unan,mi ty 
for  European 
Parliament 
amendments 
not  approved 
by  Commission 
mar  (2)• 
confirm  its 
rejection  (2) 
othe~wi  se 
qualified 
majority 
approve  a 
j.:;;,;t  text  (3) 
propose  amendment! 
to  COIIITlOn 
position  (2) 
forwarded  to I 
Council  and  to 
Commission,  which 
delivers  an  Opinic 
I 
Council's  ns( 
not  approve  1 
European  Parliamer 
amendments 
Conciliation 
Committee  convened 
with  fo 11 owing 
options  (3): 
not  app~ove 
a  jo i ,,t  text 
options  for  I 
European  Parliament 
and  Council-: 
~---------------------1 
•  both  adopt  (3) 
(1)  Art.  189b  is  new. 
Art.  189c  is  unchanged.  It previously  appeared 
in  Art.  H9(2). 
Art.  189a  is  unchanged  apart  from  the  reference 
to  the  Coo1ciliation  Convnittee,  cf.  Art.  189o(4)  and  (5). 
It previously appeared  in  Art.  149(1)  and  (3). 
(21  ThP  European  Parl1ament  ci~cide~  by  ~n absolute  majority, 
(3)  Time  limit  extendable.by  common  accord. 
SN  4364/92  . . •  -
one  of the 
two  fails 
to  approve: 
proposel 
lapses 
i.e.  260  ou~ of  5!8. 
Council  may 
confirm  common 
position,  poss. 
with  European 
Parliament 
amendments,  and 
adopt  \qtJailfied 
rnajcritJ) 
I 
tt'lless 
I 
Eurc~ean Parliament 
rejects  (2)(3) 
proposal 
lapses 
· . ·  EN - 221  -
APPLICABILITY  OF  ARTICLE  189b 
- Freedom  of  movement  for  workers  {Art.  49) 
- Right  of  establishment  {Arts.  54,  56  and  57) 
- Services  {Art.  66) 
-Internal  market  {Art.  100a) 
-Education  {Art.  126- incentive measures) 
- Culture  {Art.  128  - incentive measures 
- Council  to  act  unanimously) 
-Health  CArt.  129- incentive  measures) 
-Consumer  protection  {Art.  129a) 
-Trans-European  networks  (Art.  129d  - gu1delines) 
- Research  (Art.  1301 ( 1)  - framework  programme 
- Council  to  act  unanimously) 
-Environment  (Art.  130s{3)  -action  program~e' 
SN  4364/'!2 
lby/HM/kr 
ANNEX  6 
EN - 222  -
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ANNEX  7 
APPLICABILITY  OF  ARTICLE  189c 
- D1scr1m1nat1on  on  grounds  of  national1ty  (Art.  6) 
-Transport  (Art.  75  and  Art.  84) 
- Soc1al  Fund  (Art.  125} 
- Vocational  trainwg  (Art.  127} 
- Trans-European  networks  (Art.  129d  - apart  from  guidelines) 
- Econom1c  and  soc1al  cohes1on  (Art.  130e- implementing decisions) 
- Research  (Art.  130d  - Implementation  of  framework  programme) 
- Environment  (Art.  130s(1)  and  (3)  - act1on  and  implementation  of  action 
programme) 
-Development  co-operation  (Art.  130wl 
-Social  policy  (Art.  2(2)  of  the  Agreement  between  11  Member  States) 
0 
0  0 
SN  4364/92  E .. 
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EMU: 
- Rules  foe  mult1lateral  surveillance  (Art.  103(5)) 
-Application  of  Art.  104a(l)  (Art.  104a(2)) 
- Applica<;1on  of  Art.  104  and  Art.  104b(1)  (Art.  104b(2)) 
- Harmonizat1on  measures  for  coinage  (Art.  105a(2ll 
SN  4364/92  EN - 224  -
APPLICABILITY  OF  ASSENT 
- C1tizenship  of  the  Union  (Arto  8a) 
- Econom1c  and  soc1al  cohes1on/Structural  Funds  (Art  0  130d) 
- Cohes1on  Fund  (Art 0  130d) 
lby/HM/kr 
ANNEX  8 
- Uniform  procedure  for  elections to  the  European  Parliament  (ArL  138(3)) 
- Important  1nternat1onal  agreements  (Arto  228(3)) 
- New  Members  of  the  Union  (Arto  0) 
EMU: 
- ECB  superv1s1on  (Art 0  105(6) l 
- Amendment  of  the  ESCB  Protocol  (ArL  106(5)) 
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NEW  PROTOCOLS: 
- Protocol  on  the  acquis1tion  of  property  in  Denmark 
- Protocol  concerning  Art1cle  119  of  the  Treaty  establ1shing  the  European 
Community 
- Protocol  on  the  Statute of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  and  of  the 
European  Central  Bank 
- Protocol  on  the  Statute of  the  European  Monetary  Inst1tute 
- Protocol  on  the  excessive deficlt  procedure 
- Protocol  on  the  convergence  cr1ter1a  referred  to  1n  Art1cle  109j  of  the  Treaty 
establ1shing  the  European  Commun1ty 
- Protocol  amend1ng  the  Protocol  on  the  pr1v1leges  and  immun1t1es  of  the  European 
Commun1t1es 
- Protocol  on  Denmark 
- Protocol  on  Portugal 
Protocol  on  the  trans1tion  to  the  th1rd  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  un1on 
Protocol  on  certa1n  provis1ons  relating  to  the  United  K1ngdom  of  Great  Br1tain 
and  Northern  Ireland 
Protocol  on  certain provisions  relating  to  Denmark 
- Protocol  on  France 
- Protocol  on  social  pol1cy 
- Agreement  of  soc1al  pol1cy  concluded  between  the  Member  States  of  the  European 
Community  w1th  the  except1on  of  the  Un1ted  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Northern  Ireland 
- Protocol  on  econom1c  and  social  cohes1on 
- Protocol  on  the  Economic  and  Soc1al  Comm1ttee  and  the  Comm1ttee  of  the  Reg1ons 
- Protocol  annexed  to  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  and  to  the  Treat1es 
establ1sh1ng  the  European  Commun1t1es. 
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NEW  DECLARATIONS: 
- Declarat1on  on  civil protection,  energy  and  tourism 
- Declaration  on  nationality of  a  Member  State 
- Declaration  on  Part  Three,  Titles  III  and  VI,  of  the  Treaty establishing the 
European  Community 
- Declaration  on  Part Three.  Title VI,  of  the Treaty establishing the  European 
Community 
- Declaration  on  monetary  co-operation with  non-Community  countries 
- Declaratio~ on  monetary  relations  with  the  Republic  of  San  Mar1no,  the  Vat1can 
City  and  the  Principality of  Monaco 
- Declaration  on  Artlcle  73d  of  the  Treaty establishing the  European  Commun1ty 
- Declaration  on  Article  109  of  the  Treaty  establishing the  European  Community 
- Declarat1on  on  Part  Three,  Title  XVI,  of  the  Treaty  establishing the  European 
Community 
- Declarat1cn  on  Artlcles  109,  130r  a~d  130y  of  the Treaty  establishing tte 
European  ~ommunity 
- Declaration  on  the  Direct1ve  of  24  r~ovember  1988  (Emissions) 
- Declaration  on  the  European  Development  Fund 
Declaration  on  the  role  of  national  parliaments  in  the  European  Union 
- Declara!.lon  on  the  Conference  of  the  Parliaments 
- Declaration  on  the  number  of  members  of  the  Commission  and  of  the  European 
Parliament 
- Declaration  on  the  h1erarchy  of  Co~munity Acts 
- Declaration  on  the  right  of  access  to  information 
- Declarat1on  on  est1mated  costs  under  Commis~1on proposals 
- Declaration  on  the  implementation  of  Community  law 
- Declaration  on  assessment  of  the  environmenLal  impact  of  Community  measures. 
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ANNEX  10 
PROVISIONS  OF  THE  PROTOCOL  ON  THE  STATUTE  OF  THE  ESCB  AND  OF  THE  ECB  FROM  WHICH 
DENMARK  AND  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM  wiLL  BE  EXEMPTED,  _SHOULD  THEY  NOT  PARTICIPATE  IN 
THE  THIRD  STAGE  OF  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  UNION 
Should  Denmark  not  participate in the  third  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union, 
it w1ll  be  exempted  from  the  provisions  on  a  common  monetary  policy.  In  the 
Protocol  on  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  and  of  the  ECB,  this entails  exemption  from  a 
large  number  of Articles,  some  of  which  restate  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
while  others  are  more  technical  provisions  concerning  the  ESCB  and  the  ECB.  The 
provisions  in  question  appear  in Article  43  of  the Statute  and  they  entail  that 
the  following  Articles  do  not  confer  any  rights  or  impose  any  obllgations  on  a 
Member  State  Wlth  a  derogation: 
- Art1cle  3  deal1ng,  l1ke  Art1cle  105(2)  of  the Treaty  with  the  tasks  of  the 
ESCB; 
- Art1cle  6  concern1ng  1nternational  co-operation,  including  a  requirement  for 
ECB  approval  1n  order  for national  central  banks  to  partic1pate  in 
1nternat1onal  co-operation; 
- Art1cle  9.2  containlng  a  stipulat1on  that  the  ECB  1s  to  ensure  the  ESCB's  tasks 
are  1mplemented; 
- Art1cle  12. 1  concerning  Implementatlon  of  the  common  monetary  policy  by  the 
Govern1ng  Counc1l  (the  ESCB's  h1ghest  authority)  and  the  Execut1ve  Board; 
-Article  14.3  stipulating that  the  national  central  banks  form  an  integral  part 
of  the  ESCB  and  are  therefore  subordinate  to  the  Governing  Counc1l; 
- Art1cle  16  establishing,  like Article  105a(1)  of  the  Treaty,  that  the  Governing 
Counc1l  has  the  exclusive  right  to  authorize  the  issue  of  banknotes; 
- Article  18  authorizing  the  ECB  to  operate  in  the  financial  markets  and  also  to 
establish princ1ples  for  the  nat1onal  central  banks'  market  operat1ons; 
- Art1cle  19  entltling the  ECB  to  require  cred1t  institutions  to  hold  minimum 
reserves  Wlth  the  ECB  or national  central  banks; 
- Art1cle  20  enabling  the  Govern1ng  Council,  by  a  2/3  majority,  to  use  methods  of 
monetary  control  other  than  those  specifled  1n  the  Treaty; 
SN  4364/92  EN - 235  -
lby/HM/kr 
Art1cle  22  concerning clearing systems,  including provision  for the  ECB  to  make 
regulations  in  this  fleld; 
- Article  23  empowering  the  ECB  and  national  central  banks  to  establish external 
relat1ons  with  central  banks  and  financial  organizations  and  to  conduct 
transactions  w1th  them; 
- Art1cle  ?.6.2  governing  the  drawing-up of  the  ECB's  annual  accounts; 
Artlcle  ?.7  concerning auditing of  the  ECB's  activities; 
Article  30  concerning the  transfer  by  Member  States  of  foreign  reserve  assets 
to  the  ECB; 
- Article  31  concerning foreign  reserve assets still to  be  administered  by 
national  central  banks  themselves; 
- Article  32  determining  the  allocation of  monetary  income  accruing  to national 
central  banks  in  the  performance  of  the  ESCB's  monetary  pol1cy function; 
- Art1cle  33  governing  the  allocation of  net  profits  and  losses  of  the  ECB; 
- Article  34  laying  down,  like A;t1cle  108a  of  the Treaty,  the  ECB's  powers  to 
issue  legal  acts  and  the  legal  effects of  such  acts; 
Article  50  concerning  the  initial  appointment  of  the  ECB's  Executive  Board; 
Artlcle  52  concerning  th·~  exchange  of  banknotes  in  those  countries  moving  to 
the  third  stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union. 
The  Statute  also  specifies  that  "Member  States"  should  be  read  as  "Member  States 
without  a  derogation"  in Articles  3,  11.2.  19,  34.2  and  50  thereof.  In  addition 
to  the  Art~cles  listed  above,  this  means  exemption  for  Denmark  in practice  from 
r1ghts  and  obligations  under: 
-Article  11.2  laying down,  in  accordance  with Article  109a(2)(b)  of  the  Treaty, 
general  rules  on  the  appointment  of  the  ECB's  Exeuct1ve  Board  and  on 
el1gibility for  membership  of it. 
S1m1lar ly.  "nat  1o.1al  central  banks':  sr,ot.ld  be  read  as  "central banks  of  Member 
States  Wlthout  a  derogatt.m"  in Articles  9  2,  10.1,  10.3,  12.1,  16,  17,  18,  22, 
23,  27,  30,  31,  32,  33.2  and  ~2.  This  further entails  exemption  from  rights 
and  obl1gations  under: 
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-Article  10.1  stipulating,  In  accordance  with  Article  109a(1)  of  the Treaty, 
th~~  the  Governing  Council  is  to  comprise  the  Executive  Board  of  the  ECB  and 
the  Governors  of  the  national  central  banks; 
Article  10.3  providing,  in the  case  of  some  decisions  in matters  specifically 
affecting  the  bank's  capital,  for  the  votes  of  the  Governing  Council's  members 
to  be  weighted  according  to  the  national  central  banks'  shares  in  the 
subscribed  capital  of  the  ECB; 
- Article  17  authorizing  the  ECB  and  the  national  central  banks  to  open  accounts 
for  private  and  publiC  Institutions  and  entities. 
Lastly,  "shareholders"  In  Articles  10.3  and  33.1  should  be  read  as  "central  banks 
of  Member  States  without  a  derogation"  and  "subscribed  capital  of  the  ECB"  in 
Articles  10.1  and  30.2  as  "capital  of  the  ECB  subscribed  by  the  central  banks  of 
Member  States without  a  derogation''.  This~  of  course  means  that  Member  States 
With  a  derogation  will  not  be  required  to  pay  up  their subscribed  capital  In  the 
ECB  apart  from  anything  it  might  be  decided  has  to  be  paid  up  as  a  contribution 
to  the  ECB's  operational  costs.  That  is  spelled  out  in Article  48  of  the 
Statute. 
Paragraph  8  of  the  United  Kingdom  Protocol  lists those  Articles  of  the  Protocol 
on  the Statute  of  the  ESCB  and  of  the  ECB  from  which  the  United  Kingdom  will  be 
exempted,  should  the  United  Kingdom  not  participate  in  the  third stage  of 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  It  also  states  that  references  in  those Articles  to 
the  Community  or  the  Member  States  do  not  Include  the  United  Kingdom  and 
references  to  national  central  banks  or  shareholders  do  not  include  the  Bank  of 
England.  The  United  Kingdom  will  also  be  exempted  from  some  Articles  of  the 
Statute  from  which  Denmark  will  not  be  exempt.  This  is mainly  due  to  the 
Treaty's  provisions  on  the  ESCB  and  the  ECB  being  restated  in  the  Statute  of 
those  Institutions.  In  order  to  ensure  consistency between  the  United  Kingdom's 
exemptions  under  the  Treaty  and  under  the  Statute,  It  was  therefore  also 
necessary  to  exempt  the  United  K1ngdom  from  the  relevant  Articles  as  repeated  in 
the  Statute.  The  Articles  In  question  are  as  follows: 
-Article  4  stipulating,  like  Article  105(4)  of  the Treaty,  that  the  ECB  Is  to  be 
consulted  by  national  authorities  in  Its  field  of  competence; 
- Article  7  laying  down,  like  Article  107  of  the  Treaty,  the  independence  of  the 
ECB  and  the  national  central  banks;, 
-Article  14.1  and  14.2  stipulating,  in  accordance  with Article  108  of  the 
Treaty,  that  the  national  central  banks  are  to  become  Independent  at  the  latest 
at  the  date  of  the  establishment  of  the  ESCB  and  also  laying  down  some  rules 
concerning  the  Governors  of  central  banks; 
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-Article  14.4  st1pulat1ng  that  national  central  banks  may  perform  funct1ons 
other  than  those  spec1fied  in  the  Treaty  unless  the  Governing  Council  finds 
that  these  interfere with  the  objectives  and  tasks  of  the  ESCB; 
-Article 26.1,  26.3  and  26.4  dealing with  a  number  of  accounting  matters 
concerning  the  ECB  and  the  ESCB. 
The  United  Kingdom  does  not,  however,  enjoy  an  exemption  from  rights  and 
obligations  under  Article  17  of  the  Statute,  concerning  the  opening  of  certain 
accounts,  as  does  Denmark.  Irrespective of  whether or not  a  country  is 
specif1cally exempted  from  that  Article,  it is unlikely  to  be  of  any  significance 
for  a  Member  State  not  participating in  the  third stage  of  Economic  and  Monetary 
Union. 
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ANNEX  11 
THE  QUESTION  UNDER  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  OF  ONE  OR  MORE  MEMBERS  WITHDRAWING  FROM  EC 
CO-OPERATION 
The  quest1on  has  been  raised of  whether  11  Member  States  can  denounce  the  Treaty 
of  Rome  and  then  conclude  the  Maastricht  Treaty  among  themselves  w1th  the 
adjustments  requ1red  on  account  of  such  narrower  membership. 
The  Treaty  of  Rome  makes  no  provision  for  denunciation.  On  the  contrary, 
Art1cle  240  of  the  Treaty states  that:  "This  Treaty  is  concluded  for  an  unl1mited 
period.". 
With  regard  to  amendments  to  the Treaty,  Article  236  states that:  "The  amendments 
shall  enter  into  force  after being  ratified by  all  the  Member  States  in 
accordance  Wlth  the1r  respect1ve  constitutional  requirements".  Corresponding 
provis1ons  appear  1n  Art1cles  Q  and  R  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty. 
On  the  bas1s  of  those  prov1s1ons  1n  the  Treaty of  Rome,  it may  be  concluded  that 
any  repeal  of  the  Treaty  must  be  negotiated  between  the  part1es  pursuant  to 
Article  236.  Moreover,  the  Treaty  of  Rome  conta1ns  no  prov1s1ons  on  whether  lt 
can  be  denounced,  suspended  or otherw1se  terminated  1n  respect  of  any  or  all  of 
the  part1es  without  the  consent  of  all. 
It  1s  therefore  necessary  to  look  to  the  overr1d1ng  body  of  law  1nternat1onal 
law,  wh1ch  lays  down  general  rules  govern1ng  treat1es. 
The  account  used  1n  tu1t1on  at  Copenhagen  University states.  for  1nstance,  that: 
"A  distinct1on  may  be  drawn  between  termination  hav1ng  1ts  legal  basis  In  the 
treaty 1tself,  1n  the  parties'  freedom  of  declsion  in  other  respects  and  in 
general  internat1onal  law,  cf.  Art1cles  54  to  64  of  the  Convention  on  the  Law  of 
Treaties.''  llnternat1onal  Law  by  Gu1mann,  Bernhard  and  Lehmann). 
As  has  already  been  mentioned,  the  Treaty  1tself  IS  silent  on  th1s  quest1on. 
Clearly,  too,  there  1s  no  answer  to  be  found  In  the  doctr1ne  of  mutual  consent  by 
the  part1es  since  that  requires  the  co-operation  of  all  of  the  part1es.  The 
part1es  can,  of  course,  at  any  time  jointly dec1de  on  whatever  they  might  agree 
upon,  1nclud1ng  as  regards  the  future  of  the  Treaty. 
General  1nternat1onal  law,  however,  has  a  number  of  rules  on  the  terminatlon  of 
treaties,  applicable  save  where  a  specific  treaty provides  otherwise.  The 
1969  V1enna  Convention  on  the  Law  of Treaties  refers  1n  the  flrst  place  to  a 
breach  1mposs1bil1ty  to  perform  and  a  fundamental  change  of  Circumstances  as 
grounds  for  term1nat1on  and  these  must  be  taken  to  apply  irrespect1ve  of  the 
word1ng  of  Art1cle  240  of  the Treaty  of  Rome.  Art1cle  240  thus  br1ngs  out  a 
po1nt  already  impl1c1t  in  the  basic  rule  govern1ng  treat1es under  internat1onal 
law  that  treat1es  are  to  be  observed  and  complied  w1th  by  the  parties  in  good 
falth  ("pacta  sunt  servanda").  That  max1m,  as  clearly reflected  In  Artlcle  240 
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of  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  requires  that  good  reasons  be  given  by  a  party  invoking 
grounds  for  termination  in  order to  withdraw  from  an  otherwise  binding  treaty 
relationship. 
Of  the  grounds  for  termination mentioned,  a  breach  and  impossibility  to  perform 
are  not  applicable  in  this  situation.  On  the  other hand,  the  provision  in  the 
Convention  on  the  Law  of Treaties  (Article  62)  concerning  the  occurence  of  a 
fundamental  change  of  circumstances  with  regard  to  those  existing at  the  time  of 
conclusion  of  the  treaty  (the  "rebus  sic stantibus"  clause)  may  be  considered  to 
apply.  It  can  always  be  maintained  that  circumstances  have  changed.  However,  in 
order  to  form  valid  grounds  for  withdrawal,  there  must  be  fundamental  changes 
which:  were  not  foreseen  by  the  parties at  the  time  of  conclusion  of  the  Treaty 
of  Rome;  formed  an  essential  basis  for  the  parties'  consent  to  be  bound  by  the 
Treaty;  and  will  radically alter the  scope  of  the  obligations still  to  be 
fulfllled  under  the  Treaty. 
Even  though,  as  stated,  the  Treaty of  Rome  makes  no  provision  for  denunciation, 
general  international  law  as  embodied  in  the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of 
Treat1es  does  afford  some  scope  for  withdrawing  from  a  treaty where  it can  be 
established  that: 
(a)  the  parties  intended  to  admit  the  possibility of  denunciation  or withdrawal, 
or 
(b)  a  r1ght  of  denunc1at1on  or withdrawal  may  be  1mplied  by  the  nature  of  the 
treaty.  (Article  56  of  the  Convention). 
If  the  two  situations  mooted  by  the  rule  in Article  56  are  considered,  it should 
first  be  noted  that  there  is  scarcely  any  basis  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome  for 
inferring  from  the  "nature"  of  the Treaty  that it should  be  open  to  denunciation. 
On  the  contrary,  the  constitutional  nature  of  the Treaty,  in  conjunction  with  the 
provislon  in  Article  240  that  it  IS  to  apply  for  an  unlimited period,  points  to 
the  opposite  conclusion.  The  focus  of attention  then  turns  to  whether  it  can  be 
established  that  the  parties  Intended  to  admit  the  possibility of  denunciation or 
WIthdrawal. 
No  preparatory  work  on  the  Treaty  of  Rome  has  been  published  and  so  no  further 
light  can  be  shed  on  the  matter  from  that  angle. 
It  should,  however,  be  noted  that  discussions  in  Denmark  prior to  accession  to 
the Treaty  of  Rome  arrived  at  ~he conclusion  that  Denmark  could,  de  facto  and 
rightly  under  const~_tutional  law,  leave  the  Community  at  any  time  by  passing  an 
ordinary  law,  irrespective  cf  whether  or not  such  withdrawal  might  be  contr~ry t0 
international  law. 
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The  appendix,  giving  an  account  of  the  Treaties,  which  was  attached  to  the 
commentary  on  the  bill  on  Denmark's  accession,  ~tates  Inter alia that: 
"Commentaries  on  constitutional  law  also  agree  that  a  law  introduced  under 
the  rules  in  ~  20  can  under  constitutional  law  be  validly  repealed  at  any 
time  by  passing  an  ordinary  law,  the  adoption  of  which  requires  only  a 
simple  maJority  In  the  usual  way,  and  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  this 
purpose  that  such  repeal  should  also  be  in  accordance  with  international 
law.". 
The  question  arose  in  Denmark  again  In  1979,  when  the  SF  (Socialist People's 
Party)  put  forward  a  proposal  for  a  parliamentary  resolution concerning  a 
consultative  referendum  on  Danish  membership  of  the  EC.  The  proposal  was 
reJected,  but  during  its first  reading  Foreign  Minister Christophersen stated 
inter alia that: 
"The  procedure  which  would,  if appropriate,  best  accord  with  the 
constitutional  and  With  Danish  constitutional  tradition would  therefore  be 
for  a  maJority  In  the  Danish  Parliament  to  repeal  the  law  on  accession  by 
means  of  a  special  law,  which  could  then be  confirmed  or  otherwise  by  a 
referendum  under§  42  of  the  constitution."  (26  January  1979,  Report  of 
Parliamentary  Proceedings  for  1979,  column  5324). 
Here,  too,  it was  taken  for  granted  that  a  Member  State  can  withdraw  If it  so 
wishes  and  that,  In  Denmark's  case,  it  can  do  so  by  passing  a  law  which,  If 
approriate,  may  be  put  to  a  referendum. 
As  th1s  account  shows,  Denmark  has  taken  the  view  that it would  be  possible  under 
constitutional  law  to  denounce  or  Withdraw  from  the Treaty unilaterally. 
Whether  that  attitude  In  Denmark  - based  on  constitutional  considerations  - can 
be  Invoked  by  the  other  EC  partners  from  a  standpoint  of  reciprocity  as  grounds 
for  Withdrawing  from  the  Treaty  of  Rome  is  doubtful  but  the  argument  cannot 
simply  be  reJected  out  of  hand. 
Legal  commentaries  do  not  agree  on  the  extent  to  which  the  general  rules  of 
international  law  governing treaties  are  applicable  to  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  A 
number  of  European  writers  have  variously  advanced  the  view  that  the 
const1tutional  nature  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  precludes  or  limlts  the  application 
of  the  general  rules  of  international, law.  If necessary.  the  flnal  legal 
JUdgment  would  have  to  be  made  by  the  EC  Court  of  Justice  or by  the  International 
Court  of  Justice  in  The  Hague,  and  it  would  take  several  years  before  a  ruling 
could  be  given.  In  the  meantime,  the  legal  situation  could  thus  remain 
unresolved. 
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ANNEX  12 
PROPORTION  OF  TOTAL  EXPORTS  TO  THE  EC  FOR  DENMARK  AND  THE  EFTA  COUNTRIES 
FROM  1974  TO  1991 
Year  Denmark  EFTA 
1974  42,8%  45.7% 
1975  44,8%  44,4% 
1976  45,4%  46,6% 
1977  44,1%  46,7% 
1978  49. 1%  48,8% 
1979  50,3%  51.3% 
1980  51.4%  52,5% 
1981  47,4%  50,6% 
1982  49,8%  51. 1% 
1983  48,9%  52,0% 
1984  44,5%  53,5% 
1985  44,4%  52,9% 
1986  46,6%  53,7% 
1987  48,3%  55,1% 
1988  49,4%  55,9% 
1989  50,4%  57,0% 
1990  52,0%  58,0% 
1991  53,9% 
Source:  Danish  Statistical  Office 
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